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Abstract
This Special Issue considers the situated and contextualized development of socio-legal, or law and society,
scholarship within two materially different legal and academic cultures, namely Germany and the United
Kingdom,with a view to achieving a better understanding of why and how such differences in understanding
and practice have arisen. The contributions are grouped into three themes. The first reflects upon the
influence of institutional contexts and scholarly traditions in terms of the development of those approaches
that comeunder thebannerof socio-legal studies.The second features contributions that adopt a comparative
perspective in terms of selected areas of law, pointing to notably different approaches taken in Germany and
the UK, and considering the development of these respective situations. The third looks at the key
contemporary trends, theoretical applications, andmethodological approaches taken within both countries’
socio-legal academic contexts.
Keywords: socio-legal studies; sociology of law; legal culture; academic culture; comparative legal studies
A. Introduction
It is not unusual for an introduction to a socio-legal studies collection to open with acknowledge-
ment that the contours of the discipline—if a discipline it is—are contested. Innately interdiscipli-
nary, there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a socio-legal or a law and society
approach, or agreement as to what such an approach necessarily encompasses. Instead, law and
society scholarship is best defined as “oppositional,”1 due to the manner in which it sets, and has
historically set, itself in distinction to doctrinal legal approaches. It is this negative definition that
arguably underpins the rude health of socio-legal scholarship: such a broad-church approach lends
itself to inclusivity, and those fluid disciplinary contours easily accommodate methodological and
theoretical development in both the sociological and the legal fields.
The intent of this Special Issue is neither to reify these contours or to attempt to delimit what is
or is not included under the big umbrella of socio-legal studies. Our aim is to consider the situated
and contextualized development of socio-legal scholarship within two materially different legal
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and academic cultures, namely Germany and the United Kingdom, with a view to achieving a
better understanding of why and how such differences in understanding and practice have arisen.
There is currently no published research that adopts a comparative perspective to look at how
socio-legal research is undertaken across different academic and legal cultures, and the editors
have identified this as a gap in the scholarship. To be clear on this point, while socio-legal studies
tend to concern local and national legal issues and features, comparative law looks at legal
differences and similarities across jurisdictions. Comparative legal studies considers underlying
theoretical and critical issues of relevance and influence, and studies in legal pedagogy focus
on teaching and learning—there is little engagement with academic legal cultures, epistemic com-
munities, and institutional drivers and limitations that serve to shape specific and situated socio-
legal approaches. This Special Issue is conceived as providing the first engagement with these
important issues.
Our explicitly comparative perspective on socio-legal scholarship brings with it its own
considerations, not least the interface between socio-legal and comparative legal studies and their
respective engagement with critical approaches. With a view to reducing the variables at play, we
make a primarily functional comparison of practices concerning socio-legal studies within these
two academic legal cultures.2 It should be noted at this stage that we employ the term “legal
culture” throughout this introduction—and Special Issue—to denote law and legal practice within
a particular, often national jurisdictional, social context, and to discuss how aspects of the law are
embedded in larger frameworks of social structure’.3 Our use of the term “academic culture,” that
is, a network of knowledge-based experts that comprises an epistemic community,4 is informed by
Friedman’s conception of internal legal culture.5 Importantly, this conception of a law and society
epistemic community can transcend national jurisdictional boundaries and limitations; national
law and society research and scholarship communities may be better connected and more
coherent, but they are not siloed. In terms of the articles within this Special Issue, we have adopted
a light-touch approach to the comparative methodology used, with the result that the Special Issue
does not cleave to a single specific comparative approach. Another consideration, in terms of
variety across contributor articles, is the jurisdictional differences within the selected countries:
the UK has four home nations, across which both law and education differ, often significantly,
while Germany is a federal republic where respective federal Länder have jurisdiction over a list
of issues detailed in the constitution, including universities and law degrees.
Articles were selected from those presented at a workshop that took place in September 2019 at
the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, supported by the UK Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA)
and the German Vereinigung für Recht und Gesellschaft.6 The presented articles were in turn
selected from abstracts submitted to an open call circulated via socio-legal networks in both coun-
tries.7 This call invited articles that sought to “understand the influence of institutional contexts
and scholarly traditions upon the development of those approaches that come under the banner of
2See Naomi Creutzfeldt, Agnieszka Kubal, & Fernanda Pirie, Introduction: Exploring the Comparative in Socio-Legal
Studies, 12 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 377 (2016).
3David Nelken, Comparative Sociology of Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 329 (Reza Banakar &
Max Travers eds., 2002).
4Jennifer Hendry, The Double Fragmentation of Law: Legal System-Internal Differentiation and the Process of
Europeanisation, in ‘INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, REVISITED: THE MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN POLITY 157 (Daniel
Augenstein ed., 2013).
5LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE (1975).
6Further support came from the Recht im Kontext Project and from the Integrative Research Institute Law & Society, both
located at Humboldt’s Law Department. We gratefully acknowledge supplemental financial support from the DFG Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz Prize Funds of Christoph Möllers.
7Presentations were selected for their scholarly contribution to reflect a balance in contributions from across German and
UK institutions, gender, and career stage.
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socio-legal studies,” and this core goal remains evident in the articles comprising this issue.
Building on this, further stated aims of the workshop were as follows:
• To consider how different academic traditions and institutional contexts have influenced the
development of socio-legal research in Germany and the UK;
• To scrutinize theoretical and methodological approaches with a view to exploring similarities
and differences in both contexts;
• To start an initial dialogue among participants with a view to forging closer ties across the
German and UK socio-legal communities, and to facilitating future connections and
collaborations.
This Special Issue remains organized around these aims. Articles in the first section reflect upon the
influence of institutional contexts and scholarly traditions in terms of the development of those
approaches that come under the banner of socio-legal studies (Introduction, Background, and
Development). The second section then features contributions that adopt a comparative perspective
in terms of selected areas of law, pointing to notably different approaches taken inGermany and the
UK, and considering the development of these respective situations (Historical Socio-Legal
Perspectives). Finally, articles in section three look at the key contemporary trends, theoretical
applications, and methodological approaches taken within both countries’ socio-legal academic
contexts (Contemporary Socio-Legal Approaches).
This introductory Article will proceed in four parts. In Part One, we will outline the provisional
conceptual mapping of the field undertaken in advance of the September 2019 workshop, with a
view to explaining not only how we identified the core strands of our investigation, but also how
we discovered that points of contact were neither as obvious nor as consistent as we had originally
assumed. Included in this part are our reflections on the challenges raised by the workshop itself,
those national and local differences in both practical and interdisciplinary approaches that had us
either talking at cross-purposes or encountering unforeseen obstacles. Part Two continues to
outline this path of discovery in terms of our drafting of this Special Issue proposal and selecting
the articles: our self-reflection on these experiences builds upon insights drawn from a compar-
ative literature review of two collected volumes published in the same year and curated respec-
tively by an editor of this Special Issue. Considered comparison of the contents of these volumes—
their theoretical influences and methodological selections—yielded fascinating insight into the
respective conditions of contemporary law and society scholarship in Germany and the UK,
and assisted us greatly in the selection of the four core issues for consideration throughout this
Special Issue: culture (academic and legal); scholars; pedagogy; and environment. Part Three
introduces the contributor articles, highlighting the engagement each of these has with the
identified core issues, and outlining this Special Issue’s timely and important exploration of these
questions. The Fourth Part will consider our endeavor into its own contemporary context, not
least the continued tragedy of Brexit, but also the hopeful ambition of strengthening ties and
connections across these two national law and society research communities.
B. Part One: Conceptual Mapping
This Special Issue—just as the workshop that it is a result of—is an exercise in academic
reflexivity. On the one hand, the research questions and aims for the workshop are in themselves
part of the research process creating its own data. For example, we noticed that our expectations
about submissions and presentations at the workshop in comparison to what happened on the day
were different. On the other hand, these expectations and the questions we ask are evidently con-
nected to our own academic socialization and intellectual identity, and as such, can be seen as
“data”; it is even more clear that this applies if the research questions are located at a “meta” level
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(research about research). In this regard, then, this exercise in “conceptual mapping” should be read
as our attempt to chart the more commonly used concepts, theories, andmethods—the discipline’s
own internal shorthand, as it were—and subject these to the particular scrutiny facilitated by a
selfreflective comparative perspective. It is our conviction that the concepts, theories, and methods
employed by both lawyers and socio-legal scholars are intrinsically linked to the histories of both of
their disciplines, and that this becomes especially apparent when comparing two countries with
diverging trajectories. Socio-legal and legal thinking have always mirrored each other more or less
explicitly, even in a jurisdiction like Germany where the doctrinal project is still effectively
hegemonic.8
Hendry and Creutzfeldt were inspired to hold the Berlin workshop by an earlier SLSA-funded
UK-French 2018 event in Paris.9 They contacted Boulanger, who had been involved in recent
efforts to strengthen the socio-legal scene in Germany, and whose atypical position, a social sci-
entist working at a German law faculty, provided a fresh perspective. While all three scholars had
separate and overlapping networks within law and society scholarship, it quickly became apparent
that connections across those communities were limited. British and German scholars were often
more likely to meet, whether intentionally or coincidentally, at a Law and Society Association
annual meeting in the U.S. rather than in an academic event closer to home.10 It further transpired
that there were notable differences in the development of the research field; differences that were
often awkward to track as a result of research and scholarship being undertaken under varied
banners, namely “socio-legal studies,” “law and society,” “Rechtssoziologie/sociology of law,”
or “Interdisziplinäre Rechtsforschung (interdisciplinary research on law).”11 Finally, and perhaps
most importantly in terms of the aims of this Special Issue, the lack of comparative literature
became increasingly evident.12 Given that this initial mapping seemed to present several gaps,
we were curious to see who would respond to the workshop call for articles that asked for con-
tributions with a specifically cross-national perspective on methods and theories in socio-legal
research.
This current Special Issue showcases selected responses toourworkshopcall,with these selections
being indicative of the varied positions in both countries. Some immediately apparent divergences
arose in terms of contributors. For example, thereweremore doctoral candidates from theUK, and a
slight gender imbalance towards female participants. In terms of subject matter, submissions from
British scholars focusedmore onmethods and substantive researchquestions,while the submissions
generated via the German networks took a more historical and grand-theoretical approach. More
broadly, and notable in light of our meta-comparative approach, comparative issues were less well
represented than anticipated; indeed, throughout theworkshop it became increasingly apparent that
comparative research on socio-legal studies lacks both a shared conceptual vocabulary and a liter-
ature base. It is these lacunae that this Special Issue will start to fill.
8As compared to the UK, where some observers consider it in “its final death throes.” Anthony Bradney, Law as a Parasitic
Discipline, 25 J. L. & SOC’Y 71 (1998).
9The workshop explored the methods, traditions, and theories of socio-legal studies in France and the UK, reflecting on
what “socio-legal studies in context” means for research traditions and forms of knowledge produced. Edward Dove, What
Can Socio-Legal Studies Contribute to Medical Law? Thoughts From a Workshop in Paris, SLSA BLOG (2018),.
10This is probably true for any two European countries picked at random, there is no European forum for socio-legal
research that could remotely rival the membership base or the LSA and the corresponding size of its annual conferences.
11SUSANNE BAER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE: EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG (3d ed. 2017); THE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND SOCIETY (Austin Sarat & Patricia Ewick eds., 2015); ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL
THEORY AND METHODS (Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason & Kirsten McConnachie eds., 2020).
12There have been efforts to map individual disciplinary histories,, for example a the ongoing Journal of Law & Society
series that has so far covered Aotearoa/New Zealand, Canada, France, Germany and most recently Poland, or country reports
in the International Journal of Law in Context, including reports on Germany, France, Japan or Denmark.
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C. Part Two: Differences and Challenges
The first challenge of this comparative project is that the academic study of law differs significantly
in both countries. Leaving aside substantive and doctrinal differences, our focus is on the different
epistemological legal research traditions represented by each country’s academic culture. While
one adopts a normative perspective, the other’s perspective is more empirical, and crossover is
comparatively minimal. To make things even more complex, on closer inspection, it turns out
that the boundaries between the “normative/doctrinal” and “empirical/socio-legal” are differently
drawn in both countries, and the historical and present relationship between the two traditions
also differs significantly. It is therefore necessary to develop a vocabulary that is capable of cap-
turing not only the shifting boundaries of “legal” and “nonlegal” approaches to law,13 but also
what is distinct in the “doctrinal” study of law against which sociological approaches have often
set themselves in opposition.14
The second challenge is that, as previously mentioned, very little comparative scholarship exists
on law and society studies in both countries. This situation is further aggravated by the fact that
only scant data is available on research environments and communities upon which comparative
analyses can be based. The situation is somewhat better in the UK, as several reports on legal
education have been published, which make recommendations on socio-legal teaching and
research.15 In Germany, one report on legal scholarship, published in 2012,16 mentions the impor-
tance of non-doctrinal approaches as “foundational” subjects in legal education, but otherwise
does not contain any data of relevance to the current investigation.
A third challenge is that German-UK networks of socio-legal research collaboration and shared
information are currently still in their infancy. In the past, there have only been a few common
research projects and little exchange about academic events, a situation likely caused by the lan-
guage barrier. By contrast to this lack of direct UK-German collaboration and interaction, the Law
and Society Association (LSA) annual conference in the U.S. has provided a convenient and often
fertile ground for networking, being attended by scholars from both countries; the UK’s Socio-
Legal Studies Association (SLSA) annual conference seems to be less well known within German
academia. And a final point to note in terms of obstacles to potential collaboration is that German
remains the main language of publication of German scholarship, which has the effect of (de)lim-
iting the audience, reinforcing the academic status quo, and arguably restricting innovation.
Indeed, it was with a view to addressing these issues that the German Law Journal came into being
as the premier vehicle for English-language scholarship focusing on German, European, and
international law and jurisprudence.
An interesting sidebar with respect to research collaboration between Germany- and UK-based
scholars is that, unknown to the other, two of the present editors were involved in producing
textbooks on socio-legal approaches in the UK17 and Germany respectively.18 The different foci
13See, e.g., Reza Banakar, Law Through Sociology’s Looking Glass: Conflict and Competition in Sociological Studies of Law, in
THE ISA HANDBOOK IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY 58 (Ann Denis & Devorah Kalekin-Fishman eds., 2009) (enumerating
different forms of socio-legal research).
14Christian Boulanger, The Comparative Sociology of Legal Doctrine: Thoughts on a Research Program, in this issue.
15HAZEL G. GENN, MARTIN PARTINGTON & SALLY WHEELER, LAW IN THE REALWORLD: IMPROVING OUR UNDERSTANDING
OF HOW LAW WORKS: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2006); FIONA COWNIE, LEGAL ACADEMICS: CULTURE AND
IDENTITIES (2004); Fiona Cownie & Anthony Bradney, An Examined Life: Research into University Legal Education in the
United Kingdom and the Journal of Law and Society, 44 J. L. & SOC’Y S129 (2017).
16WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, PERSPEKTIVEN DERRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT INDEUTSCHLAND: SITUATION,ANALYSEN, EMPFEHLUNGEN
(2012), translated in GERMAN COUNCIL OF SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES, PROSPECTS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN GERMANY:
CURRENT SITUATION, ANALYSES, RECOMMENDATIONS (2012), https://www.wissenschaftsrat.de/download/archiv/2558-
12_engl.pdf;jsessionid=B2B960E93BD907264DFB20E7E54467F3.delivery1-master?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.
17ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND METHODS, supra note 11.
18INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG: EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE GEISTES- UND SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE BEFASSUNG
MIT DEM RECHT UND SEINER PRAXIS (Christian Boulanger, Julika Rosenstock & Tobias Singelnstein eds., 2019).
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and choices of these volumes are worthy of note here, as each textbook reflects the current state of
knowledge aswell as the ambition and authority of the discipline in very differentways. TheGerman
textbook is clearly embedded in a “sociology of law” tradition and maps a very disparate and frag-
mented research landscape. Its aim is to contribute to an emerging disciplinary identity after what
has been a long period of stagnation. The chapters reflect the fact that socio-legal research still lacks,
among other things, a firm institutional base, clear career paths, and established curricula. By com-
parison, theRoutledgeHandbook builds on and reflects an established discipline with academic pro-
tagonists, discrete schools of thought, different career stages, and systematic teaching on research
methodology from socio-legal scholars around the world.
D. Part Three: Contributions to this Special Issue
In light of the breadth of issues raised by the initial mapping, an important consideration for us
has been: how can we respond to these challenges and study these differences in a systematic way?
We have thus identified four core strands that appear consistently throughout this mapping and,
indeed, this Special Issue, and which are worthy of flagging in terms of the specific questions that
they provoke. These are:
1. Legal Culture: What are the different trajectories of academic and legal cultures in Germany
and the UK? Is there a typical pathway into and through law and society research?
2. Scholarship: Can patterns of law and society scholarship (education/ training/ mobility/ lan-
guage competence/supervision) be identified? How influential are kinship connections?
What theoretical traditions have been prevalent, and which ones are less visible?
3. Pedagogy: How do pedagogic practices, learning, and teaching differ in Germany and the
UK? Is law and society taught as theory, practice, or both? To what extent does canonical
socio-legal theory appear in contemporary law and society research and student education?
4. Institutions: In what ways do institutional structures that influence law and society research
and education in the UK and Germany differ? Are these academic, professional, or both?
These four strands, which will be discussed in Part Four of this introduction, should be borne in
mind throughout the Special Issue. The issue itself is structured into three sections: background
and development, historical socio-legal perspectives, and contemporary socio-legal perspectives. It
opens with Stefan Machura’s comprehensive comparative account of the status quo in Germany
and the UK. Machura sets himself the task of identifying and scrutinizing the key stages of devel-
opment in both countries’ socio-legal scholarly traditions. From the perspective of a Wales-based
and German-trained scholar, Machura’s comparison identifies the differing contours of what is
alternatively known in English as socio-legal studies, law and society, and the sociology of law, the
salient differences between these, and the extent to which they can be said to overlap. In terms of
the subject’s innate interdisciplinarity, Machura observes that particularly law schools within the
UK have been more effective in accommodating this, while in Germany the disciplines of law and
sociology are, whether intentionally or accidentally, very far apart.
Tanja Herklotz continues the comparative endeavor, although her focus rests explicitly on the
specifics of comparing different socio-legal cultures of research and scholarship. Herklotz notes
that the selection of what to compare in this sense is particularly salient, and cites the important
comparators for this task as being: institutions, publications, scholars, and teaching. Herklotz
offers a range of research questions that socio-legal scholars can draw upon when engaging in
comparative projects. Further to this, Herklotz probes the “how” of such comparative work, out-
lining and critiquing several interdisciplinary methodological approaches and tools.
This background anddevelopment section continues in a self-reflective veinwithUlrike Schultz’s
fascinating account of gender inGerman socio-legal research and teaching.Drawing onherpersonal
1314 Jennifer Hendry, Naomi Creutzfeldt and Christian Boulanger
experience, Schultz outlines and analyses not only the socio-legal issue of gender equality, but also
the challenges in, and obstacles to, undertaking such researchwithinGermany’s legal-academic cul-
ture. By blending contextualized historical developments, such as gender equality legislation and
increasingly permissive social norms, with her situated personal reflections on female professorial
appointments andgender-related content inuniversity teaching and curriculums, Schultz provides a
unique and nuanced view of value to contemporary scholars of gender equality.
Concluding this section, in Christian Boulanger’s article exploring the minefield of undertaking
comparative research on legal doctrine, or Rechtsdogmatik, Boulanger notes that, while currently
scholars in many different disciplinary areas are studying doctrinal aspects of law both
normatively and empirically, an interdisciplinary and cross-national field of research has yet
to take shape. In Germany, the sociology of law has, in Boulanger’s view, been very reticent about
analyses of legal doctrine, which it has regarded sometimes with suspicion, and as part of the “law
on the books,” in unfavorable contrast with the “law in action.” Boulanger argues that the com-
parative study of legal doctrine as an institutionally legitimated social practice helps to understand
how one is translated into the other, which is also relevant for evaluating the role of legal schol-
arship in democratic societies. For Boulanger, the almost diametrically opposed traditions of doc-
trinal analysis in Germany and the UK provide a fertile ground for comparative analysis. Using
examples from German research, Boulanger’s article contributes theoretical and methodological
perspectives to the research agenda of the currently emerging socio-legal study of legal doctrine.
The articles in the next section on historical socio-legal perspectives take a somewhat broader
approach. Remaining largely sectoral in focus, however, Rebecca Zahn, Klaas-Henrik Eller, and
Ioannis Kampourakis provide comparative analyses of, respectively, historical socio-legal labor
law scholarship, the empirical study of legal doctrine, the development of socio-legal research
on the law of contract, and the different methodological and epistemological ideas to be found
in different empirical approaches to law. Opening this section is Zahn’s article, at the forefront
of which is the recognized challenge posed by comparative labor law history, a largely neglected
field that—in both Germany and the UK—has lacked those galvanizing academic debates as to the
best way for it to be undertaken. In addition to Zahn’s comprehensive and insightful account of
this field in both countries, Zahn argues explicitly in favor of a methodology called “minor
comparativism.” Although at its heart still fundamentally comparative, this method makes the
deliberate attempt to include the marginalized or minority foreign view by intentionally adopting
“the perspective of those who remain foreign.”19
By looking at contract law, Eller is able to survey a research topic that also connects a large
variety of disciplinary inquiries from both normative and analytical perspectives, each with a long
history of scholarly interest. As Eller notes, the study of contract is torn between the universality of
the contract as a form and the specificity of its practice in different contexts. In particular, the way
contract law has dealt with the “relational” character of contracts has been very different; for
example, the fact that contracts cannot be detached from the social context in which they exist
without creating normative or analytical problems. The article contrasts developments in contract
law in the UK and US with those of Germany and finds that the variations are partly explained by
the fact that the reception of legal realism varied widely. In the common law countries, the
reception led to more interdisciplinary perspectives on contract law, whereas in Germany, realist
thinking did not take root in post-war Germany’s contract law doctrine. Eller concludes his article
with thoughts on how these developments play out in the case of transnational contract law. He
finds that despite the turn to “reflexive” law, transnational contract law scholarship is not
characterized by truly interdisciplinary debates.
Kampourakis’ article concludes this section by comparing two different sociological
approaches to law—that is, empirical socio-legal studies and the “grand theory” of autopoietic
19Rebecca Zahn, Finding New Ways of “Doing” Socio Legal Labor Law History in Germany and the UK: Introducing a
“Minor Comparativism,” in this issue.
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social systems—in terms of transnational private regulation, an “increasingly important aspect of
legal and social ordering under conditions of globalization.”20 Drawing attention to the effects that
adopting epistemologically different theoretical approaches has upon the motivations,
structuring, and results of such studies, Kampourakis then leads the more macro argument that
insights into the field’s developmental divergence in Germany and the UK can be gleaned from
each country’s law and society community, exhibiting a notable preference for one of these
respective sociological approaches to the study of law.
The final section on contemporary socio-legal perspectives showcases new methodological
approaches to socio-legal research. The articles in this section employ different perspectives,
interdisciplinary approaches, and theories, considering legal design, urban law, and what it means
to undertake socio-legal research “politically.” Perry-Kessaris’ article introduces the idea of legal
design, that is, consideration of how the outlooks and tools characteristically associated with
design can be oriented towards legal thinking and matters. Perry-Kessaris argues in favor of a
sociologically-informed approach to both the theory and application of principles of legal design,
stacking on top of these initial considerations a further requirement also to include sociological
insights. With both law and design being social phenomena, Perry-Kessaris makes the case,
referencing influential Anglo-German literature and practices, for the conceptualization of legal
design as a form of social relations. Perry-Kessaris’ article asks the question: “What would a
sociologically-informed approach to researching legal design look like conceptually, empirically,
and normatively?”21
Layard draws our attention to an area of scholarship underexplored in both countries’ law and
society scholarship: urban law. In proposing how such research can be undertaken, Layard
advocates grasping legal opportunities to analyze urbanism comparatively as a socio-legal task.
Adopting the leitmotiv of the cross-discipline, Layard shifts focus of inquiry from law to society.
While underdeveloped across Europe, urban law scholarship in North America includes analyses
of, for example, the relationships between national and state government, as well as individual legal
aspects of housing, zoning, licensing, sustainability, consumer protection, poverty, race, and data
law. Layard calls for scholars to follow Auby’s ground-breaking Droit de la ville, where Auby syn-
thesizes materials for lawyers and non-lawyers alike. Drawing on Andreas Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ suggestion of understanding a city as a lawscape, thereby integrating elements of
the lawwith elements of the city, Layarddescribes a rich set ofmethods to exploreurban law, drawing
on doctrinal analysis, empirical observations, interviews, ethnographies, quantitative and mapping
exercises, as well as contextual policy analysis.
Concluding this section, and indeed, this Special Issue, Mant’s article puts into practice the kind
of self-reflection discussed by both Herklotz and Schultz, recognizing how socio-legal researchers
—specifically early-careers researchers in this particular case—must work politically in terms of
reflecting on their own theoretical and methodological selections. This bigger-picture approach
thus demands not only a commitment to self-reflection within a research project, but also within
the discipline more broadly. Mant notes that, as is the case in her own study of litigants-in-person
(LIPs) in family courts in England and Wales, the composite application—to a single issue—of
different approaches that, while independently insightful, may appear irreconcilable, offers a
genuinely fertile tension. While Mant’s socio-legal study blends feminist legal theory with insights
drawn from Bourdieu and Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, the contribution of this article to the
Special Issue lies in its recognition of how the myriad different tools available to socio-legal
researchers can and even should interact, even in light of their apparent incoherence. That this
article focuses on the willingness of early-career researchers to undertake this kind of blended
20Ioannis Kampourakis, Empiricism, Constructivism, and Grand Theory in Sociological Approaches to Law: The Case of
Transnational Private Regulation, in this issue.
21A. Perry-Kassaris, Making Socio-legal Research More Social by Design: Anglo-German Roots, Rewards, and Risks, in this
issue
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research, moreover, highlights how different supervision and training practices have an enormous
impact upon the development and ambit of socio-legal studies more generally.
E. Part Four: Stronger Ties
This Special Issue is a foundational part of an ongoing ambitious project to bring together
socio-legal communities and to forge stronger ties between them. Our focus is on the UK and
Germany, as these are the socio-legal spaces we operate within. This connected space has, we
believe, huge potential to grow and to develop. The four strands mentioned above that we identify
as running throughout this Special Issue correspond to four focal areas. It is through the targeted
exploration of these that we can better understand the composition and operation of socio-legal
spheres in the two countries. This collaborative socio-legal work will continue, and the
uncertainties provoked by the COVID-19 pandemic and looming Brexit mean that it is ever more
important to strengthen connections between jurisdictions and intellectual communities. The next
generation of socio-legal scholars has enormous potential, and there is no better time at which to
recognize and dismantle obstacles to cross-community action and interaction, to identify syner-
gies, to strengthen ties, and to strengthen the socio-legal community beyond narrow national aca-
demic boundaries.
Cite this article: Hendry J, Creutzfeldt N, and Boulanger C (2020). Socio-Legal Studies in Germany and the UK: Theory and
Methods. German Law Journal 21, 1309–1317. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2020.83
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Abstract
Under the headings of “Rechtssoziologie” in Germany and “socio-legal studies” in the UK, scholarly tra-
ditions have developed that relate law to its social environment. This Article identifies key stages in the
development the subject took in both countries and the directions of travel. Comparable milestones were
passed, and directions were taken in Germany and the UK. This includes the institutionalization of the
subject along the lines of programmatic texts; becoming part of university education; and the establishment
of research institutes, academic associations, and specialized journals. The development tells us something
beyond sociology of law or socio-legal studies, namely about the relation of law and sociology, the parent
disciplines themselves, as well as about academic studies and professional and institutional practice.
However, in contrast to the UK, there is still more of a distance between the sociology of law and juris-
prudence in Germany.
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A. Introduction: What is “Socio-Legal Studies” or “Sociology of Law”?
Considering how “sociology of law,” or “socio-legal studies,” developed in Germany and the UK,
this Article analyzes the institutionalization of the subject. How did it grow roots in the two
countries? As other contributions to the workshop and this Special Issue explicitly focus on
the trajectory of theoretical thought in socio-legal studies, this Article will only note those aspects
in passing.1 Interest in sociology of law, or socio-legal studies, started to develop mainly in the
twentieth century and took similar trajectories in Germany and the UK. Though the UK lagged
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1The author has elsewhere narrated the history of sociology of law in Germany in more detail in Stefan Machura, The
German Sociology of Law: A Case of Path Dependency, 8 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 506 (2012), covering the development of the
two parent disciplines as well as political and social movements inspiring some of the actors. For alternative accounts on
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behind for a long time, it caught up quickly over the last decades. Today, the subject may have an
even larger base in the British Isles than in Germany. This was helped by a wider definition of the
study area in the UK than in Germany, a greater openness towards inter- and transdisciplinary
work in the UK, more flexibility of teaching demonstrated by faculties, and supported by more
wide-spread employment opportunities.
What defines sociology of law? A key German player, Erhard Blankenburg, has described it as a
social science “dealing with legal institutions and law-oriented behavior, striving to explain these
from the canon of sociological theories and which simultaneously disciplines itself to methodo-
logical standards consented among social scientists.”2 The main contrast here is between social
science and dogmatic law, where the latter is the study of law as found in authoritative legal texts
with an aim to prepare, or at least to contemplate, legal decisions. Comparatively, sociology of law
takes legal doctrine or legal decisions as “data,” and jurisprudence employs aspects of sociological
theory or sociological methods not only to theorize law but also to inform decision-making. The
latter largely describes the socio-legal studies beyond sociology of law. Socio-legal studies must
be the broader term, while sociology of law is somewhat more specific. The former could be
perceived as identical with the “law and society” label, reflecting a broad range of topics, para-
digms, and methods on display at the annual meetings of the United States’ Law and Society
Association (LSA).3
What in Germany is called “Rechtstatsachenforschung” takes little reference to sociological con-
cepts. But, as an “empirical study of law,” it draws purely on social science research methods to
inquire into problems of the application of law. The conflict between this type of socio-legal stud-
ies and sociology of law, concerned with understanding the function of law in society, was promi-
nent in the twentieth century among academics in the UK. The divide was not as important in
other parts of Europe.4 Indeed, there can be a fruitful division of labor between the two.5 The study
of law as part of society can only benefit from an inter- and transdisciplinary approach,6 in which
content from different academic disciplines is combined.
A plethora of neighboring social science and humanities subjects are drawn into socio-legal
studies and sociology of law. The most successful being criminology, which experienced a phe-
nomenal rise in public awareness, student numbers, degree courses, and targeted academic
research in the UK. “Gradually the subject took off during the 1980s as crime and crime control
became defined as a more central socio-political problem in the UK and police procedurals
became a central part of television (now media streaming) culture.”7 In the UK, criminology
is based in law schools at some universities and social sciences at other places. There are several
permanent lectureships at one university. German criminology is almost exclusively at home at
law schools where there is typically only one criminology professor with secure employment.
Criminology in Germany has long been part of the study of law, with sociological and psycho-
logical content increasingly defining the subject, following the American example.
Historically strong relations exist between sociologists of law in the three German-speaking
countries of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. In equal measure, British academia is well con-
nected to Australia, New Zealand, and other Commonwealth countries, or erstwhile British
2Erhard Blankenburg, Die Praxisrelevanz einer Nicht-Disziplin: der Fall der Rechtssoziologie, in SOZIOLOGIE UND PRAXIS.
SOZIALE WELT, (SPECIAL ISSUE) 205, 206 (Ulrich Beck ed., 1982) (author’s own translation).
3Its website lists no less than fifty-six Collaborative Research Networks, formed around joint scholarly interests, organizing
the bulk of the activities. LAW AND SOCIETY ASSOCIATION, https://www.lawandsociety.org/ (last visited 26 April 2020).
4David Nelken, The ‘Gap Problem’ in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review, 1 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 35 (1981),
reprinted in BEYOND LAW IN CONTEXT 1, 2 (2009).
5Id. at 7–8.
6Alfons Bora, Armin Höland, Dorothea Jansen, Doris Lucke, Stefan Machura, Wolfgang Ludwig-Mayerhofer & Gunther
Teubner, Rechtssoziologie „auf der Grenze“: Mitteilung der Herausgeber, 21 ZFRSOZ 319 (2000).
7Mike Levi, Emerged from the American Shadows? Reflections on the Growth of Criminology in the UK, 16 CRIM. EUR. 4, 5
(2017).
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colonies. Ideas and staff sometimes travel lightly between the English-speaking nations and
between the German-speaking countries. German sociologists of law closely follow English
language literature, but few colleagues in the UK are able to read publications in German.
Communication flows, therefore, tend to be slightly one-sided. When it comes to the structural
development of sociology of law and socio-legal studies, the conditions within the two countries
were key, as will be shown in the remainder of this Article.
B. The Early Mobilization Phase of Sociology of Law
I. Beginnings in Germany
The field developed much earlier in Germany than in the UK. Established academics pioneered
sociology of law by the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. This was the generation of
Eugen Ehrlich, as well as Max and Marianne Weber. Ehrlich published his famous book
Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts in 1913. His basic idea was that there is “dead law” that
exists in the legal codes but is not being applied in practice, and there is “living law,” some of
which bears no relation to the state’s written law.8 Associations within society may organize them-
selves along self-developed rules. For example, if judges are called to decide in a dispute, they need
to be trained to find out about those non-state but essential rules. Sociology of law would equip
lawyers to research the non-codified “living law” through observation, interviews, or the study of
legal documents. In this way, sociology of law becomes part and parcel of a more encompassing
legal science. Ehrlich’s ideas met considerable support, but also strong resistance. It started with
the Kelsen-Ehrlich debate.9 Ehrlich was not particularly extreme in his views, but he was often
carried away by his rhetoric. Politically of liberal-conservative persuasion, his “revolution” meant
providing lawyers with an additional empirical method to understand law. He did not aim to do
away with state law or with legal training based on legal texts. Hans Kelsen, his adversary, pointed
out logical errors in Ehrlich’s argumentation, but he did not deny sociology of law a place within
jurisprudence.
Max Weber’s sociology of law, published after his death, emphasized the technical advantages
of the modern dogmatic law based on the systematizing work undertaken by lawyers.10 This type
of law serves a capitalist economy and a liberal society. In his analysis, Weber was not at all blind
to the problem of economic power turning into advantages for specific classes of people when
dealing with the law and when developing the law. As a liberal thinker, he saw the alternatives
as essentially worse, even for those disadvantaged by the modern legal regime.
Sociologists of law were quite prominent on the academic scene when German sociology took
the first steps towards institutionalization at the beginning of the twentieth century. Max Weber
was heavily involved in founding the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie in 1909.11 Nevertheless,
the political, economic, and intellectual climate proved unfavorable, and the catastrophic twelve
years of national socialist rule largely stopped German sociology in its tracks. In the divided post-
war Germany, sociology of law started slowly in the Federal Republic and saw an accelerated
development in the 1970s and 1980s. Comparatively, in the German Democratic Republic
(GDR), the leadership of the ruling Socialist Unity Party did not allow any initiative in the direc-
tion of sociology of law to become a reality. The subject was seen as incompatible with the
8Eugen Ehrlich,Das lebende Recht der Völker der Bukowina, in EUGEN EHRLICH, RECHT UND LEBEN 43 (Manfred Rehbinder
ed., 1967) (1912); EUGEN EHRLICH, GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS (4th ed., 1989); Eugen Ehrlich, Über das
“lebende Recht,” in POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN 191 (Manfred Rehbinder ed., 2007).
9Hans Kelsen, Eine Grundlegung der Rechtssoziologie, in RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 3 (reprt. Klaus
Lüderssen ed., 2003) (1915); Stefan Machura, Eugen Ehrlich’s Legacy in Contemporary German Sociology of Law, in
EUGEN EHRLICH‘S SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 39 (Knut Papendorf, Stefan Machura & Anne Hellum eds., 2014).
10MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (Johannes Winckelmann ed., 5th ed. 1980).
11MARIANNE WEBER, MAX WEBER: EIN LEBENSBILD 425–430 (4th ed. 1989); Uwe Dörk, Sonja Schnitzler & Alexander
Wierzock, Die Gründung der deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie vor 110 Jahren, 48 SOZIOLOGIE 309, 311–13 (2019).
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prevailing Marxist-Leninist ideology. Once the working class established its own rule, there would
be no need for sociology of law.12 In the process of German reunification after 1990, the legal
structures, institutions, and personnel of the West were introduced.
In the early years of West Germany, aspects of sociology of law were part of lectures in phi-
losophy of law.13 A key step forward proved the editing of Weber’s sociology of law by Johannes
Winckelmann in 1956 as part of the Economy and Society compilation of Weber’s texts. The sub-
ject now had an authoritative text that was less controversial than Ehrlich’s 1913 book,
Grundlegung einer Soziologie des Rechts. The 1960s saw a further build-up of sociology of law.
In 1964, the first institute for sociology of law was founded by Ernst E. Hirsch at the Free
University Berlin.14 Still, students of sociology of law lacked a textbook in the German language.
Finally, in 1967, Hirsch and Manfred Rehbinder edited a widely used textbook, which also intro-
duced American work to German readers.15 The wider public may have learned about sociological
inquiries on law through opinion research. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann acquainted Germans with
opinion research,16 a field that developed in the United States. Some of her surveys touched on
legal topics.17 Sociology of law gained prominence through a series of empirical studies concerning
law students, lawyers, and judges. Ralf Dahrendorf emphasized the dominance of representatives
from the higher social stratum in law. The upper half of society would sit in judgment over the
lower half.18 Marxists went a step further and referred to Ernst Fraenkel’s attack on “class justice”
from theWeimar years, which by then the author himself had already come to see as too extreme a
view.19 An alternative theory was put forward by Judge Theo Rasehorn.20 This was essentially a
socialization theory: The bureaucratic apparatus of the justice system forms the actions of legal
personnel. Rasehorn’s theory was later supported by further empirical studies.21 Both approaches,
the class and the bureaucratic perspective, were quite unflattering for the legal profession and, as
they were also written in forceful language, created quite a stir.
Interest in sociology of law continued to grow, and at the end of the decade, students
demanded that the subject be taught, which meant an institutionalization of the subject
had to be granted. In the feverish atmosphere of the “student revolution,” starting in 1967,
some activists saw sociology of law as an opener for the introduction of Marxist doctrine into
universities. Others favored “sociological jurisprudence,” the phrase, of course, being much
earlier used by Roscoe Pound for drawing on “the relations of law to society.”22 The students’
demand was chiming in with the zeitgeist of the period, which widely believed in social engi-
neering. The books Sociology Before the Gates of Jurisprudence and Jurisprudence as Social
12Rosemarie Will, Betrifft: Forschungsprofilierung Rechtssoziologie, 11 ZFRSOZ 2 (1990).
13Theo Rasehorn, Wolfgang Kaupen und die deutsche Rechtssoziologie. Aufstieg und Niedergang, in EMPIRISCHE
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE. GEDENKSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG KAUPEN 15, 15–16 (Dieter Strempel & Theo Rasehorn eds., 2002).
14Thomas Raiser, Keynote Address: Sociology of Law in Germany, 11 GERMAN L.J. 391, 392 (2010).
15ERNST. E. HIRSCH & MANFRED REHBINDER, Studien und Materialien zur Rechtssoziologie, in KZFSS, SONDERHEFT, NO. 11
(Ernst. E. Hirsch & Manfred Rehbinder eds., 2d ed. 1971).
16David Childs, Elisabeth Noelle Neumann: Pioneer of Public-Opinion Polling and Market Research, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 10,
2010) www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/elisabeth-noelle-neumann-pioneer-of-public-opinion-polling-and-market-
research-1940766.html.
17See, e.g., Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewußtsein im wiedervereinigten Deutschland, 16 ZFRSOZ 121 (1995).
18RALF DAHRENDORF, GESELLSCHAFT UND FREIHEIT 195 (1963).
19ERNST FRAENKEL, ZUR SOZIOLOGIE DER KLASSENJUSTIZ UND AUFSÄTZE ZUR VERFASSUNGSKRISE 1931–32 (1968).
20Written under pseudonym XAVER BERRA, IM PARAGRAPHENTURM: EINE STREITSCHRIFT ZUR ENTIDEOLOGISIERUNG DER
JUSTIZ (1966).
21Rüdiger Lautmann, Rechtsfindung als Karriereberuf, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF WASSERMANN ZUM SECHZIGSTEN
GEBURTSTAG 109 (1985); WOLFGANG LANGER, STAATSANWÄLTE UND RICHTER: JUSTIZIELLES ENTSCHEIDUNGSVERHALTEN
ZWISCHEN SACHZWANG UND LOKALER JUSTIZKULTUR 66 (1994).
22A. Javier Treviño, Pound, Roscoe (1870-1964), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 1160, 1161 (David S. Clark ed., 2007). See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 489, § III. Sociological Jurisprudence (1911).
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Science alerted legal academia.23 As much as these debates helped the initial institutionalization
of sociology of law, they also triggered fierce resistance from traditionally-minded law professors.
The reaction of many was, “don’t rock the boat.” There was little appetite on the part of many legal
scholars to transform jurisprudence for various reasons, including the limited practicability of
sociological jurisprudence, which can be too cumbersome when decisions have to be made
quickly.24 Still today, German legal education somewhat neglects the training needs of law
graduates aiming for a career in politics and administration where social science knowledge is
obviously beneficial. The influential sociologist Helmut Schelsky first supported the institution-
alization of sociology of law, but he started to fiercely and loudly criticize left-leaning reformers.25
The short period of change was quickly followed by the onset of a roll-back. The efforts of lawyers
wanting to defend the traditional outlook of jurisprudence, a disappointment in society and poli-
tics about the practicality of social engineering on a large scale—as well as the onset of repeated
economic crises with the ensuing austerity measures, all came together to endanger the institu-
tionalization of sociology of law.
II. Beginnings in the UK
In the United Kingdom, sociology developed much later than in Germany. It essentially began in
the 1960s.26 Richard Münch paints a particular trajectory for British sociology as it was “developed
in correspondence with the labor movement. As such, social theory portrayed society as a class
hierarchy and societal development that was shaped by class conflict and power.”27 Other authors,
outlining the history of socio-legal studies and sociology of law in the UK, emphasize a very long
tradition of empirical and reform-oriented research, but with a noted absence, if not adversity,
towards general social theory in Britain.28
The earliest events relevant to the present discussion included “law in context” studies in the
new universities of Kent and Warwick, according to Bradney, on government initiative.29
Warwick kept all the law in context teaching in-house within the Law School and integrated it
into the teaching of law subjects, whereas Kent drew on teaching provisions from other academic
subjects.30 Sociology of law was just an optional third-year module in Warwick at that time.31 In
retrospect, Foster and Osborn argue that “contextualism” did not take full advantage of what
interdisciplinarity can offer and kept centered on understanding the operation of law.32
23RÜDIGER LAUTMANN, SOZIOLOGIE VOR DEN TOREN DER JURISPRUDENZ (1971); HELMUT ROTTLEUTHNER,
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT ALS SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT (1973); Doris Lucke, Feminae ante portas: Gleichstellung und
Geschlechtergerechtigkeit in der Jurisprudenz, 39 ZFRSOZ 298, 309 (2019) (commenting on the effect most recently).
24Practical problems of sociological jurisprudence are outlined by KLAUS F. RÖHL, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 100–01 (1987) [hereinafter
RÖHL, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE]; Klaus F. Röhl, Zur Bedeutung der Rechtssoziologie für das Zivilrecht, in RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE AM
ENDE DES 20. JAHRHUNDERTS: GEDÄCHTNISSYMPOSIUM FÜR EDGAR MICHAEL WENZ 39, 51 (Horst Dreier ed., 2000).
25 HELMUT SCHELSKY, DIE ARBEIT TUN DIE ANDEREN: KLASSENKAMPF UND PRIESTERHERRSCHAFT DER INTELLEKTUELLEN
(2d ed. 1975).
26Max Travers, Sociology of Law in Britain, 32 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 26, 28 (2001); Michael Albrow, The Changing British Role
in European Sociology, in SOCIOLOGY IN EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY 81, 85 (Brigitta Nedelmann & Piotr Sztompka
eds., 1993).
27Richard Münch, The Contribution of German Social Theory to European Sociology, in SOCIOLOGY IN EUROPE: IN SEARCH
OF AN IDENTITY 45, 47 (Brigitta Nedelmann & Piotr Sztompka eds., 1993).
28Carl Campbell & Paul Wiles, The Study of Law in Society in Britain, 10 L. & SOC’Y REV. 551, 555–56 (1976).
29Anthony Bradney, United Kingdom, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
1529, 1529 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).
30Ralph Folsom&Neil Roberts, TheWarwick Story: Being Led Down the Contextual Path of the Law, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 166,
182–83 (1979).
31Id. at 176.
32Ken Foster & Guy Osborn, Dancing on the Edge of Disciplines: Law and the Interdisciplinary Turn, 8 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 4,
4-5 (2010).
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A 1971 Parliamentary report on legal education, the “Ormrod Report,” called for universities to
“impart an understanding of the relationship of law to the social and economic environment in
which it operates and the intellectual training necessary to enable students to handle facts and
apply abstract concepts to them.”33 Pat Carlen mentions the Social Science Research Council,
the principal state funding agency—today, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)—
setting up a socio-legal committee in 1972.34 It was formed at about the same time as a socio-legal
group within the Society for Public Teachers of Law.35 According to Folsom and Roberts, there
was a demand for social sciences and humanities coming from the substantial part of law students
who did not wish to gain a professional legal qualification.36 Both U.S. lecturers and those teaching
abroad influenced the direction taken by Warwick and elsewhere.37 As in Germany, the subject
gained momentum when a younger generation of scholars, inspired by Marxism, started to study
theories on law and society.38 Meanwhile, there was also an established pattern of pragmatist
research directed at reforming the public sector and the welfare state, which encompassed the
state of affairs in the legal system.39 As Michael King put it, “many of us believed that the social
sciences held the key that would unlock the door to universal knowledge on how best to control
people’s behavior and regulate social life for the benefit of all society’s members.”40 Early discus-
sions focused on the contrast between the two camps: Theorists, most notably of the Marxist per-
suasion, and empirical researchers.41
C. Institutionalization of Sociology of Law
I. German Situation
1. Universities
Sociology of law became part of the curriculum for lawyers via the legal requirements for the train-
ing of lawyers, as set out in law. At this level, the curriculum is ultimately determined by political
forces, and the inclusion of sociology of law thus did not need the consent of law schools.
Germany’s law on judges now required some knowledge of the social foundations of law.42
The provinces thus included aspects of sociology of law into the spectrum of topics potentially
tested in the state bar exam, for example, today § 3(2) JAG Berlin, and § 7(1) JAG Hessen.43
The law schools had to organize lectures in sociology of law, and staff had to be employed to teach
the subject. Yet most preferred a minimal solution. Given the politically controversial nature of
sociology of law at the time and doubts over the concept of “sociological jurisprudence,” law
schools required candidates to be able to teach doctrinal law. Sociology of law became typically
one of the several denominations of a chair, in combination with public, civil, or criminal law as a
main working area. Professors had to have passed both Staatsexamen with an overall mark that
33Folsom & Roberts, supra note 30, at 169.
34Pat Carlen, Introduction, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 1, 1 (Pat Carlen ed., 1976).
35See Id. The Society for Public Teachers of Law was “the then principal professional association of British university law
teachers,” according to David Sugarman, A Special Relationship? American Influences on English Legal Education, c. 1870-1965,
18 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 7, 19 (2011).
36Folsom & Roberts, supra note 30, at 180.
37Id. at 174–75, 177; Sugarman, supra note 35.
38Travers, supra note 26.
39Id.
40Michael King, Roger Cotterrell and Law’s Sociology of Law, 42 J.L. SOC’Y 649, 649 (2015).
41Travers, supra note 26.
42§ 5a(2) Deutsches Richtergetz [The German Judiciary Act], Apr. 19, 1972, BGBL. I at 713 (Ger.), available at http://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/drig/BJNR016650961.html#BJNR016650961BJNG000100666.
43Gesetz über die Ausbildung von Juristinnen und Juristen im Land Berlin (Berliner Juristenausbildungsgesetz - JAG), June
23, 2003, GVBL., 232 (Ger.), available at http://www.lexsoft.de/cgi-bin/lexsoft/justizportal_nrw.cgi?xid=216050,1; Gesetz über
die juristische Ausbildung (Juristenausbildungsgesetz - JAG), Apr. 1, 2004, GVBL. I at 158 (Ger.), available at http://www.
lexsoft.de/cgi-bin/lexsoft/justizportal_nrw.cgi?xid=169594,1.
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allowed them to become a judge. Furthermore, it was advisable to have published a significant
amount of traditional legal books and articles. This constellation allowed universities to exclude
sociologists on the one hand and to keep out left-leaning candidates on the other hand.44 In other
words, sociology of law was only a side-aspect of a professor’s duties.45 Any engagement with the
subject beyond giving lectures and occasional seminars was an issue of personal preference.
Therefore, the quality and extent of socio-legal research in Germany has suffered tremendously.46
Sociology, as the other parent discipline, might have offered more to sociologists of law, but in
fact, it offered much less. The professionalization model of sociology in this period emphasized
embedding sociology in other disciplines.47 And law faculties were reluctant to create chairs in
sociology of law. Sociology had largely forgotten about law as a topic of research and teaching.48
In spite of the prominence of law within the oeuvres of, for example, Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen
Habermas,49 German sociologists did not typically engage with it to any real extent.
There was a big chance for sociology of law to become an integrated part of legal education but
it passed quickly. German legal education is traditionally divided into three years at university
followed by a legal apprenticeship. Some German Länder in the 1970s introduced a one-phase
model, the “einstufige Juristenausbildung,” integrating practical training elements with academic
studies. Furthermore, they also combined traditional legal learnings and the sociology of law. In
this model, law students learned about the black-letter law in its application to legal problems, the
legal practice in the application of law, and sociological analyses of the problem’s social back-
ground. But after a few years, these experiments were abruptly stopped by political decision,
because the framework for legal training is determined on the federal level where the opponents,
who were chiefly from the politically more conservative southern Länder, were in the majority.
Which model prepared lawyers better for their professional practice will never be known.
From this point onwards, the numbers of sociologists of law in permanent employment at uni-
versities started to dwindle. When a job was vacated, the law faculties allocated the positions to
other legal subjects. Many members of the younger generation took up different careers or moved
to the USA, the UK, Australia, or Norway, which offered more to sociologists of law.
Law students changed, too. Reforms, which aimed at streamlining and accelerating the speed of
studies, resulted in students at universities concentrating all their efforts on passing the key assess-
ments in doctrinal law. For their first state exam, most paid to attend extra lectures by private
Repetitoren. A leaflet illustrates the clever marketing of a leading private Repetitor.50 It shows three
gladly laughing young males and lists their names. One of them pats the right shoulder of the man
in the middle, the other one resting his arm on the left shoulder. The heading reads “Wir haben
etwas ‘gut’ gemacht” (“We did something well”), playing with the word “gut” (“good” or “well”, in
English) which in this context means the three young men depicted made the right choice to go to
this instructor, but more importantly, that they got an upper-level second class degree in the
famously selective state exams. With this average, a career as a judge, public prosecutor, or at
a reputable law firm was in sight, and the three are introduced to the reader as doctoral candidates.
The Repetitors’ formula was to calm nervous students down by offering them the bare bones of
44Pierre Guibentif, Niklas Luhmann und die Rechtssoziologie: Gespräch mit Niklas Luhmann, Bielefeld, den 7. Januar 1991,
21 ZFRSOZ 217, 230 (2000).
45Stefan Machura, Rechtssoziologie in der Juristenausbildung, 37 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 953 (1997); Barbara Heitzmann,
Lehre der Rechtssoziologie an deutschen Hochschulen, 25 ZFRSOZ, 249 (2003); Wrase, supra, note 1; Hanna Uebach & Sebastian
Leuschner, Zum Stand der rechtssoziologischen Lehre und Forschung im deutschsprachigen Raum, 31 ZFRSOZ 303 (2010).
46Susanne Karstedt, Standortprobleme: Kriminalsoziologie in Deutschland, 23 SOZIOLOGISCHE REVUE 141 (2000).
47Bora et al., supra note 6, at 320.
48Bernhard Schäfers, Rechtssoziologie, in EINFÜHRUNG IN SPEZIELLE SOZIOLOGIEN 191, 195 (Helmut Korte & Bernhard
Schäfers eds., 1993).
49NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Martin Albrow ed., Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2d ed., 1985);
NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT (1993); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG (1993).
50Alpmann Schmidt, Wir haben was “gut” gemacht (1999) (on file with the author).
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doctrinal law. Sociology-related content did not figure at all as it was no secret that sociology of
law was rarely asked for in the state exams.
After unification in 1990, the East German law faculties adopted the model of the west. As a
consequence, law professors who were experts to the western system were in high demand. This
allowed socio-legal scholars who had faced bleak job prospects after the end of the one-phase
model of legal training to receive professorships at universities like Halle, Frankfurt-on-Oder,
and Humboldt Universität Berlin. The result was a boost to socio-legal research, teaching, pub-
lication, and to the activities of sociology of law associations.
Another possible casing for sociology of law was research centers. One such attempt failed in
Hamburg when the directors decided to disband the sociology of law research group.51 The
years of Erhard Blankenburg’s leadership of a sociology of law working group at the
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin have been described by Ralf Rogowski as the most productive
for German sociology of law.52 Much later, the Law and Society Institute at the Humboldt
University was founded. It successfully tapped into the well of talent available in the Berlin
region and into the funding opportunities of the capital city. The “Recht als Kultur”
Institute in Bonn is also a more recent development and has gained an international profile
by hosting guest scholars.
2. Associations
The institutionalization of an academic subject also requires scholarly associations. The sociology
of law section in the German Sociological Association (DGS) has been in existence since 1972.
Wolfgang Kaupen, who made a name through empirical research on knowledge and opinion
on law, was a key force in the early years.53 A second association, the Vereinigung für
Rechtssoziologie, was founded in 1976 for several reasons. There were differences in appearance
and motivations between professors of law and often younger sociologists energized by the student
movement.54 Other reasons included that teachers of sociology of law in law departments needed a
place to develop their common interests. Erhard Blankenburg, a key scholar, had a two-track strat-
egy for the advancement of sociology of law in mind: The DGS section to continue its work, and
the Vereinigung as a market-place where sociologists of law interested in empirical research set out
their stalls. The strategy was successful in the following years. The Federal Justice Ministry tasked
sociologists with a series of research projects. In this, Dieter Strempel, head of the ministry’s unit
for empirical legal research, was pivotal.55 As for the cultural clash, this aspect was soon amelio-
rated. By the 1990s, both German sociology of law associations worked together in a spirit of
cooperation. Some scholars, including the author, sat on the committees of both. In 2010, the
Vereinigung changed its name to “Vereinigung für Recht und Gesellschaft” (“Law and Society
Association”) following the example of the broad approach taken by the United States’ Law and
Society Association. Also notable is the Berliner Arbeitskreis Rechtswirklichkeit (“Berlin
Working Group on Socio-Legal Studies”), which has a local focus but has, since its inception
in 2001, developed a network that includes scholars throughout and beyond the borders of
Germany.
51Dieter Martiny, Entstehung, Tätigkeit und Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungsgruppe, in EMPIRISCHE
RECHTSFORSCHUNG ZWISCHEN WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK 19, 25 (Konstanze Plett & Klaus A. Ziegert eds., 1982). The
research group existed between 1975 and 1982.
52Ralf Rogowski, Nachruf auf Erhard Blankenburg (1938–2018), 38 ZFRSOZ 168, 170 (2018).
53Rasehorn, supra note 13, at 30.
54For the UK, see Campbell & Wiles, supra note 28, at 568, 572. Life-style differences were also observed elsewhere as a
factor of group delineation. See Nicholas Mullins, The Development of a Scientific Specialty: The Phage Group and the Origins
of Molecular Biology, 10 MINERVA 51, 72–73 (1972).
55His stance can be gained from Dieter Strempel, Rechtstatsachenforschung und Rechtspolitik: Ressortforschung braucht den
Dialog zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik, in EMPIRISCHE RECHTSFORSCHUNG ZWISCHEN WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK 113
(Konstanze Plett & Klaus A. Ziegert eds., 1984).
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3. Publications
The teaching of an academic subject at universities needs an agreed-upon core of content.
A model curriculum for the sociology of law56 was developed in 1975 by a working group domi-
nated by lawyers because the subject was mainly taught at law schools. Introduction books were
a further requirement for teaching purposes. Also, in the 1970s, four law professors in particu-
lar shaped the content of the sociology of law as a subject for law students by publishing intro-
ductory books, each with a different approach.57 The most all-encompassing presentation was
drafted by Klaus F. Röhl, which widened the focus on German sociology of law to the broadest
review of international approaches and empirical findings of sociological or other origins.58
The publication of introductory materials continued.59 Susanne Baer adopted a broader law
and society approach but kept the familiar label sociology of law. Several book series feature
sociology of law, including a dedicated series “Schriften der Vereinigung für Rechtssoziologie”
(today “Recht und Gesellschaft”) by the Association for Law and Society and a bilingual,
German-English series “Society and Law” by Röhl and Machura. There was an annual publi-
cation, “Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie” which now is a book series titled
“Interdisziplinäre Studien zu Recht und Staat.”
Generally, academic disciplines tend to have their own specialized journals. Since 1980, the
“Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie,” today with the subtitle “The German Journal of Law and
Society,” fulfils this role. Erhard Blankenburg was its “spiritus rector” in the early years.60 The
ZfRSoz was preceded by an information letter that had the form and content of an academic
journal: “Informationsbrief für Rechtssoziologie,” edited by Wolfgang Kaupen. Articles in the
ZfRSoz appear in both German and English, and there is a cooperation agreement with the
French sister journal “Droit et sociéte” to exchange articles.
While some preconditions for the flourishing of German sociology of law are in place, it cru-
cially lacks firm roots in the law schools and even more in sociology departments. Very few of its
scholars enjoy permanent employment in positions allowing them to concentrate sufficiently on
the subject. This is the main obstacle.
II. UK Situation
1. Universities
The UK Quality Assurance Agency has issued Benchmarks for the study of law, and while
expressly giving faculties leeway,61 they state:
The study of law exposes students to a wide range of methods and techniques, some of which
are specific to the discipline but some of which are drawn from the humanities and social
sciences : : : . The common denominator is the requirement on the student to apply their
understanding of legal principles, rules, doctrine, skills and values.
56Raiser, supra note 14.
57MANFRED REHBINDER, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE: EIN TEXTBUCH FÜR STUDENTEN DER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1971); THOMAS RAISER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (1987); RÖHL, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE supra note 24;
HELMUT ROTTLEUTHNER, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (1987).
58RÖHL, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE, supra note 24. A revised version is available online at https://rechtssoziologie-online.de/.
Klaus F. Röhl, Lehrbücher und Reader, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE-ONLINE.DE, §https://rechtssoziologie-online.de/kapitel-1/§-2-
fortsetzung/i-rechtssoziologie-in-lehrdarstellungen-und-readern/ (last accessed Aug 29, 2019) (listing German introductions).
59ERHARD BLANKENBURG, MOBILISIERUNG DES RECHTS: EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (1995); GERHARD
STRUCK, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (2011); SUSANNE BAER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (3d ed. 2017).
60Rogowski, supra note 52, at 170.
61Quality Assurance Agency, SUBJECT BENCHMARK STATEMENT LAW 4 (2019) https://www.qaa.ac.uk/docs/qaa/subject-
benchmark-statements/subject-benchmark-statement-law.pdf?sfvrsn=b939c881_18 (last visited 5 September 2020).
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Law students are required to evidence
: : : knowledge and understanding of theories, concepts, values, principles and rules of public
and private laws within an institutional, social, national and global context.62
A survey published in 1983 showed that sociology of law and socio-legal studies had indeed
become, although to varying degrees, part of university teaching in the UK.63 Sociology depart-
ments rarely featured sociology of law, however.64 Earlier, Hunt saw it leading “a somewhat pre-
carious existence predominantly located on the fringes of law departments and faculties.”65
Roughly two decades later, Foster and Osborn, commenting on law as an academic discipline,
stated “the socio-legal has become the dominant approach in the UK.”66 This opinion is supported
by several other scholars. Reading Cownie and Bradney’s account, socio-legal studies are especially
important when it comes to the research identity of legal scholars and research activity.67
Sugarman suggested that most scholars at law schools no longer restrict themselves and their
teaching to black-letter law, but take social context into account.68 And Creutzfeldt summarizes
the developments as “socio-legal scholarship is now an established focus of scholarly and institu-
tional interest.”69 If this is indeed the situation, how did it transpire?
As is the case in Germany, the study of law in the UK has a two-stage structure. Three years of
university, four in Scotland and Northern Ireland, are followed by traineeships, the latter of which,
however, are organized differently from those in Germany. Some UK law faculties follow the “liberal
model of legal education,” where the technical study of legal skills is complemented by broader, cul-
tural and social elements.70 To mention an example, at Cardiff University, where the author was an
external examiner, law students find not only a module in jurisprudence, but also a sociology of law
module. The latter comprises major theories as well as socio-legal topics of the day. Sociology of law
elements are often included in jurisprudence textbooks and in courses on jurisprudence, while
dedicated sociology of law programs have been reduced.71 Creutzfeldt explicitly mentions Bristol,
Cardiff, Exeter, Glasgow, Kent, and Oxford as law schools offering socio-legal courses.72 In contrast,
Warwick, for example, offers a BA Law with Social Sciences, which is similar to other universities like
Bangor, which allows students to study law with social science subjects. LLM andMA specialist degrees
like “Human Rights” have strong socio-legal content73 similar to many law and criminology MA
degrees.
Law students, according to King, are preoccupied “with gaining as quickly as possible those
qualifications which they believe will place them firmly on the rungs of a career ladder.”74
Yet, in defense of current student generations, it has to be said that much has changed since
62Id. at 5.
63Nigel Fielding & Jane Fielding, Teaching the Sociology of Law: An Empirical Study, 10 J.L. SOC’Y 181 (1983).
64Max Travers, Putting Sociology Back Into the Sociology of Law, 20 J.L. SOC’Y 438, 442 (1993).
65ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW 1–2 (1978).
66Foster & Osborn, supra note 32, at 3.
67Fiona Cownie & Anthony Bradney, Socio-Legal Studies, in RESEARCH METHODS IN LAW, 40 (D. Watkins & M. Burton
eds., 2d ed. 2018).
68Sugarman, supra note 35, at 29.
69Naomi Creutzfeldt, Traditions of Studying the Social and the Legal: A Short Introduction to the Institutional and
Intellectual Development of Socio-Legal Studies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO LEGAL THEORY AND METHODS, 9,
19 (Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason & Kirsten McConnachie eds., 2019).
70Julian Webb, Education, Legal, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY. AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 461, 462
(David S. Clark ed., 2007).
71King, supra note 40, at 657.
72Creutzfeldt, supra note 69, at 19.
73Bradney, supra note 29, at 1532.
74King, supra note 40, at 657; Stephen Clear &Marie Parker, AModel for Responding to UK and International Law Students’
Great(er) Expectations in Wales’ Internationalised Learning Environment, 13 J. COMMONWEALTH L. & LEGAL EDUC. 62, 71
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the 1970s when socio-legal studies were introduced. There is more doctrinal law to master, more
competition for jobs in a forbidding climate for lawyers, and on top of it, UK students have to take
out loans to cover substantial fees and living costs. Loan schemes have been introduced for post-
graduate studies, allowing more students to extend their education to a postgraduate phase with
more specialized master’s studies. In these, doctrinal law is often mixed with socio-legal content.
Government-related funding—such as the ESRC and the Nuffield Foundation, a charitable
organization—was instrumental in the development of socio-legal studies in the UK.
Although, after initially good conditions, funding for socio-legal studies was drastically reduced
in the 1980s and 1990s.75 Michael King observes rightfully that in the current climate, the “expect-
ations and demands of legal academics and those who make grants to them and publish their
books and articles all pull in the direction of an instrumental approach to social theory.”76 It
is similar to research, which has to demonstrate an impact on society.
Historically, Max Travers noted there used to be class differences between lawyers and sociol-
ogists, which were roughly similar to German society, with the former belonging to a higher cat-
egory, resulting in a cultural clash.77 This is probably no longer the case, as in Germany,
professorial pay was in general significantly reduced, and in the UK, coinciding with the de facto
privatization of universities, salaries of lecturers and professors slipped in real value, and many
lecturers hold precarious employment contracts.
Few sociologists without a law degree are employed at British law faculties, with the notable
exception of criminologists whose subject is based in law schools at some universities. In 2006, a
commission tasked by the Nuffield Foundation claimed that there was not enough trained staff to
conduct empirical research in socio-legal studies.78 The situation has improved in the intervening
years, in part because of efforts by the ESRC. Nevertheless, in 2015 Sugarman wrote about “the
general failing of legal education to provide even basic training in empirical and socio-legal
research skills.”79 In Germany, there was the opposite situation to the Nuffield Foundations’
findings, and many well-trained German sociologists of law left the country. Some of them,
for example, took up employment on the British Isles.
When it comes to British research institutes having a role in the history of sociology of law, the
Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies provided an example of how quickly winds can change for
socio-legal studies. As Director, Donald Harris employed sociologists as researchers to collaborate
with lawyers and sought to combine theoretical and empirical work.80 Government funding was
cut in the early 1980s, and the new director was “no longer committed to recruiting sociologists to
work alongside law school researchers.”81 Luckily, things have changed again in the meantime.
2. Associations
The history of academic associations in the UK goes back, according to Campbell and Wiles, to
discussion groups. Campbell and Wiles mention a “Socio-Legal Group,” founded in 1971, which
(2019) (Mentioning as a representative UK student voice: “To gain a broad understanding of the skills needed to progress into
the law profession”).
75Linda Dickens, Some Notes on the English Experience, in EMPIRISCHE RECHTSFORSCHUNG ZWISCHEN WISSENSCHAFT UND
POLITIK 185, 185 (Konstanze Plett & Klaus A. Ziegert eds., 1984); Travers, supra note 26, at 36. Social sciences were not a
priority for successive governments of the Conservative party at the time.
76King, supra note 40, at 85.
77Travers, supra note 26.
78HILARY GENN, MARTIN PARTINGTON & SALLY WHEELER, LAW IN THE REAL WORLD: IMPROVING OUR UNDERSTANDING
HOW LAW WORKS 45–46 (2006); Travers, supra note 26, at 36.
79David Sugarman, From Legal Biography to Legal Life Writing: Broadening Conceptions of Legal History and Socio-Legal
Scholarship, 42 J.L. SOC’Y 7, 14 (2015).
80Mavis Maclean, Prize Acceptance, RCSL NEWSLETTER 2/2019, 17 (2019), http://rcsl.iscte.pt/rcsl_nl_2019_2.pdf; Travers,
supra note 26, at 29, 32.
81Travers, supra note 26, at 29.
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then merged with “the smaller Law Group of the British Sociological Association.”82 Their mem-
bership, which boasted 250 academics and postgraduate students,83 was already impressive in
comparison with German associations. The UK Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA) was
established rather late by comparison in 1990, but its ranks swelled quickly, and it soon became
the second largest academic association for lawyers in the UK.84 SLSA was characterized as
“deliberately ecumenical socio-legal association,” bridging different conceptions of the relation
of sociology and law.85 The range of activities is much larger than that of its German counterparts.
SLSA Annual Conferences occur more regularly than the Austrian-German-Swiss meetings. The
SLSA membership compares favorably with the DGS section’s eighty-seven, while the section’s
email list has 225 addresses, and the Vereinigung’s 159, with its newsletter going out to 428
addresses.86 Most of the SLSA members are from law schools.87
3. Publications
What journals mark the establishment of the subject in the UK? The main UK outlet for the
subject is the Journal of Law and Society. It started in 1974, six years earlier than the German
ZfRSoz, as British Journal of Law and Society. Remarkably, now-Emeritus Professor Philip
Thomas of the Cardiff School of Law and Politics has served as the journal’s Editor in Chief since
its establishment. His first editorial stated: “We do not subscribe to the view that the social sci-
entist is to be cast in the role of handmaiden to the lawyer.”88 A slight preference for theoretical
work can be read between the lines, but an openness for empirical articles was also expressed.
On its website, the journal Law and Critique, established in 1990, presents itself as “the prime
international critical legal theory journal,”89 appearing under the publisher’s “Philosophy and
Law” portfolio. Another publication, Social and Legal Studies, harking back to 1992, seeks to
attract “progressive, interdisciplinary and critical approaches to socio-legal study.”90 Yet another
outlet, the International Journal of the Sociology of Law, appears today under the title International
Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, signaling a shift to criminology.
Outlining the history of socio-legal studies, Campbell and Wiles mention the Law and Society
book series,91 while Folsom and Roberts additionally reference the series Law in Context and
Modern Legal Studies.92 From the mid-nineties onwards, Richard Hart printed many socio-legal
books, and publication continues today as part of Bloomsbury. At present, there is an emphasis on
articles in international peer-reviewed journals and open access, which further challenges conven-
tional publication patterns. Open access is a requirement for the Research Excellence Framework
(REF), the cyclical evaluation of university research that triggers government funding. But
demand for open access is also driven by authors wishing to better disseminate their work.
82Campbell & Wiles, supra note 28, at 568.
83Id.
84Anthony Bradney, Socio-Legal Studies Association, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY. AMERICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 1408, 1408 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).
85David Nelken, Blinding Insights? The Limits of a Reflexive Sociology of Law, 25 J.L. SOC’Y 407, 408 (1998).
86The current list of SLSA members has about 1,300 addresses, according to Jen Hendry, Associate Professor in Law &
Social Justice, University of Leeds (Sept. 13, 2019, 13:38 CET) (on file with the author), but is reported to be inaccurate, with
the number of paying full members rather being in the region of 500. For the membership of the German association: Email
from Andrea Balog-Hiatt, Secretary, Vereinigung für Recht und Gesellschaft (Aug. 27, 2019, 08:24 CET) (on file with the
author); Emails from Doris Schweitzer, Speaker Sektion Rechtssoziologie (Sept. 4 and 10, 2019, 12:33 and 13:02 CET)
(on file with the author). It is important to note that many individuals will be in both German organizations.
87A fact already reported in Bradney, supra note 29.
88British Journal of Law and Society, Editorial, 1 BRITISH J.L. SOC’Y 1, 1 (1974).
89Law and Critique, https://www.springer.com/philosophy/philosophyoflaw/journal/10978 (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
90Socio & Legal Studies, Aims and Scope, https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/journal/social-legal-studies#aims-and-scope
(last visited Aug. 25, 2019).
91Campbell & Wiles, supra note 28, at 568, 572.
92Folsom & Roberts, supra note 30, at 173–74, 189.
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In the UK, there is not the same range of books for beginners as in Germany. Roger Cotterrell’s
The Sociology of Law: An Introduction stood largely alone in the UK.93 Travers characterized it as
reflecting the legal theorist’s “instrumental, and, in some respects, unashamedly eclectic interest in
sociology as an academic discipline,” an interest directed at power relations in society.94
Socio-legal studies in the UK has a much larger footprint than its counterpart in Germany. It
owes its better position in part to the broader definition compared to Rechtssoziologie and also to
the greater openness of UK law schools for ideas from other disciplines and inter- and transdis-
ciplinary endeavors.
D. Conclusion
The development of the subject in the UK and Germany shows some initial similarities, but also
significant differences. The mobilization phase in Germany was long and drawn out, interrupted
for some decades, and mainly characterized by particular scholars. By comparison, in the UK, the
mobilization phase was shorter, but with key scholars and government action. In both countries,
its inclusion in university curriculums was more successful in law schools than in social sciences.
In Germany, inclusion finds its main expression in sociology of law lectures, while in the UK,
socio-legal studies are reflected across a multitude of modules. As a consequence, specialized
introductory books are more of a feature in Germany. Again, in both countries, lecturers are
mainly employed in law schools, and there is a preference for legally qualified staff. In
Germany, the state dominates legal education to a higher degree than in the UK. This is a result
of the state exams which define the professional careers of German law students. UK law faculties
are influenced by the rigidities of regular research evaluation exercises. The first results in ori-
enting studies towards black-letter law and towards the decisions of higher courts, while the sec-
ond points towards what stakeholders in the legal system regard as beneficial. Another
consequence of the dispersed nature of education in socio-legal studies in the UK is that the
Socio-Legal Studies Association attracts more scholars, and postgraduates, than its German coun-
terparts, allowing for a wider range of activities. In both countries, there are a plethora of pub-
lication outlets: In Germany, there is a greater concentration on one journal.
German sociology of law started earlier, but by the end of the 1970s, it had encountered strong
opposition, which arguably continues today. UK socio-legal studies is more of a success story,
although the core sociology of law element—as defined by Blankenburg’s insistence on sociologi-
cal theories and social science methods—was, and still is, the minority. Political motivations were
prominent, especially in Germany. They have boosted the development of socio-legal studies and
sociology of law, but because of their divisive character have also harmed the prospect of being
recognized in all quarters.
Clearly, sociology of law has not yet realized its full potential in Germany. The past suggests
that further developments in both countries depend on a number of factors. Funding support for
research will be important to broaden the range of findings, keeping pace with the developments
in society and its laws. The subject has to be represented in the universities’ curriculums, and more
students must become interested in studying it. An infrastructure of academic associations and
publication outlets is needed to attract scholars and bring different approaches together. To keep
scholars engaged with the subject, permanent positions in teaching and research are key to allow
them to concentrate on the field. In addition, dedicated research institutes can further strengthen
socio-legal studies and sociology of law. They allow for addressing problems that do not find
enough sustained attention in universities.
93ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1999).
94Travers, supra note 26, at 445.
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In the end, however, many people are focusing on social problems created by law, legal prob-
lems to be approached by social research, or theoretical endeavors driven by a disciplinary or
transdisciplinary approach that they may gain from each other’s work.
A final consideration: To have lasting careers in academia, scholars in both countries need a
strong disciplinary identity. It requires full credentials as typically a sociologist or lawyer. In the
German case, the two disciplines are miles apart. There still is a deep rift between what is essen-
tially an empirically oriented sociology working with theoretical tools that principally apply every-
where, and jurisprudence that is still mostly concentrating on norms formulated to guide the
application of state law. The UK example shows that the two disciplines can meet, no doubt.
But at present, they do so more often in the UK than in Germany.
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Abstract
Cultures of legal and socio-legal scholarship, like legal cultures themselves, are shaped by their respective
historical, cultural, economic, and socio-political context. Socio-legal—or law and society—studies are
thus pursued and taught differently in different parts of the world. This Article suggests making socio-
legal studies the object of comparative research, so as to understand and explain commonalities,
differences, and context dependencies in socio-legal scholarship and teaching in different countries.
Such comparative endeavors help to translate between different academic languages and to critically reflect
upon one’s own research methods and system of legal education. They prove useful for scholars planning
research in other parts of the world or engaging in cross-country collaborative research projects, and for
research institutions and policymakers involved in reforming research funding and legal education. But
how do we go about comparing socio-legal studies? More specifically, why, what, and how do we compare,
and what are the challenges that we may face when pursuing such comparative endeavors? This Article
gives an overview of potential research questions that a comparison between socio-legal studies may
address, the sources that comparativists may draw on, the methods such a comparative endeavor may
use to collect and analyze data, and the challenges researchers may face when attempting to compare
socio-legal studies in different parts of the world.
Keywords: Law and society studies; socio-legal scholarship and teaching; cross-country comparison; research methods;
Germany and UK
A. Introduction
What are socio-legal studies? The answer to this question might differ when posed in different
parts of the world. Socio-legal—or law and society—scholars in the US, Germany, or India might
describe their way of working and the scope of their research in different terms. Scholarly articles,
textbooks, and conferences on law and society in the UK, Japan, or Mexico might articulate differ-
ent understandings of the purpose of socio-legal scholarship. This is because cultures of legal and
socio-legal scholarship, like legal cultures themselves, are also shaped by their respective historical,
cultural, economic, and socio-political context. How socio-legal studies emerged and developed
over time, and how they are pursued and taught today thus differs, depending on where we are.
*Researcher at the Chair for Public and Comparative Law at Humboldt-University Berlin. In writing this Article I bene-
fitted greatly from my research stays at the Center for the Study of Law and Society at Berkeley Law and at the Centre for Law
and Society at the University of Cardiff. I wish to thank Naomi Creutzfeldt, Jen Hendry, and Christian Boulanger for their
feedback on an earlier draft of this Article.
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distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
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Reflections about socio-legal studies in specific countries—such as Germany1 or the UK,2 as
well as other parts of the world3—are not uncommon. They are, however, rarely comparative4 in
nature, and usually only focus on the development and operation of socio-legal studies in one
particular country. It is, however, especially the comparative angle that provides for interesting
insights about the context dependency of socio-legal research and teaching. Some aspects that
are of interest here, such as legal education5 or legal academia,6 have been addressed by studies
of comparative legal culture or comparative law (and society). There are, however, many more
topics to explore when comparing socio-legal studies in different parts of the world.
Scholarship engaging with sciences from a historical or sociological viewpoint—history of science,
sociology of science, or science studies—addresses questions regarding the development of
particular scientific fields and the impact of certain historical, political, cultural, or economic fac-
tors on that field. This scholarship, however, has largely focused on the natural sciences, rather
than the social sciences, and does not usually address fields such as legal—or socio-legal—studies.7
In this Article, I suggest that looking at socio-legal studies from a comparative angle—in other
words, making socio-legal studies the object of a comparative research project—is a very fruitful
endeavor. I will explain how scholars, research institutions, and policymakers may benefit from
such scholarly endeavors and how we can go about comparing the ways scholars pursue and teach
socio-legal studies—or legal studies more broadly, for that matter. In Section B, I will first suggest
some aims that a comparative project on socio-legal studies could pursue and some potential
research questions it could address. I will then deal with potential research objects, first by speak-
ing about questions of case selection—in Section C—and then by addressing sources and methods
of data collection—in Section D. In Section E, I will further inquire about how to pursue the kind
of comparative approach that I suggest in this Article by dealing with different methods of data
analysis. Lastly, in Section F, I will address potential challenges that such comparative endeavors
may face and provide a brief conclusion.
1See generally Stefan Machura, German Sociology of Law, 32 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 41 (2001) [hereinafter Machura, German
Sociology of Law]; Stefan Machura, Rechtssoziologie, in HANDBUCH SPEZIELLE SOZIOLOGIEN (Georg Kneer & Markus Schroer
eds., 2010); Doris Lucke, Germany, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (David S.
Clark ed., 2007); Stefan Machura, German Sociology of Law: A Case of Path Dependency, 8 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 506 (2012).
2See generally C.M. Campbell & Paul Wiles, The Study of Law in Society in Britain, 10 L. & SOC’Y REV. 547 (1976); David S.
Clark, United Kingdom, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1
[hereinafter Clark, United Kingdom]; Dermot Feenan, Exploring the ‘Socio’ of Socio-Legal Studies, in EXPLORING ‘SOCIO’
SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES (Dermot Feenan ed., 2013); Hilary Sommerlad, Developments in Socio-Legal Studies: Subjects and
Methodologies—the Anglo-Saxon Model, 36 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID (2015).
3For the Netherlands, see Marc Hertogh,Mind the (New) Gap: A Selective Survey of Current Law and Society Research in the
Netherlands, 8 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 137 (2012); for Denmark, see Ole Hammerslev & Mikael Rask Madsen, The Return of
Sociology in Danish Socio-Legal Studies: A Survey of Recent Trends, 10 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 397 (2014); for Portugal, see
Pierre Guibentif, Law in the Semi-Periphery: Revisiting an Ambitious Theory in the Light of Recent Portuguese Socio-Legal
Research, 10 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 538 (2014); for Belgium, see Stephan Parmentier, A Tale of Two Worlds: A (Very) Select
Overview of Socio-Legal Studies in Belgium, 12 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 81 (2016). For more information on this topic generally,
see the different country reports in the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 1.
4But see Naomi Creutzfeldt, Traditions of Studying the Social and the Legal: A Short Introduction to the Institutional and
Intellectual Development of Socio-Legal Studies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND METHODS (Naomi
Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason & Kirsten McConnachie eds., 2019); Stefan Machura,Milestones and Directions: Socio-Legal Studies
in Germany and the United Kingdom, in this issue [hereinafter Machura, Milestones and Directions].
5See Julian Webb, Education, Legal, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 1; David S. Clark, Legal Education, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY (David S. Clark ed., 2012).
6SeeCHRISTOPH SCHÖNBERGER, DER “GERMAN APPROACH”: DIE DEUTSCHE STAATSRECHTSLEHRE IMWISSENSCHAFTSVERGLEICH
(2015).
7On the sociology of science more broadly, see Mario Kaiser & Sabine Maasen, Wissenschaftssoziologie, in HANDBUCH
SPEZIELLE SOZIOLOGIEN, supra note 1.
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B. Why Compare Socio-Legal Studies? Aims of Comparison and Potential Research
Questions
Assessing how socio-legal studies are pursued and taught differently in different countries helps us
not only to understand and explain commonalities, differences, and context dependencies but also
to translate between different academic languages, and to reflect upon our own research methods
and techniques or the legal education in our home country. Such scholarly endeavors may take a
more sociological approach: Seeing socio-legal studies as a social institution and socio-legal schol-
ars as a sociological group. Or it may take a more historical approach: Assessing how the field of
socio-legal studies emerged in a particular context and as a reaction to particular events.
The findings of such a scholarly endeavor prove helpful for scholars planning research in other
parts of the world and for cross-country collaborative research projects. They also allow scholars
and institutions in different parts of the world to learn from each other, see potential gaps with
regard to their own research and teaching, and close these gaps. Some personal experience might
serve as an example here: Talking with socio-legal scholars from the US and the UK several years
ago, I first heard about the process of “getting through ethics” before carrying out fieldwork,
interviews, or ethnographic research. In the German law faculty, where I was based, legal scholars
did not have to approach an ethics committee to have their research project scrutinized before
pursuing such endeavors. The underlying assumption for why no such ethical scrutiny was needed
might have been that research in law means doctrinal research—or, potentially, research on legal
history—where ethical issues play no central role. But at German law faculties, too, some research-
ers engage in empirical research projects that might involve ethical questions. German law
faculties could thus learn from the institutional and procedural frameworks of foreign law faculties
and the experiences of scholars in other parts of the world, reflect upon their own practices, and
implement new standards and requirements. Comparative scholarship about socio-legal studies
goes beyond mere subjective impressions that researchers may collect during a research stay
abroad or through an informal conversation with foreign scholars at international conferences.
It provides us with systematic and objective findings, which are much more robust and reliable
than individual experiences, and thus serves the process of self-reflection and improvement much
better than vague personal impressions.
The findings of such a comparative endeavor on socio-legal studies may also be useful for
political decisionmakers who decide upon reforms regarding research funding and legal educa-
tion—most importantly, about the question of what kind of lawyers, judges, lawmakers, and legal
academics the country aspires to “produce” and whether a socio-legal approach in legal education
and scholarship may serve this purpose of educating good lawyers better than a purely doctrinal
approach. Foreign examples of socio-legal elements in research and teaching, again, may lead the
way for such reform. When we seek to assess how socio-legal scholarship and teaching differs in
different parts of the world, we can address a large variety of potential aspects. These aspects range
from the development of the field of socio-legal studies to the scholarly outcomes produced by
research, the methods used in pursuing this scholarship, the people who work in this field, the
institutions they work at, and the subjects that feature in teaching. Depending on our research
aim, our motivation, and our fields of interest, the research questions we pose will differ. A
few potential research topics and questions will be suggested here.
We may, for instance, look at the historical development of the field of socio-legal studies and
ask: When, how, and why did socio-legal scholarship emerge in a particular country? What was,
and is, the relationship between socio-legal studies and doctrinal legal scholarship? Which aims
inform socio-legal scholarship? What do socio-legal scholars perceive as important about their
work and where do they see their unique contribution? What role does the socio-legal approach
play in legal education?
We could also engage with the impact that socio-legal studies have had on the law and the legal
culture in a particular country by asking: Has the socio-legal education of young lawyers
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influenced how they think about and interpret the law when they later find themselves in the
positions of practicing lawyers, judges, lawmakers, or academics? And if so, has this different
way of thinking about the law shaped the legal landscape of the particular country—that is, does
the law look different in countries with strong elements of socio-legal education as compared to
those where law students are only trained in doctrinal law?
Other than that, we could compare the research topics that socio-legal scholarship addresses
and the research methods that scholars use across the globe by assessing: Which topics, which
areas of law, and which regions of the world feature most prominently in socio-legal research
and teaching? Which (inter)disciplinary methods do researchers use to deal with these topics
and why?
We may also think about the institutional context of socio-legal studies and inquire: Where are
socio-legal studies pursued—at universities or other research institutions, in law faculties, or in
sociology departments? How does the institutional context, including the possibilities of state- or
third-party funding, affect socio-legal research and teaching?
Another aspect of comparison would be to look at researchers’ biographies, their self-perception,
and their perceptionof the field of socio-legal studies, by asking:What are the academic backgrounds
of socio-legal scholars? Which personal experiences led them to pursue a particular socio-legal
project? How do researchers perceive the role of the field of socio-legal studies and how do they
see their own role as socio-legal scholars within that field?
Once we are clear about our research aim and have chosen a corresponding research question,
the next step is to decide about the objects of our comparative endeavor: First and foremost, the
countries that we seek to compare.
C. What to Compare? Questions of Case Selection and the Examples of Germany and
the UK
When comparing socio-legal studies, general questions that we ask—for instance, in comparative
law, or comparative endeavors more generally—become important. One such question is about
how we select the entities that we seek to engage with for the comparison to be meaningful—in
the case of a cross-country comparison, the countries whose socio-legal studies landscape we seek
to study and juxtapose. Mill distinguished between comparisons that look at very different cases in
order to explain a common variable—“method of agreement”—or very similar cases that differ in a
particular aspect in order to explain a variable that the two units do not share—“method of differ-
ence.”8 In the words of Creutzfeldt, Kubal, and Pirie, “the comparison may start from an assumption
of similarity—in form, purposes or context—in order to identify significant differences or it may
identify significant similarity across social and cultural divides.”9 Hirschl distinguishes even further
and mentions five different ways of case selection: To choose 1) “most similar cases”; 2) “most differ-
ent cases”; 3) “prototypical cases”; 4) “most difficult cases”; or 5) “outlier cases.”10
Another question is howmany entities we choose to compare. As with the question of case selec-
tion, this choice certainly depends on the aim that we seek to pursue by making the comparison.
Single case studies or small-N studies—those that involve only one or a few countries—allow for
detailed analysis and provide in-depth insights, while large-N studies—comparisons involving
many countries—allow for more generalizability.11
8JOHN STUART MILL, OF THE FOUR METHODS OF EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY, COMPARATIVE METHODS IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (Alan Sica ed., 2006) (1843).
9Naomi Creutzfeldt, Agnieszka Kubal & Fernanda Pirie, Introduction: Exploring the Comparative in Socio-Legal Studies, 12
INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 377, 386 (2016).
10Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125 (2005).
11See also Creutzfeldt et al., supra note 9.
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If we look at Germany and the UK, we notice both similarities and differences with regard to
the emergence and development of the field of socio-legal studies. In both countries, socio-legal
approaches developed in opposition to mainstream “black letter law” or traditional doctrinal legal
studies. Socio-legal approaches were “proclaimed as radically different from the work previously
done in law departments in general, and by jurisprudential scholars in particular,”12 and as “anti-
mainstream within jurisprudence.”13
In Germany, the sociology of law emerged comparatively early, in the wake of the 20th century.
Importantly, unlike other special areas of sociology, the sociology of law was not founded and
pursued primarily by sociologists, but by lawyers.14 In the 1960s and 1970s, German law schools
witnessed a second wave in which the sociology of law enjoyed particular prominence in research
and teaching. In a third wave that has continued since the new millennium, the field has further
diversified and been featured under different labels, including the sociology of law, law and soci-
ety, or law in context studies and interdisciplinary legal research—here, collectively referred to as
socio-legal studies. Despite its 100-year-long tradition, however, to date, socio-legal scholarship
remains marginalized in Germany. In 2007, one commentator wrote:
In Germany, there exists no scientific sociology of law community with an established
association or elaborate academic visibility comparable to the Law and Society
Association in the United States. Rather, there is a weakly tied circle of lawyers, sensitized
in sociological thinking and informed about certain issues, and another group, consisting of
sociologists interested in law. Both groups shift in the no-man’s land between sociological
jurisprudence and legal sociology. They are homeless minds in the landscape of German uni-
versities, outlaws in legal faculties and outsiders in the social sciences. Qualification in both
subjects is unusual, and most have other responsibilities in teaching and research as well.15
While this situation has changed somewhat in the thirteen years since that comment was
published, with the establishment of new institutes and research groups—which I will address
below—overall, socio-legal studies remain a niche area in German legal scholarship and legal
education. Demands by the German Council of Science and Humanities for a stronger socio-legal
approach—through “strengthening the foundational subjects [which include sociology of law],
intensifying exchanges within and outside the discipline and opening up legal scholarship towards
other academic disciplines”16—have so far not led to visible changes in German legal education.
This differs significantly from the UK. Here, the emergence of socio-legal studies occurred
somewhat later than in Germany and has its origins in the 1960s. But the development of the
field was steadier and reached a broader audience. Scholars have even held that “socio-legal study
is now the dominant approach taken by most academics in British university law schools,” at least
when using a broad definition and understanding socio-legal studies as “the use of concepts or
methods taken from the social sciences and humanities in the study of legal phenomena,” and
including the work of those using critical legal theory approaches.17
12Campbell & Wiles, supra note 2, at 549. For a juxtaposition on doctrinal legal scholarship and socio-legal studies in
Germany, see Julika Rosenstock, Tobias Singelnstein & Christian Boulanger, Versuch über das Sein und Sollen der
Rechtsforschung: Bestandsaufnahme eines interdisziplinären Forschungsfeldes, in INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG:
EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE GEISTES- UND SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE BEFASSUNG MIT DEM RECHT UND SEINER PRAXIS
(Christian Boulanger, Julika Rosenstock & Tobias Singelnstein eds., 2019).
13Machura, German Sociology of Law, supra note 1, at 506.
14Id.
15Lucke, supra note 1.
16WISSENSCHAFTSRAT, PROSPECTS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN GERMANY: CURRENT SITUATION, ANALYSES, RECOMMENDATIONS
13 (2012), https://www.wissenschaftsrat.de/download/archiv/2558-12_engl.pdf.
17Clark, United Kingdom, supra note 2.
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I will revisit the examples of socio-legal studies in Germany and the UK—in the following
sections on sources, methods, and challenges in comparative endeavors—to illustrate my broader
arguments and suggestions.
D. What to Compare? Sources and Methods of Data Collection
What do we look at when we seek to compare socio-legal studies? Again, potential objects of
research are manifold. They include—among others—research institutions, publications,
socio-legal scholars, and teaching, as I will elaborate in the following sections. The choice of
research objects is closely linked to the choice of methods for data gathering. In particular, when
we research in and about a country that is not our home country, the feasibility of the data col-
lection needs to be considered carefully. “If we want to go beyond ‘comparison by juxtaposition’
we will need to establish some sort of working relationship with those who knowmore about other
systems than we do,” states Nelken.18 He distinguishes three different approaches in conducting
research in a foreign environment: 1) “[B]eing virtually there”—the researcher relies on reports
and scholarship by local experts; 2) “researching there”—short research visits to the respective
country, for instance, to conduct interviews; and 3) “living there”—conducting ethnographic
research over a long period of time, for instance, as an “observing participant.”19 Our choice
of a research object determines our choice of how to conduct the research and collect the data,
and vice versa. For instance, if we seek to study journal articles to learn more about socio-legal
studies in a particular country, “being virtually there” might suffice for our research project. If,
however, we attempt an ethnographic study of a particular socio-legal research institution, “living
there” or “researching there” is a precondition.
I. Institutions
Studying institutions of socio-legal scholarship provides us with insights about the locales in
which socio-legal studies emerged and through which socio-legal scholars—or the socio-legal
“movement,” as it has been termed—stay connected. I understand institutions here in a broad
sense, including not only university departments, research clusters, centers, and independent
research institutes but also socio-legal associations, conferences, publishing houses, journals,
and blogs. I thus refer to journals and blogs not as conglomerates of the articles therein—in other
words, the publications that I address below—but as institutional entities, which through their
editorial boards or their members and their agreed upon thematic focuses position themselves
as actors in the field of socio-legal studies.
In the UK, the law schools at the Universities of Warwick and Kent, which were founded by the
government in the late 1960s, were dedicated to the study of “law in context.”20 Later, several other
law schools, including those at Birkbeck College, London, Cardiff, and Keele, as well as the
London School of Economics, joined Warwick and Kent in their socio-legal approaches.21 In
1972, the University of Oxford created the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies. In the same year, a
number of academic lawyers and social scientists organized the Socio-Legal Group to hold regular
conferences.22 In 1990, the group developed into the Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA),
which runs one of the key annual conferences on socio-legal studies. Central journals for
socio-legal research include the Journal of Law and Society, Feminist Legal Studies, the
International Journal for the Sociology of Law, Social and Legal Studies, Law and Policy, and
18David Nelken, Doing Research into Comparative Criminal Justice, in THEORY AND METHOD IN SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH
284 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2005).
19Id.
20Clark, United Kingdom, supra note 2.
21Id.
22Feenan, supra note 2.
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Law and Critique.23 Furthermore, longstanding law journals, such as Legal Studies, also largely
publish socio-legal research.24
In Germany, the second wave of socio-legal studies in the 1960s and 1970s led to the establish-
ment of university institutes and chairs to focus on the sociology of law, both in the faculties of law
and, less often, in the social science faculties. Two of these newly established institutes included the
Institut für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstatsachenforschung at Free University Berlin and the
Arbeitskreis für Rechtssoziologie at the University of Cologne.25 The Universities of Stuttgart,
Freiburg, Konstanz, and Munich—and later Halle—followed.26 Since 1972, sociologists of law
have organized in the Sektion Rechtssoziologie of the German Sociological Association and, since
1976, in the Vereinigung für Rechtssoziologie—later renamed Vereinigung für Recht & Gesellschaft.
A third wave of socio-legal activity has occurred since the new millennium, with the establishment
of the Law and Society Institute—today the Integrative Research Institute Law & Society—in
2008, the research Network Law in Context (Recht im Kontext) in 2010—both at Humboldt
University—and the Käte Hamburger Kolleg Law as Culture (Recht als Kultur) in 2010, at the
University of Bonn. In 2019, the Institut für Sozialforschung in Hamburg and the Chair for
Rechtssoziologie of the University of Bern formed a new Research Cluster on Legal Sociology.
Socio-legal studies also take place at different Max Planck Institutes—such as the one for the
Study of Societies in Cologne and the one for Social Anthropology in Halle—which bring together
international researchers from around the world who contribute to discussions with new
perspectives. In Germany, the main medium for socio-legal studies is Zeitschrift für
Rechtssoziologie. Other journals that publish theoretical or empirical research on law and society
include Kritische Justiz, Rechtstheorie, Demokratie und Recht. More recently, blogs, such as
Rechtswirklichkeit,27 have also become important sites for the dissemination of socio-legal
scholarship.
For the purpose of comparing these and other institutions, data can be gathered in different
ways. First of all, we can use texts about sites of socio-legal studies as data. This could be self-
descriptions of certain institutions, such as university departments, associations and conferences,
conference reports, or scholars’ descriptions about specific institutions. Articles in journals or the
self-descriptions of particular journals on their websites and through editorials also serve as data.
Seron, Coutin, and White Meeusen, for instance, studied addresses delivered by presidents of the
US Law and Society Association (LSA) and LSA meeting calls. They argue that these “demonstrate
how the boundaries of the field are established and contested.”28
To collect data on institutions, we may also draw on ethnography and conduct fieldwork in a
particular locale of socio-legal research, such as a research center, an association, or a conference.
The methods used in organizational ethnography29 might be helpful here. For instance, observa-
tional research, a well-established strategy to study the performance of organizational settings,30
can be used to gather data about sites of socio-legal studies. It requires that the process of obser-
vation is recorded through field notes, which then serve as a—necessarily selective—representa-
tion of what occurred.31
23See Clark, United Kingdom, supra note 2.
24Id.
25See Lucke, supra note 1.
26Id.
27RECHTSWIRKLICHKEIT, https://barblog.hypotheses.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2020).
28Carroll Seron, Susan Bibler Coutin & Pauline White Meeusen, Is There a Canon of Law and Society?, 9 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 287, 287 (2013).
29On the ethnography of organizations, see HELEN B. SCHWARTZMAN, ETHNOGRAPHY IN ORGANIZATIONS (1995); see also
ORGANIZATIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY: STUDYING THE COMPLEXITIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE (Sierk Ybema et al. eds., 2009).
30Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Law and Sociology, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND




A second object of research could be publications. Here, I speak about the texts that have been
published, rather than the journals or publishing houses that I mentioned above in the section on
institutions. A first set of publications worth analyzing are monographs and articles that engage
with specific socio-legal phenomena and are located at the interface of law and other disciplines,
including anthropology, cultural studies, economics, geography, history, international relations,
philosophy, politics, psychology, and sociology. A second set of texts worth studying includes
reflections upon the emergence and development of the field of socio-legal studies, and its meth-
ods, aims, and shortcomings. Textbooks often provide both an overview of the field as well as
detailed engagements with specific socio-legal questions.32 Comparing textbooks cross-nationally
“can give a sense of the way the field is conceptualized and taught in different states” and allows
the reader to “see the field through different eyes.”33
Publications can tell us, among other aspects, something about the history of socio-legal studies
and its protagonists, the topics that socio-legal scholarship addresses, the countries it is mostly
concerned with, and the methods that socio-legal researchers use. At the same time, by merely
looking at the written text, a number of questions usually remain unanswered. For instance, these
could regard scholars’motivation for delving into the particular research project and their broader
aims in pursuing socio-legal studies. Therefore, we have to engage with scholars themselves to get
a more coherent picture of socio-legal scholarship.
III. Scholars
Scholars and their biographies are a third potential object of research when comparing socio-legal
studies in different parts of the world. Textbooks and articles about socio-legal studies frequently
relate the history of the field by referring to a number of influential—mostly male—scholars
and their key texts.34 Commentators thereby frequently invoke those scholars’ biographies as well
as the socio-political context in which they lived as being particularly influential in shaping scholars’
research, and thereby the development of the field of socio-legal studies or a particular subfield.
When speaking about Eugen Ehrlich, for instance, commentators rarely fail to address the fact that
Ehrlich lived in the Bukowina—a rural region where official state law played a subordinate role and
people instead tended to organize their lives according to various customary norms—to explain why
Ehrlich came up with his concept of living law.35 Commentators have also shown that national
socialism in Germany destroyed the early attempts of socio-legal studies and pushed out Jewish
socio-legal scholars.36 With respect to the UK, researchers have demonstrated how British
scholars—who had gained experiences with law and society studies in the US—brought their
knowledge back to the UK, thereby transforming both British scholarship and teaching.37
It is not only the personal history, but also the academic background of socio-legal studies, that is
informative when assessing socio-legal studies. As Machura points out, unlike in the UK, in German
law schools, permanent employment usually requires legal qualifications and thus excludes social
32See SUSANNE BAER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE: EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG (2d ed. 2015).
33ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 32, 34 (2017).
34On the role of the “canon” in socio-legal studies, see Carroll Seron & Susan S. Silbey, Profession, Science, and Culture: An
Emergent Canon of Law and Society Research, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Austin Sarat ed., 2004);
see also Seron et al., supra note 28.
35Machura, German Sociology of Law, supra note 1, at 41; BAER, supra note 32, at 30; Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Vision of Social-
Legal Change: Rescuing Ehrlich from “Living Law,“ 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 297, 311 (2011); Walter Fuchs, Erkundung der
Theorielandschaft: Klassische rechtssoziologische Ansätze, in INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG: EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN
DIE GEISTES- UND SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE BEFASSUNG MIT DEM RECHT UND SEINER PRAXIS, supra note 12, at 34–35.
36See Thomas Raiser, Krise der Rechtssoziologie in Deutschland, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (July 26, 2007).
37See Creutzfeldt, supra note 4, at 15–16.
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scientists.38 This means that socio-legal scholarship taking place at German law schools is conducted
by scholars formally trained in law and not usually in sociology or any other discipline.
Studying scholars and their experiences and views allows us to assess “a mass of lived expe-
rience and wisdom”39 about socio-legal studies, which we can access using different methods of
data collection. Autobiographical, oral, or written accounts by scholars who reflect upon their own
role in shaping the field of socio-legal studies provide for interesting data. The Centre for Law and
Society at the University of Cardiff, for instance, makes available online the videos of a “socio-legal
conversation” series in which scholars narrate their personal stories.40 We may also conduct
(expert) interviews or surveys with scholars ourselves. Cownie, for instance, examined “the every-
day lives of legal academics, their attitudes towards, and beliefs about, teaching, research and ad-
ministration, their contacts with colleagues in other institutions” by conducting semi-structured
interviews with academics teaching and researching law in English universities.41 Creutzfeldt
interviewed British and US-American socio-legal scholars to assess “how the interviewees expe-
rienced and saw themselves during the socio-legal movement” and to “give voice to some of the
personal developments that coincided with and contributed to the institutional development of
law and society.”42 She notes that “being a socio-legal scholar today means something very differ-
ent to being a socio-legal scholar 50 years ago.”43 In her interviews with the early generation of
socio-legal scholars, she noticed in particular their “emotions and enthusiasm about wanting to
make a difference and needing to change the status quo”—something that she misses among
today’s scholars, whose agendas are too often guided by “a notion of angst” about promotion,
tenure, or research funding, “rather than wanting to change the world.”44
While research is the one central pillar of the professional life of academic scholars, teaching is the
other, and I suggest making it a fourth object of research in the attempt to compare socio-legal
studies.
IV. Teaching
Looking at how law in general and socio-legal studies in particular are taught at different insti-
tutions around the world could help answer the question of whether the aim of the early socio-
legal studies, which was “to broaden the study of law from within” or to teach “contextual law,”45
has been fulfilled. In the UK, scholars have held that socio-legal studies are today “an important
dimension of mainstream legal education,”46 thereby referring to findings that about half of the
British legal academics claim to adopt a socio-legal approach in their teaching, and many others
believe it is important to refer to “contextual issues” in their teaching.47 For Germany, scholars
have pointed out that socio-legal studies play a less important role in legal education than the core
doctrinal subjects: The sociology of law usually features in the German legal curriculum only as an
electiveGrundlagenfach (foundational subject), and scholars perceive it as an “auxiliary science” to
the law.48 Scholarship has also shown that while most universities offer courses on law and society,
38See Machura, Milestones and Directions, supra note 4.
39Creutzfeldt, supra note 4, at 9.
40Centre of Law and Society, CARDIFF U., https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/research/explore/research-units/centre-of-law-and-
society (last visited Aug. 5, 2020). For a similar format offered by the Center for the Study of Law and Society at
Berkeley Law, see Conversations in Law and Society, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/
center-for-the-study-of-law-society/conversations-in-law-and-society/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2020).
41FIONA COWNIE, LEGAL ACADEMICS CULTURES AND IDENTITIES 2 (2004).
42Creutzfeldt, supra note 4, at 10.
43Id. at 32.
44Creutzfeldt, supra note 4, at 32.
45Campbell & Wiles, supra note 2, at 550.
46Sommerlad, supra note 2, at 60.
47COWNIE, supra note 41.
48Machura, German Sociology of Law, supra note 1, at 42.
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the teaching of socio-legal topics in law faculties and sociology departments runs somewhat par-
allel, without any connections.49
Curricula, course descriptions, syllabi, and teaching modules are important data here. Seron,
Coutin, and White Meeusen, for instance, compared eighteen syllabi of law and society courses—
as taught around the United States—in order to compile a list of commonly assigned books and
articles.50 They categorize the key texts that form part of this list into five broad themes: 1)
“Situating Law and Society,” 2) “Disputing—Individual and Collective,” 3) “Law and Social
Change,” 4) “Law in Everyday Life,” and 5) “Law as Institution.” In a similar fashion,
Dollmaier and De Souza analyzed course descriptions of university courses across the globe
on “Law and Development” and found “highly diverse approaches to both ‘law’ as well as
‘development.’”51 Apart from gathering such textual material, we can also generate data through
the observation of classes or surveys, and interviews with teachers and students.
As this short overview has shown, we have a number of methods of data collection at hand
when studying research institutions, publications, scholars, and teaching to understand socio-legal
studies. The data collected can be large aggregate data—such as textbooks or articles—or smaller
sets of properly, randomly selected, samples of data—such as course descriptions or surveys—as
well as observations, conversations, and (expert) interviews. Having chosen our research object
and a method of data collection, a next question in our endeavor to assess socio-legal studies
in different parts of the world would be to choose a method to analyze the data collected and
actually compare the findings from our research in different contexts.
E. How to Compare? Methods of Data Analysis
To assess the data we have collected—such as textbooks, articles, course descriptions, or tran-
scribed interviews—and actually pursue a comparison, again, we have a number of very different
methods at our disposal. We can distinguish between qualitative and quantitative methods of data
analysis. Quantitative methods serve to test or confirm theories and assumptions, and enable
researchers to establish generalizable facts about a topic. Qualitative methods help to understand
concepts, thoughts, or experiences, and to gather in-depth insights. Here again, the specific
research question we have in mind paves the way to the method we should choose. Therefore,
there is no “correct” method as such. In this section, I mention a few selected methods to suggest
options for the analysis and comparison of data on socio-legal studies, leaving aside a vast number
of other methods that might serve this purpose too. The methods I discuss are content analysis,
critical discourse analysis, thick description, causal process tracing, and framing analysis.
The attempted research project could seek to assess which topics, areas of law, and regions of
the world feature most prominently in socio-legal research and teaching, and which (inter)disci-
plinary methods researchers use most often. Such questions can be tackled with content analysis.
Content analysis observes patterns of content in a given text to draw text-external inferences. It
does so by annotating the text with different codes to assess the absolute or relative frequencies of
words, or larger syntactic or semantic units in a given text corpus.52 For example, to explore how
international law is understood and taught differently in different parts of the world, and how
“nationalized” or “denationalized” the field is in different contexts, scholarship has assessed
the content of international law textbooks from different states—in particular, whether the books
primarily cited domestic, international, or foreign case law.53
49See Barbara Heitzmann, Lehre der Rechtssoziologie an deutschen Hochschulen, 25 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE
249 (2003).
50Seron et al., supra note 28, at 287.
51THOMAS DOLLMAIER & SIDDHARTH DE SOUZA, BEYOND “MOMENTS” AND INTO DIFFERENT “TIME ZONES”?: EXPLORING
THE TEACHING OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (forthcoming).
52See STEFAN TITSCHER, MICHAEL MEYER, RUTHWODAK & EVA VETTER, METHODS OF TEXT AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: IN
SEARCH OF MEANING (2000).
53See ROBERTS, supra note 33.
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Other scholars looked at the shifts in the subject area of books and journal articles on political
economy to learn more about the identity and the development of the field,54 and to find out about
the methods that are primarily used in the respective research projects and the gender and country
of origin of the authors.55 Content analysis of specific journals, textbooks, book series, conference
proceedings, blogs, and newsletters from the field of law and society could identify which thematic
focuses featured prominently in different countries, how these focuses shifted over time, or which
methods socio-legal scholars have predominantly used. With respect to the UK, Clark holds that
some areas—among them, civil and criminal justice, family law, and gender relations—have
received great attention among the socio-legal community, while others areas—such as land law
and equity—have been largely neglected.56 He also states that in socio-legal research in the UK,
large-scale empirical research is “relatively underdeveloped,” and that “most socio-legal work has
focused on theoretical analysis, policy work, qualitative analysis, or small-scale empirical enquiry.”57
Content analysis could support these claims with statistical data and compare the findings from the
UK with those from other parts of the world.
If we seek to go beyond very specific questions on the content of specific text corpuses—and are
instead interested in broader discourses in the field of socio-legal studies over a long period of time
and across countries—we could assess and compare these, with the help of discourse analysis, and
relate them to their respective social, cultural, and political context. Discourse analysis is the analy-
sis of relationships between a text or other forms of concrete language use and its social condi-
tions, ideologies, and power relations.58 Discourse analysis is interpretative, explanatory, and
based on the premise that discourses “are not only embedded in a particular culture, ideology
or history, but are also connected intertextually to other discourses.”59
If our research project regards a particular site of socio-legal knowledge production—a
research center, a conference, an association—and the people that interact in this site, we may
use methods such as thick description,60 a method used, among others, in anthropology, sociology,
and history. Thick description “refers to an idea of highly detailed, intricate description of par-
ticularities, emphasising personal experience of a culture ‘from the inside,’ or through a kind of
empathy allowing sensitive, rich appreciation of the outlook of those living in a particular envi-
ronment.”61 This includes the scientific observation of people’s behavior, and not only the descrip-
tion of that behavior, but also their subjective explanations for their behavior and the context in
which these people act, to add deeper meaning to the observation.
Another central question we may pose in our research pertains to the impact that the socio-legal
studies “movement” had on traditional legal studies and teaching, andwhether and how it has shaped
the way legal academics, practicing lawyers, and lay people think about the law. Creutzfeldt,
Mason, and McConnachie state that “[s]ocio-legal studies has had an enormous influence on legal
scholarship” in that it has challenged assumptions about “the nature of law, rules and legal thought;
the relationship between law and ethics, morality and religion; law, government, and governance; and
law and community,” and provided “an understanding of the meaning of legal culture and legal
54See J.P. Sharman & Catherine Weaver, RIPE, the American School and Diversity in Global IPE, 20 REV. INT’L POL. ECON.
1082 (2013); Renate Mayntz, Changing Perspectives in Political Economy (July 2019) (unpublished Discussion Paper 19/6,
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung) (on file with author).
55See Lima, Enzo, Melina Morschbacher & Paulo Peres, Three Decades of the International Political Science Review (IPRS):
A Map of Methodological Preferences in IPRS Articles, 39 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 679 (2018).
56Clark, United Kingdom, supra note 2.
57Id.
58See TITSCHER ET AL., supra note 52, at 146.
59Id.
60See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS (1973).
61Roger Cotterrell, Comparative Sociology of Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 47.
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consciousness.”62 And indeed, inmany countries, legal scholarship and teaching today looks different
than it did fifty or 100 years ago. The role that the socio-legal studiesmovement has played in this shift
can be assessed through causal process tracing. Causal process tracing is engaged with revealing “the
process that leads from a causal factor to an outcome” and “makes it possible to enhance the internal
validity of a causal claim that ‘xmatters.’”63 It is particularly useful when we seek to not only explain a
single important social event, but to identify and explain more generally the necessary and sufficient
conditions that lead to a specific type of outcome.64 With the help of causal process tracing, we could
also assess other causal relations—for instance, how the field of socio-legal studies was shaped by
particular personalities and their biographies—by particular research projects and influential
publications, or by political decisions regarding university regulation and funding. With respect to
the UK, Clark stresses the impact of the “personal inclinations of the relatively small number of
scholars” on the development of the field.65 He also refers to the importance of the “availability of
external funding, the research needs of various government departments and charitable trusts, and
the activities of a variety of pressure groups” in shaping the development of socio-legal studies.66
Causal process tracing could disentangle these different impact factors and compare the developments
in the UK with those in other countries.
Lastly, if we are interested in analyzing how the socio-legal studies movements in different
countries “re-framed” discourses about the law, we might draw on frame analysis. This method
includes a variety of approaches to studying social constructions of reality, or how people
understand specific situations and activities. Goffman, who is credited with coining the term
“frame analysis,” understood a frame to be the culturally determined definitions of reality that
allow people to make sense of objects and events.67 But the term has since been used in various
forms and by scholars of different disciplines, including social movement studies and political
communication.68 Frames call our attention to particular aspects and direct our attention away
from others,69 and can thus be used by movements or other forms of organized interest to guide
audiences in a particular direction and to certain conclusions and actions.
Thus, with regard to methods of data collection, methods of data analysis vary widely, and our
choice of one or several of these methods depends most importantly on our research aim and our
research question. While each method has its advantages, all of them also bear challenges that
need to be kept in mind.
F. What to Keep in Mind? Challenges of Comparative Endeavors on Law and Society
Studies and Concluding Thoughts
As with other socio-legal or comparative legal endeavors, projects seeking to assess socio-legal
studies in different parts of the world also confront challenges, five of which I want to briefly
discuss here.
62Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason & Kirsten McConnachie, Socio-Legal Theory and Methods: Introduction, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND METHODS, supra note 4, at 3.
63JOACHIM BLATTER & MARKUS HAVERLAND, DESIGNING CASE STUDIES: EXPLANATORY APPROACHES IN SMALL-N
RESEARCH 79 (2012).
64Id. at 80.
65Clark, United Kingdom, supra note 2.
66Id.
67See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974).
68See Mieke Verloo,Mainstreaming Gender Equality in Europe: A Critical Frame Analysis Approach, 117 GREEK REV. SOC.
RES. 11, 20 (2005) (defining policy framing as “an organising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information
into a structured and meaningful policy problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly enclosed”).
69See Martin Rein & Donald Schön, Frame-Reflective Policy Discourse, in SOCIAL SCIENCES AND MODERN STATES:
NATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND THEORETICAL CROSSROADS (Peter Wagner, Carol Hirschon Weiss, Björn Wittrock &
Hellmut Wollman eds., 1991).
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First, socio-legal studies is a vast field of scholarship that includes a huge number of subfields,
and sometimes its contours are not quite clear. Feenan has prominently asked what the “socio” in
socio-legal studies means and pointed out that “[a] number of studies define it in terms of the
study of law in its social context. Some other studies broaden that context to include the ‘political
and economic’ : : : or add the ‘cultural’ : : : . However, the precise relationship between these fields
is rarely elaborated.”70 Due to this broadness of the field and its loose definition, any comparative
endeavor will have to deal with a vast amount of material and must necessarily be selective when
deciding about the data to deal with. Setting clear boundaries for our specific research project and
stipulating clear methods on how to select representative data is thus crucial.
Second, socio-legal studies might use different media and different forms of knowledge distri-
bution in different countries. While the textbook, for example, is a prominent form of publication
in socio-legal studies in Germany and the dominant tool in teaching, this is not so much the case
in the UK, where academic papers might be more important. We thus need to pay attention in the
data selection to ensure that we do not overlook a particularly important medium, but we also
must not compare apples with oranges.
Third, different terminology is used in different languages to refer to similar things. This has
already begun with terms such as socio-legal studies, law and society studies, sociology of law, and
empirical or interdisciplinary legal research, but it might also be relevant with regard to research
methods and the like. Being aware of these different terminologies is crucial when, for instance,
browsing through databases of journals or coding journal articles.
Fourth, those scholars with a legal education are often not formally trained in using empirical
methods and often not familiar with nonlegal literatures and concepts. Attempting to pursue a
research project for which doctrinal analysis is not enough and seeking to speak to an audience
beyond the field of law, however, demands us to be familiar with those sets of methods, concepts,
and literature that are used in the social sciences. This requires self-teaching or pursuing courses to
acquire those skills and knowledge, an endeavor that might be time consuming and challenging.
Finally, a number of those challenges that comparative endeavors naturally encounter play a
role in the comparison of socio-legal studies too. Among other aspects, this concerns questions
regarding language barriers and the possibilities to pursue research abroad.
If, however, we overcome these challenges, the endeavor to compare socio-legal studies in dif-
ferent parts of the world promises fruitful outcomes. As I suggested in this Article, it allows us to
assess a number of aspects, ranging from the historical development of socio-legal studies to the
role of research institutions and the lives of socio-legal scholars. The research questions, objects of
research, and methodological approaches that I suggested in this Article are certainly not com-
prehensive, and comparative endeavors may well look at other aspects and use other tools. Ideally,
such comparative endeavors should not only take into account the usual suspects of countries in
Europe and North America, but also look at socio-legal studies in other parts of the world, par-
ticularly in the global South. The outcomes of such comparative studies would certainly enrich our
understanding of socio-legal scholarship and contribute to a cross-national dialogue.
70Feenan, supra note 2, at 4.
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Abstract
Gender in socio-legal teaching and research in Germany is a story of impediments, hindrances, and of
single-person initiatives—my personal history being a part of this. But it is also a story of influences upon
the impulse and inspiration to undertake socio-legal work. My Article is therefore influenced by (feminist)
standpoint theory (Harding 1991). Germany has had a very conservative family culture and, over the past
decades, many of the legal regulations that infringed upon women have had to be adapted, in what was
quite a tedious political process, to comply with the German Constitution’s gender equality clause. Only in
the past decade has gender awareness in law faculties increased and gained acceptance, usually as a result of
greater focus on diversity issues, and anti-discrimination legislation. Obstacles have resulted from a lack of
cooperation between the actors in social sciences and law, as well as in academia and gender equality
practice, and a lack of understanding between more conservative and more progressive women. Socio-legal
research was, and is, needed to deliver empirical evidence and provide theoretical foundations for cultural
and legal changes as societies progress towards gender equality. Socio-legal teaching is needed to alert law-
yers to necessary change, to enable them to undertake informed critique, and to prepare them to act. There
are, however, marked deficits in socio-legal teaching and research on gender. In spite of an increased politi-
cal acceptance, gender equality is still mainly a women’s project.
Keywords: gender; sociology of law; Germany; academia; gender equality practice
A. Gender in Sociology of Law
What is the role of gender in sociology of law, and what is the relevance of sociology and law for
gender? Law has traditionally been made by men, and even if today women and others are
included in the law-making process, this demands a critical view of legal norms from a gender
perspective. Among other goals, this Article aims to provide that view by raising questions
and identifying where empirical and theoretical socio-legal research can and has contributed
to the law-making process. For example: Does law do justice to all? Are legal regulations fair?
In terms of such queries, empirical and sociological research can help to find deficits and discrep-
ancies. Further questions include: In what way does sex or gender matter in legal professional
work? Are there differences in acting and decision-making? In this regard, sociological theory
can help explain power relations and bring previously unseen gender effects to the attention
of society.
The operation of sex and gender in society, and their influence on law and vice versa, is not only
the subject of socio-legal teaching and research, but also of performance and transformation in
*Ulrike Schultz is a lawyer and senior academic at FernUniversität in Hagen, Germany. She has set up and organized several
education programs, including women and law, legal skills training, and virtual international gender studies.
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arts, along with providing a basis for political action and social measures. Given the historical
development and circumstances, this activist element is particularly important and strong.
Speaking about gender in Germany needs a clarification in terminology. We use the term
“Geschlecht” to refer to the biological sexes, the socially constructed gender, the genitals, and
the ancestry or old family. The word “sex” is about sexual intercourse. As Anglo-American schol-
ars and politicians were trailblazers and influenced the discussion in Europe, the English word
“gender” became common in German academia, being used for sex and gender issues. The result
of this was confusion and friction across the population at large, who neither understood the term
nor the concept. This, further, had the effect of weakening action for gender equality, and provid-
ing a fertile ground for anti-genderist movements and polemics. The picture has since become
ever more complex as—beyond the initial dichotomy of the sexes, with men on one side and
women on the other—trans- and intersex—that is, diverse sexes and genders—now have to
be included.
B. A Personal Account of the Beginnings, the 1960s and Early 1970s
Sociology of Law became a study subject in German law faculties in the course of the students’move-
ment of the 1960s—now colloquially referred to as the “68 movement.” In 1969 or 1970, I attended
the first seminar in the sociology of law at the Chair of Andreas Heldrich at the University of Münster.
The first socio-legal paper I heard was by Klaus Ziegert1 on Podgorecki, and I also remember a paper
on “Divorce in Ticino and Comasco,” which was just about the procedure, and not about either men’s
or women’s specific problems, within divorce proceedings. Gender and women’s issues were still
largely absent. Particular note should be made of the social context at that time; if families could afford
it, then women—usually middle class women—were housewives in charge of the “interior” life of the
family while men were the breadwinners and the family’s agent in the outside world.
Research on Knowledge and Opinion about Law (KoL) in the 1960s2 had delivered empirical data
on a general remoteness of women from the law—for example, women had been to law courts less
often than men, had fewer contacts with lawyers, and would try to avoid legal action—noting what
was referred to as women’s “negative legal consciousness.”3 There were few female law students: In
the early 1960s, only ten to fifteen percent of the law students were female, rising to seventeen per-
cent by 1970. When women—with their higher voices—were asked to talk in a lecture, a loud laugh-
ter of many male throats resonated through the room, with the effect of—intentionally or not—
creating doubt about the competence of the speaker. The result of this was that in seminars, women
rarely raised their voices—a situation that has been described as “women´s classroom silence.”4
It can thus be said that the law had neglected women’s particular needs and had yet to catch up
with the gradually modernizing roles in society. For example, in the 1960s and early 1970s, there
were hardly any women in Parliament. Until 1987, their share was less than ten percent. The law
professors were men—often old—who naturally taught from a male perspective—that is to say,
with male roles and behavior as the standard. Even more problematically, these professors had a
habit of employing old-fashioned gender stereotypes in the usual made-up cases through which
law is taught in Germany—scenarios that often diminished women.5 Female legal academics, by
1Retired senior academic at FernUniversität in Hagen and current President of the Research Committee for the Sociology of
Law (RCSL).
2WOLFGANG KAUPEN, HOLGER VOLKS & RAYMUND WERLE, COMPENDIUM OF RESULTS: OF A REPRESENTATIVE SURVEY
AMONG THE GERMAN POPULATION ON KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (KOL) (1970).
3I can recall my mother shouting at someone, “I do not want to have to do with the law courts.” This was in spite of her
daughters studying law!
4See ULRIKE SCHULTZ ET AL., DE JURE UND DE FACTO: PROFESSORINNEN IN DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT: GESCHLECHT UND
WISSENSCHAFTSKARRIERE IM RECHT 236 (2018).
5See ULRIKE SCHULTZ, FRAUEN IM RECHT: ‘WIE MÄNNLICH IST DIE JURISTENSCHAFT?’ 319–59, 330 f. (Ulrich Battis & Ulrike
Schultz eds., 1990); SCHULTZ ET AL., supra note 4, at 226 ff.
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contrast, were few and far between; the first woman law professor, Anne Eva Brauneck, a crimi-
nologist, was only appointed to a Chair in 1965—a year before I started to study. Female law
students therefore felt estranged in their studies much more than men.6 In terms of my own
self-reflection on that time, I can say that I too found the usual dogmatism rather dull, as what
I had to learn had nothing to do with my life, and this made me unhappy. With a view to changing
this state of affairs I took seminars in English law, French law, comparative law, and the reception
of law, all of which gave me a perspective on German law from the outside, and not only led me
to compare legal regulations, that is, positive law, but also societies more generally, and their
history. It helped me to come to terms with my legal education.
This was a time of critical thinking about society, which, in Germany, was coupled with an
impetus to overcome the Nazi past and to create a better—in other words, a politically
left-wing—society. This movement was fueled by U.S. students and the civil rights movement.
It was predominantly about class and race barriers, however, which meant that gender—as an
important socially interpretative category—was still absent. Pictures of students’ demonstrations
in Germany at that time show men; of the very, very few women, many of those basically had the
role of making the tea.
From 1971 to 1973, I spent two years at what is now the German University of Administrative
Sciences in Speyer. It is worth noting that Niklas Luhmann had been working in Speyer for some
years during the 1960s, and by the early 1970s, his systems theory was already widely read and
cited. There, I attended a seminar in Sociology of Law with Hans Ryffel, presented a paper on
“Rechtstatsachenforschung,”a paper about the forerunners of the sociology of law, such as
Arthur Nussbaum and Eugen Ehrlich, and studied administrative sciences and sociology with
the sociologist Renate Mayntz, the first woman ever to teach in Speyer. I also started an empirical
research project on Freedom of Establishment for Lawyers in Europe. While interviewing Frederic
A. Mann—an emigrated, high-profile lawyer—in London, he criticized me, alleging my approach
to be unwissenschaftlich (“unscientific”) and far from reasonable jurisprudence. Pregnant at the
time, upon leaving the room, I started to cry and wondered whether he would have said the same
thing to a man.
A glance through the contents of older texts on sociology and the sociology of law confirms my
recollection that the prominent scholars of the time paid little heed to issues of or concerning
women, women rights, or gender. For example, Niklas Luhmann’s Sociology of Law7 makes no
mention of either women or gender, nor does Jakobus Wössner’s Introduction to Sociology8—
at the time, a very popular student text. Fischer’s Dictionary of Sociology9 includes no article explic-
itly on gender. But gender is briefly referred to in an article on “institution,” which makes the
argument that status in societies depends on sex/gender and age, and that there is a separation
of work between the sexes. In its article on social change, it is mentioned that population move-
ment is influenced by birth and death, to which questions of gender distribution and age distri-
bution have to be added. Continuing along these lines: In Walter Rüegg’s Funk Kolleg Sociology,10
there are brief remarks on gender roles in society, mainly in connection to “primitive societies”
and anthropology; Rudolf Wiethölter’s Funk Kolleg Jurisprudence,11—at the time, a must-read for
all young critical jurists—only touches upon “Geschlechtsverkehr” (sexual intercourse) between
engaged couples, in the context of discussing some amazing reasonings within judgments of
the Highest Federal Court. In fact, with the exception of Susanne Baer’s recent textbook,12 the
6See MARGARETE FABRICIUS-BRAND ET AL., JURISTINNEN: BERICHTE, FAKTEN, INTERVIEWS (2d ed. 1986); SCHULTZ, supra
note 5, at 331 f.
7See 2 NIKLAS LUHMANN, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (1972).
8See JAKOBUS WÖSSNER, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (2d ed. 1970).
9See FISCHER LEXIKON RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (René König ed., 1971).
10See WALTER RÜEGG, FUNK KOLLEG SOZIOLOGIE (1969).
11See RUDOLF WIETHÖLTER, FUNK KOLLEG RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1968).
12See SUSANNE BAER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE: EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG (3d ed. 2016).
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terms “Geschlecht,” “gender,” “female,” or “woman” are not featured in German-published books
on the sociology of law.
C. Developments in the 1970s and 1980s
I. Women’s Rights and Women in Law
As a result of the first wave of the women’s movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, by 1918, women got the right to vote. Only thirty years later, after the second World War, in
1949, a gender equality clause was included in the new Constitution of the Federal Republic.
However, this did not automatically abolish gender deficits and disparities in the law; the private
law, for example, was still lagging behind. The first Gender Equality Law of 1957 abolished some
of these deficits, notably the rule that a husband—with permission of the guardianship court—could
terminate his wife’s employment if it affected the “marital interests.” Furthermore, until 1978—and
the coming into force of the act on the adaptation of family law, Familienrechtsänderungsgesetz of
1977—the common family model accorded to a conservative ethos, that is to say, that the wife was in
charge of the household, while the husband had to go to work and thus secure the family means.13
By and by, however, women lawyers—many of them organized in the German Women Lawyers
Association (Deutscher Juristinnenbund)—dealt systematically with these disadvantages and discrim-
inations, taking cases in which the gender equality clause was infringed to the Federal Constitutional
Court, and working on proposals for legislative change.14 It was not an easy task, as some fields of law
had no, or very few, female legal experts engaging with a gendered perspective—for example, social
security law and tax law. Moreover, this task needed a thorough analysis of social reality. There were
still few women in Parliament, legal academia, and legal practice, which in turn meant almost no
female law professors and very few women in positions in the higher courts. From 1949 till
1987, out of sixteen judges at the Federal Constitutional Court, there was just a single female judge.
In the early 1970s, the women’s movement gained in momentum, in what became known as its
“second wave.” It began with the famous article “I Have Aborted,” in the journal STERN on June 6,
1971, in which 374 women—some of them prominent and many in higher occupations—con-
fessed that they had infringed the applicable law by terminating a pregnancy. This was the starting
signal for women’s own “march through the institutions,” with the aims of: Undermining and
destabilizing traditional gender concepts, making the private public, making women more visible,
breaking men’s power monopolies, and implementing alternative female counterprojects to
existing and dominant male worldviews. In research and science, these aims demanded critique,
a radical “breaking [of] the [traditional] disciplines,”15 a call for interdisciplinarity,16 and a
renewed commitment to systematically involving women’s issues in research and science.
13See Ulrike Schultz, Equal Rights for Men and Women in Germany: How a Constitutional Principle Was Transformed into
Reality, in THE FIGHT FOR THE PUBLIC SPACE: WHEN PERSONAL IS POLITICAL 85–96 (Heinrich Boell Stiftung South Caucasus
2016).
14See Ulrike Schultz, Zeitleisten: Die Entwicklung der Rechtsstellung von Frauen in Deutschland, in RECHTSHANDBUCH FÜR
FRAUEN- UND GLEICHSTELLUNGSBEAUFTRAGTE (Sabine Berghahn &Ulrike Schultz eds., 2020) [hereinafter Schultz, Zeitleisten]
(giving a full overview of the development of women’s and gender issues in European law and German law).
15See Gudrun-Axeli Knapp & Hilde Landweer, “Interdisziplinarität” in der Frauenforschung: Ein Dialog, 6 L’HOMME:
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR FEMINISTISCHE GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT (“EUR. J. FEMINIST HIST.”) 6, 6 (1995); see also JUDITH
LORBER, BREAKING THE BOWLS: DEGENDERING AND FEMINIST CHANGE (2005).
16Ulla Bock, Der Anspruch von Interdisziplinarität in der Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung, in INTERDISZIPLINARITÄT:
MÖGLICHKEITEN UND GRENZEN FÄCHERÜBERGREIFENDER LEHRE UND FORSCHUNG 65–77 (Wolf D. Hutter, Ulla Bock &
Ralf Isenmann eds., 1999); Ulrike Schultz, Interdisziplinäres universitäres Lehren und Lernen am Beispiel der “Virtual
International Gender Studies,” in INTERDISZIPLINÄRES LEHREN UND LERNEN: ZWISCHEN AKADEMISCHEM ANSPRUCH UND
GESELLSCHAFTLICHEM BEDÜRFNIS 115–37 (Pasqualina Perrig-Chiello & Werner Arber eds., 2002); QUER DENKEN –
STRUKTUREN VERÄNDERN: GENDER STUDIES ZWISCHEN DISZIPLINEN (Heike Kahlert, Barbara Thiessen & Ines Weller eds.,
2005).
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The following table shows the meager participation of women in law until well into the 1980s,
juxtaposed with the current proportion of women in legal studies, the judiciary, in legal practice,
and the legal academy, where the number of women is still strikingly low17.
II. Sociology of Law Still Ignoring Gender Issues
At the beginning of the 1970s, discussions of a reform of legal education in Germany were started,
which resulted in models of single-phase legal education with an integration of theory and prac-
tice, and an interdisciplinary approach with a stronger integration of the so-called foundation
subjects. Alongside the sociology of law, there was also legal history, legal philosophy, legal theory,
and law and economics. Even under these reformed educational models (Reformmodell), however,
neither women’s rights nor gender issues were explicitly on the agenda, although the number of
female law students had slowly started to rise. These models, which were to lead to the creation of
several new law faculties throughout the country, lasted from 1971–1984.
In 1976, I went to the first meeting of the Vereinigung für Rechtssoziologie, now the Association
for Law and Society, in Munich. To name a few of the other attendees: Gunther Teubner was there
talking about autopoiesis, Klaus Röhl asking what added value autopoiesis could provide for his
students, Erhard Blankenburg and Hubert Rottleuthner were the rising stars, and Thomas Raiser
was also present. I had the opportunity to make the acquaintance of Blankenburg, with whom I
shared a strong empirical inclination.18 Gender issues were, however, absent from the academic
program.
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*The increase in numbers after 1989 is due to reunification. The data before is only for West Germany.
**W3 are the fully equipped Chairs.
17In Germany, there are the big Chairs: W 3—in former times, C 4—and the Chairs with less assistants and money:
W 2—in former times, C 3. This shows that considerably more men hold “better” Chairs than women.
18We agreed on contributing to the big international project on Lawyers in Society. In the end, I wrote the article and he
revised it very marginally. Erhard Blankenburg & Ulrike Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly Regulated Profession, in
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: VOL. 2: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 124 (Richard Abel & Philip Lewis eds., 1988).
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Ten years later, at the same association’s biannual meeting in 1987, I recall similarly few female
contributors. I presented on “German Advocates: A Highly Regulated Profession,”my contribution
to the large international comparative project “Lawyers in Society,”19 and Vera Slupik presented
her dissertation on the decision of the German Constitution for Parity in Gender Relation.20 As far
as I remember, we were the only women to present and were both given a brief time slot in the
work-in-progress, non-thematic panel. Also in attendance was Jutta Limbach, who was the fifth
woman to get a Chair in a law faculty in West Germany and—at the time—the only female law
professor who specialized in sociology of law, but there was no stream, section, or panel for either
gender-related topics or women’s issues more broadly. This brief exposition is simply to character-
ize the value which was given to gender subjects and to give some sense of the general atmosphere
for women in legal academia at the time,21 where—of course—only a few had elevated positions.
Unfortunately, this remains much the case to this day; there are few women law
professors who specialize in sociology of law, and gender has remained largely absent in both
socio-legal teaching and in the teaching of law, although—and to a limited extent—this is argu-
ably not the case in either criminology or sociology.22
III. The First Gender Chairs in Law Faculties
In the 1980s, the former reform faculty of Bremen set up a first Chair in “law of gender relations.”
The faculty was afraid of its own courage, as a dismal recruitment process started and was then
stretched over several years,23 affecting several prominent women. For example, Jutta Limbach,
who—since 1972—had a Chair for civil law at the Free University in Berlin, went on to be the
Senator of Justice in Berlin and the first female President of the Federal Constitutional Court in
Germany. Another example is Ninon Colneric, who became President of the State Labor Court in
Schleswig-Holstein and one of the first female judges at the European Court of Justice; Ute
Gerhard got the first Chair in Women and Gender Studies and Research in Germany—in the
sociological faculty—in Frankfurt in 1987, and initiated the foundation of the Cornelia Goethe
Centrum for Women and Gender Studies at the University of Frankfurt in 1997. Finally, in
1991, Ursula Rust got the Chair. In 2001, the denomination was changed to Gender Law,
Labor Law, and Social Law, reducing the importance of gender. In 2007, Konstanze Plett was addi-
tionally appointed Professor of Gender and Law.24
Doris Lucke, a sociologist who has published widely on gender issues in law, was appointed
Titular Professor at the Institute for Political Sciences and Sociology in Bonn, in 1998.25 She
has a habilitation but never got a regular Chair.
In 1986, the FernUniversität in Hagen had been offered a Chair for a law professor in the con-
text of the newly created Women’s & Gender Research Network NRW, which was to initiate and
strengthen teaching and research on gender issues in all faculties in Northrhine-Westphalia.26 The
faculty wanted the Chair—which was paid out of a special fund—but not the gender expert. A
long quarrel started, the idea of a Chair on women’s or gender issues in law got lost, and in 1993—
finally—a man got the Chair. He was later the leading head in destroying my program on women’s
rights, a kind of irony of fate. In 1997, Katharina von Schlieffen became the first female law
19 See Schultz, Zeitleisten, supra note 14.
20See VERA SLUPIK, DIE ENTSCHEIDUNG DES GRUNDGESETZES FÜR PARITÄT IM GESCHLECHTERVERHÄLTNIS (1988).
21The moderator, Strempel, asked me not to be as aggressive as Vera Slupik.
22See SCHULTZ ET AL., supra note 4, at 97 ff.
23See id. at 112.
24But Plett did not get a Chair.
25See DORIS LUCKE, RECHT OHNE GESCHLECHT? ZU EINER RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE DER GESCHLECHTERVERHÄLTNISSE (1996)
(Lucke was appointed “due to excellent performance in research and teaching”).
26See The Women’s & Gender Research Network NRW, NRW, https://www.netzwerk-fgf.nrw.de/en/the-network/about-us
(last visited July 31, 2020). NRW holds, besides Berlin, an undisputed leading position in the field of gender research.
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professor at the law faculty. For some time, her Chair had sociology of law in its denomination.
Currently, the Network consists of 160 professors and 249 scientists, but there is no special Chair
in gender and law, and only one law professor has a Chair in criminal law and criminology that is
connected to it.27
D. Institutionalization of Gender Equality Politics
In the 1970s, the need to catch up on equality for women was internationally discussed and gradually
gained wide recognition. The United Nations (UN) declared 1975 the International Year of Women.
In 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) was adopted by the UN General Assembly. Gender equality issues also became part
of European politics. The EEC Treaty of 1957 had a clause on equal pay for men and women—
Article 119 EEC Treaty, later Article 141 EC-Treaty—which aimed less at achieving gender equality
and closing what was later called the gender pay gap, but rather to counterbalance competition
imbalances between the member states. The ECC passed the Equal Pay Directive in 1975, and in
1976, the Equal Treatment Directive regarding access to employment, vocational training and pro-
motion, and working conditions—76/207/EEC—was passed.28 In Germany, after long deliberations,
the Equal Treatment Directive was only incompletely transformed into national law in 1980. It had
to be adapted, but gradually led to changes in labor law—often only initiated after court decisions.29
In 1989, theWomen’s Advancement Act was passed in Northrhine-Westphalia, introducing the first
legal gender quota regulation. However, this is a soft quota which is only applicable in the civil
service. Its impact was more symbolic, as it was difficult to prove equal qualification, particularly
for higher positions. Therefore, the number of cases that have appeared in the German courts is
limited.30 As it turns out, the quota rule has proven highly effective, as it kept discussions about
equal rights going, in spite of the wide-reaching disapproval it caused.
In the course of the 1980s equality politics was institutionalized. Some regretted this “sociali-
zation process of the women’s question” (Verstaatlichung der Frauenfrage), as they feared that
women’s activism would lose in force as a consequence. However, change happened in the cre-
ation of the first positions for equal opportunities officers, for example. The Green Party was
founded in 1980 and had gender as a core topic of interest. Initially, it had a strong conservative
wing with eco-feminism, which subscribed to “difference models” of gender. In 1987, a Mothers’
Manifesto was published, favoring a model of society which cared for living together with
27There are also three female professors at Universities of Applied Sciences, but only one of them, Maria Wersig at
Fachhochschule Dortmund—the current President of the German Women Lawyers Association—has a strong gender
orientation.
28Between 2000 and 2006, four more equality and antidiscrimination directives were passed; one of these was a recast of the
Equal Treatment Directive. Ulrike Schultz, The Gender and Judging Project: Equity in Germany: Diversity and the Courts, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW AND COURTS (Susan Sterett & Lee Walker eds., 2019). A critical view, however, is necessary in
the evaluation of EU gender politics. On March 5, 2020, the European Commission published the strategy for gender equality
2020–2025, with the aims of improving working conditions for women and the work-life balance, equal pay, equality between
women and men in decision-making, combating gender-based violence, and promoting gender equality and women’s rights
beyond the EU. These sound ideal, but many forget that EU politics is still driven by economic objectives. In spite of the
officially declared aims of ecological sustainable growth and strengthening social politics, it is about competition as prom-
ulgated in the Lisbon strategy 2000 and boosting of growth and employment as promulgated in the European Strategy 2010.
This is not necessarily in line with the demands of the second women’s movement for better living conditions, which cannot
only be measured in economic terms.
29One of the most important decisions was on suspending the ban on night work for women in 1992 by the Federal
Constitutional Court (Urteil zum Nachtarbeitsverbot) BVerfGE 85, 191, NJW 1992, 964.
30The Federal Constitutional Court has never decided on the quota. The European Court of Justice has passed a string of
judgments on equal treatment issues in Germany. The EU Court took two major decisions on quota regulations—Kalanke in
1995 (C-450/93) andMarschall in 1997 (C-409/95). Another milestone was the decision on admission of women to the army
—Tanja Kreil in 2000 (C-285/98).
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children. After this, handicrafts and knitting became popular throughout Germany. The social
democrats, and later the left party, reinforced the socialist tradition of the fight for women’s rights.
In other words, women’s politics were professionalized, but women’s and gender issues were still
absent in mainstream socio-legal teaching and teaching of law.
The institutionalized movement for gender equality, equal status, and standing gained momen-
tum in the 1990s as the Federal and State Gender Equality Acts were passed.31 In the 2000s,
Gender Equality Offices had a solid legal and—more or less—solid financial basis in universities
and throughout the civil service more generally. The Ministries for Women—established in the
1990s—disappeared again in the course of the first decade of the 2000s after the introduction of
the gender mainstream strategy, which made gender issues a cross-sectional task for all Ministries.
Women’s issues found their way into coalition agreements between the Social Democrats and the
Green Party, money was available for research, and teaching and activist projects on women’s
rights flourished. The rising number of female politicians, members of Parliament in ministries,
and members of the German Women Lawyers Association pushed the discussion of women’s and
gender issues, and demanded necessary reforms in the law. In spite of all adaptations of legal
regulations to the gender equality clause in the constitution, a lot remained to be done. The
Ministry for Women in Northrhine-Westphalia commissioned four comprehensive handbooks
for equal opportunities officers: Women and Law 2003, Images of Women 2004, Women and
Demographic Change—The City, the Women and the Future 2006, and Women Change
EUROPE Changes Women 2008. The first and the last had more legal foundations and a strong
political stance; the other two had a focus on body perceptions, politics, and social change—a truly
interdisciplinary project. For each, I assembled a host of authors: Mainly women, a few men—
amongst them, scholars, practitioners, artists, and activists.32 This helped me widen mymeanwhile
huge network of gender specialists on which I could draw for various projects.
E. Gender and Sociology of Law in the 1990s
Throughout the course of the 1990s, a few Chairs in sociology of law started to disappear when
those who had held them retired. In line with international development, sociology of law shifted
to a broader concept of law and society in Germany,33 and with it, the duality of socio-legal
research in sociology and the socio-legal research in law extended. Initially, there may have been
curiosity between the disciplines. Now, it happened more often that sociologists criticized lawyers
for a lack of theory, and the lawyers worried about complex theoretical concepts and incompre-
hensible language.
Interdisciplinary cooperation was on the agenda of the BAR (Berliner Arbeitskreis
Rechtssoziologie),34 which was founded in 2001 by a small group of scholars in social sciences
and legal academics, all of whom were looking for an outlet for their research beyond the
traditional disciplines. The longstanding institutions were the aforementioned German
Association for Sociology of Law, which used to be dominated by lawyers. It changed its name,
in 2010, to the “Association for Law and Society.”35 There is also the small “Section Sociology
31See Ulrike Schultz, Von der Interessenvertreterin zur Gleichstellungmanagerin: Recht und Rechte der
Gleichstellungsbeauftragten – Diskrepanzen zur Praxis? Am Beispiel der Situation in NRW, in RECHTSHANDBUCH FÜR
FRAUEN- UND GLEICHSTELLUNGSBEAUFTRAGTE (Sabine Berghahn & Ulrike Schultz eds., 2013).
32The manuscripts are still stored on my personal website. Gleichstellung und Geschlechterforschung (Equality and Gender
Studies), ULRIKE SCHULTZ, http://www.ulrikeschultz.de/gleichstellung.shtml (last visited July 31, 2020).
33SeeMichaelWrase, Rechtssoziologie und Law and Society –Die deutsche Rechtssoziologie zwischen Krise und Neuaufbruch,
RECHTSWIRKLICHKEIT (May 12, 2007), https://barblog.hypotheses.org/647.
34See LEGAL REALITY: THE BLOG OF THE BERLIN WORKING GROUP ON LEGAL REALITY, https://barblog.hypotheses.org/ (last
visited July 31, 2020).
35German Association for Law and Society, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE, https://rechtssoziologie.info/en/german-association-for-
law-and-society/ (last visited July 31, 2020).
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of Law” of the German Sociological Association,36 which mainly represents sociologists. The
involvement of both in gender issues is still low. There are almost no links of the Section
Sociology of Law to the Section “Women and Gender Research,” and gender issues are only
occasionally dealt with in single presentations at meetings of the Association for the Sociology
of Law.
Teaching sociology of law became obligatory within the law curriculum—for example, Section
11 (3) Law Education Act of Northrhine-Westphalia: “The compulsory subjects [for the first state
examination] include their references to European law, taking particular account of the relation-
ship between European law and national law, their philosophical, historical and social founda-
tions, as well as the legal methods and methods of legal advisory practice.” However, gender is
not explicitly mentioned. Socio-legal contents are usually offered by public law Chairs in which
some gender competence is accumulated, as the interpretation of the equality clause—Article 3,
Section 2 in the German Constitution—is a necessary part of teaching constitutional law and
anti-discrimination law. Some reflections on gender can be taught by Chairs of criminal law and
criminology—in the context of abortion, sexual and domestic violence, female genital mutilation,
and more—but still, no foundations of gender are included in the German legal curriculum.
Gender issues became overall more accepted in research and teaching since the 1990s.
However this did not mean that they spread throughout universities or became popular in
law faculties. I was part of an initiative led by Klaus Röhl and taught women’s rights at the
law faculty in Bochum. After eight years, I stopped teaching due to a lack of interested students
signing up for the class—a fate shared by courses in the sociology of law. Women’s rights and
gender subjects were seen, with suspicion, as sectarian, and judged as irrelevant for the dogmatic
contents of the legal state examination. At the same time, I held seminars in the humanities
faculty in Essen, which were (more than) well attended.
Since the late 1980s, equal opportunities officers and women’s groups invited me to innumer-
able lectures to empower them in legal questions and to motivate them to stand up for, and to
promote legal change. However, they often could only gather small groups of attendees. A stable
increase in participants has occurred only in the last decade.
In 1991, the first big international socio-legal meeting took place in Amsterdam—a mile-
stone to remember. Gender was one of the central topics and was dealt with in plenaries.
U.S. feminist legal academics “had impacted the philosophy of American Law since the
1980s to bring about new legal ideas (“memes”) and causes of action that reframed women’s
issues and new interpretations of mainstream legal concepts.”37 We, the continental European
women, listened intensely. A post-conference meeting with many of our American colleagues
was organized in Bremen, giving motivation and impulses to gender in teaching and research.
In 1995, Ursula Rust organized a Symposium called “Women Jurists at Universities—Women
and Law in Research and Teaching” (Juristinnen an den Hochschulen—Frauenrecht in
Forschung und Lehre) in Bremen, which brought together just about all women in legal aca-
demia interested in gender issues.
F. Gender in Socio-Legal Teaching and Research
I. Theoretical Underpinnings
The second wave feminist movement—in the 1980s—was influenced by gender difference theory,
which—like the first women’s movement—assigned women gender-specific characteristics, be
36Kurzportrait, DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR SOZIOLOGIE, https://soziologie.de/sektionen/rechtssoziologie/kurzportrait
(last visited July 31, 2020).
37See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Academics: Changing the Epistemology of American Law Through Conflicts,
Controversies and Comparisons, in GENDER AND CAREERS IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY (Ulrike Schultz, Gisela Shaw, Margaret
Thornton & Rosemary Auchmuty eds., 2020).
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they cultural or biological. The leading idea was that women have “another voice” and are morally
as good or even better than men.38 The problem with this theory is that it drifts towards the
“patriarchal dilemma,” reinforcing those men who always knew that “women are different”—
meaning weaker.
In the 1990s, German feminist mainstream was dominated by sociologists39 and political
scientists, committing itself to structuralism and the deconstruction of gender. Its aim was to
overcome social gender—with its traditional gender roles and character constructed by the
patriarchy40—criticizing or even despising difference theorists41 as backwards and deprecatingly
labelling them as essentialist, although many feminists cherished a “we, the women” rhetoric,
which in itself presupposes difference. There was a change in paradigm from women’s rights
to gender equality, in line with gender mainstreaming, which had been introduced as a strategy
of European equality politics at the fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, in 1995.
Gender mainstreaming was integrated in the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997/1999 and adopted as
a guiding principle by the German federal government in 1999. Women’s offices and councils
were renamed gender equality bodies (Gleichstellungsstelle). Additionally, women’s committees
and other women’s institutions were kept to safeguard women’s particular interests and protect
women against discrimination.
After the turn of the millennium, theories stressing diversity prevailed. This put the focus on
the individual, with his or her complex bundle of qualities, character traits, and different
biographical factors—including age, education, financial situation, family status, political views,
health, sexual orientation, and more—sex being just one factor among others. The problem with
individualistic theories is that it is difficult to build research hypotheses on them, and it is further
complicated by intersectional discrimination.42
In the past two decades, it has become evident that the binary two-sex model did not fit
accepted social reality anymore, that legal adaptations were necessary, and that the gender per-
spective was opened to include queer. Rüdiger Lautmann, a trained lawyer and professor of soci-
ology and sociology of law in Bremen, had already set up a department on Gender and Sexual
Relationship in the Institute for Empirical and Applied Sociology in 1988. Further, in 1995, he
founded the first center for gay-lesbian studies in Germany. There were only loose connections
and almost no cooperation between Lautmann and the women who specialized in gender and law.
In 2006, an Institute for Queer Theory was founded.43 In recent years, the theoretical concepts
were further expanded, and concepts of masculinities were included in legal gender work.
II. The First Comprehensive Program on Women and Law
In 1985, I got the chance at my university to organize a series of lectures on “Women and Law.”
There were still hardly any women in the faculties; the first female professor, a psychologist, had
just got a Chair. At the time, I was head of the didactics unit for the law faculty in a central didactic
facility. The university, in a reform model, aimed to offer higher education to disadvantaged
groups who could not attend on-site teaching: “[W]orkmen, women, disabled persons, [and]
38See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
39See URSULA BEER, KLASSE GESCHLECHT: FEMINISTISCHE GESELLSCHAFTSANALYSE UND WISSENSCHAFTSKRITIK (1998).
40See SEYLA BENHABIB ET AL., DER STREIT UM DIFFERENZ: FEMINISMUS UND POSTMODERNE IN DER GEGENWART (1993).
41See MARY FIELD-BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN’S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND (1986).
42E.g., ANNA LAWSON, EUROPEAN UNION NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND INTERSECTIONALITY: INVESTIGATING THE
TRIANGLE OF RACIAL, GENDER AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION (Anna Lawson & Dagmar Schiek eds., 2016); see also
SUSANNE BURRI & DAGMAR SCHIEK, MULTIPLE DISCRIMINATION IN EU LAW: OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEGAL RESPONSES TO
INTERSECTIONAL GENDER DISCRIMINATION? (European Commission 2008), https://eige.europa.eu/library/resource/
aleph_eige000008236.
43See INSITUTE FOR QUEER THEORY, http://www.queer-institut.de/en/ (last visited July 31, 2020).
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prisoners.” Teaching occurs through a combination of written course materials, new media, and
via the internet.
My position opened up the possibility to deal with “non-conventional” subjects. However, in
spite of reform ideas, in the 1980s, didactics of law became a subject doomed to a shadowy exist-
ence until well into the 2000s. Law faculties in Germany have a very traditional teaching culture.
There is no stringent curriculum leading to the examination—just a catalogue of subjects relevant
for the examination, which is defined by the Ministries of Justice of the Federal States, who also
organize the examination.44
As I was in charge of media work, the lectures on women and law were video-recorded and
presented in our university TV series, which gave a lot of visibility and high prestige to the
project.45 The aim of the lectures was to inform about legal questions relevant for women: To
find deficits, articulate critique, make proposals for law reform, and lobby for reform. Over
ten years, the lectures mapped the areas of law with—at the time—the most important inequal-
ities: Disadvantages and discrimination in family law, social law, labor law and quota regulations,
pension and tax law, problems of non-marital partnerships, violence against women, the medieval
procedural code against witchcraft, abortion, in-vitro fertilization, women migrants and the law,
male legal language, the masculinity of the legal profession, and the impact of the constitutional
reform after reunification on women’s rights. Presenting were practitioners, members of
Parliament, the first female federal Minister of Justice, scholars, activists, high judges, leading pol-
iticians, and the few female law professors dealing with women and gender questions in law—in
other words, the most knowledgeable women on questions of women’s rights, who—at the time—
were still quite rare. They were all lawyers, as the focus was on law reform, but with a solid empiri-
cal foundation. The few law professors included were Jutta Limbach, who taught civil law, Heide
Pfarr, who taught labor law, and Monika Frommel, who taught criminal law. We were pioneers
and felt like it. Meeting decades later, as gray-haired women, we still remember the importance of
our project.
Based on the collected material, I set up a one-year certification program of further education
on Women and Law which became increasingly used by the growing number of equal opportu-
nities officers as proof of qualification. I had no special resources for the program except my
enthusiasm. The rector was my mentor; when he left in 1993, I was considered to be “master-
less”—putting me in a vulnerable position. In 1987, the all-male law faculty at FernUniversität
in Hagen decided to abolish “Frauen im Recht” on the grounds that “[w]e do not have these prob-
lems anymore.” I had been watched suspiciously as one who was questioning the legal system and
organizational structures: A dangerous woman with dangerous, inconvenient knowledge. The few
female professors at FernUniversität in Hagen—there were still none in law—had been afraid to
fill the gap and jump in to support a contested program.
I received a big grant for virtual international gender studies from the government, supported
by the NRWMinistry for Research, between 2000–2004. This funding and recognition enabled me
to bring my subject back into the conversation and the university. In the framework of the project,
I set up a qualification for equal opportunities work. As gender and law deals with issues in all
fields of law, I had to draw on the expertise of many authors who specialized in different subjects. I
had to be creative in keeping the program going. I managed this through obtaining money from
additional small research projects and making use of other publications in which I was involved.
44See Ulrike Schultz, Legal Education in Germany - an Ever (Never?) Ending Story of Resistance to Change, 4 REVISTA DE
EDUCACIÓN Y DERECHO (J. EDUC. & L.) 1, 1–24 (2011); SCHULTZ ET AL., supra note 4, at 189 ff.
45I got a lot of criticism for dominating the TV series with women’s issues; externally, it was a highly prestigious project.
Some of the lectures are still accessible in the FernUni video archive. Archiv der Videoproduktionen, FERNUNIVERSITÄT
HAGEN, https://www.fernuni-hagen.de/videostreaming/zmi/video/#rewi (last visited Aug. 7, 2020). Later, we changed the title
to Women in Communication and opened the scope to all disciplines. All in all, I organized—over thirty years—about 200
public lectures on women’s issues—all with women, to counterbalance the usual male hegemony of speakers.
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III. Gender Recognized as Element for Quality of Teaching
Since the 2000s, measures to strengthen the quality of teaching (“Qualität der Lehre—QdL”)46
have called for gender content to be included in teaching. High-quality teaching should be
designed to be gender- and diversity-friendly. Corresponding guidelines are anchored in women’s
promotion plans and equality policies of universities; some universities have specific gender por-
tals. In the accreditation of degree programs, which was introduced as part of the Bologna process,
the criterion “equal opportunities” is also used to check whether sufficient gender content is
offered in teaching. In the legal field, this concerns the bachelor’s and master’s in business
law. As already stated, classical law studies are exempt from accreditations. Overall, the offer
of gender content in law faculties is still sparse.47
In the mid-2000s, my university was undergoing restructuring, and this put my course for
equal opportunities at risk. I returned in 2008, after thirty years, to the faculty which had—in the
meantime—changed its structure. Men and women had Chairs, and I had the chance to offer a
module on gender in the master’s of laws. In the accreditation for the master’s, the demand had
explicitly been put forward to add gender in teaching law. For the first time in my life, I was
received—more or less—with open arms in the faculty. Meanwhile, teaching on gender and
appointing women to a Chair had also become success factors at universities, which gave the fac-
ulty extra funding until I retired in 2014. In 2016, limited for five years, the faculty had the chance
to appoint a gender Chair. For two years, Ulrike Lembke held it; and since then, Anja Böning has
held it.
IV. A Gender Curriculum
In 2008, I contributed a gender curriculum for law to a gender curricula website of the “Network
for Women’s and Gender Research,”48 which I updated in 2012.49 In the introduction, I stated: “In
classical teaching, gender aspects are negated or overlooked. In the past decade, in the course of a
shortening of legal education, the dogmatic training came to the fore and a clear tendency towards
positivism (an orientation of the teaching to the applicable law and its application) was
ascertained.”50
I further characterized my approach as follows:
The : : : proposals for imparting legal gender competence follow the ideas of a critical juris-
prudence. In the course of feminist criticism of science, a fundamental curriculum revision
would be required, which would lead to a different structuring and weighting of the course
content. Abstract theoretical interpretation of the law would take a back seat in favor of prac-
tical knowledge and application transfer. This would also remove the distinction between
substantive law and formal procedural law. It is important to strengthen legal didactics
and to ultimately rethink traditional ideas about the goals of law studies and the methods
of mediation.51
46E.g. GUTE LEHRE: FRISCHER WIND AN DEUTSCHEN HOCHSCHULEN (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz ed. 2011), https://www.
hrk-nexus.de/fileadmin/redaktion/hrk-nexus/07-Downloads/07-02-Publikationen/Gute_Lehre_9.4_FREI_200_Hoch.pdf.
47See SCHULTZ ET AL., supra note 4, at 207 f.
48GENDER CURRICULA, http://www.gender-curricula.com/ (last visited July 31, 2020).
49Of course, further updating and input from others is necessary.
50Ulrike Schultz, Gendercurriculum für die Rechtswissenschaft, Portal Gender Curricula für Bachelor und Master des
Netzwerks Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung NRW, GENDER CURRICULA (2012), http://www.gender-curricula.com/
gender-curricula/; Ulrike Schultz, Ein Gendercurriculum für die Rechtswissenschaft: Ein Vorschlag zur Integration von
Lehrinhalten der Genderforschung in das rechtswissenschaftliche Studium, 21 DJBZ ZEITSCHRIFT DES DEUTSCHEN
JURISTINNENBUNDES 225, 225–28 (2018).
51Id. The English version of the curriculum is accessible via my personal website. Gleichstellung und Geschlechterforschung
(“Equality and Gender Studies), ULRIKE SCHULTZ, http://www.ulrikeschultz.de/gleichstellung.shtml (last visited July 31, 2020).
1356 Ulrike Schultz
As the gender aspect is a cross-cutting issue, I proposed that it should be a focus of study in the
basic subjects: Introduction to law, legal history, legal sociology, and legal philosophy and meth-
odology. In addition, the gender perspective should be an integral part of all courses with regard to
justice issues and legal criticism. In addition, a special module on women/gender and law could be
offered. Although I tried to publicize the draft widely—and asked for comments and additions—
in all these years, only one colleague contacted me, but just to ask me for advice in relation to her
teaching.
V. Research and Teaching on Gender and Law
In 2002, Susanne Baer got a Chair at Humboldt University in Berlin for public law and gender
studies. Between 2003–2010, she founded and organized a gender competence center and was
subsequently also co-founder and first head of the Gender Studies Association, founded in
Berlin in 2010. In 2011, she was elected to be a judge at the Federal Constitutional Court. Her
work combines—in a unique way—gender with socio-legal competence, and she has written a
study book on Sociology of Law as an introduction to interdisciplinary legal research, which
includes feminist perspectives.52 Her Chair, which is represented during her term at the court
by Ulrike Lembke,53 is the Centre for Manifold Activities and Research Projects on Gender
Issues. Attached to the Chair is the Humboldt Law Clinic for Basic and Human Rights
(HLCMR), which takes a feminist stance.
An active group of young women from Berlin and Hamburg—among them, Dana-Sophia
Valentiner and Selma Gather, linked to the German Women Jurists Association—is dealing with
feminist demands for improving legal education,—that is, the use of gender neutral language and
gender adequate and sensitive construction of cases used in training, tests, and examinations.54
The various offers on gender issues in law show a clear north/south divide, however.
Financing options have an impact, which means that some programs which emerged will disap-
pear again. A center for research and teaching on gender and law has been set up in Frankfurt,
connected to the Chair of Ute Sacksofsky and the Cornelia Goethe Centrum for Women and
Gender Studies. At the University of Hamburg courses are offered in Legal Gender Studies, (also
at the University of Vienna connected to Elisabeth Holzleithner55 and the University of Basel con-
nected to Andrea Maihofer56, and Gesine Fuchs in Luzern57). At the University of Marburg a
“Mobile Study Day Feminist Law” is held regularly, individual courses and courses on gender
52See SCHULTZ ET AL., supra note 4.
53Ulrike Lembke set up a website on Legal Gender Studies in 2018; however, it has not been updated since. LEGAL GENDER
STUD., https://www.legal-gender-studies.de/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2020).
54DANA-SOPHIA VALENTINER ET AL., (GESCHLECHTER)ROLLENSTEREOTYPE IN JURISTISCHEN AUSBILDUNGSFÄLLEN:
EINE HAMBURGISCHE STUDIE (Universität Hamburg 2017), https://www.jura.uni-hamburg.de/media/ueber-die-
fakultaet/gremien-und-beauftragte/broschuere-gleichstellung.pdf; Dana-Sophia Valentiner, Checkliste gender- und
diversitätsbewusste Fallgestaltung in der rechtswissenschaftlichen Lehre, in FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN TOOLBOX GENDER
UND DIVERSITY IN DER LEHRE (2018), http://www.genderdiversitylehre.fu-berlin.de/toolbox/_content/pdf/Valentiner-2018.
pdf; Lucy Chebout et al., Sexismus in der juristischen Ausbildung: Ein #Aufschrei dreier Nachwuchswissenschaftlerinnen, 4
DJBZ ZEITSCHRIFT DES DEUTSCHEN JURISTINNENBUNDES 190, 190–93 (2016); see also Ulrike Schultz, Stereotype und
Sozialdünkeln - Für eine Gendersensibilität in der juristischen Ausbildung: Gegen veraltete Geschlechterbilder und
Diskriminierung, in RECHTSHANDBUCH FÜR FRAUEN- UND GLEICHSTELLUNGSBEAUFTRAGTE (Sabine Berghahn & Ulrike
Schultz eds., 2019); Anja Böning & Ulrike Schultz, Juristische Sozialisation, in STUDIENBUCH INTERDISZIPLINÄRE
RECHTSFORSCHUNG 191 (Christian Boulanger & Julika Rosenstock eds., 2018).
55See also her book, ELISABETH HOLZLEITHER, RECHT MACHT GESCHLECHT: LEGAL GENDER STUDIES: EINE EINFÜHRUNG
(2002). See alsoDIEMUT MAJER, DER LANGE WEG ZU FREIHEIT UND GLEICHHEIT: 14 VORLESUNGEN ZUR RECHTSSTELLUNG DER
FRAU IN DER GESCHICHTE (1995).
56She was the head of the Centre for Gender Studies in Basel.
57See also MANUELA ANNETTE HUGENTOBLER, LEGAL GENDER STUDIES UND FEMINISTISCHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT ALS
KERNPROJEKT VON DEMOKRATISCHEN JURIST_INNEN (2018), https://boris.unibe.ch/125637/.
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issues in law are offered at the Universities of Bremen, Bielefeld, Frankfurt,58 and a few others in
Germany. Lectures on relevant topics are offered by a number of faculties—for example, con-
nected to the Chair of Friederike Wapler in Mainz, Eva Kocher in Frankfurt/Oder, and
Katharina Mangold at the newly founded European University in Flensburg, which—it should
be noted—has no law faculty, prioritizing business studies.59
While there is little in the mainstream legal literature on gender issues in law, there are some
publications on women’s rights, law and gender, and anthologies and monographs: For example,
the study book Feminist Law, published by Lena Foljanty and Ulrike Lembke60; the collection of
sources Legal Gender Studies, published by Andrea Büchler and Michelle Cottier61; the feminist
legal journal STREIT; and the journal of the German Women Lawyers’ Association djbZ.62
In spite of the limited institutionalization in law faculties, a lot of gender research is done in
individual single projects within the forty-three law faculties in Germany. In the past two decades,
almost all socio-legal conferences—except for those on special subjects—have had sessions on
gender issues. Impressive evidence of it has been given at meetings of the socio-legal scholars
in the German-speaking countries in the past ten years, where gender issues were dealt with
in several streams, giving impulses to new socio-legal research.
The socio-legal blog63 that Klaus Röhl runs provides an inexhaustible source of inspiration—
tracking the developments in law and society and discussions on gender. An entry, for example, of
the 8th of November 8, 2019, is titled “Feminist Legal Studies have Arrived at the Center of
Jurisprudence” and deals with some of the contributions to a section on “Broadening
Perspectives Through Gender Research in Law” in the 2019 yearbook of public law.64 There
are, however—as is obvious from the names cited—few men who engage in gender issues beyond
the interpretation of the gender equality clause in constitutional law.
After the turn of the millennium, with the introduction of gender mainstreaming strategy, gen-
der education became obligatory in the civil service and the judiciary. For a couple of years, gender
training was arranged, which encountered incomprehension and objection.65 It was then included
as a mandatory requirement in guidelines for further education, functioned as fig leaves, and was
forgotten after some time. This was partly compensated by the growing number of women
involved as trainers, who included gender issues in their regular teaching, and acceptance was
reinforced by the growing number of women in leading positions.
58These are universities with a former single-phase models of legal education.
59I have interviewed most of those mentioned in this section, on questions of gender and law, for the web-portal: Herzlich
Willkommen bei Recht und Gender, FERNUNIVERSITÄT HAGEN, www.fernuni-hagen.de/rechtundgender (last visited July 31,
2020).
60LENA FOLJANTY, FEMINISTISCHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (Lena Foljanty & Ulrike Lembke eds., 2d ed. 2011). The third
edition is announced for the end of the year.
61See ANDREA BÜCHLER & MICHELLE COTTIER, LEGAL GENDER STUDIES = RECHTLICHE GESCHLECHTERSTUDIEN: EINE
KOMMENTIERTE QUELLENSAMMLUNG (2012). Michelle Cottier has built a program on legal gender studies at the
University of Zurich, funded by the Swiss National Fonds, but the program has been discontinued. Michelle Cottier is cur-
rently teaching in Geneva.
62Compare also the following list of literature. Studienliteratur, LEGAL GENDER STUD., https://www.legal-gender-studies.de/
studium/literatur (last visited July 31, 2020). In contrast to mainstream legal literature, the journals tend to include arts work,
stressing the aesthetical side.
63RSOZBLOG.-DE, https://www.rsozblog.de (last visited July 31, 2020).
64He criticizes, however, for example—positions of dominance feminism and the alliance of feminism with queer theory,
which hinders feminism to develop a positive image of women.
65See Ulrike Schultz, Do German Judges Need Gender Education?, in GENDER AND JUDGING 585 (Ulrike Schultz & Gisela
Shaw eds., 2013); Ulrike Schultz, Raising Gender Awareness of Judges – Elements for Judicial Education in Germany, 21 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 345, 345–55 (2014); Ulrike Schultz, Sexism in Law and the Impact of Gender Stereotypes in Legal Proceedings, in
THE FIGHT FOR THE PUBLIC SPACE: WHEN PERSONAL IS POLITICAL, supra note 13, at 97–108; Ulrike Schultz, Do Female Judges
Judge Better?, in WOMEN JUDGES IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 23 (Nadia Sonneveld & Monika Lindbekk eds., 2017).
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VI. Research on Women/Gender in the Legal Profession(s)
My own research is focused on women and gender in the legal profession. It was only loosely
connected to my work at FernUniversität in Hagen, and is more of a private passion. In 1994,
I became head of a Women in the Legal Profession Group, a subgroup of the Working Group
on Comparative Studies of Legal Professions.66 This led to several workshops, a triad of three
big comparative international publications,67 and several special issues in the International
Journal of the Legal Profession.68 We also organized a collaborative research network on gender
and judging in the framework of the American Law and Society Association. The next project will
be on Women in Customary Law and Proceedings.69
In 2008, I received a grant from the Ministry of Justice in Northrhine-Westphalia for empirical
research on women in leading positions in the judiciary—or rather, why there were so few of
them.70 In 2011, I received a governmental grant from the funding line “Women to the Top”
for nationwide research into the dismal situation of female law professors,71 who still—in
2020—hold only about sixteen percent of the Chairs. In the framework of the project, I set up
a website on Gender and Law, with video interviews of experts on gender issues in law and with
personality portraits of female law professors, for which I was awarded some additional funding.72
G. Problems for Institutionalizing Gender in Socio-Legal Teaching and Research
Why is it so difficult to institutionalize gender in teaching and research in law faculties and gain
recognition for it? As mentioned above, legal education is resistant to change, and gender is not
part of traditional law faculty culture. Women’s and gender issues have been regarded as repre-
senting special interests not deserving to be consolidated as concrete study subjects.
Another problem is the divides between actors in gender equality teaching, research, and practice.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a divide between the bourgeois and the
socialist women. Themoderate and the radical wing of the women’s movement had different focuses:
66The Legal Profession Group was founded in 1996, after the legendary Bellagio meeting of the Lawyers in Society Project,
and has been meeting biannually since. I chaired it from 2010–2014. A new big, international collection on Lawyers in twenty-
first Century Societies has been launched; the first issue with forty-two country reports has just come out. RICHARD ABEL,
HILARY SOMMERLAD, OLE HAMMERSLEV & ULRIKE SCHULTZ, LAWYERS IN 21ST CENTURY SOCIETIES: VOL. 1 (2020). The next
issue, which deals with comparative theories and methods, is due in early 2021.
67See ULRIKE SCHULTZ, WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS (Ulrike Schultz & Gisela Shaw, 2003); ULRIKE
SCHULTZ, GENDER AND JUDGING (Ulrike Schultz & Gisela Shaw eds., 2013); ULRIKE SCHULTZ, GENDER AND CAREERS IN
THE LEGAL ACADEMY (Ulrike Schultz et al. eds., 2020).
68See ULRIKE SCHULTZ & GISELA SHAW, WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2003); ULRIKE SCHULTZ & GISELA SHAW,
WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY (2012); ULRIKE SCHULTZ ET AL., GENDER AND JUDICIAL EDUCATION (2014); ULRIKE SCHULTZ
& TABETH MESENGU, GENDER AND JUDGES (2020).
69Since 1991, I have organized a considerable number of sessions on women’s rights and gender issues in the legal pro-
fession and the judiciary, at all annual meetings of the Research Committee for the Sociology of Law, and at the big joint
international meetings —Glasgow 1996, Budapest 2001, Berlin 2007, Honolulu 2012, and Mexico City 2017.
70See Ulrike Schultz, Women’s Careers in the Judiciary: Results of an Empirical Study for the Ministry of Justice in
Northrhine-Westfalia, Germany, in GENDER AND JUDGING 145 (Ulrike Schultz & Gisela Shaw eds., 2013) (“I was noticed
and I was asked.”); ULRIKE SCHULTZ ET AL., FRAUEN IN FÜHRUNGSPOSITIONEN DER JUSTIZ. EINE UNTERSUCHUNG DER
BEDINGUNGEN VON FRAUENKARRIEREN IN DEN JUSTIZBEHÖRDEN IN NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN PROJEKTBERICHT (Institut für
Geschlechterforschung und Gleichstellungsrecht und –politik 2011).
71See SCHULTZ ET AL., supra note 4; Ulrike Schultz, Bisher wenig Wechsel im Genderregime an deutschen juristischen
Fakultäten. Kommentar zum Artikel von Margaret Thornton: ‘The Changing Gender Regime in the Neoliberal Legal
Academy, 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 253, 253–64 (2014); ULRIKE SCHULTZ, GENDER AND CAREERS IN THE
LEGAL ACADEMY IN GERMANY: WOMEN’S DIFFICULT PATH FROM PIONEERS TO A (STILL CONTESTED) MINORITY (Schultz
et al. eds., 2020).
72See Herzlich Willkommen bei Recht und Gender, FERNUNIVERSITÄT HAGEN, https://www.fernuni-hagen.de/
rechtundgender/ (last visited July 31, 2020).
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The former with a focus on women’s roles as housewives and mothers, the socialist women feeling
closer to the male labor movement, but both with a positive evaluation of motherliness and femi-
ninity, united in their striving for women’s access to education and professional work. Today, it is the
gulf between conservative and progressive women. Gender specialists differ in their standpoints and
political stances, and differing opinions are not always treated with tolerance.
Some of the gender experts in law and sociology of law self-identify as feminists. For scholars in
the Anglo-American world, it is common, while continental—particularly German—lawyers shy
away from the word feminist, as -isms may signal ideological attitudes. Some of the women label
themselves as women’s rights lawyers (Frauenrechtlerin), which sounds somewhat old-fashioned.
The question is whether these labels—which signal a preoccupation with women’s issues—still fit
in times when the focus of gender has opened to include masculinities and when the boundaries
between the sexes and genders have been dissolved, and equal rights and fair treatment of the
multiple sexes and genders are discussed.
The big divide is that between social sciences and law. Gender research is mainly anchored in
the humanities, sociology, and cultural sciences, and has started to boom in the past fifteen years.
Sociology dominates theory building within the field of gender studies. Many gender Chairs were
established in the disciplines, and many more Chairs got an additional denomination, “gender.”
Innumerable gender conferences are held. The rising number of women in politics and in higher
positions in ministries—backed up by left, social-democratic, and green pro-women, and later
“gender” party politics—created possibilities for funding of research, teaching projects, and
Chairs. There is only a limited cooperation with the small number of women in the legal academy
who are engaged in women’s and gender issues. Except for a handful of us, women legal academics
rarely present at gender conferences in Germany. The concepts and language used in social sci-
ences—often with many anglicisms, particularities, aloof issues, and conferences in the English
language when maybe just one participant does not speak German—have created a special seg-
ment in academia, which of course is necessary, but remote from the usages in law which has a
strong orientation to practice. This causes frictions.
Additionally, there is a funding dilemma for socio-legal research. The Ministries of Justice, and
the federal and state ministries, have very limited resources. The Ministry for Research and
Education BMBF would rather fund projects in the humanities, sociology, and cultural sciences,73
and the law has no culture of externally-funded projects.74
There is a comparable divide between the academic gender research, and the institutionalized
women’s movement and gender work in equal opportunities offices, despite many of the EO offi-
cers in the civil service and public administration having a degree in sociology or political sciences.
Theoretical concepts do not help them in their daily work, although they need impulses and ideas
from outside.75 To bridge the gap, since 2006, I have been editing—with Sabine Berghahn—a legal
handbook for equal opportunities officers with regular supplements and a website.76
One of the biggest obstacles is, however, that overall gender equality is still considered a wom-
en’s project, and that in spite of all the political support, most men have not accepted it as their
task—by and large, they stand on the margins and avoid being involved.
73In 2016, I had applied with several colleagues for a project on law and practice in family court proceedings. It was con-
sidered to be a strong project, but too legal for the funding line, DFG.
74See SCHULTZ ET AL., supra note 4, at 272 f.
75In 2013, I edited a publication titled “Desire for Equality” for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the State Working Group of
Equal Opportunities officers in Northrhine-Westphalia, which gives an insight into their work and needs. See Publikationen,
NRW, http://www.frauenbueros-nrw.de/service/publikationen.html (last visited July 31, 2020).
76 See DASGLEICHSTELLUNGSWISSEN, https://www.dasgleichstellungswissen.de/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2020). I have also been
deeply involved in equal opportunities work at my university, as the longstanding head of the Equality Commission, as an EO
officer for the law faculty, and in other equal opportunities functions.
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H. Where to?
Considering equal rights for women, and the political and economic situation of women in soci-
ety, a lot has been achieved.77 The development in the past decades has been breathtaking. Of
course, the balance for gender justice is sensible; society changes, gender arrangements are mod-
ernizing, and with it, the perceptions and demands of people change. The development has to be
carefully observed and the law always needs readjustment. There are still battles left to be fought,
and there are always issues to be discussed critically. As described, scholars and practitioners of the
German Women Lawyers’ Association—but also women in legal academia and social science—
played a leading role in the process of change. Since 2005, the government has commissioned
gender equality reports to which they have contributed.78 The reports give an account of the status
of society and the identified needs of further change. The first one, “New Ways—Equal
Opportunities. Equality Between Women and Men in Their Life-Course,” was published in
2011. The second, on “Shaping and Implementing Employment and Care Work,” was published
in 2017. The work on the third one has started.
This means that socio-legal perspectives of gender are as important as ever, and they have to be
included in regular teaching. But gender cannot be seen separate from other aspects of diversity.
For example, of growing importance is ethnicity due to increased migration. In the end, the aim is
that theory has to find answers for the question: What is the life we—men, women, trans, intersex,
and non-binary people—want to have? Therefore, politics needs to build on socio-legal empirical
evidence.
77At FernUniversität in Hagen, the leading positions are meanwhile in the hands of women.
78See GLEICHSTELLUNGSBERICHT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG, https://www.gleichstellungsbericht.de/ (last visited July 31, 2020).
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Abstract
In the context of the encounter of UK and German socio-legal studies in this issue, this Article develops pre-
liminary thoughts on a research agenda for the comparative interdisciplinary empirical study of legal doc-
trine.Basedonaworkingdefinitionofdoctrine as an institutionally legitimizedpracticeofmaking statements
on the law, it presents anoverviewof sociological andcomparative theorizingaboutdoctrine inGermany, and
of the data andmethods being used to study it, in order to identify similar or diverging trends in the UK and
elsewhere. This Article aims to show that legal doctrine, which is often regarded by non-lawyers as arcane
and/or tedious, is an interesting and important subject for comparative socio-legal research.
Keywords: legal doctrine; jurisprudence; socio-legal studies; sociology of law; legal academics
A. Introduction
Socio-legal studies1 as an academic pursuit cannot be understood without its “other”—the doc-
trinal study of law—and vice versa. The relationship between these different perspectives on the
law has varied over time and has developed in disparate ways across the globe. A comparison of
Germany and the UK is an example of this: Whereas in the UK, Socio-legal Studies have a rel-
atively strong presence in the law schools, German Rechtssoziologie has not been able to gain sub-
stantial ground in law schools nor in other departments.2 Often, the relationship between
doctrinal and non-doctrinal study of the law has been strained.3 Ever since Kelsen argued with
Ehrlich over the right way to do Rechtswissenschaft, the “science of the law,” many scholars on
both sides have been accusing the other of not understanding what the law is really about.4
*Christian Boulanger is the Academic Coordinator of the interdisciplinary Research Network “Law in Context” at
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. He previously studied Modern History, Law and Political Science in Heidelberg, Berlin
and Seattle. He also has a PhD in Political Science from Freie Universität Berlin.
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the German Law Journal. This is an Open Access article,
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1As explained in the introduction to this Special Issue, the term is used here as an umbrella concept for the various forms of
the empirical study of the law, whether they are institutionally recognized academic disciplines or intellectual movements
within the established disciplines.
2See Machura, Milestones and Directions: Socio Legal Studies in Germany and the United Kingdom, in this issue. On the
relationship between sociological and doctrinal approaches to law in Germany, see Julika Rosenstock, Tobias Singelnstein &
Christian Boulanger, Versuch über das Sein und Sollen der Rechtsforschung, in INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG 3–29
(Christian Boulanger, Julika Rosenstock, & Tobias Singelnstein eds., 2019).
3For the UK, see generallyNeil Duxbury, A Century of Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 950–74
(2005). For Germany, see generally Alfons Bora, Sociology of Law in Germany: Reflection and Practice, 43 J.L. & SOC’Y 619–46
(2016).
4An excellent summary of this debate at the beginning of the 20th century can be found in HANS KELSEN UND DIE
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE: AUSEINANDERSETZUNGEN MIT HERMANN U. KANTOROWICZ, EUGEN EHRLICH UND MAX WEBER
(Stanley L. Paulson ed., 1992).
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This rift might be the reason that the doctrinal study of law has received surprisingly little
attention from socio-legal scholars.5 Though vivid, the often-used distinction between the “law
on the books” and the “law in action” is unhelpful in this respect, as long as it conjures the image
of a body of text on paper—“black-letter law”—which is largely irrelevant for the “real” law out
there in society. This Article argues that it is precisely the connection between law on the books
and the law in action that makes studying legal doctrine, from a sociological and comparative
perspective, in its various forms worthwhile. Instead of looking at doctrine as the antithesis of
their work, socio-legal scholars might gain insight about the social mechanisms of legal knowledge
production. As a side effect, this research focus might help enhance collaboration between doc-
trinal and non-doctrinal scholars because both sides are necessary for this endeavor to be
successful.
When I speak of “doctrine,” I use this term as “legal dogmatics,” which would be etymologically
closer to the German Rechtsdogmatik although it is much less commonly used.6 Both “doctrine”
(from Latin doctrina) and its continental sibling concepts that are derived from the Greek dogma
have a double etymology that provide notions of both craftsmanship and religious orthodoxy.7
The traditional German understanding of statute-based Rechtsdogmatik has been defined as
the “academic study of the law,”8 which expresses the close connection of German doctrine to
legal scholarship. In the UK, doctrine has been defined to express “authoritative juridical ideas
that may direct the course of legal decisions,”9 which hints at the high influence of courts in
the development of doctrinal statements. It is clear that “doctrine” is what lawyers deal with
and that it goes beyond positive law. As I will argue in Section D, a socio-legal analysis of doctrine
will look beyond ideas and texts and look at social practices of making statements about what the
law is—within the institutions—giving these statements authority and legitimacy.
The following sections present some preliminary thoughts on one of many possible research
agendas for the comparative empirical study of legal doctrine. After a short survey on the state of
the art, I will justify why it is important to look more closely at legal doctrine, provide a working
definition of doctrine as an institutionally legitimized practice of making statements on the law,
and give an overview about empirical theorizing about doctrine and about data and methods
that are being used to study doctrine in Germany. In line with the exploratory character of
the workshop that gave rise to this Special Issue and the early stage of my project,10 this
Article does not attempt to give a comprehensive picture of existing research. Instead, I will be
focusing on a few exemplary lines of research in Germany to show that there is a lot to be learned
by looking at doctrine from a sociological perspective. My hope is to contribute conceptually to a
future Sociology of doctrine which is done comparatively—with attention to the social, political,
and historical context—while using international and interdisciplinary collaboration.
5See Section B, below.
6The Google Books Ngram Viewer shows almost no occurrences of “legal dogmatics” until the mid-1970s, with a peak in
the mid-1980s, but even then “legal doctrine” occurs five times more frequently. See GOOGLE, Google Books Ngram Viewer,
https://tinyurl.com/y7j9erjy (last visited May 23, 2020).
7The meaning of the original Latin and Greek terms refer to teachings or to established rules of a craft, for example, in
medicine. In early Christian Theology, doctrina and dogma continued to be understood as teachings or decisions—based on
the exegesis of biblical texts—that answered a specific question. The modern connotation of officially ordained truths that are
not to be questioned—expressed, for example, in the term “dogmatism”—was only a later development. See MAXIMILIAN
HERBERGER, DOGMATIK: ZUR GESCHICHTE VON BEGRIFF UND METHODE IN MEDIZIN UND JURISPRUDENZ (1981). For uses
of “doctrine” in English legal history, see Joshua Getzler, Legal History as Doctrinal History, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (Markus D. Dubber & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2018).
8“Die rechtswissenschaftliche Bearbeitung des Rechts nennt man Rechtsdogmatik.” Christian Starck, Die Bedeutung der
Rechtsdogmatik für die Rechtsvergleichung, in RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG—SPRACHE—RECHTSDOGMATIK 11 (Frank Schorkopf
& Christian Starck eds., 2019).
9Getzler, supra note 7, at 2.
10This Article was motivated by the workshop and written afterwards, which did not leave enough time to integrate a survey
of the UK research landscape.
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B. An Emerging Research Program on Empirical and Comparative Study of Doctrine
In a 2004 article, Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer remarks that Sociology of law has, “from the beginning up
to today, shown very little interest for the doctrinal study of law, i.e. the practice of interpretation
of the codified positive law in jurisprudence (Jurisprudenz).”11 He cites a similar diagnosis to that
of Niklas Luhmann in 1986, where he finds Luhmann’s statement that “there is no adequate
Sociology of legal doctrine”12 still holds. Schulz-Schaeffer found it bewildering that the empirical
study of a social field such as law would almost completely disregard what most legal scholars, and
certainly those in Germany, consider the “core” of their enterprise.13
Another sixteen years later, have things changed? There is little evidence that it has, at least
in a systematic way. No German textbook on the Sociology of law treats Rechtsdogmatik in
depth—mostly, it serves as a reference point for what the Sociology of law is not.14 In the
UK, the situation seems not much different. The debates which have been held in the last
few decades on the question as to whether “doctrinal legal studies” have academic credentials
at all,15 have produced a number of important studies that reflect on the social practice
of the production of legal doctrine.16 However, there seems to be no systematic empirical
research on legal doctrine itself.17 Therefore, it is not surprising that, given this gap in research
at the national level, systematic comparative empirical research on the subject is hard to
come by.18
A major challenge for this research is that it is quite unclear what terms like Rechtsdogmatik,19
la doctrine,20 or legal doctrine/dogmatics/jurisprudence actually refer to when seen from a com-
parative perspective. One indication of this is the quote by Schulz-Schaeffer above, whose defi-
nition of the doctrinal study of law as “the practice of interpretation of the codified positive law in
jurisprudence” does not work very well in common law jurisdictions such as England, Wales, or
the U.S.21 There, “doctrine” is mainly equated with judicial lawmaking,22 while “doctrinal analy-
sis”means, in the majority of cases, the examination of “the content of a legal opinion to evaluate
whether it was effectively reasoned or to explore its implications for future cases.”23 Even if the
importance of statutory law has been steadily increasing, the main debate seems to center on
11Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer, Rechtsdogmatik als Gegenstand der Rechtssoziologie: für eine Rechtssoziologie “mit noch mehr
Recht,” 25 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 141, 141 (2004) (author translation).
12Admittedly, Luhmann would not consider any sociological theory on the subject to be theoretically “adequate” unless it
were derived from System Theory.
13See Susan Bartie, The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship, 30 LEGAL STUD. 345, 345–69 (2010); Martin Eifert, Zum
Verhältnis von Dogmatik und pluralisierter Rechtswissenschaft, in WAS WEIß DOGMATIK? 79–96 (Gregor Kirchhof, Stefan
Magen & Karsten Schneider eds., 2012).
14See, e.g., MANFRED REHBINDER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 1 (8th ed. 2014).
15On this debate, see Bartie, supra note 13. See also Geoffrey Samuel, Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from
Comparative Law, 67 THE CAMBRIDGE L.J. 288 (2008).
16Most notably, of course, Fiona Cownie’s seminal study on legal academics. FIONA COWNIE, LEGAL ACADEMICS: CULTURE
AND IDENTITIES (2004).
17Unlike in the United States, where empirical studies on legal doctrine has existed for some time now. See, e.g., Emerson H.
Tiller & Frank B. Cross,What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. UNIV. L. Rev. 517 (2006); Jessie Allen, Empirical Doctrine, 66 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1 (2015).
18At least such research is not reflected in handbooks that reflect the state of the art in the discipline. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE
LAW AND SOCIETY (David Scott Clark ed., 2012).
19Rolf Gröschner, Rechtsdogmatik, inHANDBUCH RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 61–66 (Eric Hilgendorf & Jan C. Joerden eds., 2017).
20Horatia Muir Watt, The Epistemological Function of ‘la Doctrine,’ inMETHODOLOGIES OF LEGAL RESEARCH: WHAT KIND
OF METHOD FOR WHAT KIND OF DISCIPLINE? 123–32 (Mark Van Hoecke ed., 2011).
21The “mixed system” in Scotland is a special case. See Stephen Thomson, Mixed Jurisdiction and the Scottish Legal
Tradition: Reconsidering the Concept of Mixture, 7 J. CIV. L. STUD. 51 (2014).
22See, for example, Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989 (1995).
23Tiller & Cross, supra note 17, at 518.
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the role of judicial precedent in determining the law of the land.24 It is clear that doctrine is about
making authoritative statements about the law, but it is less clear what this entails in practice, and
what the role of courts, legal scholarship, and lawyers in general is within this practice. The ambi-
guity of the term “doctrine” is not due to “the lack of a supra-jurisdictional lingua franca.”25 The
problem is more fundamental. As I will argue, national forms of “doctrine” are not primarily
systems of thought, but institutionally framed social practices inseparably connected with
temporal-spatial social context of the individual nations.
The challenge of undertaking comparative empirical research on doctrine is thus threefold. First,
given the multiplicity of concepts, we need to find a suitable “sociological concept” of “doctrine,”
which will work across legal cultures and histories and which can be operationalized in very differ-
ent contexts. If such a concept can be found, the second challenge is to define the comparative
“research questions.” It is to be expected that the questions researchers are interested in will differ
substantively in terms of their legal and academic context, because both the normative and empiri-
cal studies of law have very different trajectories in different countries.26 Third, given the vast array
of theoretical approaches and empirical methods available to social scientists, such a research pro-
gramwill have to decide on the right mix of these “theories andmethods”—determining which will
best serve to answer the research questions. It seems plausible to assume that no single theory or
method will be sufficient.
These challenges are further complicated by the fact that such a research program is by
definition an interdisciplinary enterprise that involves social scientists as well as lawyers.27
Fortunately, it seems that today, the unproductive antagonisms of the past are slowly being over-
come.28 Legal and socio-legal researchers—at least in both disciplines’ cutting edge research—are
taking each other seriously and are working together to better understand “the force of law.”29
Despite this, significant differences remain in the kind of questions legal and socio-legal scholars
are interested in, how they define problems and concepts, and what kind of methods they are
trained in and which they find relevant to their research questions.30
Such a project, I argue, needs input from many disciplines. First, it should entail a strong
historical component. The great variety of legal systems and cultures makes it obvious that
law is a historically contingent, path-dependent phenomenon.31 The specific form in which a
practice of legal doctrine can be observed in a particular legal system and geographic area is thus
a consequence of lengthy historical developments that shape discourses and thought patterns. The
social practice of legal doctrine is subject to constant change, whereby the interesting question
24Ugo Mattei & Luca G. Pes, Civil Law and Common Law: Toward Convergence?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
POLITICS (Gregory A. Caldeira, R. Daniel Kelemen & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2008). This is not a critique of Schulz-
Schaeffer’s article—as he is explicitly focusing on German Sociology of law and German doctrine.
25Duxbury, supra note 3, at 968.
26See Jennifer Hendry, Naomi Creutzfeldt & Christian Boulanger, Socio-Legal Studies in Germany and the UK: Theory and
Methods, in this issue.
27This mirrors the demands on the side of legal scholars that their doctrinal research should involve non-doctrinal schol-
arship, which effectively means communicating with social scientists. See generallyMatyas Bodig, Legal Doctrinal Scholarship
and Interdisciplinary Engagement, 8 ERASMUS L. REV. 43 (2015).
28But see Samuel, supra note 15.
29See generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 814 (1987).
For a less optimistic view about the cooperation between lawyers and scientists, see generally Reza Banakar, Law Through
Sociology’s Looking Glass: Conflict and Competition in Sociological Studies of Law, in THE ISA HANDBOOK IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIOLOGY 58–73 (Ann Denis & Devorah Kalekin-Fishman eds., 2009).
30On methods in the UK and other English-language research contexts, see generally NAOMI CREUTZFELDT, Traditions of
Studying the Social and the Legal, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND METHODS 9–34 (Naomi
Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason & Kirsten McConnachie eds., 2019).
31On path dependence and institutional analysis, see generally PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS,
AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004). See also Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2000).
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concerns which elements remain constant over a long period of time and which elements
must be adapted to social developments. Thus, any research on these differences must include
insights from legal history, in particular the socio-historical study of the legal method. Luckily,
we can build on a large body of historical-comparative work on the development of doctrinal
practices.32
We also need to involve and integrate the knowledge about legal doctrine that exists in the
research field of comparative law. Comparative lawyers know that, without knowledge of
contextual factors such as “legal culture, legal argumentation, judicial decision making, styles
of legal writing, diverging approaches to legal sources and to statutory interpretation (e.g., the
use of travaux préparatoires), the role of legal doctrine, the respective role of the legal profes-
sions, the role of form in law in relation to substance,”33 any comparison between laws and
legal systems will be deficient. Additionally, there is increasing interest in connecting compar-
ative law with socio-legal theory and methods.34 However, if the Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law is any indication of the current state of the art, it seems like the phenomenon
of doctrine or, in a broader sense, the legal method, is not regarded as a topic that requires a
separate chapter.35
C. Why Comparing Legal Doctrine is Important
Identifying a gap in research says little about its relevance. Why should we study doctrinal prac-
tices beyond the fact that it is still possible to say something new? One reason is that from a socio-
logical perspective, legal doctrine is about the power to make decisions. Lawyers and legal scholars
use doctrinal arguments in their attempt to influence, inter alia, administrative agencies and the
courts, and judges use it to justify their decisions. This has two implications: An analytical one that
concerns academic theory development, and a “critical legal studies” one concerning the social
and political legitimacy of doctrinal power.
Some proponents of legal realism have claimed that doctrinal argumentation amounts to a
post-hoc rationalization for what are arbitrary political or other value choices.36 In the tradition
of the legal realists, some scholars in U.S. Political Science research have been almost obsessively
studying the Supreme Court judgments with the aim of demonstrating that the impact of
32In Germany, Stefan Vogenauer has produced extensive historical and comparative work on Germany and the UK. See
generally STEFAN VOGENAUER, DIE AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZEN IN ENGLAND UND AUF DEM KONTINENT: EINE VERGLEICHENDE
UNTERSUCHUNG DER RECHTSPRECHUNG UND IHRER HISTORISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN (2001); see also Stefan Vogenauer, An
Empire of Light? Learning and Lawmaking in the History of German Law, 64 THE CAMBRIDGE L.J. 481 (2005) (providing
an English language summary on the German history). In English, one usually finds references to the classic comparative
treatises by JOHN PHILIP DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968) and by RAOUL C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES,
LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS: CHAPTERS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY (1987).
33Mark Van Hoecke, Methodology of Comparative Legal Research, in LAW AND METHOD (2015). On the history of com-
parative law methods, see Günter Frankenberg, Critical Histories of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
HISTORY (2018).
34See Annelise Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-legal Studies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(Reinhard Zimmermann & Mathias Reimann eds., 2006); Naomi Creutzfeldt, Agnieszka Kubal & Fernanda Pirie,
Introduction: Exploring the Comparative in Socio-legal Studies, 12 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 377 (2016); Michelle Cottier,
Interdisziplinäre Rechtsvergleichung, in INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG 109–23 (Christian Boulanger, Julika
Rosenstock & Tobias Singelnstein eds., 2019).
35The subject is touched on in the chapter on “Sources of Law and Legal Method.” Stefan Vogenauer, Sources of Law and
Legal Method in Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 870-99 (Reinhard Zimmermann &
Mathias Reimann eds., 2006).
36For an exposition of this claim, see generally Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205
(1980) (outlining a brilliant polemic about this claim). For a response, see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:
Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO L. REV. 462 (1987).
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“legal” factors is insignificant in explaining the court’s rulings, compared to ideological and stra-
tegic considerations.37 No matter how convincing one finds radical or simplified versions of the
legal indeterminacy thesis, legal realists’ annihilation of law’s pretenses to be an objective “science”
has, by now, been almost universally accepted, irrespective of the conclusions that one draws from
that insight.38 Many scholars do not believe that doctrine is simply a smokescreen for “something
else,” at least not in all cases. Instead, their data points them to the assumption that doctrine does
actually influence the behavior of judicial or other actors by constraining, or positively influencing,
the available outcomes.39 From a sociological perspective, it is necessary to clarify how the knowl-
edge about “what the law is” is produced, and what social mechanisms are at play when doctrinal
practices are involved in the social construction and reproduction of legal knowledge. This goes
beyond simply stating causal effects evidenced by statistical correlations in our data, as valuable as
such empirical knowledge is. Socio-legal scholars are typically also interested in how those empiri-
cal insights fit into existing social-scientific theorizing. In addition, the picture we will get will be
very complex, and we can expect each area of law to function very differently—criminal law’s
doctrinal practices are different from public law’s, and, say, family law and commercial law
are worlds apart. There will be empirical cases where doctrine truly is nothing but a rationalization
of extra-legal motivations; in other cases, we might find that it actually constrains the range of
possible legal outcomes.
In contrast, the “critical legal studies” aspect concerns the fact that looking at what lawyers do
or say is not just a special application of the Sociology of knowledge or the Sociology of profes-
sions.40 Rather, it leads to the question of how much influence the legal profession has on central
political and social decisions, and to what extent this influence can be justified—or instead—in
what respects this influence has to be criticized. Thus, the question about how legal knowledge is
produced also becomes a problem of democratic theory and the rule of law.41 It needs to be empir-
ically analyzed, not with the primary aim of “unmasking” and debunking its pretenses, but of
making its mechanisms transparent and open for critical discussion. As Dieter Grimm has argued,
if a legal norm finds its final form not at the time of its entering into force, but at the time of its
application in a specific case, then the rules and metarules of its application are as important as the
37For classic works on this see generally SEGAL & SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993);
SEGAL & SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
38Duxbury, supra note 3; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731 (2008). The legal realists in
the United States were not the first to point this out, but their influence on legal thinking was much stronger than that of their
precursors and counterparts in Europe. See also Klaas Hendrik Eller, Comparative Genealogies of “Contract and Society,” in
this issue. In Germany, the “scientific” basis of “legal science” is still an important topic. See, e.g., HELMUTH SCHULZE-FIELITZ,
STAATSRECHTSLEHRE ALS WISSENSCHAFT (2017).
39More recently, some protagonists in U.S. political science research on judicial behavior have called for revisiting some of
the main assumptions of this literature. They have hinted at the possibility that one of the factors motivating judges might,
after all, be “a simple desire to ‘follow the law.’” See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV.
POL SCI. 11, 25 (2013). See also Daniel L. Chen, Jens Frankenreiter & Susan Yeh, Judicial Compliance in District Courts (2017),
Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2740594 (last visited Apr. 27, 2020); Tiller & Cross, supra note 17; Frank B.
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998).
40This is Luhmann’s reservation against the study of judicial behavior or the legal profession. See NIKLAS LUHMANN,
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 3–9 (1972).
41See generally Liza Mattutat, Das Problem der Unbestimmtheit des Rechts – Konsequenzen für die theoretische und die
praktische Rechtskritik, KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 496–508 (2016). See also Tushnet’s claim that because of the indeterminacy of
law, the “rule of law” is nothing but untenable liberal ideology. Tushnet, supra note 36. On Critical Legal Studies, see
generally Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983) (the canonical
article on the subject), although critiques of doctrinal truth-claims are not limited to the political left, as the example
of Carl Schmitt shows. WILLIAM E. SCHEUEMAN, THE END OF LAW: CARL SCHMITT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2d ed. 2019).
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norm itself.42 As the method of interpretation can drastically change the meaning of a legal rule, it
is not surprising that, as Grimm points out, most important debates in German jurisprudence
have concerned themselves with methods rather than substantive content.43 The power to inter-
pret legal norms44 implies the power to choose the rules of interpretation. This power is always
shared with the community to which doctrinal texts are addressed, because the approval of this
audience is critical to the authority of the interpreter.45 However, the takeaway is that when we are
talking about doctrine, we are always also talking about power issues. This is obvious in high-level
cases in apex courts on a national or international level, but equally true for lower-level courts,46 or
questions of legal education47 or career paths in legal academia.48
D. Legal Doctrine as Institutionally Legitimated Practice
Before turning to the questions that a comparative inquiry might address, it is necessary to define
the concept of doctrine that such an inquiry might be based upon. As comparative lawyers know,
the use of one’s own vocabulary to describe a different legal system is highly problematic. The
same is true for a socio-legal approach. One can introduce a new, alien vocabulary, as System
Theory does, to get rid of historical and cultural connotations.49 Another option is to redefine
the existing one—with Max Weber as the obvious example50. The advantage with the latter
approach is that the resulting analysis is more accessible, in particular when dealing with an inter-
disciplinary audience, and that approach is chosen for this Article. However, it is important to
keep in mind that one has to distinguish between the analytical concept of doctrine as used in
this Article to cover doctrinal practices in general, and the term as it is used when describing actual
“doctrine” as it is understood in various English-language legal systems.
In contrast to legal philosophy, a sociological perspective will define terms that refer to observ-
able practices that go beyond the systems of thought that are communicated mainly through
printed texts. Texts are the outcome of a whole chain of events in which actors do something;
ideas are developed and communicated in social contexts which make some ideas easier to express
than others.51 Doctrinal practice usually requires making arguments that are considered to be
42Dieter Grimm, Methode als Machtfaktor, in EUROPÄISCHES RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART 469, 470
(Norbert Horn ed., 1982).
43A vivid example is the principle of proportionality, which was developed in nineteenth century administrative law, to
experience a remarkable career in German constitutional law and European Union law. MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO
PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE (2013). Because it allows courts to control the rationality of politi-
cal decisions, it was fiercely opposed by parts of legal scholarship who defended the discretion of governmental decision-
makers and/or the sovereignty of parliament.
44For recent discussions of this power in German political science, see generally Hans Vorländer, Deutungsmacht—Die
Macht der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in DIE DEUTUNGSMACHT DER VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT (Hans Vorländer ed.,
2006).
45LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES (2006); Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Audiences and
Reputation: Perspectives from Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451 (2011).
46One classical example from the German literature is RÜDIGER LAUTMANN, JUSTIZ—DIE STILLE GEWALT: TEILNEHMENDE
BEOBACHTUNG UND ENTSCHEIDUNGSSOZIOLOGISCHE ANALYSE (1972).
47For example, there are feminist critiques of gender stereotypes in the contrived examples that are used in German law
schools to teach students how to solve legal cases. See generally DANA-SOPHIA VALENTINER, (GESCHLECHTER)
ROLLENSTEREOTYPE IN JURISTISCHEN AUSBILDUNGSFÄLLEN (2017). For a critical view on legal education, see also Sonja
Buckel, Die Mechanik der Macht in der juristischen Ausbildung, 35 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 111–14 (2002).
48FIONA COWNIE, LEGAL ACADEMICS: CULTURE AND IDENTITIES (2004).
49NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Klaus A. Ziegert & Fatima Kastner trans., 2008).
50For a look at his “Basic Sociological Terms” or the ideal types of “Formal and Substantive Rationalization” in law, see MAX
WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
51Michel Foucault, in particular, stressed this point. On the uses and the limits of Foucauldian discourse theory for socio-
legal research, see Doris Schweitzer, Diskursanalyse, Wahrheit und Recht: Methodologische Probleme einer Diskursanalyse des
Rechts, 35 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 201 (2015).
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“legal” by the local epistemic community of lawyers52 at a particular place and time. In all
instances, “the normative content of any doctrine will fall to be determined by the dynamic
interpretation of the legal community.”53
This is why I argue that from a sociological perspective, doctrine refers to institutionally legiti-
mized practices of making statements on what the law is. Defining doctrine as “making statements
on what the law is” is hardly original and probably not controversial. The stress here is on “institu-
tionally legitimized,” because it signals the context-sensitivity of the approach. The form and
behavior of legal institutions varies significantly in different locations, as do the ways these insti-
tutions confer legitimacy—in its empirical sense—on its members to make authoritative state-
ments. This way of understanding doctrine as a social practice is general enough to cover the
very distinct legal cultures in the UK and Germany without claiming to provide a universal
definition.54
Doctrinal practices can be observed in judicial decision-making, in legal advocacy, and in legal
scholarship. Each use involves different, but partly overlapping, institutionalized contexts: The
judicial system, the market for legal services, and the academy. The first form has been thoroughly
studied in the U.S. context, with a focus on higher courts,55 and with the qualification that the
“mainstream” research held for a long time that the actual impact of doctrine on judicial decision
making was negligible. Lawyers have been a popular research object.56 Lawyers use “applied doc-
trine,” ready-made pieces of argumentation that do not have to be consistent as long as they are
effective. For them, “legal expertise,” which entails much more than strictly legal knowledge,57 is
much more important than the doctrinal quality of their argument. However, recent research on
strategic litigation and “cause lawyering”58 sheds a light on the attempts by lawyer activists to
influence doctrine in order to change political or social outcomes.
The third form of doctrine, legal scholarship, is developed mainly, but not exclusively, at uni-
versities. For Susan Bartie, in the case of the UK, it is controversial to try and “define a ‘standard’
form of legal scholarship in circumstances where the concept of law and how it ought to be studied
has been in a state of constant flux”.59 Bartie identifies the “core” of doctrinal legal scholarship, or
the “concept of ‘doctrinalism’ or ‘black letter law’” in the following way: “[F]ocusing on legal prin-
ciple (largely that generated by courts but also the legislature); basing argument and prescription
on a normative premise which is not unpacked or explained; reacting to events comprising of
changes to the law by judges or legislators; and, looking for deficiencies in legal principles,
52On epistemic communities in the context of EU legal integration, see Jennifer Hendry, The Double Fragmentation of Law:
Legal System-internal Differentiation and the Process of Europeanisation, in “INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW” REVISITED: THE
MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN POLITY 157–70 (Daniel Augenstein ed., 2013). In Germany, Britta Rehder has used the concept to
study developments in labor law. See BRITTA REHDER, RECHTSPRECHUNG ALS POLITIK: DER BEITRAG DES
BUNDESARBEITSGERICHTS ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DER ARBEITSBEZIEHUNGEN IN DEUTSCHLAND (2011).
53Getzler, supra note 7, at 173.
54Such an understanding is part of what Robert Merton has called “theories of the medium range,” which are “theories that
lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-
inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social
organization and social change.” ROBERT K. MERTON, SOC. THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 39 (1957). On the difference
between normative and empirical legitimacy, see Rodney Barker, Legitimacy: The Identity of the Accused, 42 POL. STUD.
101, 101–02 (1994) (providing a succinct summary on the difference).
55The advanced state of research is evidenced by the existence of specialized handbooks such as the ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Robert M. Howard & Kirk A. Randazzo eds., 2018); and THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (Lee Epstein & Stefanie A. Lindquist eds., 1st ed. 2017).
56A lot of this literature deals with the influence of the legal profession on political outcomes. See Terence C. Halliday, The
Politics of Lawyers: An Emerging Agenda, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1007, 1007–11 (1999), and Lawyers in 21st-Century Societies
(Richard L Abel et al. eds., 2020).
57For example, to know which judge is susceptible to what kind of argument. On “legal expertise,” see ALEXANDER SOMEK,
RECHTLICHES WISSEN (2006).
58See, e.g., Lisa Hahn, Strategische Prozessführung, in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 5–32 (2019).
59Bartie, supra note 13, at 349.
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suggesting ways to improve them or clarifying the law so that judges or legislators can better
understand their development.” For her, the methodology adopted is “likened to that of the courts
with the primary focus resting on the internal logic of judgments or statute[s].”60
Despite the seemingly stronger continuity and stability of the practice of doctrinal analysis in
Germany, no consensus exists about what exactly Rechtsdogmatik means.61 German lawyers,
when speaking of it, refer to texts—such as legal decisions, law review articles, commentary
literature, or monographs. “Rechtsdogmatik,” according to Christian Bumke, “endeavours to
sift through and to secure the ideas and insights about the law. To this end, it forms and devel-
ops legal concepts or principles and organizes the legal material”62 for the use in judicial argu-
ment and legal education. There is no consensus as to whether positive law is to be considered
part of “Rechtsdogmatik.”63
Both descriptions of doctrine hint at the generative, or creative, aspect of doctrinal legal
scholarship only in passing. For Bumke, legal dogmatics “forms and develops legal concept
or principles” only to the end of systematizing the law that is somehow “out there.” Bartie
equally portrays doctrinal analysis in the subservient role of a service provider for judges
and legislators, which might occasionally make suggestions to improve legal principles. Legal
doctrinal scholarship, in its many forms, is not simply reproducing decisions by legislatures
and courts, but often “creating” legal principles, interpretative choices, and other normative
ideas which are picked up and sanctified as law later on in the courts or in Parliament.
As a rule, legal doctrinal texts aim to become part of legal knowledge—meaning they are read
and cited by other lawyers. They create new law inasmuch as they do not simply reproduce
something given, but make a choice as to what should count as the law. Dogmatic texts contain
normative statements that, ultimately, are meant to be used in a judicial decision. In this way, a
doctrinal text unfolds social effectiveness in a completely different way than, for example,
a political science essay. This aspect of power is usually excluded from legal reflection.
In empirical research, however, it is of great importance.
E. The Empirical Study of Legal Doctrine
How can we go about studying doctrinal practices empirically and comparatively? As I have
argued, the Sociology of doctrine is a field of research that has yet to take definitive shape.
The aim of this section is to identify, from a bird’s eye view, existing theoretical and methodo-
logical work which can be brought together in order to advance the state of the art. As my research
into the history and present state of this research in the UK is still very much at the beginning, the
following observations are limited to a description of some recent developments in theoretical and
methodological approaches in the German literature—in order to be able to identify similar
research in the UK and elsewhere later.64
I. Theory
Traditional sociological theory has focused on observable human behavior and has regarded
law as an epistemic object. Legal knowledge in this perspective consists of information, practices,
discourses, et cetera, which are regarded, “known,” and (re-)produced by actors as ”legal.” The
60Id.
61Martin Eifert, Zum Verhältnis von Dogmatik und pluralisierter Rechtswissenschaft, in WAS WEIß DOGMATIK? 79, 80
(Gregor Kirchhof, Stefan Magen & Karsten Schneider eds., 2012).
62Christian Bumke, Rechtsdogmatik: Überlegungen zur Entwicklung und zu den Formen einer Denk- und Arbeitsweise der
deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 69 JURISTENZEITUNG 641, 641 (2014).
63Rosenstock, Singelnstein, and Boulanger, supra note 2, at 9.
64Much more current and past research exists than what I present here. See, e.g., NEUE THEORIEN DES RECHTS (Sonja
Buckel, Ralf Christensen & Andreas Fischer-Lescano eds., 2d ed. 2008).
1370 Christian Boulanger
acting persons—for example judges, lawyers, legal academics, clients, or citizens—approach the
law with often antagonistic interests and world views that can be in some way empirically
determined or are theoretically presumed.
Max Weber’s work falls into this tradition and is still quite influential, both in the social
sciences and in the law in Germany. This is not surprising because Weber was a lawyer himself
who used concepts from legal doctrine65 to analyze the law sociologically. Weber pointed out the
societal embeddedness of the law with his concept of “legal thinking,” which was not about legal
ideas alone, but also how they developed in response to social and economic needs, institutional
constraints and incentives, and self-interests of the legal profession.66 Weber’s ideal typical
description of what continental, or more specifically, German, legal doctrine purported to do
at the turn of the twentieth century is that “the jurist, taking for granted the empirical validity
of the legal propositions, examines each of them and tries to determine its logically correct mean-
ing in such a way that all of them can be combined in a system which is logically coherent, in other
words, free from internal contradictions.”67 For him, this “rational” system of doctrine was the
outcome of the monopolization of legal education at the universities. Weber contrasted this type
of “legal thinking” with the situation in England, where the “empirical training in the law as a craft
training” prevented such rationalization to take place.68 At the same time, this form of legal
thinking implies contrasting visions of the role of the judge—anonymous legal “automaton”
in Germany, charismatic judge in the UK.69 Taking into account the deficiencies of a work that
is more than one hundred years old,70 the basic tenets of Weberian thinking continue to inspire
general theorizing and often provide a common ground for lawyers and social scientists.71
However, few studies apply Weberian theory for actual empirical research.72
In recent years, Pierre Bourdieu’s work on law has become influential in German socio-legal
studies.73 Bourdieu builds on Weber’s actor-centered and institutional analysis but adds the idea
of the legal “field” in which individuals and groups with different “legal capital” and distinctive
forms of “habitus” struggle for hegemony over the authoritative interpretation of the law. In his
writings on law, which are exclusively concerned with the French case, the conflictual nature of
the legal field is emphasized in a particularly strong manner: It is a matter of struggles over
symbols and interpretations, but also over institutional hierarchies and financial resources.
65For example, note his use of “formal” and “substantive” to categorize types of legal thinking in different religions and parts
of the world. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 654.
66Id. at 654–58.
67Id. at 311. From the context, it becomes clear that Weber does not claim that the legal method would actually bring laws
into a logically coherent system. For him, lawyers in the continental European legal act as if this were the case, which has an
effect on how the law works.
68Id. at 784. It is important to remember that “rational” in the Weberian sense is an analytical, not evaluative term. See
generally Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality or Max Weber’s Sociology in the
Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2003).
69WEBER, supra note 50, at 979, 763. On the notion of a “charismatic judge,” see Isher-Paul Sahni,MaxWeber’s Sociology of
Law: Judge as Mediator, 9 J. CLASSICAL SOCIO. 209 (2009).
70For an English language overview of some of the criticism of the empirical basis of Weber’s historical and cross-cultural
generalizations, theoretical inconsistencies and political biases, see STANISLAV ANDRESKI, MAXWEBER’S INSIGHTS AND ERRORS
(2013).
71WOLFGANG SCHLUCHTER, HANDELN IM KONTEXT: NEUE ABHANDLUNGEN ZU EINEM FORSCHUNGSPROGRAMM IM
ANSCHLUSS AN MAX WEBER (2018). More specifically on legal doctrine, see JENS PETERSEN, MAX WEBERS
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND DIE JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE (2008).
72I have used Weber’s ideal typical method to study the Constitutional Courts in Germany and Hungary. See generally
CHRISTIAN BOULANGER, HÜTEN, RICHTEN, GRÜNDEN: ROLLEN DER VERFASSUNGSGERICHTE IN DER DEMOKRATISIERUNG
DEUTSCHLANDS UND UNGARNS (2013).
73DAS RECHTSDENKEN PIERRE BOURDIEUS (Andrea Kretschmann ed., 2019); ANJA BÖNING, JURA STUDIEREN: EINE
EXPLORATIVE UNTERSUCHUNG IM ANSCHLUSS AN PIERRE BOURDIEU (2017); Michael Wrase, Rechtsinterpretation als soziale
Praxis—eine rechtssoziologische Perspektive auf juristische Methodik, in POLITIK UND RECHT: UMRISSE EINES
POLITIKWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN FORSCHUNGSFELDES 63–84 (Verena Frick, Oliver W. Lembcke & Roland Lhotta eds., 2017).
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Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” is especially useful if we want to conceptualize doctrine as a
social practice—meaning the sum of behaviors, attitudes, and ways of thinking that an individ-
ual has been socialized into as a part of a social group, such as lawyers, judges, professors, or
bureaucrats.74 Bourdieu is skeptical of the doctrinal habitus75 but does not speak to the thesis of
the indeterminacy of law. Instead, Bourdieusian insights are useful to identify social factors that
affect the autonomy of legal discourse from within the legal field.76
The most individualistic approach surveyed here is the research on Behavioral Law and
Economics that has gained prominence in Germany in the last couple of years following develop-
ments in economics in the United States.77 It is premised on the theoretical model of utility maxi-
mizing actors, but unlike the original rational choice model of the homo economicus with fixed
preferences, it allows for corrections of that model, for example, via controlled experiments, or by
using large legal datasets—which I will analyze in greater detail below. Even though the research in
this tradition is empirical, it so far has remained largely unconnected to socio-legal studies, which
has to do, inter alia, with the fact that this line of research is interested in empirical questions
mainly to solve legal questions rather than advance social scientific theorizing.78 Law and
Economics has traditionally regarded itself as an alternative to doctrinal analysis.79 Because there
are many ways in which the production of legal doctrine can be analyzed from an economic per-
spective, even those skeptical of economic perspectives should not discount the heuristic value of
these approaches.80
Radically opposed to approaches that look at individuals and groups is the Systems Theory
perspective developed by Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner.81 Such approaches under-
stand law as an epistemic subject. From this perspective, law is a communicative system that
creates its own reality, including the acting “persons,” who appear only as “semantic artefacts”
created by the system itself. System Theory views law as a self-referential system of communi-
cative operations82 that differ from other communications by using the binary distinction
74Mikael R. Madsen & Yves Dezalay, The Power of the Legal Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2002).
75For his characterization of jurists as the “gatekeepers of collective hypocrisy,” see Pierre Bourdieu, Les juristes, gardiens de
l’hypocrisie collective, in NORMES JURIDIQUES ET REGULATION SOCIALE 195–99 (Francois Chazel & Jacques Commaille eds.,
1991).
76Mauricio García Villegas, On Pierre Bourdieu’s Legal Thought, in DROIT ET SOCIÉTÉ 57 (2004).
77An example of this is seen at the Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn. CHRISTOPH ENGEL, THE
PROPER SCOPE OF BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2018), http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2018_02online.pdf (last visited
July 24, 2019). For a central reference point of the U.S. literature, see generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
78CHRISTOPH ENGEL, RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT ALS ANGEWANDTE SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT: DIE AUFGABE DER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT NACH DER ÖFFNUNG DER RECHTSORDNUNG FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE THEORIE (1998), http://
www.mpp-rdg.mpg.de/pdf_dat/9801.pdf (last visited May 23, 2020). Another reason might be continuing reservations of
socio-legal studies towards Law and Economics. But the most important factor certainly is that publication in socio-legal
and/or German legal journals is unattractive for Law and Economics scholars, who must publish in highly competitive,
law and economy-focused journals to advance their careers.
79See Emanuel V. Towfigh, Empirical Arguments in Public Law Doctrine: Should Empirical Legal Studies Make a “Doctrinal
Turn”?, 12 ICON 670 (2014).
80Dogmatic knowledge production, especially outside the courts, is subject to the rules of supply and demand. Depending
on the context, certain types of doctrinal productions “pay off”more than others. On the one hand, financially—depending on
the market for textbooks, commentaries, or expert opinions—and on the other hand, structurally, which is probably more
important as a factor in the accumulation of reputational capital or career opportunities. It is also important to keep in mind
the limits of an ahistorical focus on incentives when explaining the behavior of legal actors. See Craig Green, What Does
Richard Posner Know About How Judges Think?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 625, 626 (2010).
81See Ioannis Kampourakis, Empiricism, Constructivism, and Grand Theory in Sociological Approaches to Law: The Case of
Transnational Private Regulation, in this issue.
82Gunther Teubner, Die Episteme des Rechts. Zu erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des reflexiven Rechts, in WACHSENDE
STAATSAUFGABEN—SINKENDE STEUERUNGSFÄHIGKEIT DES RECHTS 114–55 (Dieter Grimm ed., 1990), in which Teubner
emphasizes that “Law is communication and nothing but communication!” (p. 127).
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between “legal” and “illegal.”83 For Luhmann, Rechtsdogmatik in its specific German character-
istic is “one of several functionally equivalent solutions” of how the legal system is controlling its
operations.84 Systems-theoretical legal analysis has often been criticized for taking tortuous
detours to address the fact that “questions of interpretation are questions of power and
sovereignty,”85 a problem that “Critical Systems Theory” aims to address.86 System Theory is
probably the best theory we have to describe the emergence of the precarious and, according
to Luhmann, highly unlikely autonomy of law, via a process of functional differentiation.87
However, as Matthias Mahlmann has argued, System Theory is not particularly well-suited
to identify the specific social forces or purposeful interventions—for example, by moral
entrepreneurs—that very often drive real legal development.88
II. Methods
In German Sociology of law, different empirical methods have been used to look at what lawyers
are doing. In the 1970s, Ekkehard Klausa called for an empirical “Sociology of Jurisprudence”
and used survey research to gather information on law professors.89 More influential was
Rüdiger Lautmann’s study from 1972, which engaged in covert participant observation to study
how first-instance court judges actually decide cases.90 After that, most work was theoretical and
hermeneutic. It took roughly forty years before new empirical work in this tradition was pro-
duced, such as a study by Peter Stegmaier, who relied on interviews and overt participant obser-
vation to analyze how private and administrative judges deal with cases.91 But it was not the
Sociology of Law that was most productive in this respect.92 Instead, the most influential works
came from German Political Science, where partly interview-based research shed new light on
doctrinal practices at the apex courts, such as studies by Uwe Kranenpohl and Oliver Lembcke
on Justices of the Federal Constitutional Court,93 or by Britta Rehder on the interaction between
the Federal Labor Court and labor law lawyers.94
83NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Klaus A. Ziegert & Fatima Kastner trans., 2008).
84NIKLAS LUHMANN, RECHTSSYSTEM UND RECHTSDOGMATIK 18, 24 (1974). This is the “early” Luhmann, who does not yet
use the language of autopoiesis.
85Eckard Bolsinger, Autonomie des Rechts? Niklas Luhmanns soziologischer Rechtspositivismus — Eine kritische
Rekonstruktion, 42 POLITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 3, 21 (2001).
86See MARC AMSTUTZ & ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO, KRITISCHE SYSTEMTHEORIE: ZUR EVOLUTION EINER NORMATIVEN
THEORIE (2014).
87LUHMANN, supra note 83, at ch. 6.
88Matthias Mahlmann, Katastrophen der Rechtsgeschichte und die autopoietische Evolution des Rechts, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 247, 275 (2000).
89See generally EKKEHARD KLAUSA, DEUTSCHE UND AMERIKANISCHE RECHTSLEHRER: WEGE ZU EINER SOZIOLOGIE DER
JURISPRUDENZ. (1981). Klausa’s “Program for a Sociology of Juridical Science” from 1975 had no lasting influence.
See Ekkehard Klausa, Programm einer Wissenschaftssoziologie der Jurisprudenz, in WISSENSCHAFTSSOZIOLOGIE 100–21
(Nico Stehr & René König eds., 1975).
90Because of the covert nature of the observation, the study was very controversial and would probably not pass
today’s research ethics review. Most of the stir it caused, however, was due to the fact that the study revealed how much
the reality of judicial decision-making diverted from the official account of the legal process. RÜDIGER LAUTMANN,
JUSTIZ—DIE STILLE GEWALT: TEILNEHMENDE BEOBACHTUNG UND ENTSCHEIDUNGSSOZIOLOGISCHE ANALYSE
(Wiederabdruck ed. 2011).
91PETER STEGMAIER,WISSEN, WAS RECHT IST: RICHTERLICHE RECHTSPRAXIS AUSWISSENSSOZIOLOGISCH-ETHNOGRAFISCHER
SICHT (2009).
92On this, see Christian Boulanger, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsforschung und Rechtssoziologie, 56 RECHT UND POLITIK
(forthcoming 2020).
93UWE KRANENPOHL, HINTER DEM SCHLEIER DES BERATUNGSGEHEIMNISSES: DER WILLENSBILDUNGS UND
ENTSCHEIDUNGSPROZESS DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (2010); OLIVER W. LEMBCKE, HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG: EINE
INSTITUTIONENTHEORETISCHE STUDIE ZUR AUTORITÄT DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (2007).
94REHDER, supra note 52.
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Using survey research, interviews, or ethnographic methods95 can produce valuable empirical
data. One reason why these works are so rare is that applying these methods involves a lot of
additional effort and time—sometimes also financial resources—usually more than is required
when doing desk-based research, not to mention the fact that German lawyers do not receive
training in empirical methods. The general reluctance by legal professionals to publicly reflect
on the various non-legal influences on their craft has been very strong in Germany,96 although
this might be changing with new generations of increasingly interdisciplinary-minded legal
scholars and practitioners. In many cases, however, only trained lawyers have access to, and
can report from, what is going on inside the legal black box.97
An alternative approach is to return the focus to doctrinal text production. Recent literature
has taken up concepts from literary studies to differentiate the ways in which textual data can
be approached. On the one hand, “close reading” pays attention to the meaning of individual texts,
and traces the development, diffusion, and transformation of doctrinal ideas against the social con-
text in which they exist. An example of this kind of research in German constitutional law history
would be Thomas Henne’s and Arne Riedlinger’s edited volume on the Lüth Decision of the
German Federal Constitutional Court,98 which works out the historical context in which the doc-
trine of the “direct third-party effect” in German constitutional law was developed. Another example
is Gunter Frieder’s work on the competition between the Smend and Schmitt “schools” over doc-
trinal dominance in constitutional law scholarship in post-war Germany.99 Recently, Verena Frick
traced the internal struggles within the German Association of Constitutional Law Teachers and the
influence of these debates on constitutional law from a political science perspective.100 These works
emphasize the importance of biographical detail, academic lineages, institutional competition, and
historical events for the development of doctrinal thought. They call for the “historicization” of doc-
trine as opposed to the decontextualization and abstraction to which German legal thought tends.101
On the other hand, “distant reading” digests a large number of texts by having algorithms
“read” the texts.102 Algorithmic reading of judicial or academic doctrinal texts is a newer branch
of research into legal doctrine that differs from the traditional social scientific method of using
texts as data with which to test hypotheses.103 Another method for inferring causal relationships
95For yet another approach, see micro-sociological work by Thomas Scheffer and others who have been comparatively
studying interactions in German and UK courts. THOMAS SCHEFFER, KATI HANNKEN-ILLJES & ALEXANDER KOZIN,
CRIMINAL DEFENCE AND PROCEDURE: COMPARATIVE ETHNOGRAPHIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY, AND THE
UNITED STATES (2010).
96See the preface of LAUTMANN, supra note 90. There are also good reasons for this, such as keeping judicial deliberations
confidential. KRANENPOHL, supra note 93, at ch. 5.
97See Hartmut Rensen,Wie funktioniert die Interpretation des Rechts in der Praxis?, in POLITIK UND RECHT: UMRISSE EINES
POLITIKWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN FORSCHUNGSFELDES 41–62 (Verena Frick, Oliver W. Lembcke & Roland Lhotta eds., 2017).
98See DAS LÜTH-URTEIL IN (RECHTS-)HISTORISCHER SICHT. DIE KONFLIKTE UM VEIT HARLAN UND DIE
GRUNDRECHTSJUDIKATUR DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS, (Thomas Henne & Arne Riedlinger eds., 2005).
99FRIEDER GÜNTHER, DENKEN VOM STAAT HER: DIE BUNDESDEUTSCHE STAATSRECHTSLEHRE ZWISCHEN DEZISION UND
INTEGRATION 1949–1970 (2009). A different example from outside Germany would be recent work on the socio-historical
genesis of the proportionality principle. See COHEN-ELIYA & PORAT, supra note 43.
100VERENA FRICK, DIE STAATSRECHTSLEHRE IM STREIT UM IHREN GEGENSTAND: DIE STAATS UND VERFASSUNGSDEBATTEN
SEIT 1979 (2018).
101DAS LÜTH-URTEIL IN (RECHTS-)HISTORISCHER SICHT, supra note 98.
102The classic reference there is to FRANCO MORETTI, GRAPHS, MAPS, TREES: ABSTRACT MODELS FOR A LITERARY HISTORY
(2005). See Katherine Bode, The Equivalence of “Close” and “Distant” Reading; or, Toward a New Object for Data-Rich Literary
History, 78 MOD. LANGUAGE Q. 77–106 (2017).
103This methodology is based on “coding” the texts. In other words, a researcher takes documents like judicial decisions
and translates the texts into a number of static, mostly binary, variables. These variables are entered into a database; stat-
istical methods are then used to calculate if the hypotheses can be confirmed or not. See, e.g., Sylvain Brouard & Christoph
Hönnige, Constitutional Courts as Veto Players: Lessons from the United States, France and Germany, EUR. J. POL. RES.
529 (2017); Benjamin G. Engst et al., Zum Einfluss der Parteinähe auf das Abstimmungsverhalten der Bundesver-
fassungsrichter – eine quantitative Untersuchung, 72 JURISTENZEITUNG 816 (2017).
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using a large number of texts is network analysis, which has been used, inter alia, to uncover cita-
tion networks in the jurisprudence of apex courts.104 A third often-used quantitative methodology
is to use topic modeling algorithms, which have been defined as “statistical text mining or infor-
mation retrieval methods used for uncovering the main themes underlying a collection of docu-
ments.”105 This, for example, is used to show how rules of procedure affect the material content of
decisions of the German Constitutional Court.106 Finally, I should mention recent efforts to bring
together quantitative legal studies and legal linguistics, which will certainly have to be a part of a
comparative study of doctrine.107
These text-based quantitative methodologies have been almost exclusively applied to digital
text collections of judicial decisions. Unlike most other forms of legal data, collections of judicial
decisions can, in many cases, be freely downloaded. In contrast, the access to digitized forms of
legal scholarship is, in the majority of cases, encumbered by corporate paywalls and publisher’s
copyright—not to mention the complication of the fragmented state of ownership over the docu-
ments. This is probably the reason why legal doctrinal scholarship has not yet been the subject of
much quantitative research. As legal scholarship increasingly moves to open access publishing and
historical doctrinal scholarship falls into the public domain, we can expect growing opportunities
for research on legal doctrinal scholarship. Given the availability of doctrinal “big data,” we will be
able to trace the emergence and development of doctrinal figures, trace citation networks, and
academic lineages, as well as pursue other research questions that have occupied qualitative
research for a long time.
E. Conclusion and Outlook
I have presented some of the theoretical and methodological approaches in German research on
law that can be brought to bear on the interdisciplinary study of doctrine. The existing variety of
theories and methods provides multiple angles from which to choose and explain historical and
contemporary data. Combined with similar efforts in the UK and elsewhere, there is great poten-
tial for the comparative analysis of doctrinal knowledge production.
In the literature that I have surveyed, we have seen a diverse set of research questions, which
could be brought together and pushed forward in a systematic interdisciplinary and comparative
research program. One of them has been the question: To what extent do judicially or academi-
cally produced doctrinal rules determine judicial decisions? This concerns the varying degrees to
which scholarship influences judges in their decision-making and whether this influence is openly
acknowledged or not.108 However, it is important to ask what relationship exists between doctrinal
practices and the character of the political regime in which it is embedded.109 Another, more
104See generally Mattias Derlén & Johan Lindholm, Peek-A-Boo, It’s a Case Law System! Comparing the European Court of
Justice and the United States Supreme Court from a Network Perspective, 18 GERMAN L.J. 647 (2017); Jens Frankenreiter,
Network Analysis and the Use of Precedent in the Case Law of the CJEU – A Reply to Derlén and Lindholm, 18 GERMAN
L.J. 687 (2017); Niels Petersen & Emanuel V. Towfigh, Network Analysis and Legal Scholarship, 18 GERMAN L.J. 695
(2017). For Germany, see CORINNA COUPETTE, JURISTISCHE NETZWERKFORSCHUNG. (2019).
105Luisa Wendel, Anna Shadrova & Alexander Tischbirek, Variations in Prevalent Themes in the German Federal
Constitutional Court’s Decisions (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
106Id.
107See Hanjo Hamann & Friedemann Vogel, Evidence-Based Jurisprudence Meets Legal Linguistics-Unlikely Blends Made in
Germany, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1473 (2017).
108Neil Duxbury, in particular, has studied the relationship between courts and legal academia in the cases of the U.S.,
France, and the UK. See NEIL DUXBURY, JURISTS AND JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE (2001). Classical comparative works
which also touch this question are JOHN PHILIP DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968) and also RAOUL VAN CAENEGEM,
JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS: CHAPTERS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY (1987).
109See generally the classic work by MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986).
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theoretical line of inquiry, has been to ask about the function of law, and therefore legal-doctrinal
practices in society.110 In what ways does doctrine support law’s role as a tool of social control in
the hands of the economically powerful, as scholars in the Marxian tradition have argued?111
How does doctrine, as a practice, preserve inequalities in terms of, for example, gender and
race?112 And, on the contrary, in which cases can doctrinal practices be employed towards
the aim of inducing progressive social change?113 How does doctrine help sustain law’s role
as a medium of social integration envisioned by classical Sociology in the tradition of
Durkheim and Weber?114 Finally, what do the widely divergent doctrinal practices in different
jurisdictions tell us about law’s function of stabilizing normative expectations postulated by
System Theory?115
In addition, one can look at other theoretical perspectives that I have not mentioned. For exam-
ple, it would be useful to connect the comparative Sociology of academic disciplines on one side,116
with the comparative study of legal scholarship, and of socio-legal studies, on the other. In addi-
tion, further empirical research is needed to determine how processes of doctrinal argumentation
and persuasion actually work in the different legal arenas given the solid evidence of various cog-
nitive biases that affect the “rationality” of legal argumentation and decision-making.117 This
research would be crucial in covering the middle ground between the equally implausible, and
largely abandoned, theoretical positions that maintain that doctrine either is the product of an
internal “scientific” legal logic, or simply mirrors external influences—such as societal power
relations, judges’ ideological preferences, et cetera.
In German legal discourse, some argue that “through doctrinal work, objectification and
value neutrality can and should be achieved.”118 Most empirical theorists are doubtful of earlier
claims that legal doctrine is actually able “to transform value judgements into questions of
knowledge and truth.”119 As we have seen, whereas earlier social science theorizing, in particular
in the United States, was convinced that legal arguments mattered little in the decision-making
of courts, empirical research in the meantime has “established the very important point that
110See, e.g., DIE FUNKTION DES RECHTS IN DER MODERNEN GESELLSCHAFT (Rüdiger Lautmann, Werner Maihofer & Helmut
Schelsky eds., 1970). I have examined this question in more detail. See Christian Boulanger, Die Soziologie juristischer
Wissensproduktion, in INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG 173, 183–88 (Christian Boulanger, Julika Rosenstock &
Tobias Singelnstein eds., 2019).
111One text that has been influential in Germany and found an audience in the UK is KARL RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF
PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS (1949). For newer critiques of “Juridism” or the legal form, see DANIEL LOICK,
JURIDISMUS: KONTUREN EINER KRITISCHEN THEORIE DES RECHTS (2017); see also CHRISTOPH MENKE, KRITIK DER RECHTE
(2015). None of these works are sociological in nature, however.
112Valentiner, supra note 47; Cengiz Barskanmaz, Rassismus, Postkolonialismus und Recht – Zu einer deutschen Critical
Race Theory?, 41 Kritische Justiz 296 (2008).
113Many forms of civil rights litigation are aimed not only at affecting a certain outcome in a court case, but to establish
judicial precedents that effectively change judicial doctrine. For Germany, where this is a rather recent topic, see Christian
Boulanger & David Krebs, Strategische Prozessführung, 39 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 1, 1–4 (2019); Alexander Graser,
Strategic Litigation – oder: Was man mit der Dritten Gewalt sonst noch so anfangen kann, 10 Rechtwissenschaft 317 (2019).
The U.S. literature—for example, by Austin Sarat, Stuart Scheingold, or Michael McCann—is well established. Newer works
stress the fact that strategic litigation can also be used for aims that are contrary to the progressive agenda. See generally
Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Support Structures and Constitutional Change: Teles, Southworth, and the Conservative Legal
Movement: Support Structures and Constitutional Change, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 516 (2011).
114MATHIEU DEFLEM, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: VISIONS OF A SCHOLARLY TRADITION (2008).
115Or more precisely, of the expectation of expectations, see LUHMANN, supra note 84, at ch. 3.
116MICHÈLE LAMONT, HOW PROFESSORS THINK: INSIDE THE CURIOUS WORLD OF ACADEMIC JUDGMENT (2010).
117But see DANIEL M. KLERMAN & HOLGER SPAMANN, Law Matters – Less Than We Thought (2019), https://papers.ssrn.
com/abstract=3439526 (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
118Wahl, supra note 21, at 129.
119JOSEF ESSER, VORVERSTÄNDNIS UND METHODENWAHL IN DER RECHTSFINDUNG: RATIONALITÄTSGRUNDLAGEN
RICHTERLICHER ENTSCHEIDUNGSPRAXIS 98 (1972).
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doctrine does matter in future decisions.”120 How exactly this plays out in the interaction
between courts, legal practitioners and the legal academy can be the subject of future interdis-
ciplinary and comparative research. I have tried to show that doctrine, which many regard as
arcane and/or boring by non-lawyers, is actually an interesting and important subject for com-
parative socio-legal research, and that it can elucidate some of the very marked legal-cultural
differences between countries such as Germany and the UK.
120Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 517, 525 (2006).
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Abstract
Labor law scholars have been receptive to socio legal methods, going beyond doctrinal legal sources and
looking to other disciplines including industrial relations, sociology, and history. This Article revisits the
development of socio legal labor law scholarship in Germany and the UK in order to understand the
different approaches within the context of two different legal and academic cultures, and considers
how a comparison can provide new insights at a time when the discipline is in a state of flux. In particular,
this Article focuses on how history can provide an entrée into different ways of comparing labor law and
labor relations systems. It seeks to start a methodological debate on “how to do” labor law history within
the context of the discipline’s socio legal origins. In a final section, it uses insights from history and com-
parative law in order to develop a new methodology—a “minor comparativism”—which unearths the
processes and influences underpinning the historical development of labor law which have hitherto
escaped the legal record. Such an approach enables scholars to reassess traditional narratives—a
worthwhile endeavor at a time when the future role of labor law in regulating work is under scrutiny.
Keywords: Labor law; comparative law; legal history; labor history
A. Introduction
Labor law, comprising individual employment laws and the collective regulation of work by trade
unions and employers at different levels, lends itself to socio-legal approaches. Labor law not only
involves the legal regulation of the work relationship, but also broader policy choices about the
nature of society and the distribution of resources. Any sophisticated study of the discipline man-
dates an understanding of labor law’s legislative content as well as the historical, social, political,
and economic context within which it has evolved, and within which its legislation plays out.
Thus, labor law scholars have been receptive to socio-legal methods—going beyond doctrinal legal
sources and looking to other disciplines including industrial relations, sociology, and history.
Many scholars are committed to legal pluralism in recognizing the involvement of nonstate actors
such as trade unions and employer associations in law creation and law enforcement.1 Yet the
decline of the old industrial order since the latter half of the twentieth century, and the transfor-
mation of work and production, have triggered a debate amongst labor law academics about the
*Rebecca Zahn is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Strathclyde. The author would like to thank the editors of this
Special Issue for comments on earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the German Law Journal. This is an Open Access article,
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1See generally Ruth Dukes, Critical Labour Law: Then and Now, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 345,
349 (Emilios Christodoulidis et al. eds., 2019); Karl Klare,Horizons of Transformative Labour Law, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA
OF GLOBALISATION (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2004).
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future of capitalism and labor law’s role within it. Scholars have struggled to define the discipline’s
institutional and normative weight in the face of globally integrated markets and a drastically
changed regulatory environment. There is a recognition, particularly amongst British labor law
scholars, that “old ways of thinking about the subject, of describing and analyzing it, [seem]
increasingly inadequate, but new ways have yet to be found.”2
Contributing to this special issue provides an opportunity to revisit the development of
socio-legal labor law scholarship in Germany and the UK, to understand the different approaches
within the context of two different legal and academic cultures, and to consider how a comparison
can provide new insights at a time when the discipline is in a state of flux. This Article focuses in
particular on how history can provide an entrée into different ways of comparing labor law and
labor relations systems. While early labor law scholars in Germany and the UK relied on history to
develop new understandings for the discipline, few contemporary academic labor lawyers would
identify as labor law historians.3 There is no institutional infrastructure or identifiable community
of scholars dedicated specifically to the field—in the sense of scholars who share common
understandings about the subject matter, including its methodological requirements.4 The scope
of the field itself remains unclear, both substantively and temporally. It straddles labor history and
legal history, but lacks a home of its own—as scholars who research medieval laws on master and
servant are more likely to attend legal history conferences than labor law conferences.5 Since the
1960s, there has been a rise in labor history scholarship which has looked at working-class
experience more broadly where topics overlap with labor law.6 However, labor historians “have
only occasionally engaged with twentieth century labor law,”7 and their work has never become
part of mainstream labor law scholarship. Indeed, it is only occasionally cited by those working on
labor law history. A consequence of the blurring of boundaries and lack of a distinct community
amongst labor law historians is that there have been limited reflections on the foundational ques-
tion of “how to do” labor law history within a national and comparative context in both Germany
and the UK. Eric Tucker aptly suggests that labor law historians “ain’t got no home,” and that
there has been “limited development of a collective identity which in turn has failed to produce
the institutional infrastructure that would support greater reflection on methodological issues in
the field.”8
This Article seeks to start a methodological debate on “how to do” labor law history within the
context of the discipline’s socio-legal origins. It uses insights from history and comparative law in
order to develop a new methodology, a “minor comparativism,”9 which unearths the processes
and influences underpinning the historical development of labor law which have hitherto escaped
the legal record. A minor comparativism enables scholars to adopt the perspective of those who
were minorities—in the sense of being powerless—within their own country. In doing so, it
encourages alternative ways of thinking about traditional narratives by revealing the views of
minority groups whose ideas were not translated into law. Such an approach enables scholars
to reassess traditional narratives—a worthwhile endeavor at a time when the future role of labor
law in regulating work is under scrutiny.
2Dukes, supra note 1, at 354 (citing THE IDEA OF LABOR LAW (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011)).
3See generally Eric Tucker, On Writing Labour Law History: A Reconnaissance, 33 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 39
(2017) (for an overview of the literature).
4Writing labor law history is not necessarily dependent on the establishment of such a community. However, the successful
establishment of a field of study is often marked by the creation of an institutional infrastructure, including academic societies,
regular conferences, and dedicated journals. See generally id.
5Id. at 44.
6See generally JOAN ALLEN ET AL., HISTORIES OF LABOUR. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (2010).
7Id. at 106–07.
8Tucker, supra note 3, at 42.
9See generally Sherally Munshi, You Will See My Family Become so American: Toward a Minor Comparativism, 63 AM. J.
COMP. L. 655 (2015).
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The Article proceeds as follows. Sections B and C revisit the development of socio-legal, or
historical, labor law scholarship in Germany and the UK. Section B finds that there is an
openness, to varying degrees, in both systems to socio-legal approaches. Though the tradition of
socio-legal labor law scholarship originated in Germany, it has embedded itself in the UK.
Section C presents a short history of labor law history in both countries. Again, there is an
openness to socio-legal approaches, but there has been limited engagement with methodological
questions. Labor law history lacks a debate on its relationship with socio-legal studies more broadly.
In Sections D and E, I begin to develop a methodology for labor law history within a socio-legal
framework, based on comparative law and drawing on historical sources and methods. Section
D situates the methodology within comparative law and introduces the concept of a minor compa-
rativism. Section E illustrates the possible uses of a minor comparativism by summarizing my
current research project on worker participation in workplace decision-making, followed by a
conclusion.
B. The Development of the Socio-Legal Study of Labor Law
There is an established tradition of socio-legal labor law scholarship which emerged first in
Germany, and later in the UK. In Germany, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875–1945) played a major role
in developing a theory of German labor law during the Weimar Republic. Sinzheimer considered
labor law as a tool to be manipulated to correct the injustices inherent in the capitalist mode of
production.10 He supported Rudolf Stammler’s theory according to which “law” represents the
“moulding force” of social life: “Society does not exist in a preconstituted form,” but “is ‘guaran-
teed’ by law.”11 For Sinzheimer, this meant that the “law”—as contained in legislation and court
judgments—was not just a system of norms, but also had to correspond to the social needs for
which it was developed. Thus, law had to be understood within the context of “legal reality,” or,
the norms which govern social action. Any analysis of labor law had to adopt a socio-legal
method.12
Sinzheimer’s advocacy for the socio-legal method in labor law fed into the Methodenstreit of
the 1930s, which pitched the socio-legal method against the “law as science” approach— the latter
supported by a number of leading German labor law scholars, including Hans Carl Nipperdey and
Walter Kaskel.13 The “law as science” approach stressed objectivity in legal analysis—rejecting any
“politico-legal” treatment of labor law, which it considered a “step backwards to a kind of socio-
logical feuilleton”14—and instead adopted a legal dogmatic lens.15 It systematically divided labor
law “into several components (together with industrial insurance, labor contracts, labor protec-
tion, labor constitution (Arbeitsverfassung), the public authorities with regard to work and trade
disputes, as well as the ‘search’ for work (Arbeitsbeschaffung) and help for the
unemployed).”16 Labor law was studied and taught in an aprioristic manner. Sinzheimer broke
with this systematization, by interpreting labor law in a way that clarified “the processes going
towards its making, starting with the structures and functioning of rival social forces.”17
10See generally RUTH DUKES, THE LABOUR CONSTITUTION: THE ENDURING IDEA OF LABOUR LAW (2014).
11See generally RUDOLF STAMMLER, WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT (1986); Luca Nogler, In Memory of Hugo Sinzheimer
(1875-1945): Remarks on the Methodenstreit in Labour Law 2 CARDOZO L. BULL. (1996), www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/review/
laborlaw/nogler-1996/nogler.htm.
12Nogler, supra note 11.
13Id. On the Methodenstreit in law more generally, see MICHAEL STOLLEIS, DER METHODENSTREIT DER WERIMARER
STAATSRECHTSLEHRE – EIN ABGESCHLOSSENES KAPITEL DER WISSENSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE? (2001).
14See WALTER KASKEL, RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFT 70–71 (1922).
15See also SANDRO BLANKO, SOZIALES RECHT ODER KOLLEKTIVE PRIVATAUTONOMIE: HUGO SINZHEIMER IM KONTEXT
NACH 1900 Ch. 2 (2005), 67-100.
16KASKEL, supra note 14, at 71–72.
17Nogler, supra note 11 (citing Franz Mestitz, Alcuni ricordi di Hugo Sinzheimer, in LAVORO E DIRITTO 1 (1989)).
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As a prominent Jewish scholar, Sinzheimer was forced to leave Germany for the Netherlands in
1933 and died in exile in 1945. Following World War II, Sinzheimer’s approach was not initially
resurrected. Labor law lacked the foundational, legal-political debate on its role and purpose which
had defined the Weimar Republic. It was characterized by a “withdrawal to general clauses” and a
reliance on “judge-made laws.”18 Labor laws and the accompanying jurisprudence were based on
the principles of social and mutual cooperation which tempered collective articulation and
action.19 As Ramm explains, “[a]fter 1945 labor law was deprived of its left wing politics and
Jewish scholars; it was a labor law in which the force of the workers’ movement was lacking,
as was the social issue.”20 A change in approach only occurred in the 1970s when a group of youn-
ger scholars reignited theMethodenstreit of the inter-war years by calling for labor law to consider
the law as it exists in society.21 This group of scholars—the “labour law left” (die arbeitsrechtliche
Linke), a minority in labor law scholarship—presented their arguments as a rigorous rebuttal of
the majority’s legal dogmatic arguments. They adopted a broad definition of labor law as including
the law as contained in legislation and judicial decisions as well as its impact on the work relation-
ship. The arbeitsrechtliche Linke advocated a more politicized approach to labor law, analyzing the
law through recourse to socio-legal methods.22 In doing so, they revived a foundational, and still
ongoing, debate on the role and purpose of labor law scholarship. Coupled with changes in the
labor market that have led to a decline in the standard employment relationship, there has been a
recognition in Germany that labor law scholarship must respond “to problems of daily life and
away from abstract theory or, as it is called,Dogmatik,”23 thereby opening up potential avenues for
future socio-legal research projects.
Although his influence has been limited in his home country, Sinzheimer’s socio-legal
approach had an effect beyond Germany. Otto Kahn-Freund (1900–1979), the “founding father”
of British labor law and one-time student of Sinzheimer, had internalized his teacher’s thinking.24
Kahn-Freund’s main contribution to the creation and development of British labor law was his
articulation of the doctrine of collective laissez-faire, which states that the central function of
British labor law is to enable, facilitate, and support the regulation of the employment relationship
through voluntary collective bargaining between employers and trade unions. As Davies and
Freedland explain:
At the heart of Otto Kahn-Freund’s thinking about labor law was an ideology of collective
bargaining : : : . It was an ideology in the sense of being a set of ideas that assumed systematic
proportions, that is to say was regarded as a basis for thinking about labor law and labor
relations as a composite conception that embraced both the practice and the regulation
of the employment relationship.25
This sociological approach to thinking about labor law à la Sinzheimer embraced both “the law”
and the “actual state of affairs.”26 In order to determine “the actual state of affairs,”
Kahn-Freund collaborated with a number of industrial relations scholars, particularly the
18Ramm speaks of a “Flucht in die Generalklauseln” und “richterliche Rechtsfortbildung.” See Thilo Ramm,Die “Linke” und
das Arbeitsrecht, 33 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 184, 185 (1978).
19See generally Thilo Ramm, Codetermination and the German Works Constitution Act of 1972, 3 INDUS. L.J. 20 (1974).
20Thilo Ramm, Pluralismus ohne Kodifikation. Die Arbeitsrechtswissenschaft nach 1945, in RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN DER
BONNER REPUBLIK 456 (Dieter Simon ed., 1994).
21See generally Wolfgang Däubler, Arbeitsrechtliche Forschung in der Bundesrepublik, in WSI MITTEILUNGEN 67 (1985).
22See generally Ramm, supra note 18.
23Rolf Birk, Labour Law Scholarship in Germany, France and Italy, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 679, 686 (2002).
24See generally DUKES, supra note 10.
25Paul Davies &Mark Freedland,National Styles in Labor Law Scholarship: The United Kingdom, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y
J. 765, 766 (2002).
26See generally DUKES, supra note 10.
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“Oxford School” led byAllan Flanders andHughClegg—scholarswhohad an interest in andunder-
standing of the history of industrial relations.27 The resulting multi-disciplinary labor law scholar-
ship sought to analyze and explain legal rules within their social context. Although this particular
type of British labor law scholarship had its heyday in the 1960s, it produced an extended generation
of labor law scholarswho followed inKahn-Freund’s footsteps.28Many of these scholars drewon the
writings of labor historians and industrial relations scholars in order to explain and develop labor
law. Their work placed “labor law at the cutting edge of British socio-legal scholarship.”29
Subsequent shifts in government policy have meant that collective laissez-faire as a key feature
of British labor law has all but disappeared, and as such, new rationales for, and ways of thinking
about, labor law have emerged. Yet British labor law scholarship stands out for retaining an open,
multi-disciplinary approach. There has not been the development of a single dogmatic framework
which guides analyses.30 Contemporary researchers have turned to philosophy and political
theory, economics, sociology, and political economy approaches in order to explain and advance
the discipline at a time when the labor market has fundamentally changed.31 This Article proposes
to use history as an entrée into developing different ways of understanding the origins and future
trajectory labor law and labor relations systems. As a prerequisite for this approach, the next
section reviews the labor law history scholarship in Germany and the UK.
C. A History of Labor Law History in Germany and the UK
I. The UK
Labor law history in the UK lives at the margins and intersections of a number of different fields—
including labor history, legal history, labor law, and industrial relations. The extent to which
scholars have adopted an explicitly socio-legal approach—in the sense of going beyond doctrinal
sources—appears to be driven by individual project considerations—including researchers’ his-
toriographic and theoretical commitments—rather than being shaped by discipline-wide meth-
odological debates—which have hitherto been lacking. Labor law history emerged, along with
labor history, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries among scholars interested in
the “labor question,” centered on the role of workers’ collective action.32 Early labor law histories
traced the legal regulation of trade unions.33 Labor law history has thus traditionally been situated
within an industrial relations framework—although labor law and industrial relations have parted
ways as the former has responded to shifts in government policy away from collective laissez-faire
and the latter has focused increasingly on quantitative methodologies, becoming a “largely his-
tory-free field fundamentally concerned with policy in the present.”34 As a result, labor law history
27See Clegg’s three-volume work, in particular, on the history of trade unions which combined industrial relations and labor
history, I–III H.A. CLEGG, A HISTORY OF BRITISH TRADE UNIONS SINCE 1889 (published between 1964 and 1994). Industrial
relations subsequently turned away from history and developed as a specialized, largely history-free field fundamentally con-
cerned with policy in the present. See generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6.
28These include Bill Wedderburn, Paul O’Higgins, Bob Hepple, and to some, though perhaps a lesser extent, Roger Rideout,
Steve Anderman, Roy Lewis, Jon Clark, Paul Davies, and Mark Freedland. See Davies & Freedland, supra note 25, at 769.
29Id.
30Id. at 786.
31See generally THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LAW (Hugh Collins et al. eds., 2018); Keith D. Ewing,
Democratic Socialism and Labour Law, 24 INDUS. L.J. 103 (1995); Georg Menz, Employers and Migrant Legality:
Liberalization of Service Provision, Transnational Posting, and the Bifurcation of the European Labour Market, in
MIGRANTS AT WORK (Cathryn Costello & Mark Freedland eds., 2015); Ruth Dukes, The Economic Sociology of Labour
Law, 46 J.L. & SOC’Y 396 (2019).
32Tucker, supra note 3, at 42.
33See generally SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (1894); ROBERT YORKE HEDGES & ALLAN
WINTERBOTTOM, THE LEGAL HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (1930).
34ALLEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 107.
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differs in its origins and approach from legal history, which has traditionally produced narrow
“internal histories” of law with an emphasis on the common law.35
Legal history’s purpose has been to recreate the particular contexts which shaped the law by,
inter alia, reading marginalia, case notes, personal papers, government reports, newspaper articles,
and other, often archival, materials which normally evade the attention of other legal scholars, in
order to fully capture the contexts surrounding the law.36 Labor law historians, by contrast, do not
produce “internal” histories in the sense understood by the legal historian, but analyze labor law
history in relation to wider social forces. Labor law historians have walked a fine line between law
and politics. Often, the purpose of adopting a historical lens has been to better understand the law
with a view to making reform proposals.37 The most extensive analysis of labor law history can be
found in Lord Wedderburn’s The Worker and the Law. Published in 1965, it explained the whole
legal framework governing labor in an historical and sociological context.38 As Hepple explains,
“Wedderburn came to labor law through his private reading of labor history.”39 He relied on a
wide range of materials, including extracts from judicial decisions and decisions of national
insurance commissioners, government ministers, the Registrar of Friendly Societies, collective
agreements, union rule books, fair wages resolutions, and other documents not commonly used
in traditional black-letter law books.40 Subsequent editions of the book maintained the contextual,
historical focus to explain legal developments.41 As Hepple points out, “Wedderburn found that
the history books’ accounts of [labor law’s development] were inadequate. His special contribution
to the history of labor law and industrial relations : : : was to synthesize the history of legal doc-
trine and social history.”42
A handful of other scholars have also written on labor law history over the last thirty years,
taking as their starting point the different historical and social forces which have shaped labor law
—which is understood broadly to include legislation, case law, regulations and customs. Their
methodological choices have been guided by the purpose of individual projects. In 1993, Paul
Davies and Mark Freedland wrote a history of British labor legislation between 1945 and
1990.43 They explicitly situated their legislative history within a legal framework—rather than
seeking “to operate as historians or social scientists”44—taking into account that law is “a product
of the formulation and application of governmental economic and social policies.”45 By way of
contrast, Keith Ewing has made extensive use of archival materials and social and economic his-
tory literature. His book, Trade Unions, the Labour Party and the Law, consulted a wide range of
sources to study the Trade Union Act of 1913 from historical and legal perspectives with a view
to understanding the legislation’s origins and effects within its broader social context.46 In an
article published in 1998, Ewing presented a reassessment of Kahn-Freund’s account of collective
35See Sarah E. Hamill, Review of Legal History, 28 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 538 (for a recent review of legal history scholarship).
36See generally, Michael Lobban, Introduction: The Tools and Tasks of the Legal Historian, in 6 ANDREW LEWIS & MICHAEL
LOBBAN, LAW AND HISTORY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2003 (2004) (including recent attempts in legal history to give a voice to
“the other”).
37See, for example, HEDGES & WINTERBOTTOM, supra note 33, where the authors went back to the Elizabethan statutes on
wages and apprenticeships and also looked at gild regulations, gild customs and the laws regulating trade unions. The book
ends with legislative reform proposals.
38K.W. WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1986).
39Bob Hepple, Wedderburn’s The Worker and the Law: An Appreciation, 34 HIST. STUD. REL. 215, 223 (2013).
40Id. at 218.
41The third edition, published in 1986, included 200 pages on the history and analysis of the law on industrial conflict. See
LORD WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW (3rd ed. 1986).
42Hepple, supra note 39, at 223.
43See generally PAUL DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, LABOUR LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993).
44Id. at 2.
45Id. at 7.
46See generally K.D. EWING, TRADE UNIONS, THE LABOUR PARTY, AND THE LAW (1982).
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laissez-faire by looking at the relationship between the state and industrial relations.47 He used
multiple sources, including government reports, Hansard minutes, TUC documents, and
Labor Party documents in order to develop a nuanced understanding of the role of the state
in British labor law. Douglas Brodie’s A History of British Labor Law, published in 2003, also
combined primary and secondary sources in order to analyze the purposes underlying particular
legislative developments between 1867 and to compare this with the law’s subsequent shape.48
Ruth Dukes, in The Labor Constitution, published in 2014, looked at the history of labor law
scholarship and the enduring relevance of foundational texts to the study of labor law today rather
than considering the historical development of labor laws as such.49 Despite the rich scholarly
output that exists on British labor law history, a broader debate on methodological issues in
the field, including the scope of the discipline, how to approach its study, and its overlap with
other subjects, has hitherto been limited.
II. Germany
In Germany, labor law history finds its roots in legal history rather than labor history.50 As such, it
sits less comfortably within a socio-legal framework, although early accounts of labor law history
have been criticized for not giving due regard to social, economic and cultural factors which
shaped labor law’s development.51 Since the 1950s, scholars, starting with Theo Mayer-Maly, have
moved beyond “pure” legal history to take account of the social context of labor law.52 Harald
Steindl’s edited collection in 1984, Wege zur Arbeitsrechtsgeschichte,53 attempted to respond to
repeated calls amongst German scholars in the 1970s and earlier for the development of a com-
prehensive, socio-legal labor law history.54 His collection had the explicit aim of starting a dialogue
between law and social and economic history.55 It contained chapters on a broad range of indi-
vidual and collective labor laws in Germany and Austria, including contributions on social insur-
ance. Drawing lessons from legal history, the collection tried to map different histories of labor in
order to illustrate breaks and transformations of the law in a historical narrative. There was a
recognition within the collection itself, however, that it could do no more than indicate different
paths that scholars could take—which have so far not been fully explored by subsequent projects.
Individual scholars have continued to write on a broad range of topics: These include the
historical development of the contract of employment, the juridification of labor relations, the
47See generally K.D. Ewing, The State and Industrial Relations: ‘Collective Laissez-Faire’ Revisited, 5 HIST. STUD. INDUS. REL.
1 (1998).
48See generally DOUGLAS BRODIE, A HISTORY OF BRITISH LABOUR LAW (2003).
49DUKES, supra note 10.
50German legal history has a very different tradition compared to UK legal history. For methodological debates in German
legal history see Marcel Senn, Rechtswissenschaft und Geschichte, in INTERDISZIPLINARITÄT IN DEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTEN –
INNEN UND AUSSPERSPECTIVEN (2012); Marcel Senn, The Methodological Debates in German-Speaking Europe (1960–1990), in
MAKING LEGAL HISTORY. APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES (2012); Gerhard Oexle, Rechtsgeschichte und
Geschichtswissenschaft, in AKTEN DES 26. DEUTSCHEN RECHTSHISTORIKERTAGES FRANKFURT A.M., 22. BIS 26.
SEPTEMBER 1986 (1987); Ogorek, Rechtsgeschichte in der Bundesrepublik (1945-1990), in RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN DER
BONNER REPUBLIK. STUDIEN ZUR WISSENSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE DER JURISPRUDENZ (Dieter Simon ed., 1994). Early legal his-
tories which touched upon labor matters include OTTO VON GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS (1894).
51Theo Mayer-Maly, Aufgabe und Probleme einer Geschichte des Arbeitsrechts Mayer-Maly, “Aufgabe und Probleme einer
Geschichte des Arbeitsrechts”, in DAS RECHT DER ARBEIT 126 (1956).
52Harald Steindl, Vorwort, in HARALD STEINDL, WEGE ZUR ARBEITSRECHTSGESCHICHTE viii (1984).
53Id.; Wilhelm Herschel, Arbeitsrecht in der Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft, in RECHT DER ARBEIT 402, 402 (1968) (“Die Geschichte
des Arbeitsrechts – sie ist leider noch nicht geschrieben.”).
54Franz Mestitz, Probleme der Geschichte des Arbeitsrechts. Ein Forschungsbericht für die Jahre 1974 bis 1979, in
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NEUERE RECHTSGESCHITCHTE 47 (1980).
55Id. at x.
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German labor constitution, the works constitution, the history of the labor courts, collective labor
law, and labor law under National Socialism.56 Although Arbeitsrechtsgeschichte has not been
subject to a sustained methodological discussion, there have been some attempts to define the
field and appropriate research methods.57 Most works adopt a broad definition of “labor”
(Arbeit) and “law” (Recht). There has been an intense debate over the “starting point” of labor
law and the temporal scope of labor law history.58 In broad terms, research questions are
underpinned by a regard for the question sociale. Taking its cue from legal history, they often
rely on hitherto ignored archival materials. Franz Mestitz suggested that labor law needs to be
understood as both expressing and shaping social reality. Taking such an approach allows for
a problem-oriented, historical analysis of the discipline rather than a chronological retelling of
developments.59 Joachim Rückert approached the history of labor law by looking at the legal sol-
utions which have been found for particular problems at work over time and in different geo-
graphical locations in a holistic way.60 In 2020, Wolfgang Däubler and Michael Kittner
published a historical study of the German works constitution (Betriebsverfassung), relying on
a wide range of legal and other historical sources. They argued that as a central tenet of
German history, the works constitution can only be properly understood taking into account
the economic and political power struggles, as well as the formal laws and informal norms, which
have shaped, and continue to influence, its form.61
Despite their different starting points, there is a recognition in Germany and the UK that labor
law histories, if they are to do more than provide internal histories and account for the external
forces which have shaped the law’s development, are difficult to write and require scholars to, at
the very least, engage with other disciplines, thereby opening up to socio-legal approaches. Labor
law historians must also ask theoretical and methodological questions about their ability to
research economic and social history if they have not had subject-specific training.62
Questions also arise on the scope—in terms of topic, place and time—of labor law history.
Labor law’s boundaries are nebulous. Harry Arthurs aptly describes labor law as emanating from
“an infinity of sources, permeat[ing] all aspects of social and economic life, [it] is as much to be
inferred as formally announced, and affects behavior, positively and negatively through social
processes which are as varied as their context.”63 Problems of definition and scope inevitably arise
in every field. However, the absence of an identifiable community of labor law historians—
let alone of comparative labor law historians—has led to limited debate on “how to do” labor
law history. In the next two sections, this Article seeks to kindle the debate by outlining the begin-
nings of a proposed socio-legal methodology for labor law history based on new approaches to
comparative law, and drawing on historical sources and methods.
56Scholars include, amongst others, Thilo Ramm, Wolfgang Däubler, Gerd Bender, Joachim Rückert, Martin Becker,
Martin Otto, Otto Kempen, Michael Kittner, and Thorsten Keiser.
57A particular example is the Initiative Arbeitsrechtsgeschichte; a cooperation between the Hugo Sinzheimer Institute and
the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History. See Gerd Bender, Initiative History of Labour Law, MAX PLANCK
INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY, https://www.rg.mpg.de/cooperations/hugo-sinzheimer-institut.
58See generally Franz Mestitz, Zur Mirkungsgeschichte Des Arbeitrechts in Steindl, supra note 54. See generally THORSTEN
KEISER, VERTRAGSFREIHEIT UND VERTRAGSZWANG IM RECHT DER ARBEIT VON DER FRÜHEN NEUZEIT BIS IN DIE MODERNE
(2013).
59Mestitz, supra note 54, at 8–9.
60JOACHIM RÜCKER, ARBEIT UND RECHT 1800: HISTORISCH UND VERLEICHEND, EUROPÄISCH UND GLOBAL (2014).
61WOLFGANG DÄUBLER & MICHAEL KITTNER, GESCHITCHTE DER BTRIEBSVERFASSUNG (2020).
62Some scholars have addressed this dilemma in relation to legal history. See Jonathan Rose, Studying the Past: the Nature
and Development of Legal History as an Academic Discipline, 31 J. LEGAL HIST. 101 (2010). On law and history, see ROBERTW.
GORDON, TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN LAW (2017).
63Harry Arthurs, Understanding Labour Law: The Debate over “Industrial Pluralism”, 38 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 83, 86
(1985).
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D. Comparative Labor Law: Introducing a “Minor Comparativism” of Labor Law
History
Labor law is no stranger to comparative law. A large body of theoretical literature has developed
on the proper application of the comparative method to labor law as well as an ever-increasing
amount of literature comparing aspects of different legal systems.64 As Kahn-Freund pointed out,
the objective of comparative labor law should be to discover whether an institution, practice, doc-
trine, or tradition is inevitable or universal, or whether it is the outcome of specific social, his-
torical, or geographical conditions.65 A large portion of comparative writings seem to fall
short of this objective by remaining superficial in the depth of comparison achieved. Their
aim is to compare legal differences and similarities across jurisdictions. However, some works
manage to conduct more thorough comparisons which convey a sense of how specific laws play
out in a given society and provide an insight into how the law may be improved within that social
setting.66
The main contribution to such “profound”67 comparative labor law stems from Otto
Kahn-Freund. His dual legal background equipped him with the requisite socio-historical
understanding of more than one legal system in order to carry out effective, in-depth comparisons.
For Kahn-Freund, comparative labor law should not be seen as a separate field of research but as a
tool of analysis. As Kahn-Freund pointed out:
[O]ne of the virtues of legal comparison (which it shares with legal history) is that it allows a
scholar to place himself outside the labyrinth of the minutiae in which legal thinking so easily
loses its way and to see the great contours of the law and its dominant characteristics.68
This approach was applied in the 1970s by a group of leading scholars, under Bob Hepple’s editor-
ship, who attempted to explain labor law’s pluralism by undertaking a comparative historical
research project, published as The Making of Labor Law in Europe: A Comparative Study of
Nine Countries up to 1945 in 1986.69 The project explained the historical development of labor
law as resulting from “a process of struggle between different social groups : : : and of competing
ideologies conservatives, liberals and socialists, and of religious and secular groups.”70 Labor law
“is made by men and women in a society not of their own making.”71 Its shape is dependent on the
outcome of power struggles—what different social groups could “force or persuade other groups
to let them have.”72
Hepple sought to explain the comparative development of labor laws at two levels: (1) The
direct historical relationship of legal transplants from one country to another, and (2) the “inner”
social, economic and political relationship of parallel developments in different countries. The first
level is relatively straightforward: “[M]any rules of national systems of labor law are either derived
64David Ziskind, Labor Law Comparison in Perspective, 2 COMP. LAB. L. 209 (1977) (providing a good overview of these
topics)
65See generally OTTO KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR RELATIONS: HERITAGE AND ADJUSTMENT (1979).
66See generally Matthew Finkin, Comparative Labour Law, in MATHIAS REIMANN & REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (2006) (giving an overview of the different types of comparative law); ROGER
BLANPAIN, COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALISED MARKET ECONOMIES (2004);
ANNE TREBILCOCK, HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW (2018).
67Finkin categorizes writings on comparative labor law into five genres which are often overlapping: Descriptive, purposive,
predictive, theoretical, and profound. See Finkin, supra note 66.
68Otto Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 L.Q. REV. 40 (1966), at 40.
69See BOB HEPPLE, THE MAKING OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NINE COUNTRIES UP TO 1945
(1986) [hereinafter HEPPLE (1986)]; see also BOB HEPPLE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 15 COUNTRIES 1945–2004 (2009) (the successor to Hepple’s 1986 book).




from or have been strongly influenced by other systems.”73 The comparative law literature has
long debated the viability and shape of legal transplants.74 Two main theoretical strands have
emerged. For Watson, “a rule transplanted from one country to another : : : may equally operate
to different effect in the two societies, even though it is expressed in apparently similar terms in the
two countries.”75 This implies that the transplantation of legal rules without adjustment of those
rules is possible. Yet the success of rules borrowed from one legal system and directly imported to
another system is rare. The second strand of thinking on the transplantability of legal rules stems
from Otto Kahn-Freund. For Kahn-Freund, the degree to which a rule can be transplanted
depends on the extent to which it conforms with the foreign political and legal structure.76
Thus, “we cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable : : : ; any attempt
to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its origin [entails] the wish of rejection,” unless
legislators have adequate “knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also of its social, and above
all its political, context.”77
On the “inner relationship” between systems, Hepple argued that the development of labor law
“is the product of a variety of historical factors, which are neither ‘necessary’ nor ‘natural’ : : : . The
choices made were not inevitable solutions to the social problems created by the workings of the
market.”78 The challenge for comparative labor lawyers is to explain the specific features of his-
torical change. In Hepple’s book, the individual chapters do this by looking at how particular
legislative measures were introduced in each country through the lens of “power.” For Hepple,
“[m]any of the demands made by labour movements and social reformers were unsuccessful
because they were unacceptable to those with greater economic and political power : : : . [T]he
powerfulness of the opponents of reform was the decisive factor in the making of labor law.”79
Adopting the lens of power in this sense allowed the contributors to portray the common tend-
encies and divergences of different labor law systems in nine European countries.
The question of whether and how to draw on other disciplines in order to undertake a com-
parison also permeates comparative law. Recent scholarship has sought to move away from what
Pierre Legrand described as “positivist” comparative law, towards the contextualized analysis of
legal rules, their active interpretation, and engagement with interdisciplinary study.80 As part of
this trend, scholars have adopted different methodological lenses in order to give a voice to indi-
viduals and social groups whose views are not part of mainstream narratives.81 Their approach
decenters the state and positive law as the focus of a comparison and recognizes the legitimacy of
multiple traditions and social orderings.82 In an article published in 2015, Sherally Munshi bor-
rowed from comparative literature to propose the idea of a minor comparativism, which engages
73Id. at 2.
74Authors who have written on transplantation include: ROGER BLANPAIN, COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALISED MARKET ECONOMIES (8th ed. 2004); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative
Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974); Pierre
Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997).
75WATSON, supra note 74, at 20.




80See generally Pierre Legrand, Jameses at Play: A Tractation on the Comparison of Laws, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2017); as well
as the other contributions in the 2017 special issue of the American Journal of Comparative Law.
81For an overview, see the Decolonial comparative law project led by Professor Dr. Ralf Michaels and Dr. Lena Salaymeh at
the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law (Hamburg). Ralf Michaels & Lena Salaymeh,
Decolonial Comparative Law, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE (2020) https://www.mpipriv.de/decolonial.
82Thus, there are some similarities between the arguments made in favor of transnational history to correct the focus by
comparative historians on the nation state. See generally Jürgen Kocka, Comparison and Beyond 42 HIST. & THEORY 39 (2003);
Ian Tyrell, Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History: Theory and Practice, 4 J. GLOB. HIST. 453 (2009).
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“the essential instability, incoherence, alterity, and heterogeneity that define the state.”83 A minor
comparativism retains the general tenor of comparative law, which is “to reveal something about
our immediate world that would not reveal itself but through the practice of adopting a foreign
perspective”, but it seeks that foreign perspective “within” one’s own country.84 It “sets the official
image of a particular state against the reflections of its minority subjects.”85 A minor compara-
tivism acknowledges that the minority—to be understood in the sense of foreign or not belonging
to the majority—is not peripheral but central to the formation of laws, the state, and the nation.
A minority constructs its thinking not within a national culture but apart from it—without
absorbing a nation’s consciousness, morality, or worldview.86 Adopting such a minority perspec-
tive decenters the state, thereby engaging “the essential instability, incoherence, alterity, and
heterogeneity that define the state.”87 It recognizes that the state incorporates diverse peoples
and views, and “severs the imagined unity between the state and its subjects.”88 A consequence
of this is that a minor comparativism resists regurgitating authorized representations of the law.
While traditional approaches to comparative law tend to identify and isolate particular rules or
institutions across legal systems, a minor comparativism focuses on discovering how the law is
encountered, shaped, and perceived by the minority. It seeks to complicate received understand-
ings of the law and its development. For labor lawyers, the use of such an approach opens up
traditional narratives to reinterpretation at a time when the discipline is in flux. As Munshi
explains:
The purpose of such investigation is not merely ethnographic or to thicken our account of a
culture, but liberatory. By recognizing that authoritative declarations of law do not exhaust
our own understanding or experience of law, we proliferate opportunities to transform the
laws that give shape and meaning to our shared circumstances.89
The question arises as to who is meant by “the minority” for labor law scholars. Two possibilities
arise. First, Hepple, in his comparative labor law study, recognized that labor law’s shape is
dependent on the outcome of power struggles. The views of the individuals or groups who lost
out in the power struggles—social reformers and labor movements who were unsuccessful—have
been erased from the legal record and, by extension, are the subject of study of legal or labor his-
torians, but are often neglected by comparative law and labor law scholars. Yet, their demands
held sway at particular moments in history even if they were not in the end translated into
law—the outcome of power struggles were neither inevitable nor predetermined. Second, there
are the views of minority groups within states who observe majority culture but are not part
of it. These minority groups are more frequently studied by historians than by lawyers, yet their
perspectives offer valuable insights on the functioning of law in society.
Aminor comparativism allows labor law scholars to rediscover both of these viewpoints, thereby
disrupting and complicating received understandings of labor law’s historical development. Such an
exercise requires scholars to engage seriously with the discourse of foreign minorities and to set it
against the traditional narrative. This, in turn, enables scholars to identify, question, and challenge
conventional assumptions about the legal system by rendering those conventional assumptions for-
eign to themselves. Such an approach has not hitherto been applied to labor law. It allows scholars to
83Munshi, supra note 9, at 665 (citing Pierre Legrand, Issues in Translatability of Law, in NATION, LANGUAGE, AND THE
ETHICS OF TRANSLATION (2005)).
84Id. at 664.
85Id. at 665.





consider the possibilities of what could have been, to think about law in a different framework from
the norm, and to develop alternative approaches to legal regulation. In a final section, I begin to
develop a minor comparativism of labor law history within a socio-legal framework with a view
to revealing alternative ways of thinking about worker participation in workplace decision-making
in the UK and Germany.
E. Developing a Minor Comparativism of Labor Law History: “Foreign” Views on
Worker Participation in Workplace Decision Making
Labor law’s essential form reflects the problems occasioned by industrialization, including the
separation of production from consumption and of workers from ownership and control of
the means of production.90 For much of the twentieth century, worker representation within
the workplace in the UK had been assured primarily through agreement between employers
and trade unions outside a formal legislative footing.91 The dominant view in British labor law
justifying the lack of workers’ formal involvement in the control of industry has been intertwined
with collective laissez-faire in that worker representation on management boards was “unaccept-
able” as it threatened trade-union independence.92 For most of the twentieth century, worker par-
ticipation on company boards was also anathema to corporate law’s model of shareholder
ownership and primacy. Since the 1990s, corporate law scholars have shown resurgent interest
in protecting “stakeholder rights”—broadly defined to include workers, consumers and other
interest groups—through corporate governance reforms, including providing for worker and
other stakeholder representation on company boards.93 In contrast, there has been comparatively
limited engagement by labor law scholars with labor law’s role in providing for worker partici-
pation in workplace decision-making. Much of the British labor law literature which discusses
worker representation focuses on the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial
Democracy (1977) Cmnd 6706 (the “Bullock Report”). For those arguing in favor of worker par-
ticipation, the German model of parity codetermination (paritätische Mitbestimmung), which
provides for equal worker and management representation on certain company supervisory
boards, is cited as exemplary,94 without probing the principles and historical contingencies under-
pinning the system.95 British labor law is lacking a debate about what workplace participation is
for and what it should look like.
90SIMON DEAKIN & FRANK WILKINSON, THE LAW OF THE LABOUR MARKET: INDUSTRIALIZATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND
LEGAL EVOLUTION Ch. 2 (2005).
91See generally Ruth Dukes, Voluntarism and the Single Channel: The Development of Single-Channel Worker
Representation in the UK, 24 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 87 (2008).
92H.A. CLEGG, A NEW APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 22 (1960). Since 1993, the adoption of several EU directives
requiring information and consultation of employees has introduced, in certain circumstances, information and consultation
channels forworker representatives.However, the impact of thesemeasures has been limited. See generallyDukes, supranote 91.
93See generally Zoe Adams & Simon Deakin, Corporate Governance and Employment Relations, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (2018).
94In 2016, upon becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May pledged to appoint workers to company boards with a view to
diversifying boardrooms, controlling executive pay, and scrutinizing management decision-making. See Nils Pratley, Theresa
May’s plan to put workers in boardrooms is extraordinary, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 11, 2016, 11:47 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/politics/nils-pratley-on-finance/2016/jul/11/theresa-may-plan-workers-boardroom-reform-extraordinary-tories. In 2013,
Frances O’Grady, the General Secretary of the TUC argued that worker representation through trade unions was justified
on the basis that “economic strength demands economic democracy, a recalibration of the relationship between capital
and labour.” Frances O’Grady, Attlee Memorial lecture, TUC (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.tuc.org.uk/union-issues/frances-
ogradys-atlee-memorial-lecture.
95Codetermination (“Mitbestimmung”) is an umbrella term which describes a body of different practices that take place
under law in the individual enterprises of industry, commerce, and trade, and which require joint decision-making by labor
and management representatives in the control and conduct of an enterprise either. Of these, the system of parity co-
determination (“paritätische Mitbestimmung”) stands out for providing the greatest level of involvement for workers by
allowing for equal representation of employees and management on the supervisory boards of companies in certain industries
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A minor comparativism within a socio-legal framework can ignite such a debate by revealing
alternative ways of thinking about worker participation. The approach combines archival research
with an analysis of German and British literature drawn from labor and corporate law, history,
and industrial relations in order to reconstruct and reassess historical debates on worker partici-
pation through a minority lens. This enables an analysis of worker participation within a different
framework from the status quo, opening it up to other possibilities. It moves away from main-
stream explanations of the law’s development and, instead, focuses on the law’s perception at its
time of coming into being by the minority—as evidenced by archival sources. A minor compa-
rativism in this case sets the mainstream narrative that worker participation is “unacceptable”
against the debates that were taking place in the UK on worker participation during and immedi-
ately after the period of the Second World War, up to 1950. Two minority perspectives are of
interest. First, that of a group of exiled German trade unionists based in the UK during
World War II who combined to form the Trade Union Centre for German Trade Unionists
in the UK (Landesgruppe deutscher Gewerkschafter in Grossbritannien). A close reading of the
German literature96 suggests that the post-war German model of codetermination, initially intro-
duced by the British military government in the iron and steel industries in 1947, is based on plans
designed by the Landesgruppe.97 The Landesgruppe’s chairman, Hans Gottfurcht98—a German
Jewish trade unionist who fled to the UK in 1938—set up a number of working groups during
the war to develop plans for post-war German reconstruction. The Landesgruppe was the only
German emigrant body that brought together and represented all leftwing exile groups.99 One
of these groups, the Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund (ISK), had a substantial, albeit hith-
erto unexplored, influence on Landesgruppe policies—and had close links with British intellec-
tuals, including the industrial relations scholar Allan Flanders, throughout the 1920s, 1930s,
and 1940s.100 Letters exchanged between Landesgruppe members and British trade unionists,
including Walter Citrine, the Secretary General of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), and
Ernest Bevin, the Minister for Labor (1940–1945) and Foreign Secretary (1945–1951), before, dur-
ing, and after the war, are indicative of close personal relationships. Many German post-war trade
union leaders were exiled in the UK during the war and had been members of the Landesgruppe.
As such, the Landesgruppe is an example of a minority within, but apart from, and not of, the
British labor law tradition. An exploration of their deliberations on worker participation also
raises the question of whether there was any cross-fertilization of ideas between the British
and exiled German trade union movements which have hitherto escaped scholars’ attention.
The second minority perspective is that of a number of British trade unionists who advocated
worker participation in workplace decision-making throughout the 1940s. The subject of worker
representation on boards had arisen repeatedly at TUC Annual Congresses throughout the 1920s,
1930s, and early 1940s in the context of debates on the future nationalization of British industry.
Nationalization of, inter alia, the coal, iron, and steel industries formed a major part of the election
manifesto of the Labor government which came to power in July 1945. The general question that
was raised for British trade unions by the nationalization program was whether unions would, or
should, be prepared to take a wider role in the management of these nationalized industries.
and above specific size thresholds. It is widely regarded in German literature as a successful trade-union achievement and a
vital element, and even as the most important “socio-political innovation” of German post-war industrial democracy. HORST
THUM, MITBESTIMMUNG IN DER MONTANINDUSTRIE (1982), 11-37; GLORIA MÜLLER, MITBESTIMMUNG IN DER
NACHRIEGSZEIT (1987), 113-46.
96See generally EBERHARD SCHMIDT, DIE VERHINIDERTE NEUORDNUNG 1945–1952 (1977).
97Id.
98See generally URUSLA BITZEGEIO, ÜBER PARTEI- UND LANDESGRENZEN HINAUS: HANS GOTTFURCHT (1896–1982) UND DIE
GEWERKSCHAFTLICHE ORGANISATION DER ANGESTELLTEN (2009).
99See generally LUDWIG EIBER, DIE SOZIALDEMOKRATEN IN DER EMIGRATION (1998).
100For an overview, see SABINE LEMKE-MÜLLER, ETHISCHER SOZIALISMUS UND SOZIALE DEMOKRATIE. DER POLITISCHE
WEG WILLI EISCHLERS VOM ISK ZUR SPD (1988).
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However, in practice it became clear that the TUC generally was prepared to take only the most
cautious steps in this direction despite a number of affiliates advocating a different, and after 1945,
increasingly vocal stance which has largely been forgotten.101
Viewing the dominant narrative on worker participation through these minority eyes provides
new perspectives on the subject. It is liberating in the sense that it transforms the way in which
worker participation can be understood within the UK labor law framework and provides differ-
ent starting points to develop a contemporary model for worker participation—grounded in labor
law, and appropriate for a post-industrial landscape.
The minor comparativism proposed here takes place within a socio-legal framework. It
does not seek primarily to document the origins of particular laws or legal concepts, but
instead seeks to rediscover the views of two minority groups who were advocating in favor
of worker participation in workplace decision-making at a critical time in British labor law
history, but whose views have escaped the legal record. The comparativism relies on a wide
range of German and British primary and secondary sources drawn from labor law, history,
and industrial relations in order to reconstruct the Landesgruppe’s deliberations on worker
participation and their interactions with British trade unionists on the subject. Archival
sources, which are held in archives in Germany and the UK,102 include documents from
the British military government, correspondence between British and exiled German trade
unionists, diaries of exiled trade unionists, and minutes of Landesgruppe meetings.
Archival sources have been under-used in British labor law history, although they form
the backbone of legal historical research. As Boorstin points out, “history is the data of
law.”103 It allows the legal scholar to discover the “minds, intentions, problems, and limita-
tions of those who created [it] or for whom [it was] created.”104 By using archival sources,
scholars can revisit classic accounts of the development of the theories and processes under-
pinning the labor law system.105 For lawyers, the opening up of their discipline to the findings
of historians and to new methods of comparative law allows a more empirically refined and a
theoretically sounder understanding of the socio-legal history and nature of labor law.
F. Conclusion
There is a long history of socio-legal labor law scholarship in Germany and the UK, and labor law
historians have recognized that, in order to trace the influences and processes which explain labor
law’s development, they must be open to using a broad range of sources. Yet methodological
debates on “how to do” labor law history, and the discipline’s links with socio-legal studies, have
been limited in Germany and the UK. This Article has considered how history, when applied
within a socio-legal comparative framework, can provide an entrée into different ways of thinking
about labor law and labor relations systems. It has proposed a minor comparativism of labor law
history, based on archival materials and drawing on legal, historical, and industrial relations
101See generally Rebecca Zahn, German Codetermination Without Nationalization, and British Nationalization Without
Codetermination: Retelling the Story 36 HIST. STUD. INDUST. REL. 1 (2015). Hugh Clegg elaborates three principles under-
pinning industrial democracy which, according to him, crystallized in the inter-war years, and which provide an explanation
as to why codetermination never took root in the UK: First, trade unions must be independent of the state; second, trade
unions can only represent the industrial interests of workers; and, third, the ownership of industries is irrelevant to good
industrial relations. See Clegg, supra note 92, at 21–25. Clegg argues that workers’ representation in management or their
involvement in the control of industry does not therefore form a fundamental underpinning of industrial democracy and
is indeed “unacceptable” as it threatens trade-union independence. Id. For a broader overview see HUGH CLEGG,
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALIZATION (1951).
102Primarily in the Modern Records Centre (University of Warwick), the National Archives (Kew), the Bundesarchiv
(Koblenz) and the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie/DGB Archiv (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn).
103Daniel Boorstin, Tradition and Method in Legal History, 54 HARV. L. REV. 424, 427 (1941).
104ROBERT BARTLETT, HISTORY AND HISTORIANS: SELECTED PAPERS OF R.W. SOUTHERN 104–05 (2004).
105On the value of law and history generally, see Rose, supra note 62.
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literature in order to shed new light on conventional assumptions about worker participation in
workplace decision-making in the UK. A minor comparativism unearths hitherto neglected per-
spectives—those that have escaped the legal record—thereby opening up traditional narratives to
new interpretations. As applied to worker participation in workplace decisionmaking, it
provides the basis for a contemporary debate about what workplace participation is for and what
it should look like. Finally, in proposing a socio-legal methodology for labor law history, this
Article hopes to begin a debate, in the spirit of the subject of this special issue, on the theoretical
and methodological contours of German and British labor law history and its possible links with
socio-legal approaches.
Cite this article: Zahn R (2020). Finding New Ways of “Doing” Socio-Legal Labor Law History in Germany and the UK:
Introducing a “Minor Comparativism”. German Law Journal 21, 1378–1392. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2020.79
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Abstract
Since contracts form a basic institution of every legal order, the interdisciplinary orientation of
concepts of contracts reveals socio-legal inclinations of a legal order more broadly. Contrasting the
UK and US Common Law of contracts with developments under German law, this Article examines
the relation between normative and social science approaches, notably rooted in economics, economic
sociology, and social theory in the genealogy of contract law. A shared leitmotif over the 20th century
has been the drive to account for the societal embeddedness of contract. However, conceptualizations
of “Contract and Society” differ considerably between legal orders in their disciplinary ingredients and
design. In the US, and to a lesser extent also in the UK, the rather continuous reception of legal realism
has paved the way for broad interdisciplinary perspectives on contract law, ranging from classical
socio-legal, empirical work (e.g., Macaulay), economics (e.g., Williamson), sociology (e.g., Powell),
and critical theory (e.g., Kennedy) to today’s landscape, where essentially instrumental and
ideal-normative theories compete. Alternatively, in Germany, where the realist heritage was more
ephemeral, the transformations of contract law were processed from within legal discourse and
foremost in their effects on private autonomy as conceptualized, for example, in German idealism,
discourse theory and critical theory. Similarly, the “constitutionalization” of contract law—even if
championed for fostering private law’s reflexivity—has, for the most part, defied a socio-legal
orientation. Finally, the Article highlights the path dependencies with which these different starting
points translate in current debates around the role of contract in transnational governance.
Keywords: Comparative contract law; socio-legal studies; relational contract; constitutionalization; transnational contract law;
legal interdisciplinarity
A. Introduction: De-Essentializing Contract
Contract is arguably the most chatoyant legal institution—appearing in changing light when
seen from a wide array of legal perspectives, but also at the center of an unmatched set of other
disciplinary inroads, including political philosophy, ethics, economics, sociology, anthropology,
psychology, and gender studies. This plurality of approaches reminds us of contract’s inherent
tension between the universality of its form and the highly diverse and specific ramifications
of contractual practice. This tension translates into two antagonistic points of departure of current
contract scholarship that compete for doctrinal recognition: normative, ahistorical, and ideal
approaches on the one hand, and socio-legal, context-specific, and particularistic approaches
on the other hand. While many quibbles in contract law seem timeless and canonical, as the
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discontinued project of a Common European Sales Law1 reminds us, national contract laws are by
no means uniform. It had created increased attention for comparative legal analysis of contract
law,2 first with the ambition to highlight family resemblances, especially in the EU, then with a
closer look at divergences and pluralism. In today’s comparative law landscape, contract law is
often seen as a field of reference for principled qualifications of a legal order at large as being
more or less liberal.
Despite a widespread acknowledgement of novel forms of contracting and a respective need for
new conceptualizations, the historical and philosophical origins3 of contract and its peculiar
location between “state” and “society”4 continue to form a prominent point of departure for
contractual thinking. This entails a steady risk of essentializing contract on the basis of its most
general definition—as a voluntary exchange5—which abstracts almost entirely from any
parameter of the surrounding social context. Emanating from such a view of contract is a similarly
essentializing image of “the market” as a natural order which law only regulates a posteriori and
from the outside in order to protect its proper functioning.6
Yet, ever since the realist tradition of the early twentieth centurywith authors likeKarl Llewellyn,7
Eugen Ehrlich,8 Felix Cohen,9 and Robert Hale,10 a strong strand of contract scholarship has gradu-
ally moved away from theWillistonian archetype of contract11 to more contextualized approaches.
Here, contract is acknowledged to give rise to a social relation, a shift that entails two important
consequences. First, contract is deeply embedded in a set of social and cultural norms, or as
1The EU Draft Regulation on a Common European Sales Law, Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Nov. 10, 2011), withdrawn in
2014, seems to have been the peak of such initiatives. It had been preceded by the “Principles of European Contract
Law” (PECL) and the “Draft Common Frame of Reference” (DCFR) as expert-driven norms that continue to serve as bench-
mark in the field. For an analysis of the political stakes of this harmonization, compare Reinhard Zimmermann & Nils Jansen,
General Introduction: European Contract Laws –Foundations, Commentaries, Synthesis, in COMMENTARIES ON EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAWS 1 (Nils Jansen & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2018), and Horst Eidenmüller et al., The Common
Frame of Reference for European Private Law—Policy Choices and Codification Problems, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659
(2008).
2See the excellent compilation COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2017).
3For concise surveys, see REINHARD ZIMMERMAN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVIL
TRADITION (1996); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1999).
4PEER ZUMBANSEN, ORDNUNGSMUSTER IM MODERNEN WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT: LERNERFAHRUNGEN ZWISCHEN STAAT,
GESELLSCHAFT UND VERTRAG 242–269 (1999).
5See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”).
6Cf. Andrew Lang, Market Anti-Naturalisms, in SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT 312 (Justin Desautels-
Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE
MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 78–102 (2012); NATHAN OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2017). On the role of the state, see Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, The State and the
Market – a Parable: On the State’s Commodifying Effects, 3 PUB. REASON 44 (2011).
7Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931). See also Alan Schwartz, Karl
Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in JURISPRUDENCE OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 12 (Jody Kraus
& Steven Walt eds., 2000).
8EUGEN EHRLICH, GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS (1913) (Manfred Rehbinder ed., 4th ed. 1989).
9Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 6 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 839 (1935).
10Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943). Cf. BARBARA FRIED, THE
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998). For more
on the realist legacy, see Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
191 (2007).
11SAMUELWILLISTON (WITH GEORGE J. THOMPSON), A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936–38, vol I—IV);
for an insightful review compare Lon Fuller, Williston on Contracts, 18 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1939). Generally, on the persistent
struggle around “socializing” contract, see Luke Herrine, Socializing Contract (May 30, 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2989173.
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Durkheim famously phrased: “[T]out n’est pas contractuel dans le contrat.”12 Second, it becomes
reductionist to assess the emerging contractual order from the perspective of the parties and the
principle of privity alone, rather than with a view to society at large. A perspective of ”contract
and society”13 would investigate how contract becomes fragmented across spheres of social inter-
action and is both shaped by and is itself shaping its environment beyond the immediate parties.
Contracts between or involving states, within the family, at the workplace, among global corpora-
tions, or for a home do not solely differ by subject matter.14 Their multiplicity results from their
respective embeddedness in a social context that grants a peculiar reach to the idea of privity
and that relies on contract for very different forms of social ordering. This heterogeneity poses a
significant challenge to both descriptive and normative attempts to account for the entirety of con-
tract law.15 It may not surprise that even normatively monist or ideal theories, be they centered
around efficiency,16 autonomy,17 fairness,18 democracy,19 or distributive justice20 are increasingly
incorporating pluralist elements.21 Socio-legal explanations see the function of contract precisely
in enabling cooperation despite potentially diverging, “pluralistic” normative preconceptions:
The role of contract is to regulate—or make endogenous to the contractual program—certain
behaviors and understandings of parties that fall within its scope, just as much as it is to explicitly
make exogenous other factors.22
This Article is interested in the underlying (inter-)disciplinary dynamics that guide this move,
or rather, that guide the reflection of contract’s foundational normative and social pluralism.
Contrasting the UK and US Common Law of contracts with developments under German
law, this Article will examine the relation between normative and social science approaches,
mostly those rooted in economics, economic sociology, and social theory, in the genealogy of con-
tract law. It takes the perspective of asking which normative and conceptual preconditions ani-
mate the evolution of contract law, in particular, with regard to complex transactions and
12ÉMILE DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL 189 (1893). Positioning Durkheim within early socio-legal
scholarship, see Moritz Renner, Privatrecht und Soziologie, in PRIVATRECHTSTHEORIE 121 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds.,
vol I, 2014).
13C.f. Lawrence Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986) (deliberately alluding to the
methodologically diverse movement of “law and society”).
14For a taxonomy, see HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 93–101 (2017).
15C.f. GORDLEY, supra note 3; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541 (2003).
16E.g., Richard Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 487 (1980); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 289 et seq. (2004); ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS Ch. 8 (6th ed. 2012). C.f. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three
Decades: Success or Failure, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003).
17DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 14; Hanoch Dagan &Michael Heller, Autonomy for Contract, Refined, 38 L. & PHIL. (forth-
coming 2020); Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Why Autonomy Must Be Contract’s Ultimate Value, 18 JERUSALEM REV.
LEGAL STUD. 148 (2019); Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice for Contracts (August 11, 2019), available at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3435781; Thomas Gutmann, Theories of Contract and the Concept of Autonomy, Centre for Advanced
Study in Bioethics Münster Working Paper No. 2013/55.
18Florian Rödl, Contractual Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law (Theory), 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (2013).
19Martijn W. Hesselink, Democratic Contract Law, 11 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 81 (2015).
20LYN TJON SOIE LEN, MINIMUM CONTRACT JUSTICE: A CAPABILITIES PERSPECTIVE ON SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER
CONTRACTS (2017); Hugh Collins, Distributive Justice Through Contracts, 45 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 49 (1992). Cf. Aditi
Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 193 (Gregory Klass et al.
eds., 2014).
21See Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915 (2012); Nathan Oman, Unity and
Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (2005). For a call to account for plural spheres of valuation, see also
Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409 (2012). On balancing normative goals,
Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420
(2001).
22C.f. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 459 (1993) (Ger) (stating that contracts “stabilize a specific
difference over time, while being indifferent to anything else,” “indifference for the sake of difference”, translation KHE).
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transnational arrangements. Contracting practice here looks very unlike the idea of a bilateral
“meeting of minds,” which, with some perseverance, remains the prototype of contract law
debates. Consequently, the individual justification of contract rooted in autonomy and an idea
of human agency needs to be complemented by a broader societal justification that is concerned
with the social institutions—such as markets or chains of production—that contract gives rise to.
This Article will illustrate how the disciplinary framing underlying the push towards more soci-
etally contextualized conceptions of contract differs between the jurisdictions discussed. A central
explanation for this is that along the lines of legal realism, the US—and to a lesser extent also the
UK—have sought to contextualize contract from the outside, that is, by a broad range of inter-
disciplinary perspectives. In turn, the German debate has processed transformations of contract
law from within the legal discourse and through the lens of its ramifications on private autonomy.
Accordingly, despite a surprising congruence across Western legal orders in the evolution of
contractual paradigms over the twentieth century,23 this shift was ultimately animated by different
normative and socio-theoretical considerations across jurisdictions. On the one hand, the gradual
move from Willistonian formalism to a “material” or “social”24—and occasionally to a more ”
procedural” or “reflexive”25—paradigm has echoed a changing philosophical discourse around
the antinomies of freedom.26 The philosophical contribution highlighted the normative insuffi-
ciency of a formal idea of freedom in light of structural coercion or dependency—as illustrated,
for example, in labor law.27 On the other hand, a significant second stream stems from the realm
of socio-legal analysis. Both Maine28 and Weber29 provided early accounts of how the scope of
contractual ordering within a given society expanded as societies moved from traditional
segmentation and hierarchical stratification to functional differentiation.
The picture hitherto allows two cautious observations regarding attempts of contextualizing
and embedding contract in society. First, in a scholarly landscape dominated by deontological
analysis, such projects surely form a minority current. Second, among such projects, the scope,
interdisciplinary inspiration, doctrinal realization of such embedding, and the respective imagi-
nary of “non-contractual elements of contract” vary between jurisdictions. Against this
23Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Duncan Kennedy, The
Globalisation of Critical Discourses on Law: Thoughts on David Trubek’s Contribution, in CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: LIBER AMICORUM DAVID M. TRUBEK 3 (Gráinne de Búrca et al. eds., 2014).
24MARC AMSTUTZ ET AL., SOZIALES VERTRAGSRECHT: EINE RECHTSEVOLUTORISCHE STUDIE (2006); Claus-Wilhelm Canaris,
Wandlungen des Schuldvertragsrechts – Tendenzen zu seiner “Materialisierung”, 200 ARCHIV FÜR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 273
(2000).
25Rudolf Wiethölter, Proceduralization of the Category of Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN-GERMAN
DEBATE 501 (Christian Joerges & David M. Trubek eds., 1989); Rudolf Wiethölter, Materialization and Proceduralization
in Modern Law, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 221 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986); Gunther Teubner,
Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 239 (1983); GRALF-PETER CALLIESS,
PROZEDURALES RECHT (1999); Dieter Hart, Zur konzeptionellen Entwicklung des Vertragsrechts, AG 66 (1984); Karl-Heinz
Ladeur, Prozeduralisierung zweiter Ordnung—Am Anfang war das Verfahren, in PROZEDURALISIERUNG DES RECHTS 82
(Tatjana Sheplyakova ed., 2018).
26GONÇALO DE ALMEIDA RIBEIRO, THE DECLINE OF PRIVATE LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF LIBERAL LEGALISM
(2019).
27John Gardner, The Contractualisation of Labour Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LAW 33 (Hugh
Collins, Gillian Lester & Virginia Mantouvalou eds., 2019).
28HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 174 (1861).
29MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT: GRUNDRISS DER VERSTEHENDEN SOZIOLOGIE 387–97, 503–13 (5th ed.
1972). Weber’s historical sociology went as far as to decry non-formal elements to modern law, especially those in contract,
as potentially countering the formal rationality of modern society and prone to cause social regress, partly because it would
expand the discretion of bureaucracy to the detriment of its predetermination and control through parliament. C.f.Wolfgang
Mommsen, MaxWebers Begriff der Universalgeschichte, inMAXWEBER, DER HISTORIKER 51, 52–54. (Jürgen Kocka ed., 2011);
Hans-Peter Müller, Rationalität, Rationalisierung, Rationalismus. Von Weber zu Bourdieu?, in DIE RATIONALITÄT DES
SOZIALEN 43 (Andrea Maurer & Uwe Schimank eds., 2011); Martin Albrow, Legal Positivism and Bourgeois Materialism:
Max Weber’s View of the Sociology of Law, 2 BRITISH J.L. & SOC’Y 14 (1975).
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background, thisArticlewill first showcase the plurality of arrangements of “contract and society” in
a double intention to illustrate contract’s heterogeneity as a legal institution, and to use contract
theory—more broadly speaking— as a test case for socio-legal inclinations of a legal order.
Second, this Article will then turn to the issue of long-term, project-specific, in other words
“relational,” contracting as a focal point to analyze how the Common Law of contracts, especially
in the UK and the German legal order, have conceptualized the challenge such contracts pose to
traditional contract thinking, and what paths of adjustment they have developed. Finally, in an
outlook, this Article will project these experiences from the national level towards the analysis of
transnational law and discuss their respective influence—for the novel task of private governance
by contract—beyond the state.
B. “Contract and Society”: Situating the Impact of Socio-Legal Analysis
The birth of modern contract law as a distinct discipline is often located in the second half of the
nineteenth century for US law,30 and was brought to its pinnacle in the works of Langdell31 and
Williston.32 For Europe, the grand treatises by Pothier,33 Savigny,34 and Blackstone35 suggest a
much earlier development.36 Conceptually, contract law emerged as a set of rights and duties that
stood alongside the preexisting system of ownership rights in property. It comprised rules for the
entire lifecycle of a contract in the general effort of laying the foundations of a formalist, well-
ordered model of contractual thinking that was induced from the sub-types of contract and
adjudged cases. The implications of the formalist vision were not limited to doctrinal particulars,
but rather formed a comprehensive mode of thought that extended to the whole of private law.
The idealizations of a Kantian will theory resonate just as much in contract law as they do in
property law and theories of legal personality. Hegel, while having a thicker idea of contractual
justice than Kant’s theory of contract law, likewise saw contract’s essence in the recognition
among property owners.37 In other words, formal contract law was entrenched in a general private
law architecture of pre-existing legal subjectivity, property rights, and a primacy of civil society
over the state. Consequently, the institution of contract is inseparable from other basic institutions
of private law38 because the scope of contracting parties and objects of transaction are decided
upon outside of contract law. This liberal architecture justified contract on the basis of the formal
equality of the parties—overlooking how the socio-political situatedness shapes contracting
opportunities and behavior in morally significant ways. Accordingly, contracting shapes contexts
beyond the contracting parties. Relegated to a “private affair and not a social institution,”39 the free
bargaining process provided for the congruency of contract with the social order as a whole.
30KEVIN TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 217 (1990).
31CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1880). For a contemporary analysis, c.f. Bruce
Kimball, Langdell on Contracts and Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 L. & HIST. REV. 345 (2007).
32Williston, supra note 11.
33JEAN-ROBERT POTHIER, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS (1761).
34II FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS OBLIGATIONENRECHT ALS THEIL DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS (1853).
35WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765–69). For more on Blackstone’s underlying
conception of law and social theory, see Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV.
205 (1979) with a reply by Alan Watson, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 97 YALE L.J. 795 (1988).
36ALFRED SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 199 (1987).
37C.f. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS § 63 (1820). For a synthesis, see
Peter Landau, Hegels Begründung des Vertragsrechts, 59 ARCHIVES FOR PHIL. L. & SOC. PHIL. 117–38 (1973).
38See Thomas Vesting, Einbau von Zeit: Rechtsnormativität im relationalen Vertrag, 52 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 626 (2019); Maria
Rosaria Marella, Who is the Contracting Party? A Trip Around the Transformation of the Legal Subject, in COMPARATIVE
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 2, at 205 .
39Friedrich Kessler, The Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract Role of Compulsion in Economic
Transactions, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943).
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I. Legal Realists: Combining Micro- and Macro-Sociology of Contract Law
Legal realists paved the way for a more complete picture of contract. Even though the movement
was strongest in its intellectual firepower and lasting effects on legal thought in its variant of
American Legal Realism,40 Europe knew parallel streams dubbed either “realism”41 or early “
sociology of law.”42 European authors made important contributions to the US variant.
This section seeks to develop how realist jurisprudence reframed the embeddedness of contract
in society and reshuffled the relation between black-letter contract law and additional elements
central to contract’s operation. It will become clear that legal realism has opened the door to a
necessarily eclectic set of social science approaches to contract law, which raises questions of
disciplinary pluralism.43 Without the realist pioneers, critical approaches to contract law44 as well
as the impactful frameworks of welfare45 and institutional economics46 would be largely
inconceivable. Above being a political or distinctively normative project, legal realism was a
jurisprudential movement that promoted a legal mode of thought. Their project was, generally
speaking, to counter the distortive effects of the formal model of contract by deciphering
its constructed nature and to make political and societal stakes part of the analysis. Despite being
somewhat politically heterogeneous, the realists’ generation would possibly regard some of their
theoretical heirs of today with suspicion.
In his trailblazing contribution of 1931, Karl Llewellyn asks “what price contract?”47? What
could, misleadingly at first sight, be understood as going into a similar direction as Coase’s analysis
of “social costs,”48 takes the social anchoring of contract in society seriously by assuming it cannot
be aptly expressed in economic terms alone. His interest goes into the “role of contract in the social
order, the part that contract plays in the life of men.”49 Compared to the formalist mainstream of
his time, Llewellyn’s approach entails looking behind the edifice of doctrine and asking what type
of society and market, or social and economic relations, contract gives rise to. In an inquiry that
qualifies as institutionalist avant la lettre, albeit one inevitably pursued on the basis of an “arm-
chair” economic sociology, Llewellyn connects contract to markets that emerge from aggregate
and decentralized contracting. For him, individual contracts, and a fortiori the market, are ani-
mated to a large extent by norms that are operational irrespective of court intervention and a
lawyer’s lens—an idea he attributes to Eugen Ehrlich’s “living law.”50 Rather, contract is tasked
with developing the constitutional side of the self-government of society,51 not in a laissez faire
sense, but with the idea to incorporate non-economic effects, which, for Llewellyn, seem more
40For concise overviews, see Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607 (2007); BRIAN LEITER,
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007).
41On the Scandinavian realist movement, see Jes Bjarup, The Philosophy of Scandinavian Legal Realism, 18 RATIO JURIS 1
(2005); Gregory S. Alexander, Comparing the Two Legal Realisms—American and Scandinavian, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 131
(2002).
42On the trajectory of German sociology of law, compare StefanMachura, Law in Other Contracts German Sociology of Law:
A Case of Path Dependency, 8 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 506 (2012).
43For a normative perspective on disciplinary pluralism in private law, compare Stefan Grundmann, Pluralistic Private Law
Theory (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Stefan Grundmann, Methodenpluralismus als Aufgabe—zur
Legalität von ökonomischen und rechtsethischen Argumenten in Auslegung und Rechtsanwendung, 66 RABELSZ 423 (1997);
MARIETTA AUER, ZUM ERKENNTNISZIEL DER RECHTSTHEORIE 35 (2018) (drawing on Duncan Kennedy to advocate for “fancy
theory,” in other words, an experimental patchwork of approaches to overcome disciplinary silos).
44C.f. Duncan Kennedy, The Political Stakes in ‘Merely Technical’ Issues of Contract Law, 1 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 7 (2001).
45See Schwartz, supra note 7; Horst Eidenmüller, Rechtswissenschaft als Realwissenschaft, 54 JURISTENZEITUNG 53 (1999).
46For an explicit reverence to realist pedigree, see Oliver E. Williamson, Revisiting Legal Realism: The Law, Economics and
Organization Perspective, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 383 (1996).
47Llewellyn, supra note 7.
48Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
49Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 705.
50Id. at 706 n.6 (“This whole paper builds at every point on Ehrlich, as any such paper must.”).
51Id. at 727–31.
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sophisticated to capture.52 Such “constitutions” can only exist in plural, carefully attuned to the
living institutional setting of corporations, factories, trade-unions, churches, and households.
Contract law’s principal role here is to provide an adjustable, indicative framework that parties
can turn to in case of unexpected disagreement, or when the cooperative spirit ceases. Does the
relative insignificance of contract law for most transactions imply it could simply be abrogated?
Llewellyn hastens to specify that growingly complex markets—and therefore expanding reliance
on impersonal trust—become easier with a credible threat of enforcement through state law.53 As
much as state power is not the ultimate and only “basis of contract,”54 Llewellyn does not go as far
as to dismiss the state legal system and the judiciary as its incarnation. The “rule of law,” in other
words, remains an unshattered reference for him, unlike the critical tradition and later empirical
works. One resulting limitation—perhaps less significant in his time than nowadays—is that
Llewellyn concentrates on “legal” markets and on contracts in their “legal” enforceability, as
opposed to “illegal” or “black” markets on which contracts exist as social artefacts without aspi-
rations of enforceability.55
The realist movement did not lobby for a holistic project of legal reform that would implement
their analysis broadly speaking, even though many of its protagonists identified as social reform-
ers.56 To be sure, sectoral reforms like the social current in labor and rental law were unmistakably
fueled by realist inspiration. Similarly, the rise of contracts of adhesion corroborates the realists’
observations on contract law, because boilerplate transcends the usual framework by overshad-
owing the individuality of parties and reflecting the impersonality of the market within the insti-
tution of contract.57 Next to such specific fields of application, the deeper shortcomings of formal
contract law that realism as a jurisprudential movement laid bare are too heterogeneous to be
mitigated by a single legislative act, specifically because a central tenet of the realist project
was precisely to highlight the decay of unity in contract law. More specifically, only rather small
parts of realist scholarship even aimed at the legislator, while others were directed at courts or—in
the most frequent scenario—gathering information on the legal process irrespective of a peculiar
addressee and oftentimes even highlighting the relative insignificance of formal legal actors in
parliaments and court chambers.58
II. The Realist Heritage: Diverging Trajectories
Despite the transnational character of the realist movement, the mark left by the realist tradition
on contract law paradigms varies considerably between and within Europe and the US. This
becomes clear in a comparative socio-legal analysis of the changing paradigms of contract over
the twentieth century until today.59 In UK and US Common Law, realism has facilitated and
52Id.
53Id. at 720–21. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
54Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 56 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933).
55The ongoing role of law on “illegal”markets is similarly unaddressed in moral debates around the limits of marketization
of certain commodities. See, e.g., DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THEMORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS
(2012). Empirical studies suggest that “illegal” markets operate on the basis of replicated forms of normativity and enforce-
ment that realists should study. C.f. THE ARCHITECTURE OF ILLEGAL MARKETS: TOWARDS AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF
ILLEGALITY IN THE ECONOMY (Jens Beckert & Matías Dewey eds., 2017).
56Katharina I. Schmidt, Law, Modernity, Crisis: German Free Lawyers, American Legal Realists and the Transatlantic Turn
to “Life,” 1903-1933, 39 GERMAN STUD. REV. 121 (2016).
57Kessler, supra note 39, at 633 (referring to the “high price” paid by society “for the luxury of an apparent homogeneity in
the law of contracts”).
58Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 13 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1981).
59On such a methodology, see Annelise Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-legal Studies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 772 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2d ed., 2019); David Nelken, Comparative
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encouraged socio-legal perspectives on contract law with varying leading disciplinary references
over time. The most salient contestation comes from a recent surge in moral contract theories,60
not from mere doctrinalism. Turning to the UK context more specifically, it is remarkable that
both pioneers of a regulatory approach to contract61 and of a more recent “legal institutionalism”62
develop their views with regard to UK examples.
In his influential monograph of 1999, Hugh Collins formulates avenues for an understanding
of contract that does justice to forty years of empirical studies since Macaulay, and thus moves
beyond a “closed” legal doctrinal perspective. He discusses contract as a legal institution in a state
of flux, undergoing a metamorphosis from the formalism of UK orthodox doctrine63 to a con-
textual support of parties’ manifold projects in business and beyond. Collins develops a theory
that collapses the distinction between private law and regulation as contract itself becomes a realm
of regulation, both used for regulatory purposes and endowed with regulatory effects. He locates
contract as a “hybrid” between discourses of law, economics, and sociology of business, and decid-
edly links Macaulay’s and Macneil’s contribution to a systems theory conceptualization of law as a
communicative system. Consequently, economic, social, and legal inroads to contract are closely
entangled, and it becomes the office of the judge to prove awareness of the multi-sidedness of a
case. Unlike some of his critics,64 Collins does not stop at the point of acknowledging the practical
difficulties that such ambitions for judicial reasoning pose. The reconstruction of those principles
and reasonable expectations that nurture parties’ cooperation can be inferred from a theory-based
understanding of parties’ intentions, notably, with recourse to models of complex transactions in
economic sociology.65 Here, Collins distinguishes himself from scholarship on “relational” con-
tracting.66 Unlike Macneil, who interprets contractual behavior in light of a predetermined set of
“types of transactions,” Collins seeks to identify the “normative points of reference that guide
behavior,” hence the specific contractual project undertaken by the parties. The more robust judi-
cial entitlement to considerations of distributive justice67 is thus grounded in a “sociological juris-
prudence”68 that uses both substantive and procedural mechanisms of contract doctrine to
mitigate the “alienation” of the facts of a case and the subversion of extra-contractual norm sys-
tems between the parties when being translated into legal categories. Overall, Collins’ concern
with jeopardizing social bonds and atypical cooperative projects translates the realist project to
contemporary business reality, although the exclusivity of business as a field governed by contract
seems reductive.
“Legal institutionalism” may serve as a second example of a mode of legal thought developed
with a view to UK Common Law that has strong allegiance to a realist pedigree. It uses an
Sociology of Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 329 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2002); Naomi
Creutzfeldt et al., Introduction: Exploring the Comparative in Socio-legal Studies, 12 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 377 (2016). For a
synthesis, see DAVID CAMPBELL, LINDA MULCAHY & SALLY WHEELER, CHANGING CONCEPTS OF CONTRACT (David
Campbell, Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2013).
60In the aftermath of Charles Fried, see CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS A PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981).
61HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999).
62Notably, see Simon Deakin et al., Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law, 45 J. COMP. L. &
ECON. 188 (2017); KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY (2019).
63Collins states that the US Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts have allowed legal
formalism to disintegrate much faster than in the UK. See COLLINS, supra note 61, at 199.
64John Gava & Janey Greene, Do We Need a Hybrid Law of Contract? Why Hugh Collins is Wrong and Why it Matters, 63
CAMRIDGE. L.J. 605, 616–19 (2004).
65Hugh Collins, The Research Agenda for Implicit Dimensions of Contract, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT 1 (David
Campbell et al. eds., 2003).
66See infra Section C.
67For a recent reconceptualization of distributive justice with regard to private law, see Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman,
Poverty and Private Law: Beyond Distributive Justice (June 27, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3637034.
68See DIE FÄLLE DER GESELLSCHAFT: EINE NEUE PRAXIS SOZIOLOGISCHER JURISPRUDENZ (Bertram Lomfeld ed., 2017).
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interwoven framework from economic sociology, institutional economics, and political economy
to identify certain institutions as a backbone and central characteristic of capitalism and highlights
the role of law in establishing and maintaining them.69 Institutions mark the settings of human
interaction which are governed by respective operating rules. Institutions, here, appear as “part
and parcel of any mode of production”70; they shape, rather than merely follow, modes of pro-
duction. For instance, legal institutionalism points out that technology can only become a central
driving force of economic innovation when coupled with a supportive set of property rights,
finance, and other legal parameters. In this, “legal institutionalism” builds on previous institu-
tional accounts of law, and both transposes and profoundly sharpens the institutional economics’
insights into law.71 Unlike Williamson,72 who, drawing on Coase,73 established the role of law in
building economic institutions but saw law—particularly private ordering—as essentially serving
efficiency between firms and markets, “legal institutionalists” claim a more holistic understanding
of the law and its basic concepts as social and economic institutions. While taking private ordering
in its current pervasiveness and practical appeal seriously, “legal institutionalists” likewise reflect
on the power structure implicated in private ordering and see the state as contested, yet still an
irreducible element to the very concept of law. Legal rules are evaluated not solely in their influ-
ence on rational acting individuals, but in their institutional effects, namely those effects that,
under realistic assumptions arise from the aggregate use of the particular rights and entitlements
that a legal rule confers. In this light, for instance, the circulation of knowledge in society crucially
depends on the design of institutions, among them legal institutions such as intellectual property
and competition law.74
In contrast, in Germany, it was the realist tradition that introduced a thicker concept of “con-
tract” compared to the rather marginal idea embodied in the German Civil Code of 1900. Not only
was the codification under the influence of German idealism with its three freedoms of contract,
property, and the freedom to make a will, but legal sociology was also still in its infancy and unable
to call for a more contextualized assessment of contract. In fact, in the eyes of contemporary critics
like Otto von Gierke,75 the codification paid insufficient reverence to the Germanicist tradition,
which had developed independently of a nation state for more than a century and thus incorpo-
rated collective effects of individual rights into the idea of freedom of contract. Still, the realist
heritage was particularly ephemeral in Germany because communitarian thinking was discredited
and again fell into oblivion in the post-war period. Consequently, unlike in the Common Law
trajectory, contract law’s evolution in the second half of the twentieth century did not follow a
sequence of changing interdisciplinary references. Rather, it was structured around the analytical
legal typology of a “material” and “reflexive” law coupled with a pivotal role given to the “con-
stitutionalization” of contract law. Franz Wieacker’s eminent study on the “social model” of the
69Deakin et al., supra note 62.
70Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Conceptualizing Capitalism: A Summary, 20 COMPETITION & CHANGE 37 (2015).
71Dick Ruiter, Economic and Legal Institutionalism: What can They Learn From Each Other, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 99
(1994).
72OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 68 (1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
73Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW
(1988).
74C.f. Dan Wielsch, Private Governance of Knowledge: Societally-Crafted Intellectual Properties Regimes, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 907 (2013).
75OTTO VON GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 12 (1889). See also Olivier Jouanjan, Le souci du social: Le
“moment 1900” de la doctrine et de la pratique juridiques, in LE “MOMENT 1900”. CRITIQUE SOCIALE ET CRITIQUE
SOCIOLOGIQUE DU DROIT EN EUROPE ET AUX ÉTATS-UNIS 13 (Olivier Jouanjan & E. Zoller eds., 2015); TILMAN REPGEN,
DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS: EINE GRUNDFRAGE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION AM ENDE DES 19
JAHRHUNDERTS (2001).
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grand codifications76 is firmly rooted within legal analysis. A “social model” for Wieacker
crystallizes typically implicit assumptions about society, markets, and the realization of freedom
that underlies legal thinking and court practice. Despite its double nature as normative and
descriptive, “social models” are not understood as inroads for interdisciplinary, socio-legal work,
but serve as a basis for a historical and philosophical reconstruction of legal developments since
the entry into force of the German Civil Code.77 This orientation shines through in the structure
of leading discussions of German contract law calibrated around the extent and justification of
private autonomy78 as a vantage point, while socio-legal perspectives on that same topic remained
of rather marginal standing.79 Even the extensive discussion of shortcomings of the regulatory or
welfare state—a prime domain, in principle, for socio-legal analysis—was conducted through the
legal lens of private autonomy and the related risks of normalizing effects and petrification of
social roles.80
Interestingly, the innovation81 provided for by the growing influence of fundamental rights on
contract law82 seems to have further solidified a reasoning that is at least not outspokenly inter-
disciplinary. Even if not positivist in a strict sense, and vested with the potential to foster self-
reflection within contract law,83 the “constitutionalization” of contract law has barely opened
up a new disciplinary repertory. Instead, recurring topoi pertain to the alleged risk of a levelling
down of an existing hierarchy of norms and a venturesome turn in the theory of fundamental
rights.84 This partly stems from the fact that private autonomy as guaranteed under Art. 2(1)
of the Grundgesetz is conceived predominantly in individualistic terms and not socially situated
and mediated through the power of social institutions. The liberal epistemology of fundamental
rights that is common for their role in curtailing state power complicates the accommodation of
sociological theories of fundamental rights85 that are based on non-ideal and situated theories
of society.
76FRANZ WIEACKER, DAS SOZIALMODELL DER KLASSISCHEN PRIVATRECHTSGESETZBÜCHER UND DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER
MODERNEN GESELLSCHAFT (1953).
77See also MARIETTA AUER, MATERIALISIERUNG, FLEXIBILISIERUNG, RICHTERFREIHEIT 27 (2005).
78Notably, see Ludwig Raiser, Vertragsfunktion und Vertragsfreiheit, in 1 FS ZUM HUNDERTJÄHRIGEN BESTEHEN DES
DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES 1860–1960 101 (1960); Ludwig Raiser, Vertragsfreiheit heute, in JURISTENZEITUNG 1 (1958); I
WERNER FLUME, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS, DAS RECHTSGESCHÄFT 1 (4th ed. 1992).
79But see WALTER SCHMID, ZUR SOZIALEN WIRKLICHKEIT DES VERTRAGS (1983).
80See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY 413 (William Rehg trans., 1996). Similarly, the disciplinary pluralism in the work of Rudolf Wiethölter, informed
through the triad of critical theory, systems theory, and political economy, while decidedly inviting social science models in
private and business law, does so with cautious concern for the legitimating patterns of dominant legal thought. C.f. Ruldolf
Wiethölter, Sozialwissenschaftliche Modelle im Wirtschaftsrecht, 18 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 126 (1985).
81On such effects of fundamental rights, see GERRIT HORNUNG, GRUNDRECHTSINNOVATIONEN (2015).
82For leading cases, see BVerfG, 1 BVR 26/84, Feb. 7, 1990, https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?
Gericht=BVerfG&Datum=07.02.1990&Aktenzeichen=1%20BvR%2026%2F84; BVerfG, 1 BVR 567/89, 1044/89, Oct. 19,
1993, https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Gericht=BVerfG&Datum=19.10.1993&Aktenzeichen=1%20Bv
R%20567%2F89; BVerfG, 1 BVR 3080/09, Apr. 11, 2018, https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Gericht=
BVerfG&Datum=11.04.2018&Aktenzeichen=1%20BvR%203. Among the abundant literature, see also Claus-Wilhelm
Canaris, Verfassungs-und europarechtliche Aspekte der Vertragsfreiheit, in WEGE UND VERFAHREN DES
VERFASSUNGSLEBENS: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR PETER LERCHE ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAG 873 (Peter Badura & Rupert Scholz eds.
1993); Stefan Grundmann, Constitutional Values and European Contract Law—an Overview, in CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
AND EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 3 (Stefan Grundmann ed., 2008); Felix Maultzsch, Die Konstitutionalisierung des
Privatrechts als Entwicklungsprozess, JURISTENZEITUNG 1040 (2012).
83DanWielsch,Grundrechte als Rechtfertigungsgebote im Privatrecht, 213 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 718 (2013).
84Matthias Kumm, Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights and Principles and the
Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341 (2006).
85See NIKLAS LUHMANN, GRUNDRECHTE ALS INSTITUTION (6th. ed. 2019). C.f. Gunther Teubner, Ein Fall von struktureller
Korruption? Die Familienbürgschaft in der Kollision unverträglicher Handlungslogiken (BVerfGE 89, 214 ff.), 83 KRITV 338
(2000); Gert Verschraegen, Human Rights and Modern Society: A Sociological Analysis From the Perspective of Systems
Theory, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 258 (2002).
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C. The Interdisciplinary Matrix of Legal Analysis and the Conceptualization of
“Relational” Contracting
One of contract theory’s recurring threads is to conceptualize new modes of economic
organization and the related contractual devices. Contractual practice often seems to be the first
mover, yet ultimately legal practice can only express itself within the available legal imaginaries of
contract, including those originating in practice. As a result, the most adequate depiction seems to
be that of a co-evolution between contract law and economic organization based on division of
labor, specialization, and cooperation.86 Arguably, the most significant evolutionary step of the
second half of the twentieth century in the field, and an ongoing domain of scholarly innovation,
is the discovery of “relational” contracting, that is, the specificity of contracts related to long-term
and/or multi-party projects that often use network-types of organization.87 Fittingly for a mode of
contracting that lies at the heart of a global trend towards accelerated and fluid modes of produc-
tion,88 the conceptualization of “relational” contracts has been a truly interdisciplinary and cross-
jurisdictional endeavor.89 Indeed, critical contributions stem from lawyers, institutional econo-
mists, and economic sociologists, to name just the central proponents. Today, “relational” contract
theory finds at least as much resonance outside of law, notably in management,90 as it does within
the legal academy.
I. The Discovery of “Relational” Contracting: From Socio-Legal Studies to Institutional
Economics
As a legal concept,91 “relational” contracts have been developed in a critical dialogue between the
lawyers Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil. Both works—while not identical in their interdisci-
plinary orientation—have become the new “orthodoxy” within socio-legal scholarship on con-
tracts92 and took inspiration from legal realism.93 Stewart Macaulay’s empirical study of the
manufacturing business in Wisconsin in the 1960s94—conducted during a time of flourishing
socio-legal research—marked a primer for the study of relational contracting. It challenged
two important standing assumptions of lawyers at the time, namely that legal design is crucial
86Gunther Teubner, Idiosyncratic Production Regimes: Co-Evolution of Economic and Legal Institutions in the Varieties of
Capitalism, in THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL ENTITIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY 161 (Michael Wheeler et al.
eds., 2002); IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, The Role of Law in Global Value Chains: A Research
Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT. L. 57 (2016); Klaas Hendrik Eller, Is ‘Global Value Chain’ a Legal Concept? Situating
Contract Law in Discourses around Global Production, 16 EUR. REV. CONT. L. (2020).
87Another paradigm case, yet from a totally different field of private law, is marriage. C.f. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E.
Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (1998).
88See, e.g., Stefano Ponte & Timothy Sturgeon, Explaining Governance in Global Value Chains: A Modular Theory-Building
Effort, 21 REV. INT. POL. ECON. 195 (2014); Joonkoo Lee & Gary Gereffi, Global Value Chains, Rising Power Firms and
Economic and Social Upgrading, 11 CRITICAL PERSP. INT. BUS. 319 (2015).
89Stefan Grundmann, Towards’ a Private Law Embedded in Social Theory: Eine Skizze, 24 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 409 (2016).
90See, e.g., Donald J. Schepker et al., The Many Futures of Contracts: Moving Beyond Structure and Safeguarding to
Coordination and Adaptation, 40 J. MGMT. 193 (2014); Bjoern Ivens & Keith Blois, Relational Exchange Norms in
Marketing: A Critical Review Macneil’s Contribution, 4 MARKETING THEORY 239 (2004).
91Hugh Collins, Is a Relational Contract a Legal Concept?, in CONTRACT IN COMMERCIAL LAW 37 (James Edelman et al.
eds., 2016).
92Sally Wheeler, Visions of Contract, 44 J.L. & SOC’Y 74 (2017).
93But see, Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (2000).
94Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business—a Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). For later
discussions of his own work, see Steward Macaulay, Long-Term Continuing Relations: The American Experience Regulating
Dealerships and Franchises, in FRANCHISING AND THE LAW—DAS RECHT DES FRANCHISING: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE
APPROACHES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 179 (Christian Joerges ed., 1991); Steward Macaulay, Relational Contracts:
Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775 (2000); David
Campbell, What Do We Mean by the Non-Use of Contract, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART
MACAULAY 159 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2003).
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in a transaction, and that thinking about economic organization could be aligned with the
Coasian95 dichotomy of market and firm correlating with contract and organization.
Macaulay’s series of interviews and reviews of contract terms led him to conclude that the degree
of meticulous planning and recourse to legal sanctions in business relations is surprisingly low.
Contracts—and contract lawyers—oftentimes seem to hinder rather than enable transactions by
being at odds with the logic of the social relation that surrounds them. The underestimated non-
contractual elements include business customs, good faith relationships, past transactions, per-
sonal and professional relations between actors across businesses, as well as mechanisms of trust,
reciprocity, and reputation. One company even estimated that the majority of its contracts might
be unenforceable and yet would not hinder its business.96 Macaulay concludes that the scope and
type of planning is unlike the one found in classical and neo-classical theory. A more thorough
planning manifests itself with regard to the core obligations of the contract and existential risks.97
Yet, instead of substantive solutions, legal rules will often be limited to deciding on internal pro-
cedures and decision-making authority. Furthermore, within a company, management will be
leaning less towards legal planning than accountants and legal departments, whose very role is
a formal legal assessment and who will often be unaware of or skeptical towards inter-party
dynamics at the management level. The picture shifts after termination of a contract, in other
words when the continuation of a business relation is no longer a promising trajectory.
Macneil, in a seminal article and subsequent work,98 has further developed the study of rela-
tional contracts, sharpened its definition, and expanded its scope, conceptualization, and discipli-
nary portfolio. First, Macneil went beyond Macaulay by introducing network-patterned multi-
party settings that later became a primary case of application of relational contracts, especially
spurred by the economic sociology of networks represented, for example, by Powell.99 Second,
he integrated “relational” contracts into an abstract typology of phases of contract law’s develop-
ment, ranging from classical via neo-classical to relational contract law.100 The features Macneil
understands as distinctive for relational contracting become clear in this confrontation: Classical
contract law governs discrete “spot” transactions and focuses on locking parties’ consensus at a
given time into a perpetual state (“presentiation”), abstracting from surrounding factors, uncer-
tainties, and externalities. Neo-classical contract law overcomes some of the rigors of its prede-
cessor by situating contract formation in time, including provisions that govern adjustments,
through indexes as external references, good faith or renegotiation, or disputes clauses.
Ultimately, however, neo-classical contract law continues to see the formalized consensus as
the anchoring point of a transaction. The third “system” is what Macneil refers to as “relational
contract law.” Such contracts feature an organizational dimension that distinguishes it from an
exchange relation.101 They are constitutive of a “minisociety”102 and thus require rules to
95Coase, supra note 73.
96Macaulay, supra note 94.
97Id.
98Ian Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). As scholarship under the label of “relational”
contracting grew, Macneil himself grouped his work under the headings of a “new social contract” and later “essential contract
theory.” See IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian
Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340 (1983); Ian Macneil, Contracting Worlds and
Essential Contract Theory, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 431 (2000).
99Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy—Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
295 (1990).
100For a discussion, compare Jaakko Salminen, Towards a Genealogy and Typology of Governance Through Contract Beyond
Privity, 16 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 25 (2020) (comparing Macneil, Williamson, and conceptualizations around global value chains
[GVCs]).
101Drawing on these characteristics, see THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRACT: FROM EXCHANGE TO LONG-TERM NETWORK
COOPERATION IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2013).
102Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 901 (1978).
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harmonize conflict between the more discrete and long-term behavior in order to preserve the
relation against threats of opportunism. Accordingly, without vanishing altogether, the “original
consent” cannot stand unquestioned as the ultimate reference, but will need to be balanced with
competing goals of safeguarding, coordination, and adaptation. In short, “relational” contracts
pursue no single purpose, but become flexible multi-purpose vehicles.103
Methodologically, Macneil broadened the interdisciplinary scope of the study of “relational”
contracts by including economic, behavioral, and historical elements, thereby allowing for an eas-
ier reception within nascent institutional economic literature, especially in the work of Oliver E.
Williamson. Williamson,104 along the lines of Coase’s introduction of transaction costs, drew on
Macneil’s typology to identify the most suitable governance structure. In this, his analysis aims at
curbing the specific vulnerability of long-term relations by addressing three causes. The stability of
a long-term, relational contract hinges on the degree of asset specificity or relation-specific invest-
ment—forming part of “sunk costs”—, the degree of uncertainty between parties, and the fre-
quency of individual interaction and transaction within the broader frame that is the
relational contract.
II. Developing “Relational” Contract Law and the Politics of Method: The Case of UK and US
Common Law
Relational contracting has inspired a broad interdisciplinary legal literature on specific contractual
arrangements, normative regimes, and industry studies. While the scholarly debate outside of law
—for example in management, sociology of networks, institutional economics, critical theory, and
anthropology—is genuinely global, the legal debate is mostly global in its analytical streams—such
as on concepts of “contract governance”105—yet fragmented along boundaries between jurisdic-
tions or at least legal systems in its doctrinal processing. Because models and knowledge from
other disciplines cannot simply be “applied” doctrinally, but necessarily undergo a process of
translation,106 patterns of reception of “relational” contracting allow some cautious remarks on
the inclination of a legal order towards interdisciplinary legal work generally speaking, and on
the disciplines that find most voice within doctrinal scholarship. Even if it is intuitive and widely
accepted that—unlike in the formal, classical model of contract—"non-contractual” elements play
an important part of the story, it remains to be seen how they should be identified for the purpose
of legal analysis, and even more so, how law might contribute to strengthen those complementary
elements. These questions cannot be solved doctrinally by means of legal systematization alone,
but are a genuine field of interdisciplinary inquiry. Though for long, the discussion centered
around the question of the influence of “economics” versus “sociology,” the latter finding support
and being promulgated in socio-legal studies, today’s analysis needs to be attentive to inner dis-
ciplinary debates. For legal reception, some of the most salient recent debates in economics—neo-
classical versus behavioral,107 or in sociology— constructivist versus positivist—suggest very dif-
ferent understandings of law and its regulatory function.
“Relational contracting” naturally presents itself as a focal point of research for numerous dis-
ciplines. It shifts the vantage point of analysis from contracting parties with a preconfigured set of
preferences to the emerging social relation. Cautious to avoid a simplifying understanding of an
“efficient” design of complex relations, it highlights the social mechanisms that reinforce or jeop-
ardize cooperation in long-term interactions. Just like the Böckenförde dilemma has observed with
103Mika Viljanen, Actor-Network Theory Contract Theory, 16 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 74 (2020).
104WILLIAMSON, supra note 72.
105CONTRACT GOVERNANCE: DIMENSIONS IN LAW AND INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2015).
106See Gunther Teubner, Rechtswissenschaft und-praxis im Kontext der Sozialtheorie, in RECHT UND SOZIALTHEORIE:
INTERDISZIPLINÄRES DENKEN IN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT UND—PRAXIS 145 (Stefan Grundmann & Jan Thiessen eds., 2014).
107See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 93 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2007); Richard A.
Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803 (2007).
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regard to the liberal secularized state, contract also—and most specifically complex contracts and
private ordering—“lives by prerequisites which it cannot guarantee itself.”108
Because bothUSandUKCommonLawadhere toan ideal of “completeness”of contracts, treating
a social relation, not individual parties’will, as a unit of analysis was a far-reaching step to make. 109
The doctrinal reaction to the discovery of “relational” contracts was to equate relational contracts
with “incomplete” contracts that suggest a role of the state in regulating or “completing” such con-
tracts.110 This task strongly alludes to one’s normative presuppositions and thus takes different
directions depending on whether, for example, “efficiency,” “autonomy,” or “distributive justice”
form the goal of regulation, and depending on the status of bottom-up norm creation, for example,
through social groups,111 business communities, or trading partners.112 Macaulay, for instance,
holds that private parties develop fully-fledged, complex normative regimes that make use of the
parties’ proximity and expertise to guarantee for a constant adjustability. For him, such “private
government”113 neither can nor should be easily influenced, let alone replaced, by state interven-
tion—an idea that has lost much of its innocence in later years.114
Having debuted in socio-legal “law in action” fromWisconsin, “relational contracting” hasmade
its way through social norms theory and institutional and behavioral economics to the present day
where three diverging impulses seem to reign. One is an empirical micro-modelling approach that
tests the hypothesis of behavioral and institutional economic models on the basis of simplified con-
cepts of contract.115 Main fields of application are to date specialized fields, such as consumer, con-
tract, and credit law. The second ismore closely linked to sociological theories of networks and social
systems, and takes a critical distance towards an agency-driven legal model.116 Finally, a third
model is barely a model of “relational” contracting properly speaking, but rather a movement that
counters the very project of embedding contract and commenced with Charles Fried’s “Contract as
Promise.”117
III. From “Relational Contracts” to “Networks”: German Contract Law and the Criticality of
Sociological Jurisprudence
German contract law has never developed a thick notion of a “relational contract” and has main-
tained reservations against the concept, both among doctrinal118 and socio-legal scholars.119 These
108Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation, in STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT,
FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR STAATSTHEORIE UND ZUM VERFASSUNGSRECHT 41–64 (1976).
109See Jay M. Feinman, The Reception of Ian Macneil’s Work on Contract in the USA, in THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF
CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 59 (David Campbell & Ian Macneil eds., 2001); Peter Vincent-Jones, The
Reception of Ian Macneil’s Work on Contract in the UK, in THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF
IAN MACNEIL 67 (David Campbell & Ian Macneil eds., 2001); David Campbell & Hugh Collins, Discovering the Implicit
Dimensions of Contracts, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT 25 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003).
110C.f. Scott, supra note 93.
111See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
112See, e.g.,Matthew Jennejohn,ThePrivateOrder of InnovationNetworks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281 (2016); Ronald J. Gilson et al.,
Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice andDoctrine, 110COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010).
113Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 445 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986).
114ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT
IT) (2017).
115For an overview, see Zev Eigen, Empirical Studies of Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 291 (2012); Russell Korobkin,
Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, U. ILL. L. REV. 1033 (2002).
116Hugh Collins, Networks and Comparative Sociological Jurisprudence, in SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ. FESTSCHRIFT F.
GUNTHER TEUBNER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 249 (Gralf-Peter Calliess et al. eds., 2009).
117FRIED, supra note 60. For an overview of recent US scholarship in the field, see Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and Theory:
Three Views of the Cathedral, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2077 (2014); Herrine, supra note 11.
118For an overview, compare II MICHAEL MARTINEK, STAUDINGER COMMENTARY § 662, ¶¶ 68–88 (14th ed. 2006); WALTER
DORALT, LANGZEITVERTRÄGE (2018).
119Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 399 (2006).
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reservations had two main origins. In part, they were linked to peculiar features of German
contract law, which, going back to organicist Germanic theories such as those of Otto von
Gierke,120 echoes a “relational” dimension already in its key concept of Schuldverhältnis
(obligation).121 Interestingly, reference to Gierke was made in the US specifically by realists
going back to Roscoe Pound122 in order to oppose the then-flourishing reception of the
Continental European will theory, and as part of a broader movement of restoration of US
contract law.123 It has therefore been argued that “relational” contract law conceptualizes
adjustments that are necessary predominantly under the Common Law.124 It contributed
to this impression that the German reception focused on the potential need for a new “con-
tract type” of Dauerschuldverhältnis (long-term contractual relation) instead of fleshing out
relational elements in existing “contract types.”125 Put this way, existing leverage through gen-
eral clauses, third party beneficiaries, or “piercing the veil” was overlooked in its potential to
accommodate complex networked patterns.126 The second reason for skepticism in the
German debate arose from a critique of an all-too-easy construction of social embeddedness
as stable and holistic that was suggested by the social theory underlying “relational” con-
tracting and its interdisciplinary inspirations.127 The underlying, and at times outspoken,
debate128 centers around methodologies of delimitating the social context to a contract
and is accordingly particularly illustrative for the present context. The conceptual move of
“embedding” contract in society will differ in scale and manner depending on which social
science discipline prevails in informing legal analysis. Both welfare and institutional econom-
ics emphasize an efficient design between parties, while effects on third parties that result from
the non-irritability and closure of multilayered networks are investigated by social theories
that take complexity as a starting point. Systems Theory129 in particular here offers its critical
gist by shedding light on the relation between business networks and their social environ-
ment.130 Unlike in an organization, networks lack centralized institutions and procedures
of observing and reflecting their environmental effects. Law’s ability to perceive and effec-
tively curtail such effects therefore hinges upon selecting interdisciplinary references beyond
the micro-level.131
120See GIERKE, supra note 75.
121Jürgen Oechsler, Wille und Vertrauen im privaten Austauschvertrag, 60 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 91, 93 (1996).
122Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 30 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1917); ROSCOE POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921).
123POUND, supra note 122, at 114–17.
124Oechsler, supra note 121, at 93 (“late reimport” into German law). For a synoptical comparison of Common and Civil
Law systems, compare THOMAS LUNDMARK, CHARTING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN COMMON AND CIVIL LAW (2012).
125DER KOMPLEXE LANGZEITVERTRAG: STRUKTUREN UND INTERNATIONAL SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT (Fritz Niklisch ed.,
1986).
126SeeGUNTHER TEUBNER, NETZWERK ALS VERTRAGSVERBUND: VIRTUELLE UNTERNEHMEN, FRANCHISING, JUST-IN-TIME, IN
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHER UND JURISTISCHER SICHT (2004).
127See Teubner, supra note 119.
128Id.; Oliver Gerstenberg, Justification (and Justifiability) of Private Law in a Polycontextural World, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD.
419 (2000); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877 (2000); David
Campbell, The Limits of Concept Formation in Legal Science, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 439 (2000).
129Niklas Luhmann, Temporalization of Complexity, in SOCIOCYBERNETICS 95 (Johannes van der Zouwen & R. Felix Geyer
eds., 1978).
130See Gunther Teubner, From “Economic Constitution I, II” to the “Self-justifying Law of Constitutional Law”: On the criti-
cality of Rudolf Wiethölter’s Critical Systems Theory, ANCILLIA IURIS 1 (2020); Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Ironie der Autonomie:
Die Rechtswissenschaft im Pakt mit der ökonomischen Macht, 47 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 414 (2014).
131KLAAS HENDRIK ELLER, RECHTSVERFASSUNG GLOBALER PRODUKTION (forthcoming, 2020).
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D. Outlook: Path Dependencies of “Contract and Society” in Transnational Contract
Governance
The methodological stakes are even higher when shifting to the transnational level. Contract is a
pivotal trope of transnational ordering across various fields of social interaction.132 Contract here
becomes immersed in the fault lines of globalization, that is, of enhanced self-referentiality of
social systems unfolding against the backdrop of a hierarchical global political economy.133
Because recourse to domestic democratic legitimation is cut off for the most part, contract theories
need to come to grips with the role of the political. The very question of seeing the transnational
realm and its power imbalances and more remote interconnectedness as a novel challenge to con-
tract law depends on theoretical presuppositions that create path dependencies for debates within
national jurisdictions. The phenomena of interest here cover the emergence of a fully-fledged ana-
tional law of commercial contracts—“new lex mercatoria”—as well as, more generally, contracts
as a governance mechanism and backbone of transnational social institutions of various types,
enabled through the transnational reach of private autonomy.134 The latter is exemplified, for
example, by cross-boundary commercial and investment contracts, but also by the role of contract
in transnational “private” ordering in fields as diversified as financial markets, sports, digital com-
munication, or copyright. Here, contracting realities become disembedded from background
justice provided for by nation states—irrespective of the claim that “private autonomy” might
conceptually be granted only within a given legal order.135 As soon as private law can no longer
rely on a well-curated division of labor with a public regulatory framework to bridge it with con-
cerns of common interest, a crucial element in formalist and neo-formalist contract theories falls
apart and thereby shifts attention to the inner-contractual mechanisms of justice. While in the EU,
political pluralism can still—hypothetically—be processed by a democratically enacted contract
law,136 such stable political references become ultimately fictitious in the transnational realm. In
other words, contracts form miniature transnational legal orders; they build communities and
ultimately society at large—a task that is not mastered en passant by enabling and restricting indi-
vidual transactions—but requires an attention to broader societal effects. The role of contract in
animating global value chains,137 for instance, illustrates how contract becomes an arena for mat-
ters of distribution, participation, and equality in the global realm138—a role that reaches far
beyond providing for an efficient design of buyer-seller relationships. This has deep methodologi-
cal implications for contract law theories.
Scholarship on “relational” contracting has introduced a thinking about contracts as a tool for
social, not merely interpersonal, ordering. Even though much more anonymous than in
Macaulay’s local study of Wisconsin businesses, global trade relations rely on a comparable
multi-layered web of norms encompassing custom, social norms—such as reputation and
trust—and law.139 However, the dominant approaches in the Common Law debate, rooted in wel-
fare and institutional economics, appear increasingly problematic when transposed to the trans-
national level. In essence, they seek to guide legislators in the regulation of business contracts by
132See ZUMBANSEN, supra note 4.
133Klaas Hendrik Eller, Transnational Contract Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Peer Zumbansen
ed., forthcoming 2020). For conceptualizations of “transnational law,” see generally GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER
ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 27–152 (2010);
Roger Cotterell, What is Transnational Law?, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 500 (2012).
134Horatia Muir Watt, Party Autonomy in Global Context: An International Lawyer’s Take on the Political Economy of a
Self-Constituting Regime, in COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW, supra note 2, at 512.
135HEIN KÖTZ, VERTRAGSRECHT ¶ 22 (2d ed. 2012) (“Vertragsfreiheit gilt freilich nur im Rahmen der Rechtsordnung. ”).
136For such a call, compare Martijn W. Hesselink, Democratic Contract Law, 11 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 81 (2015).
137See Ponte & Sturgeon, supra note 88; Lee & Gereffi, supra note 88.
138See Eller, supra note 86; Ioannis Kampourakis, Empiricism, Constructivism, and Grand Theory in Sociological Approaches
to Law: The Case of Transnational Private Regulation, in this issue.
139THOMAS DIETZ, INSTITUTIONEN UND GLOBALISIERUNG (2010).
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curtailing contract law to the maximization of parties’ contractual surplus from transactions, while
refraining from any other goal.140 Besides the absence of a central legislator beyond the state, what
is more problematic is the resulting lack of any embedding institution geared towards mediating a
business rationale with public interests. The transnational character forms a blind spot in theories
of “relational” contracting, appearing as a proxy for the general complexity of such contract
regimes. This can be read as a direct outgrowth of the conceptual architecture of relational con-
tract theory and has widely inhibited its influence in the field of transnational contract law. The
more broadly received projects in transnational law perform an inward turn to contract law by
fusing it with social theory to reflect upon its broader and conflicted social function. Especially
promising is the theme of an inner “constitutionalization” of private law regimes, which was
probed distinctively in Germany at the national level, in the interplay between private law and
fundamental rights. From this perspective, theories of “societal constitutionalism”141 stand in
direct lineage to a specific configuration of socio-legal research at the domestic level.
E. Conclusions
Across jurisdictions, the drive to account for the non-contractual elements and extra-contractual
effects of contract law has been a leitmotif of contract law’s development since at least the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. This Article has examined the relation between normative and
social science approaches, notably rooted in economics, economic sociology, and social theory
in the genealogy of contract law. Contrasting the UK and US Common Law of contracts with
developments under German law, it has been shown that the disciplinary framing underlying
the push towards more societally contextualized conceptions of contract differs considerably.
One explanation can be seen in the rather continuous reception of legal realism, certainly in
the US, and to a lesser extent also in the UK. This has paved the way for broad interdisciplinary
perspectives on contract law, ranging from classical socio-legal, empirical work, via economics,
sociology, and critical theory, to today’s landscape, where essentially instrumental and ideal-
normative theories compete. In Germany, however, the realist heritage was less powerful, partly
because of a widespread reluctance to blur a rule-based model of law in the post-war era. By con-
sequence, the transformations of contract law were processed from within legal discourse and
foremost in their effects on private autonomy as conceptualized, for example, in German idealism,
discourse theory, and critical theory. Similarly, the “constitutionalization” of contract law—even
though championed as fostering private law’s reflexivity of its social effects—has not in its core
promoted a socio-legal or interdisciplinary legal discourse.
These findings can be backed by a case study on the discovery and conceptualization of
“relational,” in other words long-term and often multi-party, contracting. A veritable product
of interdisciplinary contributions,142 “relational” contract has become a prominent concept in
US and UK Common Law and inspired a contract law taxonomy going from classical, via
neo-classical, to relational contract law.143 The German legal order, in turn, had an easier task
in conceptualizing such contractual regimes, partly on the basis of doctrines originating in the
Germanicist tradition and echoing the values of trust and expectation. Still, the German debate
was also divided about which disciplines—and more importantly— which underlying theories of
society to turn to in order to inform law about the “reality” of complex business transactions. The
resulting picture of comparative socio-legal analysis of the changing paradigms of contract is not
limited to retracing past legal developments. It also proves profitable when turning to the role of
140C.f. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 15, at 544.
141GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (2012); Marc
Amstutz et al., Civil Society Constitutionalism: The Power of Contract Law, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 235 (2007).
142Grundmann, supra note 89.
143Macneil, supra note 102.
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contract in transnational governance. Contract is the central building-block for many develop-
ments in the transnational legal realm, and our ability to conceptualize it hinges strongly upon
our preconceptions rooted in domestic theories of contract law. The transnational, however, does
mark a different terrain in its political, economic, and social structure, and thus for most contract
theories, requires conceptual adjustment. In critically following such attempts, being able to
identify path dependencies to domestic discourses seems particularly valuable.
Cite this article: Eller KH (2020). Comparative Genealogies of “Contract and Society”. German Law Journal 21, 1393–1410.
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Abstract
Sociological approaches to law in both Germany and the UK have been characterized by internal divisions
and divergent methodologies and aspirations. While, in the UK, empirical socio-legal studies have been a
prominent way of studying how law shapes and is shaped by social institutions, in Germany, the “grand
theory” of system-theoretical approaches to law has had a lasting impact. In this Article, I discuss the
epistemological contrast between these two sociological approaches to law by focusing on how they address
transnational private regulation. Empirical socio-legal studies share an epistemic commitment to an
objective and knowable social reality, and they tend to see human actors as the motors of history.
Thus they focus on the inter-relational dynamics within Global Value Chains (GVCs), searching for
“what works” in transnational private regulation. On the contrary, systems-theory oriented sociological
jurisprudence views social reality as constructed and fragmented into the epistemes of different social
systems. GVCs are understood as self-referential normative orders, in which the question of agency
and human actors is secondary—the emphasis is on communications and anonymous forces of ordering.
Attempting to inspect the possibilities for synthesis, I ask how “big” we can and should think in law and
society. I thus attempt to outline an approach that starts from the materiality of social structures to inves-
tigate processes beyond individual agency and to uncover elements of normative reconstruction of the
particular area of social activity.
Keywords: Empirical socio-legal studies; constructivism; systems theory; private regulation; transnational law
A. Introduction
The workshop that inspired this Article set out to trace the convergences and divergences
between socio-legal studies in Germany and the UK. My contribution relates to internal debates
on the nature and purpose of socio-legal studies broadly understood—or, differently—of “socio-
logical approaches to law.”1 Such debates have taken place with different intensity and different
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Kampourakis has been a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Edmond J Safra for Ethics at Tel Aviv University and a Postdoctoral
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Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law (SAIFAC).
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distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1For the purposes of this contribution, I follow the functional definition provided by Hendry et al., in Socio-Legal Studies in
Germany and the UK: Theory and Methods in this issue, according to which socio-legal studies are best defined as “opposi-
tional” to doctrinal legal approaches. In that sense, socio-legal studies become synonymous with—the elsewhere broader
—“sociological approaches to law.”
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protagonists in both countries.2 Indeed, in both Germany and the UK, approaches that claim
to study law in light of how it intervenes in social reality have diverged over their prioritized
methodologies—that of “empirical research” or that of “grand theory.” As empirical research,
I understand the research that collects data for the investigation of a particular problem.3
Empirical socio-legal research then uses such data to study “the intersections of law and society
and the ways in which law and society are co-constitutive and co-existent.”4 As grand theory,
I understand the attempt to construct a systematic and encompassing theory of the studied rela-
tionship or phenomenon, in this case, how law and society interact and shape each other. For the
purposes of this Article, I consider both directions to make part of the socio-legal field, broadly
understood. A third direction that shares an affinity with the field of “law and society” but which
I will not discuss here is that of critical legal studies and theory.5
As I will show, the difference between empirical socio-legal research and grand theory-oriented
sociological jurisprudence is primarily a difference of epistemology, reflecting the divide
between empiricist and positivist aspirations in social sciences on the one hand, and postmodern
constructivism on the other hand. In Germany, system-theoretical approaches to law have been
an influential current of sociological jurisprudence. Iwill, therefore, discuss the attemptof legal auto-
poiesis and of its progeny, societal constitutionalism, to present a unifying theory of law and society
without relying on the provision of raw data from field research.6 Societal constitutionalism builds
on the epistemological and analytical premises of systems theory and legal autopoiesis. However,
contrary to the latter, it also suggests a normative framework as an answer to the question of
how to constrain the expansionary and potentially destructive dynamics of social systems. The reli-
ance on the same constructivist assumptions as systems theory and the engagement with normative
thinking makes societal constitutionalism a particularly strong representation of grand theory in
contemporary sociological jurisprudence and, thus, a good instance for the comparativework Iwant
to undertake. In the UK, empirical socio-legal research has arguably been a more prominent way to
study the law and society nexus. In line with the comparative aspirations of this Special Issue, I will
then discuss the underlying methodological and epistemological assumptions of empirical
approaches to law. I will draw the comparison between these two different sociological approaches
to lawby focusing onhow they address one increasingly important aspect of legal and social ordering
under conditions of globalization, that of transnational private regulation. Unavoidably, the con-
clusions I draw from this comparative endeavor cannot do absolute justice to the richness of nuances
that exist within the paradigms of empirical socio-legal studies or system-theoretical approaches to
law. Yet, the discussion of their underlying epistemologies and how these epistemologies inevitably
2See Stefan Machura, Milestones and Directions: Socio-Legal Studies in Germany and the United Kingdom, in this issue;
Alfons Bora, Sociology of Law in Germany: Reflection and Practice, 43 J.L. & SOC‘Y 619 (2016); Max Travers, Sociology of
Law in Britain, AM. SOCIOLOGIST 26 (2001).
3 LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 3–4 (2014).
4MARGARET DAVIES, DOING CRITICAL SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 88 (Naomi Creutzfeldt et al. eds., 2020).
5Critical legal approaches occasionally share the sociological, non-doctrinal viewpoint of socio-legal studies. Without the
holistic aspirations of “grand theory,” critical legal studies approach the law-society nexus through an abstract inquiry into the
significance of legal structures or through a critical rationalization and explication of doctrinal choices. See COSTAS DOUZINAS
& ADAM GEAREY, CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JUSTICE (2005). For the critique that recent
critical legal theory has tended to be ethical, rather than socio-historical in its form, see Alan Norrie, From Critical to
Socio-Legal Studies: Three Dialectics in Search of a Subject, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 85 (2000). “Law and Economics” also shares
the external perspective to the study of the law. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 3 (2001). However,
Law and Economics’ distinct ambitions and historical development justify not considering it part of the “law and society”
movement. As such, I do not discuss it here. See also John J. Donohue, III, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken,
22 L. & SOC. REV. 903 (1988).
6For an introduction to systems theory, see NIKLAS LUHMANN, INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS THEORY (2012) [hereinafter
LUHMANN, INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS]. For legal autopoiesis, see NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (2004)
[hereinafter LUHMANN, LAW]. For societal constitutionalism, see generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (2012).
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structure distinct projects captures an essential aspect of the debates about the nature and purpose of
sociological approaches to law. It also provides an insight into the divergent development of law and
society in the UK and Germany.
The case study that Iuse touncover thedifferent startingpoints, aspirations, and results of empiri-
cal socio-legal research and system-theoretical analysis is that of transnational private regulation.
Private regulation I understand as the “voluntary, private, non-state industry and cross-industry
codes that address labor practices, environmental performance, and human rights policies.”7 As
a form of legal pluralism, private regulation poses a challenge to legal centralism and state sover-
eignty, making doctrinal approaches to law ill-suited to capture its significance. Considering that
private regulation does not depend on the coercive power of the state apparatus and, in that sense,
is not a product of a national legal order, it could be readily dismissed as a non-legal phenomenon.8
Yet, private regulation produces binding and otherwise normative effects on the ground for a plu-
rality of actors in global supply chains. The non-doctrinal, “beyond the books” perspective of socio-
logical approaches to law is sensitive to this normativity that is not linked to state law.
Empirical socio-legal studies approach transnational private regulation through the specificities
of each particular context: Which actors are involved; how it is applied in practice; whether it has
an impact, and, if so, what the reasons behind its success are. Although a general conclusion about
all empirical socio-legal work in the field of transnational private regulation is beyond the aspira-
tions of this Article, the four research works that I analyze point to the conclusion that an empha-
sis on “context” and, eventually, a level of particularism, is a shared and unifying theme of this
strand of research. Underlying this type of sociological approach is an epistemic commitment to
an objective and knowable social reality and, to a certain extent, a methodological individualism,9
which seeks to explain social phenomena in terms of facts about individuals.
In line with systems theory, societal constitutionalism approaches transnational private
regulation the opposite way: Fitting concrete instances into its bigger theoretical framework.
Systems theory posits that society is fragmented into multiple systems of communication that do
not interact directly with one another. Instead, each system translates “irritations”10 from its envi-
ronment into its own code communication.As a result, change cannot be imposed upon systems but
rather stems from “within” each social system.11 Societal constitutionalism adds a normative dimen-
sion to this descriptive framework by suggesting that social systems need to develop forms of
self-limitation and internal democratization.12 This “constitutionalization” of social systems is nec-
essary in a world where dangers for the social fabric do not emanate solely from political power but
7David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 49 BUS.& SOC‘Y 68, 68 (2010).
8On the debate on voluntary/binding character of instances of transnational private regulation, see Florence Palpacuer,
Voluntary Versus Binding Forms of Regulation in Global Production Networks: Exploring the “Paradoxes of Partnership,” in
THE EUROPEAN ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT (Geert de Neve & Rebecca Prentice eds., 2017); Radu Mares, Global
Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights and Law: An Interactive Regulatory Perspective on the Voluntary-Mandatory
Dichotomy, 1 TRANSNAT. LEGAL THEORY 221 (2010); John Gerard Ruggie, Multinationals as Global Institution: Power,
Authority and Relative Autonomy, 12 REG. & GOVERNANCE 317 (2018). According to Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina:
Legal Pluralism in the World-Society, in Global LAW WITHOUT A STATE 7 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1996):
[O]n this [legal centralist, doctrinal] viewpoint, any legal phenomenon in the world necessarily has to be “rooted”
in a national legal order; it needs at least a “minimal link” to national law. Lex mercatoriawill never develop into an
authentic legal order because it does not regulate an exclusive territory with coercive power.
9On the historical waves of methodological individualism, see JOSEPH HEATH, METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2020). For a defense, see Steven Lukes, Methodological Individualism Reconsidered, 19 THE BRITISH J. SOC. 119
(1968). For a critique, see Roy Bhaskar, On the Possibility of Social Scientific Knowledge and the Limits of Naturalism, 8 J.
THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 1 (1978).
10LUHMANN, LAW supra note 6, at 258-259.
11GUNTHER TEUBNER, INTRODUCTION TO AUTOPOIETIC LAW 7–8 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
12TEUBNER, supra note 6, at 83-86, 88-89. See also Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17
L. & SOC‘Y REV. 239, 266-270. (1983).
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also from other systems, most prominently the economy.13 Transnational private regulation
appears as a fitting instantiation of this theoretical framework, as it represents attempts of economic
actors to self-limit, often in response to social pressures – to irritations from their environment.
Underlying this approach to understanding private regulation is, first, a constructivist epistemology
that views social reality as constructed and fragmented into the epistemes of different social systems.
Second is an anti-individualism that refuses to see human actors as the agents of social action and
points instead to constructs, the communications of which human actors express in their social
interactions.14
While these approaches initially appear irreconcilable and each has its own value as a distinct
project, I believe that there is also a margin for a middle ground, or, more ambitiously, for syn-
thesis. This emerges when considering whether there is a spectrum between an encompassing
theory of society and sectoral approaches into the specificities of particular social problems. In
other words, what are the degradations of thinking “big” in law and society? In that direction,
this Article attempts to draw the contours of an approach that focuses on the materiality of social
structures. This materiality can be empirically examined not only to provide context-specific
insights, but also to uncover elements of normative reconstruction of the particular area of social
activity. If frameworks that present themselves as merely “descriptive” do in fact convey implicit
normative presuppositions, then empirical research has an inherent potential for normative think-
ing that extends beyond institutional reforms. A synergetic approach would start inductively from
the empirical examination of the materiality of social structures to investigate and possibly to chal-
lenge processes that take place beyond individual agency.
In Section B, I show how empirical socio-legal studies and also legal autopoiesis and societal con-
stitutionalism share an external—as opposed to internal, in other words, doctrinal—perspective to
law, but differ in their epistemological bases. In Section C, I discuss in detail the response of socio-
legal studies and societal constitutionalism to the conundrumof transnational private regulation. In
particular, I focus on the role each approach attributes to agents and structures in Global Value
Chains (GVCs). In SectionD, I attempt to outline a role for “thinking big” in sociological approaches
to lawand to trace elements ofpossible convergencebetween thedifferent approaches. I conclude the
Article with a brief summary of the main points discussed and with a note on how thinking on syn-
ergies might develop further.
B. Empirical Socio-Legal Studies and Legal Autopoiesis: Converging Perspectives,
Diverging Epistemologies
Legal autopoiesis, the conceptual foundation of societal constitutionalism, and empirical
socio-legal studies both follow the “sociology of law” tradition of thinking about the law from
an “external,” observer’s perspective.15 Where “restricted legal theory”16 adopts a standpoint that
is internal to state-based law, aspiring to work out how law is or is meant to be interpreted by legal
practitioners, sociological theories of law deliberately distance themselves from the professional
viewpoint of the legal practitioner. The limitations of the internal perspective are captured by
David Schiff, according to whom “jurisprudence writers in general, have tended to show a lack
of concern for an analysis of the structure of society which accounts for the workings of the legal
13Science and technology or the media—including social media—are further social systems, the unfettered expansion of
which might be detrimental to the social fabric. See Teubner, supra note 6, at 1.
14For this core notion of systems theory, see NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY 6-13. (2012).
15Roger Cotterrell, The Sociological Concept of Law, 10 J.L. & SOC‘Y 241, 242–43 (1983).
16According to DOUZINAS & GEAREY, supra note 5, at 10–11, by focusing on the question “what is law ”, “restricted legal
theory” is bound to seek the characteristics that define the “essence” of the law, limiting the legal phenomenon to particular
institutions, practices, and actors.
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systems.”17 To address this shortcoming, sociological theories have attempted to answer broader
questions about the role of law in society, its relation to political and economic structures, or its
role in historical change and social transformation.18 In that direction, legal autopoiesis is not
interested in questions of jurisprudence for their interpretative value for doctrine or case law.
Rather, it uses them to distill a broader principle of social theory—the self-referentiality of the
law. This becomes instrumental in conceptualizing law as a social system wherein the “paradox”
of self-referentiality is not something to be resolved but is rather constitutive of the system and
structural in making it operational.19 Similarly, empirical socio-legal studies are not employing
empirical designs to evaluate the internal coherence of the legal doctrine. Instead, they seek to
test assumptions about the operations of the legal system and to study how the law affects or
is affected by various social institutions.20
Starting from such an external perspective and a sociological concept of law, empirical legal
research, for many a core element of socio-legal studies, attempts to use the methods of social
sciences and study law and legal practices in an objective light, as a set of observable facts.
According to Simon Deakin, this type of approach is based on the premise that data gathered
through empirical research is “capable of representing features of the social world which exist
independently of the process of inquiry which is being used to study them.”21 In other words,
empirical legal research is underpinned by the idea that, within a particular social context, there
can be objective knowledge that is not merely interpretative or hermeneutics.22 Such “truth” can
be attained, or at least approached, through the rules of good scientific practice. Admitting the
possibility of objective empirical knowledge, even with a role for intellectual construction, follows
the currents of logical empiricism and positivism in social sciences.23 Historically, the aspiration
behind the use of empirical methods has been to transform society through the use of knowledge:
Even in the absence of concrete predictions, the data gathered by social sciences provides a frame-
work of argumentation, dispelling speculative metaphysical doctrines.24
17David N. Schiff, Socio-Legal Theory: Social Structure and Law, 39 MOD. L. REV. 287, 289 (1976).
18DAVIES, supra note 4, at 88.
19Gunther Teubner,How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 727, 736 (1989).
20SeeDavidM. Trubek,Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 581 (1984) (“[L]aw
cannot be defined other than by the difference it makes in society, and empirical inquiry is necessary to determine what that
is.”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Uses and Abuses of Socio-Legal Studies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY
AND METHODS 43 (Naomi Creutzfeldt et al. eds., 2020):
[W]here legal scholars have focused on doctrinal developments and often argue for law reform, often without any
reference to empirical data : : : socio-legal scholars have been especially good at focusing on non-uniform impacts
of law (various forms of patterning by race, class, gender, and other characteristics), the contextual conditions that
may be necessary for legal policies to be effective.
21Simon Deakin, The Use of Quantitative Methods in Labour Law Research, 27 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 456, 458 (2018).
22Geoffrey Samuel, Does One Need an Understanding of Methodology in Law Before One Can Understand Methodology in
Comparative Law?, in METHODOLOGIES OF LEGAL RESEARCH 189 (Mark van Hoecke ed., 2011).
23See Filipe J. Souza, Meta-Theories in Research: Positivism, Postmodernism, and Critical Realism, in 16 ORGANIZATIONAL
CULTURE, BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS, AND INTERFIRM NETWORKS (ADVANCES IN BUSINESS MARKETING AND
PURCHASING (Arch G. Woodside ed., 2010) (describing the explicit case for the “Empirical Legal Studies” movement in
the U.S., and citing Elizabeth Chambliss, When Do Facts Persuade - Some Thoughts on the Market for Empirical Legal
Studies, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 32 (2008)).
24See OTTO NEURATH ET AL. eds., INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE 46 (1944). The role of scientific
progress and expertise was also an important aspect of legal realism, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110
HARV. L. REV. 991, 1001 (1997 [1897]), according to whom “the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
economics. ” Legal realism has been invested in highlighting the distance between “law in the books” and “law in action,” an
effort that can only be achieved through empirical study of social facts pertaining to legal endeavors; see also Hanoch Dagan,
The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607 (2007). For a reappreciation of positivism’s progressive and even
socialist angle before its fall into dismay amongst critical thinkers, see John O’Neill, In Partial Praise of a Positivist: The
Work of Otto Neurath, 074 RADICAL PHIL. (1995). Similarly, yet denouncing the label of “positivism,” Trubek, supra note
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On the contrary, legal autopoiesis, and by extension, societal constitutionalism, relies on a
postmodern, constructivist social epistemology, according to which there is no “reality” to be dis-
covered. Instead, “reality” is constructed. In the case of law, it is law itself as an epistemic subject
that constructs its own reality.25 Systems theory posits that society is differentiated into distinct
social systems, each with its own code of communication and, inevitably, its own episteme. In fact,
the loss of a “unifying mode of cognition”26 is a fundamental attribute of modern society. As each
social system constructs its own reality, law becomes a “self-validating discourse : : : largely
impervious to serious challenge from other knowledge fields.”27 This perspective leads to a foun-
dational clash with the positivist ontological underpinnings of empirical socio-legal studies and
their invocation of the authority of controlled scientific observation as a privileged access to real-
ity. As Gunther Teubner emphasizes, following Niklas Luhmann, “science does not discover any
outside facts; it produces facts.”28 Similarly, law is self-referential and produces its own distinc-
tions and categories. Most characteristically, law should not be understood as a product of par-
ticular individuals’ actions—including, legislators and judges. Instead, it is law itself as a
communicative process that “produces” human actors as its semantic artifacts.29
The epistemological divide between socio-legal studies and societal constitutionalism corre-
sponds to the epistemological and ontological divide between positivism, empiricism, and ration-
alism on the one hand, and constructivism on the other hand.30 As I will show in the following
section, the empirical dimension and largely positivist ontology of empirical socio-legal studies
result in a study of the inter-relational dynamics of the actors within GVCs, constituting an effort
to uncover “what works” in transnational labor law. On the contrary, societal constitutionalism
starts from an understanding of GVCs as self-referential normative orders in which the question
of agency and particular actors is secondary. Instead, the normative dimension of societal con-
stitutionalism places the emphasis on the structures and mechanisms that may generate self-regu-
latory dynamics within social systems, such as human rights or the corporate codes of lead firms.31
C. Case Study: Agency and Structure in Global Value Chains
The fact that multiple systems of ordering, not necessarily linked to the legitimate state legal order,
might co-exist in the same place at any one time has since long been recognized and theorized by
20, at 580, according to whom those that use empirical methods in legal scholarship are driven by practical concerns, as
opposed to an epistemological commitment to positivism or a belief in determinism—this is a commitment to “pragmatism.”
At the same time, empiricism has also roots in Karl Popper’s “rationalism” and the idea that beliefs are rationally grounded
only if they can pass a “crucial experiment test”—an approach that led to the dismissal of Utopian social philosophy. See KARL
R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (2013).
25Teubner, supra note 19 at 730.
26Id. at 738.
27Roger B.M. Cotterrell, Law and Sociology: Notes on the Constitution and Confrontations of Disciplines, 13 J.L. & SOC‘Y 9,
15 (1986).
28See Teubner, supra note 19, at 743 (attacking “law and society“ approaches—meaning, here, empirical socio-legal
approaches—as “the celebrated controlled experiment is not what it pretends to be, a test of an internal theory against external
reality, but is a mere internal coherence test comparing two constructs that are produced according to different procedural
requirements: The logic of theoretical reasoning and the logic of the laboratory”). According to NIKLAS LUHMANN,
WISSENSCHAFT 2, 9 (1988), “science produces a construction of the world which is validated by its distinctions and not
by the world as such. Thus, science cannot claim the authority to discover the only and the correct access to the real world
and to communicate this to others.” According to LUHMANN, supra note 14, at 16, “the coincidence of empirical knowledge
and reality cannot be empirically determined, and from an epistemological point of view must accordingly be treated as
accidental.”
29Teubner, supra note 19, at 741.
30For a brief impression of this recurrent debate, see how Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School, in his 1937 article The
Latest Attack on Metaphysics, attacks Vienna Circle’s neo-positivism for political quietism and for furnishing unwitting as-
sistance to fascism, MAX HORKHEIMER, CRITICAL THEORY: SELECTED ESSAYS (1972).
31See generally TEUBNER, supra note 6.
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socio-legal research.32 Private regulation is one instance of this type of legal pluralism. The differ-
ent ways it has been probed and studied within the socio-legal field flesh out how the different
epistemological and methodological assumptions of empirical socio-legal studies and grand-
theory sociological jurisprudence lead to divergent ways of conceptualizing the phenomenon
and to distinct normative projects.
In a global economy characterized by an organizational system of vertical disintegration,
fragmented ownership, and dispersed production, lead firms have managed to keep manufactur-
ing-related concerns outside the legal boundaries of the firm.33 However, as an appeal to consum-
ers or as a result of social pressures often following a moment of crisis,34 lead firms have, in many
cases, instituted private regulatory regimes that aspire to improve working conditions within sup-
ply chains. Currently, the labor aspect of transnational private regulation and the question of lead
firm accountability for human rights violations in global supply chains is becoming a growing
concern in both studied countries. In Germany, the Jabir v KIK case of 2019 highlighted that
it might be possible to establish lead firm liability based on obligations assumed by the firm
and incorporated in corporate codes that make part of supply chain agreements.35 Similarly,
in the UK, the 2019 Lungowe and Ors. v Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines
Plc case underscored that a UK parent company could arguably owe a duty of care to the people
affected by its subsidiary’s operations.36
Yet, the normativity and the social reality of transnational private regulation pose a challenge
to traditional conceptions of law that have as their starting point legal centralism and state sov-
ereignty.37 This makes the external perspective of sociological approaches to law uniquely suited
to examine this phenomenon. Empirical socio-legal studies are often concerned with “what
works” in transnational private regulation—in other words, what can be evidenced as having
an effect. Drawing from the positivist ontology of social sciences and from a methodological
individualism that unpacks collective phenomena through the agency of individual actors oper-
ating in particular contexts, empirical work concentrates on context, specific case studies, and
actors in the value chain. The caveats of inductive reasoning notwithstanding, the researched
case studies help to draw lessons of broader theoretical significance. For the purposes of this
Article, I summarize four such attempts to delve into the specificities of GVCs, to trace the
impact of corporate codes of conduct, and to discern how they interact with public regulation,
or what meaning they may acquire when used by local actors as leverage. In these cases, the
authors generally refrain from postulating a grand theoretical framework. Any attempts to
understand the structure of GVCs and the role of private regulation therein are deduced from
the data acquired through the research, the subjects of which are specific actors within the value
chain—for example, workers and unions.
32See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 869 (1988).
33Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 REV. INT‘L POL. ECON. 78 (2005).
34For example, the hybrid regulatory regime of the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh was
established following the collapse of the Rana Plaza in 2013 and the death of 1,134 people, most of them garment workers.
35See Landgericht Dortmund [LG] [Dortmund Regional Court], 7 O 95/15 (filed Mar. 13, 2015) (Ger.) (eventually rejected
on the basis that the statute of limitations had expired).
36See Lungowe and Ors. v. Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc [2017] [EWCA] (Civ) 1528 (holding that
a UK parent company could arguably owe a duty of care to the people affected by its subsidiaries’ operations, on the grounds of
the “high level of control and direction” that the parent company exercised over the subsidiary); Even though this case con-
cerns individuals affected by the operations of a subsidiary who are not employees of the subsidiary, it eventually follows
Chandler v. Cape Plc [2012] [EWCA] (Civ) 525, where the parent company was found to have assumed a duty of care towards
the employees of its subsidiary, who had been exposed to asbestos. This was a result of the parent company’s “state of knowl-
edge” about the factory in which these employees worked and “its superior knowledge about the nature and management of
asbestos risks” in relation to the operations of the subsidiary [78].
37Teubner, supra note 8, at 6–7.
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I. Empirical Studies
One example in this direction is the work of Tim Bartley and Niklas Egels-Zanden, who employ
qualitative research methods to interrogate the common hypothesis of the “decoupling” between
the symbolic CSR commitments of lead firms and concrete work practices.38 In particular, they
are interested in how local actors within the value chain use the leverage provided by CSR codes
to achieve improvements in working conditions. NGOs and especially trade unions use these
largely symbolic structures as resources and an opportunity to enroll other actors in order to
achieve local goals.39 One prominent example of such CSR leveraging is “brand boomerang”
campaigns, in which union activists facing repression from factory managers cooperate with
international allies to pressure lead buyer firms.40 Yet, the authors point out further avenues
taken by Indonesian unions in using CSR commitments to advance their causes. Unions appeal
to brands’ compliance staff to resolve grievances with factory managers or use the possibility to
do so as a form of pressure during negotiations. They also occasionally attempt to engage in
capacity-building and participate in standard-setting together with lead firms. In all these
instances, the addressee of the demand to promote workers’ rights is the lead firm of the value
chain, as opposed to the government.41 Considering the occasional and limited success of such
strategies, Bartley and Egels-Zanden suggest that, instead of complete decoupling, it is more
suitable to think of CSR and actual labor practices in terms of “contingent coupling.” The cou-
pling is contingent because it emerges out of highly contextual contention beyond universal-
izable recipes for success, and it only temporarily addresses structural, underlying problems,
with transformative gains being rare.42
Another example of empirical research in transnational private regulation that highlights
the importance of context is that of Greg Distelhorst and others in the electronics industry.43
Using quantitative analysis of factory audits and qualitative fieldwork to identify the institutional
38Tim Bartley & Niklas Egels-Zandén, Beyond Decoupling: Unions and the Leveraging of Corporate Social Responsibility in
Indonesia, 14 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 231, 233 (2016). For the hypothesis of decoupling, see John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan,
Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977); Luc Fransen, Multi-
Stakeholder Governance and Voluntary Programme Interactions: Legitimation Politics in the Institutional Design of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 10 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 163 (2012); Dima Jamali, MNCs and International Accountability
Standards Through an Institutional Lens: Evidence of Symbolic Conformity or Decoupling, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 617 (2010).
39See the notion of “principled opportunism” in Marxist theory, Robert Knox, Marxism, International Law, and Political
Strategy, 22 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 413, 433 (2009). See also Evan Schofer & Ann Hironaka, The Effects of World Society on
Environmental Protection Outcomes, 84 SOC. FORCES 25 (2005) (demonstrating how this dynamic is also examined in world
society theory).
40In a well-known case, independent unions at the Kukdong factory inMexico and BJ&B factory in the Dominican Republic
successfully gained collective bargaining rights after international campaigns pressured Nike to support freedom of associ-
ation, Bartley & Egels-Zandén, supra note 38, at 236. See also CÉSAR A. RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, NIKE’S LAW: THE ANTI-
SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, AND THE STRUGGLE OVER INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS IN
THE AMERICAS (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2009).
41On how this strategy increases “the very power of corporations that the campaigns aimed to denounce and circumscribe,
vesting lead firms with a new form of political authority based on private regulation schemes in global production networks,”
see Palpacuer, supra note 8, at 80.
42Empirical research has already shown that corporate codes can lead to improvements in outcome standards, while they
change little in process rights for workers and cannot comprehensively challenge existing commercial practices of exploitation,
see Stephanie Barrientos & Sally Smith, Do Workers Benefit From Ethical Trade? Assessing Codes of Labour Practice in Global
Production Systems, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 713 (2007). See also Richard M. Locke et al., Does Monitoring Improve Labor
Standards? Lessons from Nike, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (2007) (reviewing factory audits of working conditions in over
800 of Nike’s suppliers and found that monitoring had only limited results); DARA O’ROURKE, MONITORING THE MONITORS:
A CRITIQUE OF PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS’ LABOR MONITORING (2000) (employing ethnographic research, which included
observing monitors at work, to reveal the weaknesses of the monitoring system).
43Greg Distelhorst et al., Production Goes Global, Compliance Stays Local: Private Regulation in the Global Electronics
Industry, 9 REG. & GOV. 224.
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dimensions that complement private regulation, the authors suggest that the local institutional
context is the most significant predictor of private regulation being effective at improving labor
standards. Strong state regulatory institutions and a strong local civil society are crucial for mean-
ingful compliance, while they also enable synergies with private regulation that lead to higher
standards of labor rights protection.44 Specifically, the authors examined how Hewlett-Packard
(HP) monitors and facilitates the compliance of its suppliers with the voluntary Electronics
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) code that HP helped establish in 2004. While factory audits
reveal that suppliers are far from fully compliant,45 working conditions appear to have improved
as a result of HP’s engagement with suppliers.46 Yet, the rate of improvement and compliance with
social standards is best explained not by factory-level predictors, but rather by examining the local
institutional environment. In countries with weaker regulatory institutions, including developing
countries, the strength of civil society becomes a differentiating factor for the effectiveness of com-
pliance. For example, in Mexico, the mediation of a local NGO led to the creation of a relatively
successful collaborative dispute resolution institution that subsidized inefficient state institutions.
By contrast, in China, such civil society partners were not easily available, and unionization did
not sufficiently advance worker interests.47 As a result, compliance with the EICC was lower and
private regulation could not sufficiently complement lax state enforcement of labor laws. Overall,
Greg Distelhorst and others underscore that the local institutional context is vital for the success of
transnational private regulation, while private and public regulatory regimes should be thought of
as complements rather than rivals.
The study conducted by Andrew Crane and others on forced labor in domestic supply chains
in the UK offers another example of focusing on the institutional context to untangle the par-
ticular workings of GVCs.48 Shifting the spotlight from the developing world to forced labor in
developed countries, they draw attention to the role of labor market intermediaries. For exam-
ple, the construction and food industries make significant use of “temporary, casual, and other
forms of contingent labor, the supply of which is often outsourced to third-party labor provid-
ers.”49 While a key factor for the emergence of forced labor in GVCs is the price pressure exerted
by buyers from the Global North on manufacturers in the developing world, in supply chains of
the Global North the division of legal status and protections offered to workers depending on
their country of origin is critical. The contrast between domestic and global supply chains
becomes even more prominent in the discussion of remedies and solutions to such governance
gaps. While GVC scholarship emphasizes the potential of private regulation and explores the
possibilities for reconfiguring private law instruments along the value chain,50 domestic supply
chains bring to the foreground the state, regulatory enforcement, licensing, and policing. In a
sense, this is a response to another difference between global and domestic supply chains—their
level of complexity. As Crane and others point out, the “cult of complexity” that surrounds
global supply chains overlooks important aspects of simplicity within domestic supply chains.51
44On how private compliance efforts are layered upon traditional forms of regulation, see D.M. Trubek & L.G. Trubek, New
Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry or Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539 (2007). On the
question of designing CSR and governance mechanisms that effectively engage with local variations, see Luc Fransen, The
Embeddedness of Responsible Business Practice: Exploring the Interaction Between National-Institutional Environments and
Corporate Social Responsibility, 115 J. BUS. ETHICS 213 (2013).
45Distelhorst et al., supra note 43, 228 (“42 percent of audited facilities were non-compliant in wages and benefits.”).
46Id. at 228.
47Id. at 236 (explaining that low percentages of participation and underfunding are pointed out as reasons for this failure).
48Andrew Crane et al., Governance Gaps in Eradicating Forced Labor: From Global to Domestic Supply Chains, 13 REG. &
GOV. 86, 93 (2019).
49Id. at 93.
50See The IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, The Role of Law in Global Value Chains: A Research
Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT‘L L. 57 (2016).
51Crane et al., supra note 48, at 101.
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Critical in the suppression of forced labor in domestic supply chains then becomes the co-
ordination of already-existing hierarchy- and market-based initiatives designed to address labor
abuses, as well as regulation around immigration and other structural conditions that promote
vulnerability to exploitation.52 Eventually, this accentuates the importance of politics, as
opposed to capacity deficits.
Anthropological and ethnographic work within GVCs reinforces the idea that structures of
exploitation are contextual. This also supports the conclusion that the normativity of private regu-
lation needs to be addressed in its particular instantiations. Anna Tsing, in her study of supply
chain capitalism, draws attention to the fact that the cultural diversity of GVCs is a structural
element of the processes of exploitation that develop within the chain.53 In other words, according
to Tsing, supply chains vitalize performances of non-economic features of identity and neutralize
worker negotiation leverage to maximize exploitation beyond what would be expected from gen-
eral economic principles—for example, Christian service work at Wal-Mart, women from the
Global South with sewing skills learned at home, coding work as entrepreneurship for white
men holding on to independence, etc. As diversity becomes ingrained in the processes that make
GVCs operational, any comprehensive legal and political theory of supply chain capitalism would
have to take into account the “full tapestry” of gender, race, and national status through which
exploitation becomes possible.54 A theory of transnational labor rights and “decent work” can
only aspire to be normative through context, through the lived reality of intersecting structures
of exploitation. There can be no unifying theory of emancipation designed on paper; instead,
theory-building must start from the ground up.
II. Societal Constitutionalism
Does then this emphasis on context and particularity preclude the possibility of a grand theory
of supply chain capitalism? Societal constitutionalism shifts the focus from agents to structure,
conceptualizing context as an integral feature of its grand theory. The move to structure and
the core methodological challenge societal constitutionalism poses to empirical socio-legal
approaches does not consist of simply taking into consideration the aggregate dynamics arising
from the decentered use of private autonomy. That is something empirical approaches are atten-
tive to, as manifested in the examples above, such as the cumulative and strategic use of codes of
conduct in Bartley and Egels-Zanden. Rather, it consists of undermining the fundamental
assumption that individuals are the agents of social action and, eventually, the makers of history.
The system-theoretical underpinnings of societal constitutionalism draw attention to constructs,
primarily to self-organized systems of communication. In system-theoretical terms, humans can-
not be thought of as independent agents, beyond the confines of social systems; instead, they par-
take in multiple and overlapping systems of communication, the codes and functions of which
they express through their actions. As a result, the individual is not the basic unit of analysis.
She is a medium through which the workings of broader social systems become manifest.
This defines both how to understand society and how to envision social transformation. As
society is imagined, divided into multiple self-referential social systems, which remain functional
only by translating external complexity to their own code of communication, change and evolu-
tion can only happen in one way: System-internally.55 Social transformation is only possible
52Id. at 102.
53Anna Tsing, Supply Chains and the Human Condition, 21 RETHINKING MARXISM 148 (2009). See also Hannah Appel,
Race Makes Markets: Subcontracting in the Transnational Oil Industry, SOC. SCI. RES. COUNCIL (2018), https://items.ssrc.org/
race-capitalism/race-makes-markets-subcontracting-in-the-transnational-oil-industry/.
54Tsing, supra note 53, at 172.
55TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 1, 7–8.
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through the internal workings of social systems, as opposed to superimposition by external agents,
such as the state. Effective limitations on the destructive expansion of social systems, like the
economy, can only be the result of system-specific logic.56 In the context of the economy, this
is because of two main reasons. The first is that the necessary knowledge for inhibiting a cata-
strophic expansion of economic rationalities cannot be built from external observation points,
such as that of the state. There is no comprehensive, centralized knowledge that can capture,
let alone regulate, the hyper-complex processes of the global economy.57 A mundane manifesta-
tion of this lack of epistemic and enforcement capacity is the way transnational corporations man-
age to circumvent and avoid ex-ante regulations, such as taxation. The second reason is that if
politics is left to define the fundamental principles of other social systems, such as that of the
economy, there is a risk of de-differentiation of society and of slippage to totalitarianism in which
politics aspires to represent the whole of society.58
Therefore, the solutions to the conundrums of decent work, sustainable development, and even
social justice and equality, lie within the transnational economy itself. GVCs must be understood
as normative orders in need of constitutionalization.59 However, the constitutionalization process
must not replicate that of the political system.60 Different, non-state, social structures develop their
own forms of self-limitation that amount to constitutionalization through their autonomous proc-
esses. This often happens ad hoc at the emergence of a particular social problem.61 There is no single,
all-encompassing social constitution—only “islands of the constitutional in the sea of globality.”62
One way of envisioning such transnational constitutionalization of the economy is through
corporate codes of conduct.63 By applying to contractors and subcontractors, the codes of
transnational corporations constitute regimes of corporate self-governance that coordinate and
homogenize outsourced production. While originally designed for guaranteeing product and ser-
vice standards, such codes have the potential to—and often, indeed, do—expand into areas tradi-
tionally understood as “externalities” of the supply chain: The safeguarding of labor rights among
suppliers or the impact of the outsourced production on the environment.64 The genesis of these
codes may be traced to the susceptibility of lead firms to “learning pressures,” that is, to external
pressures, such as reputational sanctions, that lead to internal self-limitation. Such pressures may
result from court cases of supply chain liability, soft international legal norms, or civil society
pressures and political consumerism. Contrary to state-initiated soft law on the social
56Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of ‘Hitting the Bottom,’ in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (Poul F. Kjaer et al. eds., 2011). As mentioned above, supra note 14, the same logic applies
with regards to the expansion of other social systems. For example, with regards to the legal system, human rights serve as a
counterinstitution wherein the self-limitations to the expansion of the system are congealed.
57On the convergence between systems theory and the Hayekian insistence on “constitutional ignorance” and the “unknow-
ability” of the global economy, see QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM,
224-235. (2018). In parallel with systems theory, F.A. Hayek also opposed ideas of planning and saw the market as a “sponta-
neous order” and a “system of communication, ”in which only “pattern prediction” is possible.
58This is a recurrent concern in Teubner’s work. See, for example, his exchange with Antonio Negri in Gunther Teubner,
Societal Constitutionalism and the Politics of the Common, 21 FINNISH Y.B. INT‘L L. 2 (2010). For a critical engagement with
this view, see Ioannis Kampourakis, CSR and Social Rights: Juxtaposing Societal Constitutionalism and Rights-Based
Approaches Imposing Human Rights Obligations on Corporations, 9 GOETTINGEN J. INT‘L L. 537, 566 (2019).
59On law’s endogeneity in GVCs, see Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in
Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT‘L L.J.411 (2005).
60Teubner, supra note 58, at 13.
61One such example could be considered the emergence of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh.
62TEUBNER, supra note 6, at 52. See also Neil Walker, Beyond the Holistic Constitution?, in THE TWILIGHT OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2012).
63Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of “Private” and “Public” Corporate Codes of Conduct,
18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 (2011).
64Jaakko Salminen, Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance Mechanisms: Conceptualizing Fragmented and Globalized
Production as Collectively Governed Entities, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 709, 713–14 (2016).
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responsibility of transnational corporations,65 the resulting corporate codes of conduct are con-
sidered an effective and binding form of private ordering.66
A second lens through which to understand the normative direction of constitutionalizing
GVCs is that of human rights. Human rights make up an integral aspect of the decentered con-
ceptualization of society that informs societal constitutionalism. However, in a clear shift from
agents to structure, the crucial feature of human rights is not their role as guarantors of affected
legal interests of individuals, but rather their function “as social and legal counter-institutions to
the expansionist tendencies of social systems.”67 The question behind the “horizontal effect” of
human rights is not a question of balancing the rights of concrete actors—instead, it is an “eco-
logical” question of the weight of the injury caused by the expansion of a social system to other
functional systems.68 The case of labor and human rights violations in sweatshops is elucidating.
In this case, it would be a mistake to consider factory managers as the only ones responsible,
especially considering the price pressure imposed on them by lead firms. Yet, focusing only
on lead firms is equally misleading. Often, arguments of lack of knowledge or control over sup-
pliers’ management of production have a basis as monitoring and auditing processes might be
circumvented. It is, instead, “anonymous market forces” that are eventually responsible for the
structural violence that characterizes sweatshops.69 Therefore, human rights need to be conceived
as a defense against precisely such anonymous forces, rather than against specific actors.
Despite the normative direction of societal constitutionalism toward the democratization of
the economy from within, there is no room for optimism for an overarching resolution to issues
of justice and genuine fulfillment of human rights. The project of a utopian justice remains a
conceptual impossibility. Humans are, by definition, neither the subjects nor the objects of com-
munications—these are the social systems in which humans take part. As a result, society can
never aspire to fully do justice to humans, who stand outside communication. At best, it can
create the kind of irritations or “learning pressures” to social systems so that they remove unjust
situations. But then, it can be asked, how do we know which situations are unjust? The way out
for societal constitutionalism is to draw attention to spontaneous indignation, protest, and
unrest. This is a move that reconnects a grand theory project with empirical reality and, in a
way, it prepares the ground for the argument I will present on the possibilities for synthesis.
While the claim that justice can only be construed in negative terms may be seen as anti-utopian,
it shares the characteristic grand theory-like attribute of making broad claims about the nature of
social order. The “negativity” of this overarching perspective captures the postmodern incredulity
to narratives of incremental reform, a tendency present in the empirical analyses of GVCs dis-
cussed above. Drawing from the comparison between empirical socio-legal studies and societal
constitutionalism I outlined in this section, I will now attempt to further elucidate the role of
“grand theorizing” in the socio-legal field.
65E.g., the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights of 2011. For quasi-soft law legislative initiatives focusing
on transparency, see also the EU Directive 2014/95 or the UK Modern Slavery Act of 2015.
66TEUBNER, supra note 6, at 48. Corporate codes are particularly promising as “civil constitutions” because they introduce
not only primary rules for the protection of labor rights or the environment but also secondary rules that juridify reflexive
processes that link the corporation with its environment. See Teubner, supra note 63, at 624. On the potential of corporate
codes, see also, ANNA BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND
NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2015).
67Gunther Teubner, Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Effect?, 40 NETH. J.L. PHIL. 191, 210 (2011).
68Gunther Teubner, The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by ‘Private’ Transnational Actors, 69 MOD. L. REV.
327, 330 (2006).
69Id. at 335.; Mark Anner et al., Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of Labor
Violations in International Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 1, 3 (2013) (“[L]abor violations are not
simply a factory-level problem that can be corrected by improved compliance monitoring; they are a pervasive and predictable
outcome in an industry dominated by lead firms whose business model is predicated on outsourcing apparel production via
highly flexible, volatile, and cost-sensitive subcontracting networks.”).
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D. How “Big” Should We Think in Law and Society?
The discussion of the empirical research inGVCs indicated that the authors did not—with the excep-
tion of AnnaTsing—attempt to link their findings to an overarching theory of society or of the role of
law andprivate regulation in conditions of globalization. Is there a value in extrapolating fromempiri-
cal findings to more systematic theory-building? What is the place of social and legal theory—and
especially of grand theory—in the socio-legal field and in connection to empirical scholarship?
Underlying empirical socio-legal work is the assumption, first, that objective social reality
exists, and second, that it is, in some way, observable, intelligible, and even measurable. The exist-
ence of a material, social reality implies that phenomena occur within a specific socio-historical
context. It is by gathering data within that context that researchers may find regularities and pat-
terns behind social phenomena. By definition, then, all knowledge is partial and contextual. Any
unitary account of the social order is at best reductive and at worst obfuscating, possibly manipu-
lating data to advance transhistorical claims.70
On the one hand, relying on empirical data to address specific social problems has had a dis-
tinctly “progressive” and “reformist” character. Indeed, a cardinal aspect of legal realism was the
urge to study the social facts behind legal endeavors, to demystify metaphysical legal doctrines
through the knowledge of their social impact, and to shape a better, more moral law based on
the teachings of sociology, economics, or anthropology.71 For example, in the U.S., this realist
recruitment of empiricism and the sciences was the intellectual spearhead behind the New
Deal policies in the 1930s.72 At the same time, however, the reliance on facts and data fueled
the “rationalist” turn in social disciplines, namely the Popperian dictum that beliefs are rationally
grounded only if they can pass an experimental test of falsifiability.73 This test was meant to
distinguish between factual and normative claims, placing the social disciplines on the path to
become “real” sciences.74 By separating the normative from the descriptive, while attributing
scientific credence only to the latter, the rationalist stance was decisively anti-utopian.
Thinking “big” in social philosophy was tantamount to “mystifying nonsense.”75
But can we so neatly distinguish between the factual and the normative? Or does the
discernment of the factual already smuggle in normative preconceptions? According to
Thomas Kuhn, our access to facts, in the light of which we are supposed to test our beliefs, is
always filtered by existing “paradigms” of understanding.76 If our access to reality is dependent
on contingent beliefs and paradigms of understanding, then the rationalist project begins to lose
ground and the boundary between the factual and the normative becomes more porous.
Knowledge is not partial and contextual; it is socially constructed. Postmodern constructivist posi-
tions that start from this premise would not normally dovetail with singular, overarching schemes
of explanation.77 However, the constructivist position is in itself an overarching, singular explana-
tory scheme about society. Theoretical endeavors that start from such an epistemology cannot but
morph into some form of grand theory.78 They are bound to prioritize concepts as opposed to
70C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 22 (2000).
71MORTON J. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 189 (1992)
(summarizing the reformist impetus of legal realism in which “detailed knowledge of social fact [provides] a necessary demys-
tifying first step toward the goal of social reform”).
72SeeMarcus J. Curtis, Realism Revisited: Reaffirming the Centrality of the New Deal in Realist Jurisprudence, 27 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 157 (2015).
73See POPPER, supra note 24.
74QUENTIN SKINNER, THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 5 (Quentin Skinner ed., 2000).
75POPPER, supra note 24, at 247 (citing Schopenhauer’s critique to Hegel).
76See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2009).
77SKINNER, supra note 74, at 12.
78Id. at 12–13:
There is no denying that Foucault has articulated a general view about the nature of knowledge, that Wittgenstein
presents us with an abstract account of meaning and understanding, that Feyerabend has a preferred and almost
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concrete social reality because they see concepts at the roots of all understanding. At the same
time, the recognition that the factual cannot exist irrespective of some normative preconceptions
implies that even an explicitly self-declared empirical approach, like that of Empirical Legal
Studies, cannot help but convey—at least implicitly—a theory about the role of law in society
and the way it mediates between power and reason.79 Even an instrumental approach to legal
reform entails the commitment to a background prescriptive theory of the relevant area of social
practice, as manifested at least in selecting the cases to be examined.
Fleshing out such normative commitments may lead to delimiting the role law can play in social
transformation, acknowledging that it is only one among interrelated social frameworks where social
hierarchies might be instantiated.80 For example, in that direction, societal constitutionalism delimits
what law can achieve by daring a big claim about justice: That it is unattainable—at least through law.
The determinism of this claim is only nuanced by its attachment to the contingency of the meaning of
justice.81 For law to approach justice, it is neither enough to refer to its own internal principles
(positivism) as justice searches for an extra-legal orientation, nor to appeal to metaphysical authorities
beyond law that supposedly possess substantive criteria of justice (natural law). Instead, law is
dependent on its “ecologies”: Its social, human, and natural environment and the varying under-
standings of justice therein.82 Regardless of where one stands on this pluralist utopianism, it consti-
tutes a type of normative thinking that goes beyond legal reform. Societal constitutionalism engulfs
contingency, context, and local variation as parts of a singular explanatory and normative framework.
Paradoxically, difference becomes the unifying theme of a constructivist, postmodern grand theory.
Is the dichotomy between empirical socio-legal approaches and constructivist grand theory
approaches unbridgeable? Critical realism offers a way to imagine a possible middle ground or
even a synthesis between empirical socio-legal studies and grand theory. Critical realism rejects
the methodological individualism of explaining social phenomena via an ultimate recourse to the
individual in a way that is reminiscent of systems theory: A study of society is not a study of the
behavior of large groups but rather a study of the persistent relations between individuals or
groups.83 However, critical realism also acknowledges that society consists of real people and that
“the material presence of social effects consists only in changes in people and changes brought
about by people on other material things.”84 While people unconsciously reproduce the structures
that govern their lives, they retain agency in the process. The hegemony of particular social struc-
tures is ensured through the repetition of their performance. In turn, this repetition constitutes a
particular social order and the individuals therein, defining the contours of their agency.85
Popperian method of judging scientific hypotheses, and even that Derrida presupposes the possibility of construct-
ing interpretations when he tells us that our next task should be that of deconstructing them : : : . There is no
paradox, in short, in giving pride of place to the iconoclasts: Almost in spite of themselves, they have proved
to be among the grandest theorists of current practice throughout a wide range of the social disciplines.
79Hanoch Dagan et al., Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 292 (2018).
80Nicola Lacey, Normative Reconstruction in Socio-Legal Theory, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 131, 140, 146 (1996).
81It is interesting to note that this determinist anti-individualism that leaves little room for human agency is common with
that of structuralism. See, e.g., Louis Althusser, Louis Althusser Replies to John Lewis, 1 AUSTL. LEFT REV. 23, 29 (1972) (“[H]
istory is a process without subject.”). The contingent meaning of the discussed categories is the differentiating, post-
structuralist factor. See Bernard E. Harcourt, An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Poststructuralism?’, (University of
Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 156, 2007).
82Gunther Teubner, Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula of Law?, 72 MOD. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).
83Bhaskar, supra note 9, at 6 (explaining it would be impossible to give a non-social, for example, strictly individualistic
explanation of an individual—“explanation : : : always seems to involve irreducibly social practices”).
84Id. at 8. Materiality is different from “observability” but is rather defined through the function structures perform in the
social world. For example, structures may not be observable but still perform a function such as the concept of a deity. See also
Souza, supra note 23, at 24; ROY BHASKAR, A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE (2008).
85Luis Eslava, The Teaching of (Another) International Law: Critical Realism and the Question of Agency and Structure, L.
TEACHER 1, 4 (2019).
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Therefore, social structures, if only by reason of them constituting subjectivities, have a material,
palpable manifestation in the real world. While this does not exclude that some aspects of the
world are socially constructed, it allows a wide margin for empirical research to work with
and elucidate this materiality.
Grand theories in sociological approaches to law base their normative output on presupposi-
tions that are inevitably axiomatic. For example, societal constitutionalism’s normative agenda of
“democratizing the economy from within” follows from the presuppositions, first, that society is
fragmented in different systems of communication and, second, that these systems cannot com-
municate directly. The impossibility of direct communication implies that top-down state inter-
vention in the economy cannot be efficient, redirecting the focus of social transformation in
system-internal processes.86 Yet, how do we know that these presuppositions are “true”?
Admitting that social structures possess materiality means that some type of empirical
examination of them must be possible and that they are not accessible only through reason.
Yet, at the same time, admitting the existence of structures that go beyond the individual use
of private autonomy invites a level of abstraction capable of capturing processes that take place
“beyond individual agency,” such as the anonymous market forces defining sweatshops. Empirical
socio-legal research has the capacity to uncover how social structures are shaped and negotiated in
specific social practices, localities, and contexts. In Anna Tsing’s words, “it is time to reimbue our
understanding of the economy with the art of noticing.”87 A similar undertone echoes in
Boaventura De Sousa Santos’ argumentation for an “emancipatory common sense.”88 In that
sense, empirical socio-legal studies can be most promising when they are not merely attuned
to possible institutional reforms, but when they discover, inductively, elements of normative
reconstruction of the particular area of social activity. What meaning do concepts like justice
acquire in the human “ecologies” of the law? By turning the attention to “subaltern counterpub-
lics”89 and giving them a voice, counter-hegemonic values that were so far unexplored may gain
prominence, disrupting currently dominant ways of social ordering. In that direction, the field-
work of De Sousa Santos on the parallel legality of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro provides a basis for
theoretical insights on law, postmodernism, and social struggles.90 Similarly, Tsing’s ethnographic
research on supply chain capitalism shows how diversity is both the condition that makes value
extraction from supply chains possible and a challenge to GVCs, that is, a possible opening to non-
capitalist spaces.91 An inductive approach of descriptive and normative inquiry may never meet
the requirements of the rationalist, “scientific” objectivity. Yet, it could be the underpinning of
utopianism and normative legal thinking that imagines new institutional and social arrangements.
E. Conclusions
Both in Germany and the UK, sociological approaches to law have had internal divisions,
methodological rifts, and divergent aspirations, while still sharing an external perspective to
the study of law. While empirical socio-legal studies have strong institutional presence and influ-
ence in legal research and education in the UK, the same cannot be said about Germany.92 At the
86GUNTHER TEUBNER, AFTER LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM? STRATEGIC MODELS OF POST-REGULATORY LAW 310–12
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1986) (considering direct, top-down regulation faces a “regulatory trilemma” of under-effectiveness,
over-effectiveness, or regulatory capture).
87ANNA TSING, THE MUSHROOM AT THE END OF THE WORLD: ON THE POSSIBILITY OF LIFE IN CAPITALIST RUINS
132 (2017).
88BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC
TRANSITION 46-50 (1995).
89See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, SOC. TEXT
56 (1990).
90DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 88. See also PETER FITZPATRICK, LAW AND STATE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (1980).
91Tsing, supra note 53, at 171–72.
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same time, Luhmann, Teubner, and others in sociological jurisprudence from a systems-theory
perspective have had a lasting influence in German legal academia.93 In this Article, I have tried to
show that these projects do not differ only in their methodologies or their style but also in their
epistemologies and ontological perspectives on social reality. Where empirical socio-legal studies
tend to see an objectively existing social reality that can be probed and studied through the col-
lection of data, societal constitutionalism – and legal autopoiesis more broadly – see a constructed
and fragmented reality in which there is no “unifying mode of cognition.”94 This structures
different ways to approach societal problems and different ambitions in suggesting explanatory
and normative frameworks. Indicatively, the tendency of societal constitutionalism to decipher
social reality through structures, such as the communications of social systems, rather than
through human agency, leads to holistic explanatory and normative frameworks despite taking
into consideration context and difference. On the contrary, the focus of empirical socio-legal stud-
ies on observable social reality and concrete individuals renders such approaches self-aware of the
partiality of their contribution.
The discussion of transnational private regulation revealed these rifts. Empirical socio-legal
studies tend to focus on the dynamics between agents in GVCs and on the concrete impact of
transnational private regulation, often attempting to uncover what could make this form of legal
pluralism more effective in protecting labor rights or the environment. Societal constitutionalism
emphasizes the need for structures and mechanisms that may generate self-regulatory dynamics
within social systems, such as, for example, human rights or the corporate codes of lead firms.
While the content of these mechanisms may be context-specific, the idea of self-limitation—as
opposed to, for example, external limitation—is a necessary and unavoidable result of the
theoretical premises of societal constitutionalism.
The quest to imagine possible synergies between the discussed ways of thinking about the law
sociologically extends beyond the ambitions of this Article. Indeed, the quest to adequately capture
the materiality and meaning of “context” is ever-present in socio-legal studies.95 Synthesis of the
empirical and the grand theory perspective is premised on the idea that social structures, such as
the “anonymous market forces”, do, in fact, have material existence, at least because they shape
and condition individuals. Yet, while the “individual” is conditioned through its contact with
social structures, empirical research targets subjectivities under continuous forces of transforma-
tion. Even if a certain outline of social structures is postulated, such as the asymmetry of power
relations in value chains, the outcome of the produced subjectivities remains uncertain. For in-
stance, workers could endorse corporate codes and aspire to be part of a broader corporate culture,
they could reject them as paternalizing, or they could only use them strategically. Starting induc-
tively from the materiality of social structures and the conditioned subjectivities to eventually
uncover and normatively evaluate processes beyond individual agency may be a key in thinking
“big” in law and society.
92Bora, supra note 2, at 640.
93That does not mean that in each examined country the different approach is absent. For example, systems theory has
influenced scholars working in the UK, like Emilios Christodoulidis, Jen Hendry, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos,
Christopher Thornhill and others. Similarly, empirical socio-legal research is of course also present in Germany, often under
the title “interdisciplinary legal research” (“Interdisziplindre Rechtsforschung”). See SUSANNE BAER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE: EINE
EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE INTERDISZIPLINÄRE RECHTSFORSCHUNG (3d ed. 2017).
94Teubner, supra note 19, at 738.
95Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law as Socio-Legal Theory: The Challenges for “Law in Context” in a Divided World, 67
BUFF. L. REV. 909, 911 (2019).
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Abstract
This Article looks for signs of Anglo-German life in the literature and practice under-pinning the current
move to use “designerly ways” in socio-legal research; and asks whether design has a role to play in nurtur-
ing a sense of Anglo-German socio-legal community. It argues that a “sociological imagination” is essential
if we are to fully understand possible synergies between design and socio-legal research, and the risks and
rewards of activating them; and that while we cannot know what socio-legal research will or ought to look
like in the coming months and years we must pay more attention to designing those moments that we are
lucky enough to share in person.
Keywords: Legal design; socio-legal research methods; Anglo-German scholarship
A. Introduction
A central theme motivating the 2019 workshop on “Socio-Legal Studies in Germany and the UK:
Theory and Methods”—from which this Special Issue emerged—was “how academic traditions
and institutional contexts have influenced the development of socio-legal research in Germany
and the UK,” and whether there exists a “typical pathway into and through law and society
research” in each jurisdiction. During discussion, repeated note was made of a tendency among
German academic institutions to be relatively structured or rigid—both in their definitions and
assessments of legal research, and in their expectations around publishing and career pathways—
and it was argued that this influences the inclination and ability of researchers to follow where
their intellectual curiosity might lead. By contrast, it was observed, researchers in the UK benefit
from a greater freedom to pursue the topics and methods of their choosing. As Stefan Machura
details elsewhere in this Special Issue, this divergence manifests in the fact that, although German
Rechtssoziologie began earlier, the UK variant, socio-legal studies, is stronger—a difference he
attributes to the fact that socio-legal studies is defined more broadly, and there is a “greater open-
ness” to “ideas from other disciplines in the UK.”1 As a UK-based academic, I can confirm that my
*Professor of Law, Kent Law School. a.perry-kessaris@kent.ac.uk. I am grateful to the Socio-Legal Studies Association and
the Leverhulme Trust for financial support, as well as for intellectual leadership and inspiration from Jen Hendry, Naomi
Creutzfeldt, and Christian Boulanger, who organized the SLSA seminar “Socio-Legal Studies in Germany and the UK:
Theory and Methods,” held at Humboldt University in September 2019; and from Rossana Ducato and Alain Strowel,
who organized the Legal Design Methodology Roundtable hosted remotely from Brussels in April 2020.
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the German Law Journal. This is an Open Access article,
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work
is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order
to create a derivative work.
1Stefan Machura, Milestones and Directions: Socio-Legal Studies in Germany and the United Kingdom, in this issue.
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personal experience—shaped, of course, by a particular constellation of factors such as time, place,
economics, and identity—has been one of freedom, and especially recently, of support to go my
own way. Most notably, I have been able to devote substantial time and research funds over the
last twenty-five years to train in other disciplines; and my attempts to draw insights from those
disciplines have generally been received as legitimate by the UK socio-legal research community.
That curiosity-driven, somewhat “serendipitous”3 journey has led me to an ongoing project,Doing
Socio-Legal Research in Design Mode, which explores the potential of design to help us to under-
stand and enhance socio-legal research methods.
My interest in the intersections between law and design was triggered by frustration at the lack
of communication among law, economics, sociology, and development studies.4 Between
2012–2017, I became a part-time student of visual communication and then graphic design at
the University of the Arts, London. A key insight I took from those years spent as a student
of design is that “designerly ways”—that is, the mindsets, tools, and processes that are
Figure 1. Visual summary of discussion on pathways to socio-legal scholarship in the UK and Germany at “socio-legal
Studies in Germany and the UK: Theory and Methods”2.
2Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Screenshot of a Tweet During a Discussion on Pathways to socio-legal Scholarship, Twitter
(Sept. 24, 2019, 10:05 AM), https://twitter.com/aperrykessaris/status/1176422363510059009?s=20.
3See infra Figure 1.
4Amanda Perry-Kessaris, The Case for a Visualized Economic Sociology of Legal Development, 67 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 169
(2014).
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characteristic of design—are more inherently “social” than legal ways. I began to investigate the
potential of designerly ways to make socio-legal research more “social.”6
Reflecting back on the workshop discussion, two questions arise for me—one retrospective and
inward-looking, one prospective and outward-looking—around which I will structure this Article.
First, what signs of Anglo-German life can I find in the literature and practice underpinning my
current research into socio-legal research and design? Second, might design have a role to play in
nurturing a sense of Anglo-German socio-legal community?
B. Anglo-German Concepts and Norms
Any approach to law can be categorized in terms of what, substantively, is approached—for
example, legal text, context, and/or subtext; how it is approached, both empirically and concep-
tually; and why it is approached—that is, motivated by what values and interests (Figure 2).7 My
wider project on “doing socio-legal research in design mode” focuses primarily on how designerly
ways (mindsets, tools, processes) might enhance how (empirically, conceptually) we do socio-legal
research; and in so doing, to better promote whichever values and interests we may seek to pro-
mote through our research. Here, I emphasize the Anglo-German influences on the conceptual
(not empirical) dimensions of my work (how); and on my normative agenda (why).
Figure 2. Excavating the Anglo-German roots of Doing socio-legal Research in Design Mode5.
5Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Image of the Anglo-German Roots of Doing socio-legal Research in Design Mode (2020).
6For a discussion of how, using designerly ways to make research more “social,” we can improve its meaningfulness to the
public or stakeholders, see Amanda Perry-Kessaris & Joanna Perry, Enhancing Participatory Strategies with Designerly Ways
for socio-legal Impact: Lessons from Research Aimed at Making Hate Crime Visible in Europe, SOC. & LEGAL STUD. (forth-
coming 2020); for a more detailed exploration of the risks and rewards of “doing socio-legal research in design mode,”
see AMANDA PERRY-KESSARIS, DOING SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH IN DESIGN MODE (forthcoming 2020).
7Perry-Kessaris 2015 Perry-Kessaris, A (2015) ‘Approaching the econo-socio-legal’ 11:16 Annual Review of Law & Social
Science 1-18. See infra Figure 2.
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I. Concepts
socio-legal researchers conceptualize the world, including law, in terms of social relations and the
values and interests that underpin or motivate them. Like many in the UK and beyond, I tend to
think in terms of the typology proposed by German sociologist and jurist, Max Weber, to distin-
guish between values and interests that are “instrumental” (for example, motivated by a purpose
or task), “belief-based” (for example, motivated by religion), “affective” (for example, motivated by
love) or “traditional” (for example, motivated by custom).8 As populations have diversified and
the complexities inherent in notions of national identity have been exposed, so it has become
necessary to identify more flexible units of social analysis. Here, I draw on UK sociologist and
legal philosopher Roger Cotterrell, who has long argued that we ought to look less for “society”
and more for “communal networks”—that is, for those patterns of relatively sustained and trust-
ing interactions, centering on any of the values and interests identified by Weber, in which each of
us is (typically multiply) engaged.9 This is the lens through which I think about both the social life
of law, especially law as a communal resource; and the socio-legal research process, especially
socio-legal researchers as forming an (instrumental, but also potentially affective) communal
network.
II. Values and Interests
Why do we (or ought we to) do socio-legal research—what values and interests does it (ought it
to) serve? What is its function? For me, the most useful and meaningful answers to this question—
at least in the English language—are to be found in Cotterrell’s recent work on sociological juris-
prudence, which—like his earlier work on law’s role as a communal resource—is built on German
foundations.10
In Sociological Jurisprudence, Roger Cotterrell celebrates the role of “jurists”—that is, those11
who, first, approach law as a “practical” as opposed to purely abstract or technical, “idea”; and,
second, seek to protect and “promote” its “well-being,” rather than to merely exploit, “unmask or
debunk it.” He argues that this juristic “promotion of a value-oriented idea of law,” which is
“adapted to the specific, varying conditions of law’s sociohistorical existence is the most distinc-
tive, perhaps ultimately the most difficult, form of legal expertise,”; and that it requires a distinctly
sociological—as opposed to a black-letter law, or law and social theory—orientation.12 For me, the
unavoidable implication of Cotterell’s argument is that all socio-legal scholarship ought to be
juristic. So how does such a juristic orientation translate into socio-legal practice?
First, a juristic orientation implies a focus on law as an empirical, real world, phenomenon.
This aligns very easily with standard socio-legal practice which has for many decades, and thanks
in large part to Max Weber, centered on systematic sociologically-informed studies of what I will
call legal action—for example, of how police, judges, bureaucrats, activists, and/or litigants use,
abuse, and avoid law. Second, a juristic orientation encourages the systematic, sociologically-
informed study of “legal ideas”—for example, what are the core “values” present in law and
8Max Rheinstein, Introduction to MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY i (Max Rheinstein ed. & trans., E.A.
Shills trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1954).
9Roger Cotterrell, A Legal Concept of Community, 12 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 75, 80–82 (1997).
10Cotterrell.
Cotterrell 1997.
Cotterrell, R. (2006) Law, culture and society: legal ideas in the mirror of social theory. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Cotterrell, R. (2018) Sociological Jurisprudence: Juristic thought and social inquiry Routledge.
11Although anyone who engages with law—journalists, private practitioners, or policy makers—might take a juristic
approach to the field, this Article focuses on socio-legal researchers.
12ROGER COTTERRELL, SOCIO-LEGAL JURISPRUDENCE: JURISTIC THOUGHT AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 31–33 (2018).
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society, where do they come from, and what are their effects? Again, this aligns with standard
socio-legal practice, which in turn owes much to the work of Max Weber.
What makes a juristic orientation distinctive is that it can shed light on what legal values ought
to be. This is controversial because sociology and, therefore, socio-legal scholarship, is tradition-
ally directed to “understanding facts” rather than “applying values.”13 Specifically, Cotterrell
argues, a juristic orientation gives an overarching, normative purpose for socio-legal scholar-
ship—namely, unity. Drawing on the work of German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch
(1878-1949), Cotterrell proposes that we conceptualize law as a “triangle” composed of “three
central values.” Of these, two are basic technical values that fall within even the thinnest of con-
ceptions of law: Namely order (“or security or certainty”) and justice (or “equal treatment”). But
the third value, law’s “(fitness for) purpose,” is dynamic and contingent. Its “content”—including
“who and what are to be considered equal : : : and how justice is to be measured and realised” is
derived from, and so changes with, “sociohistorical place and time.”14 The distinctive duty of the
jurist who, by Cotterrell’s definition, seeks to promote the well-being of law as a practical idea, is to
actively work to “hold” that “justice-order-purpose triangle of law together.” They must do this by
conceptualizing law in ways that accommodate and promote diversity, specifically by “integrating
as equally valuable subjects of law : : : all those living within the jurisdiction of a legal system.”15
More specifically, the social function of law is to express the values and interests that hold us
together, coordinate the differences that keep us apart, and encourage participation in social life.16
The upshot for socio-legal researchers is that we have a juristic duty to promote social and legal
unity from and for social and legal diversity. In my view, that duty applies to us both in our
capacities as members of socio-legal research communities, and in relation to the impact that
our research might have on communal networks beyond academia. At the heart of this duty
is, I argue, a tension between unity/structure and diversity/freedom on the other:
On the one hand, a commitment to the well-being of law requires a commitment to “law’s
unity” as a coherent “structure of values.” On the other hand, a commitment to law as a
practical idea, one that is socially meaningful, requires a commitment to ensuring that it
accommodates, and actively nurtures, diversity. Law achieves this objective, which
Cotterrell terms “social unity,” by “facilitat[ing] communication” about the “need” for
“respect” for “all”; as well as by enforcing that need by challenging inequality and bias.17
This need to navigate the tension between structure and freedom, and this emphasis on law as a
communicator, are clear points of contact between law and design. Furthermore, a juristic com-
mitment to the well-being of law as a practical idea calls for skills, knowledge, and attitudes that
are at once practical, critical, and imaginative; and, as will be seen below, this constitutes the third
point of contact between law and design. What I did not fully appreciate before the opportunity
presented by the workshop is that these points of contact exist in large part thanks to 19th and
20th Century Anglo-German efforts to organize design into a socially-attuned practice.
C. Design as Socially-Attuned Field of Practice
Generations of sociological thinking render it commonsensical for a socio-legal researcher to see
law and design—and therefore, legal design—as fundamentally social phenomena—that is,
13Id. at xiii, 1.
14Id. at 38.
15Id. at 31, 38.
16Cotterrell, supra note 9, at 80–82; see also AMANDA PERRY-KESSARIS, GLOBAL BUSINESS, LOCAL LAW: THE INDIAN LEGAL
SYSTEM AS A COMMUNAL RESOURCE IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT RELATIONS (2008).
17Perry-Kessaris, A (2019) ‘Legal design for practice, activism, policy and research’ 46:2 Journal of Law and Society 185-210
quoting Cotterrell 2018 pp. 31, 33 and 170.
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“concerned with the mutual relations of human beings or classes of human beings,” especially with
“society” and “its organization,”; and shaping and shaped by human “interdependence,” including
the “need for companionship” and cooperation.18 Perhaps more surprising to the socio-legal
researcher, and indeed for some contemporary design enthusiasts, is that the discipline of design
was, at its Anglo-German origins, remarkably socially-attuned. By this I mean that design was
seen as a form of social relations, as playing a role in social relations, and as having a role to play
in working for certain forms of social relations.
The story begins with the Arts and Crafts movement and its leading light, English designer and
social activist William Morris (1834-1896). “Born of thinkers and practitioners in Victorian
England who despaired of the ornate clutter which seemed to be pervading architecture and
design,” this was a “movement about integrity. It was about respecting your materials, and the
way you used them,” about “the maker and the process of making as much as the object made.”
In so doing, it “produced works of extraordinary vibrancy and intellectual rigor.” Although the
Arts and Crafts movement “came to an end shortly after the First World War,” its already global
influence endured.19 Crucial to that endurance was the fact that architect Walter Gropius was
directly influenced by Morris in writing the Manifesto and Program for Germany’s famous
Bauhaus school of art and design in 1919.20
Although the Bauhaus itself was short-lived, its practices were secured in its curriculum and
carried by its members as they scattered across the globe in the wake of its 1933 closure by the
Gestapo. Much of the Bauhaus agenda was later picked up and extended at the Ulm School of
Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung). From Ulm, “research into design methods crossed the chan-
nel and found its advocates in Britain” in “the ‘design methods movement’ of the 1960s,”21 most
visibly in the 1962 Conference on Design Methods in London. Designers have since periodically
pushed back against the normative agenda of “design methodology.”22 But the Bauhaus approach
continues to exert global influence right through to the contemporary teaching and practice of
design.
I. Design as Social Relations
The Arts and Crafts movement and the Bauhaus school both demonstrated a keen awareness of,
and willingness to exploit, the relational dimensions of design. The Bauhaus Preliminary Course
(Vorkurs) was the first, at least in the global North, to systematize the teaching—and therefore
practice—of design, and remains perhaps its most influential legacy.23 The course “emulated Arts
and Crafts practices,” not only in its “promotion of the applied arts and integrated design” but also
in its communal “workshop-based system.”24 Although “its character changed significantly” with
each lead instructor—Johannes Itten, László Moholy-Nagy, and Josef Albers—it nevertheless
“served as a unifying experience for students and a common ground from which all began their
studies,” because all “students, be they joiner, bookbinder, potter, weaver or stage designer
received the same instruction.”25
18OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
19ROSALIND P. BLAKESLEY, THE ARTS AND CRAFTS MOVEMENT 1, 9 (2006).
20Lauren S. Weingarden, Aesthetics Politicized: William Morris to the Bauhaus, 38 J. ARCHITECTURAL EDUC. 8, 12 (1985).
21Helen Charman, Designerly Learning: Workshops for Schools at the Design Museum, 15 DESIGN & TECH. EDUC.: AN INT’L
J. 28, 29 (2010).
22Nigel Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing: Design Discipline Versus Design Science, 17 DESIGN ISSUES 49, 49–50 (2001).
23Id. at 49.
24BLAKESLEY, supra note 19, at 135.
25Jeffrey Saletnik, Josef Albers, Eva Hesse, and the Imperative of Teaching, 7 TATE PAPERS (Spring 2007), https://www.tate.
org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/07/josef-albers-eva-hesse-and-the-imperative-of-teaching.
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More specifically, and in today’s terminology, we can say that they understood design as a
form of sociomaterial relations. Course leaders at the Bauhaus echoed the Arts and Crafts
movement’s determination that designers and users alike should fulfill their “psychological
and sensory needs” by “the acts of creating, using, touching, and perceiving.”27 For example,
Johannes Itten saw experimentation as a way to “unlock students’ creative potential,” which he
sought to do using “several unorthodox techniques, including rhythmic and improvisatory
drawing,” “gymnastics,” and “other body-based, meditative” practices which were conducted
communally. Under course leader Josef Albers, students were asked to complete a series
of experiments—"practical, concrete exercises”—that emphasized “process” and “learning
through doing”.28
The outcomes of these regular experiments were brought together into a shared space and
assessed. Although they were intended to function as mere drafts or prototypes, such examples
still exist—even the names and specifications of the experiments—and are today, 100 years
later, treated as artistic works and are exhibited in major art galleries around the world—either
in their original state or reproduced in larger form. But it is rare to see them as they
were intended—as a collection of experiments on a common theme that generated a sense of
community.29 Figure 4).
Figure 3. Assessment of work from Albers’s Preliminary Course, 1928-192926.
26Otto Umbehr (Umbo), Photograph of Students from Albers’s Preliminary Course, THE JOSEPH AND ANNI ALBERS
FOUNDATION/VG BILD-KUNST, BONN AND DACS, LONDON (2007). Image reproduced with permission.
27Weingarden, supra note 20, at 12.
28Saletnik, supra note 25. See infra Figure 3.
29Exhibition notes. Original Bauhaus exhibition. BERLINISCHEN GALERIE. 6 July 2019 – 27 January
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II. Design in and for Social Relations
Members of the Arts and Crafts movement and the Bauhaus understood design(s) normatively, as
tools for shaping social relations. They pursued a—then radical—agenda of making design
Figure 4. Vorkurs exercises celebrated (a) as a list and (b) in large scale, high quality reproduction30.
30Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Photographs of Original Bauhaus Exhibition from July 6, 2019 to January 27, 2020,
BERLINISCHEN GALERIE (July 6, 2019–Jan. 27, 2020).
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relevant, appealing, affordable, and even transformative to all, including the relatively poor. For
example, Morris asked in 1883, “[w]hat business have we with art at all unless all can share it?”31
Likewise, “[u]niting all of [the Bauhaus’] multiple tendencies and impulses was an attempt to put
Figure 4. Continue.
31Letter from William Morris to The Manchester Examiner (1883) [hereinafter Morris Letter].
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art and architecture to use as social regeneration for the world’s working classes.” But it took some
time to get there: Gropius originally wrote in his 1919 manifesto that “[t]he ultimate aim of all
artistic activity is building!” and “[t]he ultimate, if distant, aim of the Bauhaus is the unified work
of art.” But in 1929 then-director of the Bauhaus, Hannes Meyer, “consciously revised the state-
ment, in poetic form, no less: ‘thus the ultimate aim of all Bauhaus work / the summation of all
life-forming forces / to the harmonious arrangement of our society.’”33 Relatedly, both the Arts
and Crafts movement and the Bauhaus were committed to the practical idea that, above all,
designs must function. For example, Morris exhorted his followers to “have nothing in your
houses that you do not know to be useful or believe to be beautiful”34 (See Figure 5)— a sentiment
since summarized in the maxim “form follows function,” which is widely associated with the
Bauhaus.35
Over time it became clear that this socially-attuned quest for user-centered functionality ought
to begin further upstream, with design theory and pedagogy. So, at the Ulm school of design,
Bauhaus graduate Max Bill sought “to make the design process more readily accessible and easy
to understand,” and thereby “to facilitate cross-disciplinary work, for example with anthropology
and psychology.”36
Figure 5. William Morris’ 1880 exhortation for useful, beautiful design32.
32Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Image of William Morris’ 1880 Exhortation (2015).
33Nikil Saval, How Bauhaus Redefined What Design Could Do for Society, N.Y. TIMES STYLE MAG. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/t-magazine/bauhaus-school-architecture-history.html.
34Morris Letter, supra note 31. See infra Figure 5.
35The maxim originates with American modernist architect, Louis Sullivan, who wrote:
It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things physical and metaphysical, of all things
human and all things superhuman, of all true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is
recognizable in its expression, that form ever follows function.
Louis H. Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered, LIPPINCOTT’S MAG., Mar. 1896, at 403–09. See also
JONATHAN BALDWIN & LUCIENNE ROBERTS, VISUAL COMMUNICATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 49 (2006) (interviewing
Neville Brody).
36During the planning phase, “Bill succeeded in transforming the concept from a political school with integrated art, to a
design school that integrated some political education.” David Oswald, The Information Department at the Ulm School of
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Thereafter, as design was evermore associated with consumerism, designers across the world
have pushed back with regular attempts to highlight its ever-present political dimensions. Perhaps
most famously, in 1964, UK-based designer Ken Garland launched First Things First, a rather
Arts and Craft-y/Bauhaus-y “manifesto,” calling on designers to take more responsibility for
their practice. It was restated in broader terms in 2000 and 2014, and now calls to address
“environmental, social and cultural crises.”37
In recent years, design has come to be applied—across a wide range of private, public,
and civil society contexts—to create or enhance not only “physical products” but also
“services, strategies and policies.”38 This movement towards what is often referred to by
the—misleadingly partial—moniker of “design thinking”39 has been especially pronounced
in countries such as the UK and Germany that are home to well-developed design sectors.
For example, globally, Germany and the UK ranked 4th and 5th respectively for their per capita
design-related exports in 2015. While the UK “has the largest design sector” in Europe and its
government was “one of the first to recognise the power of design” in the private and public
policy sectors,40 the Policy Lab of the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs uses
“design thinking labs” to promote “cooperative thinking.”41 Anglo-German influence over design
thinking discourse is to be found in an ever-growing collection of frameworks42—variously
described as systems, toolkits, guides, and so on. For example, the Design Council—which is
an independent charity and adviser to the UK Government on design—produced in 2004 a
globally influentialDoubleDiamond, visualizing four phases in designprocesses:Discover, define,
develop, and deliver.43 Likewise, a largely German team of independent designers was behind the
globally influential This is Service Design Thinking project, which centers on three designerly
tools: Personas, maps, and prototypes.44
Proponents of “design thinking” see it as “a cognitive style” that can serve as a “resource for
organizations.”45 However, as the pioneers of the Arts and Crafts movement and the Bauhaus
always already knew, design is much more than a way of thinking. It is a sociomaterial prac-
tice—that is, a “routinized . . . behavior” including bodily and mental activities, “‘things’ and their
use,” “background knowledge,” know-how, emotion, and motivation. Seen as a practice, “design
thinking” comprises not merely the thoughts and actions of individuals, but rather “dynamic
Design, in DESIGN FRONTIERS: TERRITORIES, CONCEPTS, TECHNOLOGIES 68 (Priscilla Lena Farias, Anna Calvera, Marcos da
Costa Braga & Zuleica Schincariol eds., 2012).
37Ken Garland, First Things First Manifesto, Address at the Institute of Contemporary Arts (Dec. 1963), in First Things
First, KEN GARLAND, http://kengarland.co.uk/KG-published-writing/first-things-first (last visited Aug. 16, 2020); First Things
First Manifesto 2000, EYE MAG., http://www.eyemagazine.com/feature/article/first-things-first-manifesto-2000 (last visited
Aug. 16, 2020); First Things First 2014 initiated by Cole Peters Available at http://firstthingsfirst2014.org (Accessed
Dec. 4, 2018). See RUBEN PATER, THE POLITICS OF DESIGN: A (NOT SO) GLOBAL MANUAL FOR VISUAL COMMUNICATION
(BIS 2016).
38LUCY KIMBELL, APPLYING DESIGN APPROACHES TO POLICY MAKING: DISCOVERING POLICYLAB (2015); CHRISTIAN BASON,
DESIGN FOR POLICY (2014).
39Lucy Kimbell, Rethinking Design Thinking: Part I, 3 DESIGN & CULTURE 285 (2011).
40DESIGN COUNCIL, THE DESIGN ECONOMY 34–36 (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.designcouncil.org.uk/resources/report/
design-economy-2015-report.
41The Policy Lab, GERMAN FED. MINISTRY LAB. & SOC. AFFS., https://www.denkfabrik-bmas.de/en/ (last visited Aug. 16,
2020).
42See TOOLBOX, https://www.toolboxtoolbox.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2020) (displaying the collection of toolkits curated
on Toolbox).
43DESIGN COUNCIL, THE DESIGN PROCESS: WHAT IS THE DOUBLE DIAMOND?, http://www.designcouncil.org.uk/news-
opinion/design-process-what-double-diamond (last visited Aug 16, 2020).
44MARC STICKDORN, ADAM LAWRENCE, MARKUS EDGAR HORMNESS & JAKOB SCHENIDER, THIS IS SERVICE DESIGN DOING
SEBASTOPOL (2018).
45Lucy Kimbell, Rethinking Design Thinking: Part II, 4 DESIGN & CULTURE: J. DESIGN STUD. F. 129, 142 (2012).
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configurations of minds, bodies, objects, discourses, knowledge, structures/processes and
agency.”46 So it makes more sense to think in terms of sociomaterial “designerly ways.”47
Since at least 2001, there has been an increasingly concerted and global effort to apply design—
more often “design thinking” than “designerly ways”—in the legal sphere.48 Initially, the focus was
on visualizing legal instruments such as contracts,49 while recent efforts have addressed more stra-
tegic and systemic concerns.50 As I have argued elsewhere, the rise of what we now call “legal
design”51 can be both explained and justified by the existence of important “points of contact”
between “lawyerly concerns” and “designerly ways.” On the one hand, drawing on Roger
Cotterrell, I argue that lawyers need to communicate; they need to balance structure/unity and
freedom/diversity; and they need to be at once practical, critical, and imaginative. On the other
hand, drawing on social designer Ezio Manzini, I argue that designerly ways—especially the
emphasis on communication, experimentation, and making things visible and tangible—can
improve communication and generate new spaces of “structured freedom,” in which lawyers
can be simultaneously practical, critical, and imaginative.52 Given these synergies, I have argued
that attention ought also to be paid to the potential of design to enhance legal, especially socio-
legal, research.
D. Designerly Ways for socio-legal Community?
A key insight emerging from my research into the potential of design to help us understand and
enhance socio-legal research methodology is that designerly ways can help us more productively
to navigate the tension between structure and freedom that is inherent in socio-legal research.
That tension manifests not only in law’s (in)ability to promote social unity from and for diversity,
but also in scholarly (in)ability to promote conceptual unity from and for diversity and, relatedly,
the (in)ability of academic communities to promote social unity from and for diversity among
their members. For example, in his presentation at the Berlin workshop underpinning this
Special Issue, Timur Bocharov explored one specific difference between the two jurisdictions
(Figure 6)—namely, a lack of conceptual agreement around “legal culture” in socio-legal schol-
arship coming from the UK; and, in stark contrast, a clear consensus among German scholars
around the concept of “Recht als Kultur”—that is, founded in the home-grown classical sociology
of Max Weber and Georg Simmel.53 And this divergence may be symptomatic of the fact, as noted
46Id. at 134–36, 142.
47Cross, supra note 22, at 49.
48Here, I have borrowed “mindsets,” “processes,” and “tools” from IDEO—which itself uses other terms in the same report.
IDEO, FIELD GUIDE TO HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN (2019). In the past, I have referred to designerly ways in terms of “skills,
knowledge and attitudes.”Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Legal Design for Practice, Activism, Policy and Research, 46 J.L. & SOC’Y 185
(2019).
49See Colette R. Brunschwig, Contract Comics and the Visualization, Audio-Visualization and Multisensorialization of Law,
46 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 191 (2019); Colette R. Brunschwig, Visualisierung von rechtsnormen: Legal Design (“Visualization of
Legal Norms: Legal Design”), 45 SCHULTHESS JURISTISCHE MEDIEN (2001).
50See also Helena Haapio & Margaret Hagan, Design Patterns for Contracts, in NETWORKS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INFORMATICS SYMPOSIUM 381, 383 (Erich Schweighofer, Franz Kummer, Walter Hötzendorfer &
Georg Borges eds., 2016); LAW BY DESIGN, http://www.lawbydesign.co/en/home/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2020); Stefania
Passera, Beyond the Wall of Contract Text: Visualizing Contracts to Foster Understanding and Collaboration Within and
Across Organizations (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Aalto University).
51A consensus is building around the Legal Design Alliance definition of legal design as “an interdisciplinary approach to
apply human-centred design to prevent or solve legal problems.” LEGAL DESIGN ALLIANCE, https://www.legaldesignalliance.
org (last visited Aug. 16, 2020).
52Perry-Kessaris 2019.
53Timur Bocharov, Presentation at “Socio-Legal Studies in Germany and the UK: Theory and Methods”: Legal Culture
v. Recht als Kultur: The UK and German Approaches to Law and Culture (Sept. 24, 2019).
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above, that German socio-legal culture is perceived to be relatively structured and UK socio-legal
culture is perceived to be relatively free. What might be the impact of any difference in general
aversion/adherence to canon, or in divergence in the content of said canon, on the possibility of
future Anglo-German collaboration on socio-legal research? And might it be overcome with the
aid of design?
I. Socio-Legal Model-Making
Multiple sub-fields, such as transition design and social innovation design, have seen designers
collaborating with communities through design for more or less radical social change.55 For
Figure 6. Live-tweeted visual summary of presentation by Timur Bocharov on “Legal Culture v. Recht als Kultur: the
UK and German Approaches to Law and Culture” at “Socio-Legal Studies in Germany and the UK: Theory and
Methods”54.
54Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Screenshot of a Tweet During Timur Bocharov’s Presentation, Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019, 11:38
AM), https://twitter.com/aperrykessaris/status/1176445860449792000?s=20.
55EZIO MANZINI, DESIGN, WHEN EVERYBODY DESIGNS 11 (MIT, 2015); ROBIN MURRAY, JULIE CAULIER-GRICE & GEOFF
MULGAN, THE OPEN BOOK OF SOCIAL INNOVATION (NESTA, 2010), https://youngfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
10/The-Open-Book-of-Social-Innovationg.pdf.
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example, social innovation designers provoke and facilitate us—“diffuse designers”—to work col-
laboratively for social change by approaching our own field of expertise or life in “design mode.”57
Here, the intended users of the social design output—which may be, for example, an artifact, envi-
ronment, service, or event—become “co-researchers and co-designers exploring and defining the
issue, and generating and prototyping ideas.”58
Between 2016–2017, I drew on these practices to run a series of experiments in the UK that
eventually included around 100 researchers and focused on how we might make socio-legal ideas
“visible and tangible,” and how that might affect the social dimensions of socio-legal research.
Participant researchers engaged in individual and collaborative model-making in relation to their
ongoing projects. The primary outcome of those experiments was an open-access guide introduc-
ing three forms of socio-legal model-making (See infra Figure 7): ‘Modular” model-making, in
which systems such as LEGO are used primarily for the practical purpose of explaining; “found”
model-making, in which stumbled-upon or curated items are used primarily for the critical
purpose of generating new perspectives; and “bespoke” model-making, in which artifacts are
made—for example—from clay, primarily for the imaginative purpose of speculating about
new possibilities.59
Figure 7. A guide to socio-legal model-making, designed to be downloaded and folded into a booklet56.
56Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Image of a Guide to socio-legal Model-Making (2017).
57Id. at 31, 77.
58KIMBELL, supra note 38, at 64.
59See socio-legal Model Making, AMANDA PERRY-KESSARIS, https://amandaperrykessaris.org/modelmaking; Amanda
Perry-Kessaris, socio-legal Model Making, VIMEO, https://vimeo.com/album/4228144 (video collection).
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The most potentially significant of these instances of socio-legal model-making occurred
during the compulsory postgraduate Research Methods in Law module at Kent Law School, which
became distinctly more social and more communal as a result. The module runs for autumn and
spring terms. A model-making session is held towards the end of the first term. The session is
based around an A3 landscape printed worksheet on which participants from all over the world
are asked to use a LEGO set to complete three builds relating to their research project61: First, they
build a representation of their project, focusing on key concepts, actors, and relationships; second,
they add in a representation of themselves in relation to the representation of the project; third,
they build a representation of what they hope their project will be in the future. More experienced
student researchers attend the session to act as mentors. Participants are encouraged to video or
photograph the process throughout to remind themselves of how their build progressed; to
explain their model to other participants, especially mentors; to ask each other questions about
the models of others, and to offer critical feedback. Feedback reveals that model-making not only
helps participants to better understand their research but also reminds them of the need to “dis-
cuss our projects more, to learn more from each other.” They provoked and facilitated to form
trusting relationships with each other, and to engage in depth with each other’s projects; and these
relationships extend beyond their cohort. A sociomaterial community of practice is formed
(Figure 8).
It is particularly gratifying—and relevant to the present context—that students, such as
Steve Crawford, have transferred socio-legal design skills learned at Kent Law School to other
postgraduate and faculty in the UK and elsewhere in Europe,62 including to postgraduate
Figure 8. Postgraduate research students modelling their projects at Kent Law School60.
60Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Photograph of Students Modeling Projects at Kent Law School (2018).
61The purchase was provoked by my attendance at a LEGO-based workshop on “Exploring Stuckness,” run by Graham
Barton, Academic Support Coordinator at Central St Martins, University of the Arts, London.
62Steve Crawford, Reflection on Socio-Legal Research Methods, SOCIO-LEGAL STUD. ASS’N BLOG, http://slsablog.co.uk/blog/
blog-posts/reflection-on-socio-legal-research-methods/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2020).
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researchers Lisa Hahn and Siddharth de Souza, who have in turn introduced it to the postgraduate
research community at Humboldt University in Berlin via their vibrant socio-legal Lab, on
which more below.
II. Making Anglo-German socio-legal Research Community?
The question that arises then is whether designerly ways might be especially well-suited to
facilitating Anglo-German cooperation around socio-legal research. Visual summaries of the kind
that I live-tweeted during the workshop63 (See infra Figures 1, 6) are one simple example. But what
if, for example, by collaboratively making our ideas visible and tangible—in material models or
even virtually—we might generate a sense of community among UK and German socio-legal
researchers?
For a transnational precedent, we can look to the inaugural conference of “The IEL
Collective”—a collaboration of academics and practitioners from across the world who aim
to work inclusively to “stimulate conversations about plurality, representation and critical-
ity”—in the field of International Economic Law.64 Like any possible future effort at promoting
Anglo-German socio-legal community, the Collective can be framed as a “prefigurative”
endeavor, in the sense that its participants seek to “perform present-day life in the terms that
are wished-for,” both in order “to experience a better” present, and “to advance” future
change”.65 Returning to the normative agenda outlined above, we can see that for the IEL
Collective collaboratively to protect and promote the “wellbeing” of international economic
law as a “practical idea” requires unified-yet-diverse thinking. It is only by bringing diverse
conceptual frames, empirical examples, and normative agendas into the same space that we
can really respect, understand, and use them in practical, critical, and imaginative ways.
Collaborative mindsets, tools, and processes are not part of traditional legal scholarship and
practice. Might they be introduced though model-making? This was the question that motivated
me to propose the co-production of an IEL-Pop-Up Collection as part of the IEL Collective
inaugural conference held at Warwick Law School in November 2019.66
The Pop-Up Collection was designed to make unity from and for diversity, visibly and tangibly,
and in prefigurative spirit. Delegates from across the world were invited to bring with them to the
conference an artifact (object or image) that they felt was relevant to their approach to, or under-
standing of, International Economic Law, thatwas either found ormade, and thatwould fit on anA5
page.Most delegates had nevermet, andwere unlikely to have engaged in such an activity in the past,
but these barriers to engagement were offset by the context—that is, the warm, inclusive, and non-
hierarchical approach of the people at the heart of the Collective; and via specific social media
prompts (Figure 9). During the conference, the artifacts were placed on designed A5 cards in the
formof a grid. Arrows printed on the cards indicated possible points of contact or influence between
the artifacts, and the approaches to or understandings of IEL that delegates intended them to re-
present. For example, Figure 10 shows delegates handling and discussing an artifact, made by
Gamze Erdem Turkelli, to represent International Economic Law as a black box. On opening,
we find plain notes representing the international economic activities—trade, investment, and
aid—and elaborate bejeweled notes representing the promised benefits of engaging in such activ-
ities—for example, prosperity. Eventually, we realize that the box contains another hidden layer full
of decentered concerns, such as climate change, colonialism, and gender. The Collection grew,
63See infra Figures 1, 6.
64Disrupting Narratives and Pluralising Engagement in International Economic Law Scholarship, Teaching and Practice, IEL
COLLECTIVE, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/centres/globe/ielcollective/about/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2020).
65Davina Cooper, Prefiguring the State, 49 ANTIPODE 335 (2017).
66Amanda Perry-Kessaris, The IEL Pop-Up Collection, AMANDA PERRY-KESSARIS, https://amandaperrykessaris.org/
collections/iel-pop-up-collection/.
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Figure 9. IEL Pop-Up Collection display cards as social media prompt67.
Figure 10. Delegates interacting with models at the IEL Collective inaugural conference in Warwick68.
67Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Screenshot of a Tweet During a Discussion on Pathways to socio-legal Scholarship, Twitter
(Nov. 3, 2019, 12:18 PM), https://twitter.com/aperrykessaris/status/1190966533176074240?s=20.
68Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Photograph of Delegates Interacting with Models at the IEL Collective (2019).
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shrank, grew again, and moved to a new venue over the course of the two days—a quiet, shifting
presence. The impact of the Collection, and of the event, was extended through video tweets of such
discussions.70 This experiment was successful in generating a “structured-yet-free” prefigurative
space for practical, critical, and imaginative thinking—both individual and collective. That space
was necessarily limited by the usual constraints of time and attention, all the more so in the context
of the heady and transformative atmosphere of the wider IELCollective conference. But it is there to
be reactivated at future events, and deepened via an online collection of commentaries.71
What evidence is there that it might be possible and productive to conduct an Anglo-German
Socio-Legal Studies variant of this experiment? One reason for hope is the Socio-Legal Lab at
Humboldt, which seeks:
[T]o create an environment that facilitates collaboration in research, to provide a commu-
nication space that is open and safe for wide-ranging discussions, and to create communities
of support for researchers such that they feel empowered to voice their anxieties and to test
and incubate new ideas.72
It can be seen as designerly, in the sense that it promotes experimentation—both with different
methods and with “different ways of communicating research,” including visualization
(See Figure 11)—to determine “what works best in conversation and cooperation with others.”
Although it is explicitly disruptive in orientation, it has been supported by institutions—such as the
Law and Society Institute Berlin and the Berliner Arbeitskreis Rechtswirklichkeit (Berlin Working
Figure 11. Brainstorming the interrelations between law and society69.
69Lisa Hahn & Sisddarth de Souza, Photograph of Brainstorming Session at the IEL Collective (2020).
70See Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Making Unity from and for Diversity: The IEL Pop-Up Collection, AMANDA PERRY-
KESSARIS (Nov. 9, 2019), https://amandaperrykessaris.org/2019/11/09/making-unity-from-and-for-diversity-the-iel-
pop-up-collection/.
71Pop Up Museum of Legal Objects, AMANDA PERRY-KESSARIS, https://amandaperrykessaris.org/collections/pop-up-
museum-of-legal-objects-2017/.
72Lisa Hahn & Siddharth de Sousa, Introduction to the Blog Symposium: The Socio-Legal Lab as a Didactic Format,
RECHTSWIRKLICHKEIT BLOG (Mar. 12, 2020), https://barblog.hypotheses.org/3437.
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Group on Socio-Legal Studies, BAR)—and attracted participants from across Germany.73 So it is
safe to predict that at least some of its innovations will be absorbed into the German mainstream.
Lest we forget, the UK and Germany share darker histories too, not least a propensity for
empire-building. Much remains to be done in both jurisdictions to face the past, present, and
future effects of those histories. For example, Philipp Dann has observed a “contemporary amne-
sia,” both regarding the pursuit by the German state of empire outside Europe (18751919) and
within Europe (19391945), and regarding East and West German scholarly critiques of empire-
building by the “other side” during the Cold War.74 This shared imperial history is relevant here
because mainstream visions of design are—like law—infused with a particular social and political
history. Design began to emerge as “an aspect of every day” during the Industrial Revolution
because mechanization focused attention on making, and because European societies became
“pervaded by expert knowledge and discourses.” Over time, Eurocentric conceptions of design
were exported, not least via empire, as part and parcel of the “universalizing ontology of dominant
forms of modernity.” So, argues Arturo Escobar, if design is to play a role in meaningful social
change—especially in non-European and postcolonial contexts—it must first “be creatively reap-
propriated.”75 Any proposal to use designerly ways to promote Anglo-German socio-legal com-
munity must be open—proactively inclusive of all, especially those stakeholders whose
perceptions, expectations, and experiences might otherwise be ignored.
E. Conclusion
My initial workshop preparation strategy was to look for signs of Anglo-German life in my niche
field of study. This led me to questions that I would never otherwise have considered, and to
answers that are both surprising and reassuring to me as a UK-based transnationalist in
Brexity times. In particular, design communities in the UK and Germany can both lay substantial
and roughly equal claims to establishing design as a socially-attuned discipline; and while I have
since been initiating the systematic exploration of design’s potential for socio-legal research, early
career researchers have been early adopters and innovators in Germany. Long may this story of
mutual Anglo-German provocation and appreciation continue.
The combined effect of Anglo-German scholarship and practice is to teach us that a “socio-
logical imagination”76 is essential if we are to fully understand possible synergies between design
and socio-legal research, and the risks and rewards of activating them. At the time of writing,
social relations of all kinds are being strained, broken, deepened, and reinvented to accommodate
the material threats posed by a global pandemic; all on the back of sustained pressure relations,
perhaps especially Anglo-German relations, arising from Brexit; and all in the context of the rise of
other nationalistic movements across the world. We cannot know what socio-legal research will or
ought to look like in the coming months and years. My own experience of pandemic-lockdowns-
as-natural-experiment has made visible to me how important sociomaterial interaction with my
socio-legal community is, and reinforced my conviction that we must pay more attention to
designing those moments that we are lucky enough to share in person.
73Siddharth De Souza. Personal communication. See also Lisa Hahn & Siddharth de Souza, The Socio-Legal Lab: Beyond
Methods, RECHTSWIRKLICHKEIT BLOG (May 29, 2018), https://barblog.hypotheses.org/2047.
74Philipp Dann, Presentation at the Law and Development Research Network Conference: German Histories of Law and
Development (Sept. 25–27, 2019).
75ARTURO ESCOBAR, DESIGNS FOR THE PLURIVERSE: RADICAL INTERDEPENDENCE, AUTONOMY AND THE MAKING OF
WORLDS xi, 19, 32, 66 (2017).
76C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (Penguin Books 1970) (1959).
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Abstract
This Article considers the development of urban law. It suggests that urban law is socio-legal in its explo-
ration of law’s role in the production of the city and urban life, enabling the study of the city as a distinctive
legal entity. Addressing the question “why urban law?,” this Article considers similar debates in geography
and urban policy before developing three arguments for studying urban law: (i) urbanism is a vibrant field
of scholarly research; (ii) socio-legal research can take an explicitly normative focus in pursuit of improving
urban quality; and (iii) at a city scale we can investigate governance concepts of territory, sovereignty and
jurisdiction. One of the difficulties with urban law is finding the right level of analysis, covering sufficient
legal and empirical detail whilst also making the city legible at an urban scale. Although this tension pro-
duces imperfect compromises, accepting the limitations means that we can begin the shared task of devel-
oping an intellectual infrastructure, a grammar, for the study of urban law.
Keywords: Urban law; socio-legal studies; law and society
A. Introduction
The extent of urban life is extraordinary. Half of humanity, 3.5 billion people, now live in cities
with numbers expected to rise to over sixty percent by 2030.1 Employment opportunities, cultural
diversity and connections attract people to urban areas, producing both increased density and
sprawl. Yet cities are not just the sum of their populations—they have distinctive social, spatial,
cultural, political, military, and economic characteristics. Writing in 1931, Chicago sociologist
Lewis Wirth highlighted the capacity of cities for soft governance:
The influences which cities exert upon the social life of man are greater than the ratio of the
urban population would indicate, for the city is not only in ever larger degrees the dwelling-
place and the workshop of modern man, but it is the initiating and controlling center of
economic, political, and cultural life that has drawn the most remote parts of the world into
its orbit and woven diverse areas, peoples, and activities into a cosmos.2
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Urbanism, for Wirth, is a way of life, a collective endeavor, a “complex of traits which makes up
the characteristic mode of life in cities.”3
And yet despite the acknowledged significance of cities to modern society, or urbanism as a
process, urban law remains under-developed as a field of study. Although scholars investigate
housing, environmental, protest, or economic development law in cities, there is—so far—a rel-
ative lack of scholarship examining how cities produce regulation, rules, and policies and, corre-
spondingly, how regulation, rules, and policies co-produce cities. Drawing on a wide range of legal
methodologies—socio-legal, comparative, or doctrinal analysis—urban law can study the city as a
distinctive legal entity.
Urban law is most identifiable as a cohesive sub-discipline in the United States. Here, scholars
analyze both individual legal aspects of housing, zoning or planning, licensing, sustainability, con-
sumer protection, poverty, race, and data law, as well as relationships between national and state
government. Even in America, however, Nestor Davidson, Director of Fordham’s Urban Law
Center, calls for “a renewed appreciation of urban law as a distinctive enterprise,” registering a
decline in forty years of scholarship since Fordham’s Urban Law Journal was launched.4
This apparent absence of scholarship raises an academic question: How should we understand
urban law? In Europe, there are few programmatic academic investigations, with the notable
exception of Jean Bernard Auby’s pathbreaking Droit de la Ville, praised as “le seul manuel
dèdié à cet objet,” synthesizing materials for lawyers and non-lawyers alike.5 International lawyers,
including Helmut Philipp Aust in Germany, have raised questions about how cities are beginning
to assert themselves as internationally relevant actors through addressing climate change law or
human rights implementation.6 European criminologists have long studied the city and its effects,
suggesting that “to understand crime has been in many ways to understand the city.”7 Legal and
critical theorists have tilted the lens, with Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos crafting an
understanding of the city as a lawscape—embodying mutuality, and grasped as “the ever
receding horizon of prior invitation by the one (the law/the city) to be conditioned by the other
(the city/the law)”8, capturing the interaction between law and urban living. Other than these
interventions, however, European urban law is still largely underdeveloped. To adapt the words
of James Baldwin, one of America’s most famous expatriates, European cities have “a sense of the
mysterious and inexorable limits of life,” but we have still to inculcate a sufficiently American
“sense of life’s possibilities.”9
When studying cities, we often see urban analyses couched in disciplinary specialties.
Geologists see rock formations, healthcare experts identify the scope for pandemic transmissions,
economists and political geographers focus on financial flows, engineers appreciate load risks,
historians track past lives and events, while social scientists observe urban cultures and politics.
Few, so far, have looked for the legal gridlines that structure the city, producing relationships
between cities and citizens, states, and national parliaments. Legal frameworks govern housing,
transportation, and infrastructure, regulatory provisions and practices are critical to understand-
ing policing, cultural innovation, and promotion of sustainable development. While urban studies
3Id. at 4–7.
4Nestor Davidson,What is Urban Law Today? An Introductory Essay in Honor of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1579, 1579 (2016).
5JEAN-BERNARD AUBY, DROIT DE LA VILLE: DU FONCTIONNEMENT JURIDIQUE DES VILLES AU DROIT À LA VILLE 348 (2016);
Julien Betaille, Jean-Bernard Auby, Droit de la ville – Du fonctionnement juridique des villes au droit à la Ville, 2013, 38 REVUE
JURIDIQUE DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT 385, 385 (2013).
6H.P. Aust, Shining Cities on the Hill? The Global City, Climate Change, and International Law, 26 EUR. J. INT. L. 255, 278
(2015).
7ROWLAND ATKINSON & GARETH MILLINGTON, URBAN CRIMINOLOGY: THE CITY, DISORDER, HARM AND SOCIAL CONTROL
1 (2018).
8ANDREAS PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, LAW AND THE CITY 10 (2007).
9JAMES BALDWIN, NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME 12 (2013).
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have long been driven by debates about the appropriate level of analysis, balancing micro with
macro, case studies, and theory, legal analysis is often beyond this cross-disciplinary boundary.
By drawing regulation, rules, and policies into urban studies, urban law can contribute to these
cross-disciplinary debates, asking how cities are legally co-produced, managing themselves, their
residents—both human and otherwise—as well as their landscapes, financial flows, and
reputations.
For socio-legal scholars, studying the city enables us to ask questions in action, that leitmotif of
law in society work. We can focus on both processes and perspectives, understanding law as an
ongoing dynamic activity, full of compromise, negotiation, and meaning-making. Urban lawyers
can borrow from urban anthropologists who investigate modern urban life not only “in the city,”
but also “of the city.”10 The city is more than a background location for fieldwork; the urban
becomes the research question: How is urban life created, governed, and experienced? To under-
stand the city from a socio-legal perspective, we do of course need to be open to the difficulties of
being comprehensive, avoiding reduction where possible, whilst also acknowledging the need to
retain legibility. It is not a simple task to study urban law, but it is one that is both timely and
inviting.
B. Socio-Legal Studies and Methodology
Is urban law a socio-legal form of study? To answer this question, we need a working definition.
For some scholars, socio-legal studies foregrounds society. Susan Silbey, argues, for example, that
socio-legal studies require “a doubling of the social, both the subject and the method.”11 Other
formulations understand socio-legal studies as the multidisciplinary studies of law and legal insti-
tutions. Such a framing puts law at the center—not “law first” necessarily—but identifying law
and legal institutions as the subject of study, noting that “law” here can include rules, customs,
norms, and practices because socio-legal scholars rarely confine their analysis to legislation, case
law, or other formal sources. In this characterization, socio-legal studies can include doctrinal legal
analyses, understanding the legal landscape to ground other empirical research or providing a
basis from which to argue for reform.12
This broader formulation of socio-legal studies suggests that even when legal analytical meth-
ods predominate, if it is society rather than “law in books” that is under the microscope, it is the
shift of subject—from law to society—that confers socio-legal significance to the research.13 We
are altering our focus, as Carrie MenkelMeadows explains, from the formalism of jurisprudence
—“what” is law—or doctrinal studies of law—“what is” the law—to instead concerning ourselves
with “what does law do?”14 So urban socio-legal studies investigate what urban law does, how it cre-
ates urban structures, policies, and practices, which themselves contribute to spatial, social, economic,
cultural, and historical factors to produce the city itself.
10RIVKE JAFFE & ANOUK DE KONING, INTRODUCING URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY (2015).
11Susan S. Silbey,What Makes a Social Science of Law? Doubling the Social in Socio-Legal Studies, in EXPLORING THE ‘SOCIO’
OF SOCIO-LEGAL STUD. 20–36 (Dermot Feenan ed., 2013), 20.
12Sarah Blandy, Socio-legal Approaches to Property Law Research, in RESEARCHING PROPERTY L. 24–42 (Susan Bright &
Sarah Blandy eds., 2016).
13Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986); Joel F Handler, Postmodernism,
Protest, and the New Social Movements, in THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 697 (1992); David Nelken, Law in Action or Living
Law? Back to the Beginning in Sociology of Law, 4 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 157 (1984); Susan S. Silbey, Everyday Life and
the Constitution of Legality, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE 332 (2007); Mariana Valverde,
“Which Side Are You On?”Uses of the Everyday in Socio-legal Scholarship, 26 POL. & L. ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 86, 86–98 (2003).
14Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Uses and abuses of socio-legal studies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND
METHODS 35–57, 39 (Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, & Kirsten McConnachie eds., 1 ed. 2019).
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I. Qualitative Research
To investigate the interaction between law and society, methodologies and methods are articulated
through a research design. Empirical socio-legal researchers use both qualitative and quantitative
methods to empirically test their theories and hypotheses. Qualitative socio-legal research is
predominantly naturalistic, ethnographic, and/or participatory, looking for evidence of mean-
ing-making. Here, methodologies draw primarily from social science and humanities research,
including, increasingly, anthropology. Many legal scholars would also argue that legal research,
insofar as it draws on legislation, case law, and policy documents, is itself empirical, being con-
cerned with observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic. Lisa Webley explains the
connection, suggesting that “[m]any common law practitioners are unaware that they undertake
qualitative empirical legal research on a regular basis—the case-based method of establishing the
law through analysis of precedent is in fact a form of qualitative research using documents as
source material.”15
We can use qualitative research, defined broadly to include doctrinal, comparative, and law-in-
context approaches, to investigate cities encompassing the many, the diverse, and the outsiders. As
Hendrik Hartog explained in Pigs and Positivism, customs, histories, people, buildings, sightlines,
and even pigs can make up a city.16 When an 1819 judgment prohibited the animals from running
freely in the streets of New York, preferring judicial reasoning to established custom, this “creation
of a modern bureaucracy, the transformation of relatively self-sufficient artisans and mechanics
into a working class, and the growth of a commercial rural agriculture dedicated to feeding urban
residents” combined to present a coherent articulation of nineteenth century urban modernity.17
For Hartog, it enabled the city to be “derived imaginatively” from the judgment prohibiting the
pigs.18 Analyzing the judgment is a form of qualitative research, making meaning from the deci-
sion to better understand urban governance, reading decisions for both their ratio and for their
absences, in this case the legal customs, everyday practices, and the perspectives of excluded par-
ticipants, in this case, the pigs.
We must, as Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos explains, be careful of our vantage
points and blind spots in urban law.19 We all experience “the city” differently, not least due
to race, gender, age, or additional needs with racism, gender vulnerability, and ableist infra-
structures often built into the fabric of cities. One famous story concerns the decision by
Robert Moses to design bridges on parkways running through Long Island to be too low to
allow regular use by buses, thereby preventing the twothirds of New Yorkers who did not have
access to a car from visiting the State’s beaches.20 In his biography of Moses, Robert Caro sug-
gests that was a conscious decision, embedding political decisions in concrete rather than rely-
ing on legal restrictions:
Mr. Moses did this because he knew that something might happen after he was dead and
gone. He wrote legislation [clauses prohibiting the use of pathways by “buses or other com-
mercial vehicles”] but he knew you could change the legislation. You can’t change a bridge
after it’s up. And the result of this is that a bus from New York couldn’t use the parkways if
we wanted it to.21
15Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
RESEARCH 927, 927 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
16Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 4 WIS. L. REV. 899 (1985).
17Id. at 912.
18Id. at 911–12.
19PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, supra note 8.
20See also, Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 121–36 (1980).
21ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 952 (2015).
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In this New York context, anyone lacking access to a car could not rely on buses to use the
roads. The rules permitting Moses to determine the height of bridges despite their discriminatory
effect, provided a physical legacy still felt today, illustrating how rules can be built into the urban
infrastructure itself. Pouring Moses’ decision-making into concrete made the prejudiced assump-
tions about who should leave the city to visit the beach both spatially difficult and expensive to
alter. Similarly, the protection of statues of men involved in slavery or oppression by heritage
bodies has caused huge pain and unhappiness to urban residents, prompting extra-legal responses
to administrative procedures of officials.22 By recognizing these interrelationships, using qualita-
tive research methods including close reading of texts, interviews, participant observations, and site
visits, socio-legal scholars can investigate urban law as an ongoing dynamic activity—identifying how
legal provisions, practices, customs, bridges, statues or pigs order the city.
II. Quantitative Research
Legal quantitative research does not differ significantly from quantitative research in other dis-
ciplines. Socio-legal scholars still design their projects, collect and code data, conduct analyses, and
present results. The biggest difficulty in empirical legal research, as Andrew Epstein and Lee
Martin suggest, is a lack of statistical understanding in their readership, communicating “complex
statistical results to a community lacking in statistical training.”23 As with qualitative research,
quantitative analyses can be exploratory, explanatory, and/or descriptive. Socio-legal scholars
can add to this sustained interrogation of categories, which is premised on legal definitions that
underpin the data.
One area where legal definitions and quantitative assessments interact is in indicators, an
increasingly hot topic in comparative law, with possible implications for urban law. An indicator
has been defined as “a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or
projected performance of different units.”24 The critical aspect here is that the data are “generated
through a process that simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon” and are, “in this
simplified and processed form, : : : capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis
(such as countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically or over time, and to evaluate
their performance by reference to one or more standards.”25
Exploring the genealogy of indicators, investigating how individual criteria have developed, by
whom and for what purpose, has led Sally Merry to identify their “seductive qualities.”26 She raises
the alarm, writing that indicators, “particularly those that rely on ranks or numbers, convey an
aura of objective truth and facilitate comparisons” even while they “typically conceal their political
and theoretical origins and underlying theories of social change and activism : : : [relying] on
practices of measurement and counting that are them-selves opaque.”27 Scoring progress against
indicators encourages partial compliance—and even cheating or changing definitions and assess-
ments of whether compliance has been achieved.28 Scholars are critical of how indicators function
22Briana Millett, Historic England has say on future of Edward Colston statue, BRISTOL POST (June 8, 2020), https://www.
bristolpost.co.uk/news/bristol-news/historic-england-edward-colston-statue-4203119 (last visited Jun 8, 2020).
23Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Quantitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH, 902 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
24Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance, 46 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 71, 73–74 (2012).
25Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Introduction: The Local-Global Life of Indicators: Law, Power,
and Resistance, in THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS 4 (Sally Engle Merry, Kevin E. Davis & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2015).
26SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND SEX
TRAFFICKING (2016).
27Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance: With CA Comment by John
M. Conley, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83, S84 (2011).
28Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Prepare Your Indicators: Economics Imperialism on the Shores of Law and Development, 7 INT’L
J.L. CONTEXT 401, 410 (2011).
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as a technology of governance, noting their “deep managerial roots,” with Amanda Perry-Kassaris’
video providing an excellent representation of how indicators narrow down the view—translating
something into a definition to be counted, relying on a particular form of recognizability—which
may not translate into all contexts and cultures.29 Indicators are both a form of knowledge pro-
duction and a technique of governance, producing both co-option and resistance.30
And yet, despite all of these critiques, indicators are likely to continue in policy evaluations.
They provide a method to attempt to achieve equivalence, critical to any form of comparative
urban assessment. By understanding quantitative data analysis, the legal formulations that under-
pin categorizations, and the critiques of numeric reduction, socio-legal scholars can contribute to
these debates, explaining how legal and numeric taxonomies interact at the urban scale.
III. Urban Law: A Grammar
As analysts, in any discipline, we need some way to make cities legally legible, we cannot see the
city in its legal totality, at a scale of 1:1. This frustration was famously captured by Luis Borges and
Adolfo Bioy Casares’ one-paragraph story, On Exactitude in Science, where the Guild of
Cartographers “struck up a map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which
coincided point for point with it.”31 To map on a scale of 1:1, the cartographers had to create
a map as big as the space they were mapping, and in their case, the Empire. To map the urban
on a scale of 1:1, we would have to create a city.
This necessity for analytical reduction is not only a problem for lawyers. Algebraic equations
make the world readable to scientists, modern economics rests on a central tenet that profit and
loss can be calculated—there are many mechanisms of legibility. If urban law aims to understand
cities, then we need some mechanism of reduction, a form of intellectual infrastructure, to inves-
tigate how cities govern and are governed by people, places, reputations, and things. We cannot
study the city in all its complexity.
So how do we reduce the city to be studied in urban law? One starting point is to attempt to
identify the grammar of urban governance by identifying the key legal frameworks, the laws, cases,
policy documents, practices, and legal cultures that govern cities—including local government
arrangements, economic development, housing, transportation, public and community spaces,
the community as a whole, criminal law and criminology, and infrastructure. We then use the
socio-legal scholar’s toolkit: Theory, qualitative, quantitative, and/or doctrinal legal analysis to
understand how cities are produced by, and produce, law. Socio-legal research investigates
how law constitutes everyday social relations, in this case, in an urban setting. This includes a
focus on administrative rationality, asking how a city sees as well as investigating how the city
is produced, from the ground up.32 Quantitative data sets, including indicators, might be useful
here—noting their limitations—particularly when paired with legal analyses. Although
undoubtedly costly, urban law research can draw on multiple methods, engaging reflexively to
interrogate and strengthen initial theories, questions, and findings.33
The aim is to understand how cities are legally produced with an eye to identifying shared legal
concepts, regulatory approaches and practices, as well as notable differences. We can adopt the
insight, if not the full critique, of Jennifer Robinson, that most urban areas are “ordinary cities,”
29Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Socio-legal model making 3: Conceptualisation (2016), https://vimeo.com/185963121 (last visited
May 15, 2020).
30Morag Goodwin, The Poverty of Numbers: Reflections on the Legitimacy of Global Development Indicators, 13 INT’L J.L.
CONTEXT 485, 486 (2017).
31JORGE LUIS BORGES, COLLECTED FICTIONS 325 (1999).
32Mariana Valverde, Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban Governance:
Seeing Like a City, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 277 (2011).
33See Laura Beth Nielsen, The Need for Multi-Method Approaches in Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
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addressing similar problems—unaffordable housing, transport congestion, and air pollution—
using analogous governance frameworks. Research has often prioritized capital and mega-
cities—such as London, Paris, Shanghai, or New York—yet we need to study cities regardless
of their size. An ordinary city approach avoids hierarchy, privileging the “mega-cities,” “global
cities” or the metropolis over other cities and can help bridge geographical and epistemological
divides, and broadens the number of cities understood as legal governance systems.34 As Belgian
Geographer Nick Schuermans reviewing Robinson’s book notes, challenging the hierarchical pro-
duction of urban theory:
Very rarely, a scholar from the Anglo-Saxon heartland would be expected to cite a Belgian
case study for the sake of the originality of the theory, and not just to embellish his list of
references with a publication from an exotic country imitating and confirming the theories
produced in London, Los Angeles or New York.35
To truly understand the urban everyday, we need to understand “ordinary” as well as “mega” or
“global” cities—assessing both the differences and similarities between them, and producing legal
legibility for analysis.
C. Why “Urban”?
For lawyers, the urban area can fall into administrative boundaries, drawing a line beyond which a
city government’s formal jurisdiction on local affairs does not run. One risk with this bounded
approach is that it can transform urban law into local government or localized administrative law
—raising the argument that we should no more study cities than rural administrative areas. A
related concern is that focusing too much on city boundaries can also prioritize the rights, duties,
and interests of city government—downplaying the significance of land ownership, private capital
flows, ecosystems or movements by people, vehicles or pollutants. More fundamentally, a focus on
local government boundaries misses the quality of urbanism as a way of life.
Such questions are not limited to urban law. One of the most perplexing questions for all urban
scholars—be they in anthropology, sociology, politics, history, or geography—is why we would
distinguish cities from other forms of human settlement. Should we have a specifically urban focus
of analysis? What, if anything, is distinctive about cities or urban places?
Summarizing this critique in the 1980s, DoreenMassey explained that “[e]stablished theory has
on the whole rested content with a rather unthought-out position that there is something called
‘the urban,’ that urban phenomena can be treated as independent variables.”36 This led some geog-
raphers to shift their interests, focusing on networks, mobilities, and global capitalist relations,
aiming to understand cities as part of broader economic, spatial, and social processes.37
Marxist geographers raised questions about whether cities are better understood as facilitating
capitalism, creating a class of workers to service wealth production, or embedding cities within
broader economic and political relations.38 David Harvey, investigating how capital and urban
34JENNIFER ROBINSON, ORDINARY CITIES: BETWEEN MODERNITY AND DEVELOPMENT (2013); SASKIA SASSEN, SOCIOLOGY OF
GLOBALIZATION (2007); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2013); Nick Schuermans,
J. Robinson, Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development. 4, 5 (2009).
35NICK SCHUERMANS, J. ROBINSON, ORDINARY CITIES: BETWEEN MODERNITY AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 4 (2009).
36Doreen Massey, The Urban Land Nexus and the State, London: Pion. (Book Review 1980).
37See generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE URBAN QUESTION: A MARXIST APPROACH (1977); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE CITY
AND THE GRASSROOTS: A CROSS-CULTURAL THEORY OF URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1983); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF
THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2000); JOHN ALLEN ET AL., RETHINKING




processes interact and what they spatially produce, concluded that capital accumulation takes
place within geographical context, producing specific kinds of geographical structures, including
cities.39 Henri Lefebvre suggested that urbanization processes create the conditions for capitalism,
underpinning his claim that “society has been completely urbanized.”40 For scholars studying the
urban effects of empire, relationality proves significant. Colonial cities should not be understood
as a particular category of city, explains Anthony King, but rather as the interaction of distinct
elements, including national society, territory, and location, as well as the particular process of
colonization experienced.41 This critique recognises that urbanism is also a process, challenging
a conception of “the urban” as just a type of place.
There are also geographic boundary criticisms. Where does the city end and the rural start?
How should we understand the causes and effects of urban expansion, decentralization, and sub-
urbanization? Roger Keil has argued that urbanization today “is mainly suburbanization in its
manifold differentiation” with the “form and life of the global suburb” taking “shape in a general
dynamic of multiple centralities and decentralities.”42 Infrastructure is networked, often—though
not always in a “modern infrastructural ideal”—patterning urban and suburban areas in way we
often take for granted outside of rural settlements, where fuel supplies, broadband connections,
and sanitation connections may be missing.43 Given these networked infrastructures, can we effec-
tively draw lines around a city boundary?
A further challenge is to identify the best scale for research, with researchers often finding that
urban inequality occurs in neighborhoods, rather than in cities as a whole. Scholars identify hous-
ing choices and residential mobility as having the capacity to improve neighborhood deprivation
at the neighborhood scale.44 They examine experiences of structural racism, high rates of poverty,
and social isolation in communities suffering from poor infrastructure, job opportunities, and
reputational stigma.45 Economic geographers, in particular, investigate urban difference at a
granular level to try to understand whether living or growing up in certain neighborhoods affects
life chances—even when they are embedded in broader national, regional or city-wide processes
such as recessions, de-industrialization, or local government austerity.46 Scholars researching one
Swedish neighborhood found that “individuals who lived with their parents in a poverty concen-
tration neighborhood, experience negative effects on their income later in life, even seventeen
years after they have left their parental home.”47 Although there is much more that needs to
be understood here, research so far indicates that housing tenure and social welfare programs
39See David Harvey, The Geography of Capitalist Accumulation: A Reconstruction of the Marxian Theory*, 7 ANTIPODE 9
(1975); DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2006); DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY
TO THE URBAN REVOLUTION (2012).
40HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE URBAN REVOLUTION (2003), 1.
41See ANTHONY D. KING, URBANISM, COLONIALISM, AND THE WORLD-ECONOMY (2015).
42Roger Keil, Extended urbanization, “disjunct fragments” and global suburbanisms, 36 ENVIRON PLAN D 494–511, 494
(2018).
43Olivier Coutard, Placing Splintering Urbanism: Introduction, 39 GEOFORUM 1815, 1815–20 (2008); STEVE GRAHAM &
SIMON MARVIN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE CITY: ELECTRONIC SPACES, URBAN PLACES (2002); STEVE GRAHAM &
SIMON MARVIN, SPLINTERING URBANISM: NETWORKED INFRASTRUCTURES, TECHNOLOGICAL MOBILITIES AND THE URBAN
CONDITION (2002).
44WENDA DOFF, PUZZLING NEIGHBOURHOOD EFFECTS: SPATIAL SELECTION, ETHNIC CONCENTRATION AND
NEIGHBOURHOOD IMPACTS (2010).
45WILLIAM JULIUSWILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, SECOND
EDITION (2012).
46JÜRGEN FRIEDRICHS, GEORGE GALSTER & SAKO MUSTERD, LIFE IN POVERTY NEIGHBOURHOODS: EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (2013); DAVID MANLEY ET AL., NEIGHBOURHOOD EFFECTS OR NEIGHBOURHOOD BASED
PROBLEMS?: A POLICY CONTEXT (2013).
47Lina Hedman et al., Cumulative Exposure to Disadvantage and the Intergenerational Transmission of Neighbourhood
Effects, 15 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 195, 207 (2015).
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appear to improve neighborhood outcomes, providing more equitable life chances for children
growing up in deprived urban areas.48
Despite these findings, legal rules and practices are rarely implemented at a neighborhood
scale, with these effects continuing to be poorly understood, despite studies of “the divided city.”49
Neighborhoods have been studied in the context of planning and ideologies of localism, or as
relationships between neighbors.50 Scholars have addressed legal questions at a micro-scale,
particularly on the street or sidewalk, investigating how such interactions are produced and
managed51, and these are important contributions to understanding how urban flows are regu-
lated by people, objects, rules, and practices. However, just as urban studies cannot ignore neigh-
borhood effects on health, wealth or participation, neither can urban law. We need city,
neighborhood, and street-scale analyses to combine if we are to understand urban legal dynamics.
The task is to use the granular findings from streets and neighborhoods to inform a broader
understanding of urban law, even if this widens out our understanding of “the urban”.
Yet another critique of urban law is that governance arrangements vary, with many cities
having only limited jurisdictional scope. Not all can determine economic policies, make their
own transportation improvements, or cap rents. Sometimes responsibility rests with regional gov-
ernance, as with German Länder. At other times, as in the United Kingdom, centralized govern-
ments make the most fundamental urban decisions, limiting local tax raising powers, controlling
local budgets, and mandating rental laws and employment frameworks. Different histories
embodying the legacies of the Hanseatic League or Italian city states have emerged into distinctive
jurisdictional arrangements.52 The task of urban law must acknowledge the variabilities of con-
stitutional law, identifying the powers of cities. Having set out the local government framework,
urban law must then go beyond it, explaining how cities operate in both law and policy in the gaps
that are left—or in the governance fields cities claim, depending on the jurisdiction. Such analyses
can draw work in international law where scholars consider the scale of human rights—investigating
their possibility at the citylevel, questioning the value of legalizing urban citizenship, and analyzing
the effects of framing places as sanctuary cities.53
A broader riposte still to urban law is to ask whether—even if we study deprivation, pollution,
and poor housing quality in cities—we should neglect economic, welfare, or environmental law
outside urban and spatial boundaries. Is housing law not the same inside and outside of cities?
Even if we argue that some policy problems accumulate in certain places, that air quality is worse
in urban areas and high demand can exacerbate poor quality housing, this is not necessarily an
argument for urban law per se.
48FRIEDRICHS, GALSTER & MUSTERD, supra note 46.
49SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN, IAN GORDON & MICHAEL HARLOE, DIVIDED CITIES: NEW YORK & LONDON IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD (1992); ALAN MALLACH, THE DIVIDED CITY: POVERTY AND PROSPERITY IN URBAN AMERICA (2018); CARL H.
NIGHTINGALE, SEGREGATION: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF DIVIDED CITIES (2012).
50See Alexandra Elizabeth Flynn, Re-Imagining Local Governance: The Landscape of “Local” in Toronto, OSGOODE DIGITAL
COMMONS: PHD DISSERTATIONS (2017), https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd/35; Alexandra Flynn & Zachary
Spicer, Re-Imagining Community Councils in Canadian Local Government (2017); Alexandra Flynn & Mariana Valverde,
Planning on the Waterfront: Setting the Agenda for Toronto’s ‘Smart City’ Project, 20 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 769, 769–75
(2019); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (2009).
51NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: SIDEWALKS AND THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC FLOW (2010); Rodrigo Meneses-
Reyes, Out of Place, Still in Motion: Shaping (Im)Mobility Through Urban Regulation, 22 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 335 (2013);
Padmapriya Vidhya-Govindarajan, Who Owns the Sidewalk?: Analysing Spatial Reorganization Amidst Regulation
and Hierarchies in the Pondy Bazaar Street Market, Chennai, India, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN LAW 114
(Nestor M. Davidson & Geeta Tewari eds., 2018).
52SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2008).
53Aust Helmut Philipp, Urban Citizenship – a Status or a Practice?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (JAN. 29, 2020), https://verfassungs-
blog.de/urban-citizenship-a-status-or-a-practice/; Harald Bauder & Dayana A. Gonzalez, Municipal Responses to ‘Illegality’:
Urban Sanctuary across National Contexts, 6 SOC. INCLUSION 124 (2018).
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The imperfect answer to all of these criticisms is that they undoubtedly hold a kernel of truth,
and yet we should still act. Half of humanity, 3.5 billion people, live in cities,54 many in quite
terrible personal circumstances, produced by a lack of regulatory oversight of housing quality,
pollution control, or planned economic development. Urban law gives us a rare opportunity
to engage holistically, investigating how laws interact in time and space from the ground up.
We cannot capture every urban aspect. Instead, urban lawyers attempt to study cities from the
inside, trying to commit to paper how the city operates around us and how legal rules on local
government, finance, transportation, education, sustainability, housing, policing, and protesting
—to name just a few—operate at the same time.
D. Why Urban “Law”?
Taking all these difficulties and limitations on board, we can identify three further sets of reasons
to develop urban law as a field of study: The first is the subject’s potential to contribute to vibrant
interdisciplinary research; the second is to put law in service of improved urban quality; the third
is to further develop legal concepts and understandings of interest to lawyers including gover-
nance, territory, jurisdiction, sovereignty, networks, and money.
I. Urbanism
The first argument for urban law is perhaps the most compelling—urbanism is interesting. In
1973, New York urban lawyer Frank Grad suggested that then, in a period of urban decline, one
contributing factor to the relative lack of urban law scholarship rested on “the many so-called
urbanists who either hate the city or have given up on it.”55 Today, cities and urban living are
back in vogue, providing a growing focus for interdisciplinary research. Cities attract socio-
legal scholars, the intellectual descendants of Ehrlich’s study of “living law,” keen to study
urban rules and practices in urban sites that are still, to some extent, living laboratories—
to use the language of 1930s Chicago sociology. Anthropological and sociological methodol-
ogies and methods, particularly ethnography, interviews, and observations, provide valuable
ways for scholars interested in urban law to gather data to better understand the legal produc-
tion of the city, even if at the moment much of this research is undertaken by scholars with
their initial training outside of law.56
And so, despite the vibrant discourse of urban studies, legally-focused scholarship is, with
notable exceptions, mostly absent.57 Nonetheless, lawyers have much to contribute here, asking
54UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 1.
55Frank P. Grad, The City is Here to Stay, URB. L. ANN. 3, 3 (1973).
56NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING THE CITY: URBAN LAND AND THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY (2004); Mariana Valverde,
Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban Governance, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 277
(2011); INSA LEE KOCH, PERSONALIZING THE STATE: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, POLITICS, AND WELFARE IN AUSTERITY
BRITAIN (2018).
57Phil Hubbard, Kissing is Not a Universal Right: Sexuality, Law and the Scales of Citizenship, 49 GEOFORUM 224 (2013);
Phil Hubbard & Rachela Colosi, Sex, Crime and the City: Municipal Law and the Regulation of Sexual Entertainment, 22 SOC.
& LEGAL STUD. 67 (2013); Jason Prior, Spike Boydell & Philip Hubbard, Nocturnal Rights to the City: Property, Propriety and
Sex Premises in Inner Sydney, 49 URB. STUD. 1837 (2012); Nicholas Blomley, How to Turn a Beggar into a Bus Stop: Law,
Traffic and the “Function of the Place”, 44 URB. STUD. 1697 (2007); Anna Barker et al., Everyday Encounters with Difference in
Urban Parks: Forging ‘Openness to Otherness’ in Segmenting Cities, 15 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 495 (2019); John MacDonald et al.,
The Privatization of Public Safety in Urban Neighborhoods: Do Business Improvement Districts Reduce Violent Crime Among
Adolescents?, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 621 (2013); Mariana Valverde, Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern
Ways of Seeing in Urban Governance: Seeing Like a City, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 277 (2011); Mariana Valverde, Authorizing the
Production of Urban Moral Order: Appellate Courts and Their Knowledge Games, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2005); Ann Varley,
Modest Expectations: Gender and Property Rights in Urban Mexico, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 67 (2010).
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about the significance of property, feeding into debates about urban land acquisition,58 protest and
free expression, policing and urban criminology, and cultural practices—complementing socio-
logical focus not only on people in cities but also people in urban law and society.
Certainly, the ideal type of the European city, so influenced by Weber and his Die Stadt with
its emphasis on urban associations, cannot provide a single template for urban law. Weber’s
“Politico-Administrative concept of the City”59 undoubtedly informs urban life in some coun-
tries but cannot encapsulate all cities in their entirety. In particular, as Weber himself noted,
urbanism as a form of consciousness is distinct from its physical embodiment. Contrasting
these as the cité and the ville, Richard Sennett identifies the cité as representing “the character
of life in a neighborhood,” its anthropology and a “kind of consciousness,” while ville encom-
passes the built environment—both buildings and “the product of the maker’s will.”60 These
two conceptions can be bridged, Sennett argues, if the urbanist is a partner to the urbanite,
being both critical and self-critical.61 Similarly, for urban lawyer and theorist Andreas
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, there is far more to cities than built environment alone, remain-
ing in pursuit of careful critical analysis which produces “the ideal conversion from urbs to
civitas.”62 Fordham’s Nestor Davidson and Nisha Mistry also point to the broader possibilities
for urban law, borrowing from Jan Gehl’s 1973 Life Between Buildings, to call for “Law Between
Buildings,” providing a careful investigation of cities beyond their physical form.63 With par-
ticipatory governance a conventional way to understand the cité, and planning, building and
infrastructure regulations conventional ways to understand the ville, urban lawyers can bring
their appreciation for how these regimes interact, by producing, for example, opportunities for
local residents to object to contentious development applications, even if they are not
always heard.
Urban studies can also be enriched through analysis of repeated techniques used in urban law,
fitting into modern debates framed as “planetary urbanism”, drawing on the broader question
about what is distinctive about “the urban”, whether there is an “outside” to urbanity.64 This line
of scholarship, developed by Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid, builds on Henri Lefebvre’s argu-
ment from the 1960s that, given the extension of networks both human, technological and finan-
cial, we are, in effect, “all urban now”.65 These arguments are highly theorized and polarized,
highlighting urbanization as a process, prioritizing dynamics in terms of explanatory power, pre-
ferring to understand “urban” as a verb rather than as a noun.66 Theories of planetary urbanism
have been criticized for “occluding” central aspects of urban studies, including difference, central-
ity, and the everyday, as well as privileging particular epistemologies.67 Arguing for progressive
urban change, Clive Barnett and Susan Parnell have noted that while planetary urbanism provides
space for aspects of Southern urban realities, it does not provide much assistance in thinking
58ALLEN J. SCOTT, THE URBAN LAND NEXUS AND THE STATE (2013); Allen J. Scott & Michael Storper, The Nature of Cities:
The Scope and Limits of Urban Theory, 39 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 1 (2015).
59Max Weber, The Nature of the City, in RICHARD SENNETT, CLASSIC ESSAYS ON THE CULTURE OF CITIES (1969).
60RICHARD SENNETT, BUILDING AND DWELLING: ETHICS FOR THE CITY 1–2 (2018).
61Id. at 16.
62PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, supra note 8, at 7.
63See NESTOR DAVIDSON & NISHA MISTRY, LAW BETWEEN BUILDINGS: EMERGENT GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN LAW
(2016).
64HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE URBAN REVOLUTION (Robert Bononno tran., 2003); PLANETARY URBANIZATION: AN URBAN
THEORY FOR OUR TIME?., (Neil Brenner & Christian Schmid eds.,); NEIL BRENNER, IMPLOSIONS/EXPLOSIONS: TOWARDS A
STUDY OF PLANETARY URBANIZATION (2014); Christian Schmid, Journeys through planetary urbanization: Decentering per-
spectives on the urban, 36 ENVIRON PLAN D 591–610 (2018).
65Id.
66NEIL BRENNER, IMPLOSIONS/EXPLOSIONS: TOWARDS A STUDY OF PLANETARY URBANIZATION (2014).
67Sue Ruddick et al., Planetary Urbanization: An Urban Theory for Our Time?, 36 ENVTL. PLAN. 387 (2018).
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concretely about how local city governments can find opportunities about how city-based actors
can be supported “to expand their influence and agency relative to national and international
actors such as firms, political parties or governments.”68
And yet while there may be limits to the planetary urbanism thesis, the focus on repetition
within debates on planetary urbanism provides space for lawyers to demonstrate how repeated
practices—sometimes by global commercial players using familiar techniques of property man-
agement and urban renewal—can replicate across jurisdictions.69 In Urban Warfare: Housing
Under the Empire of Finance, Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Raquel Rolnik argues
that the financialization of housing since 2008 has been disastrous for many left homeless and
dispossessed.70 Rolnik points to familiar legal techniques, often resting on property commodifi-
cation, including home ownership, sub-prime mortgages, and the right to buy, arguing that these
legally facilitated transactions enable global urban wealth to be concentrated disproportionately in
the hands of a few. Many cities have been affected by the same legal techniques, conceptually
similar, if tweaked by jurisdiction.
Similarly, repeated practices have characterized urban retail development. Legal and spatial
enclosures of previously public spaces, “malls without walls,” are often based on repeated proto-
types, particularly using long leases from public authorities to private developers for 250 years—
whilst maintaining on websites or public documents that the city still owns the land, which of
course it does in terms of the freehold estate, though this is a long-postponed interest in reversion.
The standard pattern is to masterplan a neglected urban area, using public powers of compulsory
purchase and highway adaptation to subdue unruly landscapes into economically productive sites
of consumption, governed by standard leases networks of experience.71
Transportation is also subject to repeated moves, including the designation of express
or motorways, governed often at a national or regional scale, used by individual and corporate
drivers.72 Automobility is a cultural, economic, and political practice, which, all around the
world is “the predominant global form of ‘quasi-private’ mobility that subordinates other
mobilities of walking, cycling, travelling by rail and so on, and reorganizes how people nego-
tiate the opportunities for, and constraints upon, work, family life, childhood, leisure and
pleasure.”73 Observing these repeated patterns and practices provides legal scholars opportu-
nities to investigate transfers of both progressive and regressive urban practices. More funda-
mentally, by exposing the legal basis for these practices, urban lawyers can ask whether these
repetitions are urban in their conception or in their effect. Urban lawyers have real scope to
contribute to broader debates on whether “the urban” is a place or a process, engaging
with debates in “planetary urbanism” or “planetary gentrification” explaining how we can
often see the same techniques used again and again. It is in picking up these repeated legal
forms—as well as noting progressive good practice or cultural distinctions—that urban law
can develop in its own right as well as contributing to comparative legal development and
urban studies.
68Clive Barnett & Susan Parnell, Ideas, Implementation and Indicators: Epistemologies of the Post-2015 Urban Agenda, 28
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 87, 87 (2016).
69See LORETTA LEES, HYUN BANG SHIN & ERNESTO LÓPEZ-MORALES, PLANETARY GENTRIFICATION (2016); Antonia Layard,
Property and Planning Law in England: Facilitating and Countering Gentrification, in HANDBOOK OF GENTRIFICATION
STUDIES (2018).
70RAQUEL ROLNIK, URBAN WARFARE: HOUSING UNDER THE EMPIRE OF FINANCE (Gabriel Hirschhorn trans., 2019)
71Antonia Layard, Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 412 (2010).
72See generally John Urry, The ‘System’ of Automobility, 21 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 25 (2004); JIM CONLEY, CAR
TROUBLES: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AUTOMOBILITY AND AUTO-MOBILITY (2016); NICHOLAS LOW, TRANSFORMING URBAN
TRANSPORT: FROM AUTOMOBILITY TO SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT (2012); SUDHIR CHELLA RAJAN, THE ENIGMA OF
AUTOMOBILITY: DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND POLLUTION CONTROL (1996).
73Urry, supra note 72, at 26.
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II. Law in Service of Urban Quality
The United Nations couch their call for policy engagement by extrapolating from current trends,
in that “the future will be urban for a majority of people, the solutions to some of the greatest
issues facing humans—poverty, climate change, healthcare, education—must be found in city
life.”74 The city provides a test case for policy questions, while “sustainable urbanism” becomes
a policy rubric to address shared problems of infrastructure, housing, economic development, and
environmental adequacy. This is a pragmatic—if sometimes contested— strategy. For while sus-
tainable development has long been understood as a contested subject, modern formulations,
beginning with the Millennium Goals, have reduced complexity—compared to Agenda 21’s
351 pages—fitting objectives onto a single page, using simplicity to raise public awareness, facili-
tating mobilization, advocacy, and continuity.75
Law and legal practice are clearly relevant to this progressive task. The “New Urban Agenda”
was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development
(Habitat III) in Quito, Ecuador in 2016 and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly
later that year.76 It presents a “shared vision,” promoting the agenda as “a powerful tool for sus-
tainable development for both developing and developed countries.”77 The Agenda incorporates
the newly developed Sustainable Development Goal 11, which proclaims that we should make
“cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.”78 Such policy activity
is increasingly coupled with rising interest in behavioral economics or “nudge theory” in policy
and decision-making circles, encouraging scholars to contribute understanding of “the human
dimension” in more accessible forms.79 Any legal contributions come, of course, with an acknowl-
edgement of disciplinary normativity, explicitly acknowledging urban aims to build better,
cleaner, and more equitable cities. It requires urban law scholars explicitly to lay bare their intel-
lectual foundations, which is an unfamiliar scholarly move.
Socio-legal studies are primarily concerned with the “how,” investigating the ways in which law
and society, people and rules, customs and practices, objects and places, interact and inter-relate.
Of course, it will always be critically important to separate the research from policy prescriptions.
Nonetheless, urban law has potential not only to understand the “how” but also to inform the
“how to.” Socio-legal studies have seen increasing numbers of self-identified “scholar activists”
at a time where politicians have sometimes claimed that “people have had enough of experts”
or where identifying a point as “academic” consigns it to the sidelines of debate.80 M. V. Lee
Badgett, writing in The Public Professor: How to Use Your Research to Change the World, calls
on scholars to engage with problems of climate change, social and economic inequality, war, vio-
lence, threats to democracy, and infrastructure meltdowns. He argues that while “it’s tempting to
keep our heads in books and computers, hoping that our students and published ideas will trickle
down from the ivory tower into the world to make a difference,” this rarely happens.81 Indeed,
Badgett believes that “giving into this temptation would be a lost opportunity and an abdication of
our social responsibility.”82 Martin Partington agrees, particularly given the growing preference
74UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 1.
75Jeffrey Sachs, From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals, 379 LANCET 2206, 2210 (2012).
76UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON HOUSING AND SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HABITAT III), New Urban
Agenda, (Oct. 20, 2016).
77Id. at iv.
78Id. at 4.
79Noel Castree et al., Changing the Intellectual Climate, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 763, 763–68 (2014).
80Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove, FINANCIAL TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-
abc22d5d108c (last visited May 13, 2020); Michael Gove on the Trouble With Experts, CHATHAM HOUSE (March 3, 2017),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/michael-gove-trouble-experts (last visited May 13, 2020).
81M.V. LEE BADGETT, THE PUBLIC PROFESSOR: HOW TO USE YOUR RESEARCH TO CHANGE THE WORLD 15–16 (2016).
82Id.
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for “evidence-based” policy-making, noting drily that evidence-based policymaking is always
“likely to be better than policy-making shaped by anecdote or personal preference.”83
Of course, taking a normative position, being “pro-urban,” is not a neutral step. It is important
to be explicit about it, separating “research” from “policy implementation” to the greatest extent
possible. Given socio-legal academics’ substantial—if sometimes imperfect—academic freedom
all research starts from a subjective viewpoint. It is increasingly important to acknowledge
researcher positionality within socio-legal studies. Urban law is no different in this respect.
In the absence of formal treaties or legislation focusing on urban law, charters and indicators
provide one way to engage in detailed legal scrutiny of explicitly pro-urban agendas, using well-
established doctrinal skills. The 1996 Habitat II Charter, agreed to in Istanbul, had already called
for legal implementation of urban objectives, including through “national laws and development
priorities, programs and policies,” as “the sovereign right and responsibility of each State in con-
formity with all human rights and fundamental freedoms [ : : : ] to achieve the objectives of
adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements development.”84 Such definitions pro-
vide lawyers with opportunities to track language and meanings, noting how rhetorically attractive
declarations can shift objectives over time.
In housing, Habitat II already emphasized the importance of legal rights to security of tenure in
1996 when it called for states to provide “legal security of tenure and equal access to land to all
people, including women and those living in poverty.”85 Nevertheless, by 2016, the Habitat III
Quito Declaration on Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements for All, security of tenure, such
a key legal concept, was only to be “promoted”.86 Paragraph 13, rather than confirming the sig-
nificance of secure tenure, “envisage[s] cities and human settlements that: Fulfil their social func-
tion, including the social and ecological function of land, with a view to progressively achieving the
full realization of the right to adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate stan-
dard of living, without discrimination.”87 The understanding of hard and soft law, policy, and the
limits of rights legislation by lawyers, is critical to understand what States have signed up to.
Such linguistic and legal limits to international declarations have long been understood. Their
limitations provide one reason why modern global urban policymaking has turned to targets and
indices to encourage progress. Sustainable Development Goal 11 “to make cities and human set-
tlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” has been crafted in ostensibly quantitative form,
with four priority targets and accompanying indices.88 The four targets are to: (i) Improve housing
and upgrade slums; (ii) reduce harm to people and economic losses from disasters; (iii) reduce the
adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, particularly from air quality and waste man-
agement; and (iv) substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and
implementing integrated policies and plans.89 The SDG housing target 11.1 assesses whether
States can “[b]y 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic
services and upgrade slums,” with an indicator measuring the “proportion of urban population
living in slums, informal settlements or inadequate housing.”90
83Martin Partington, Empirical Legal Research and Policy-Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
RESEARCH 1004 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
84UNITED NATIONS, Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (HABITAT II), 17 (1996).
85Id.
86United Nations, New Urban Agenda: Quito Declaration on Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements for All 35 and 109
(2016).
87Id.
88Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, (2017), https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list/ (last visited May 15, 2020) [hereinafter SDG
Indicators].
89Id.
90SDG Indicators, supra note 88 (Target 11.1).
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As Sally Merry et al. have explained in their explorations of the genealogies of indicators, cat-
egorizations are deductive, raising democratic questions of who assesses, what is measured, and
why.91 One task for legal scholars is to engage with the definitions that underpin these targets and
indicators in meaningful ways. Clearly, definitions of a “slum” or a “plan” can vary considerably92
so that even if slums and plans can be counted, they may not all be equivalents, with the potential
that some quite shocking urban housing conditions could be ignored. A definition of a “slum”
matters, particularly when listing the proportion of a country’s urban population living in slums93:
any number is not absolute, instead it provides a perspective of what a “slum” is and how it can be
counted. Theoretical and political objections remain to using reductive quantified assessments of
this type that may miss important lived realities, while data tables and visualizations are only as
reliable as the information entered into the software. Focusing on SDG 11, and indicator 11.1
specifically, the United Nations itself acknowledges the difficulties in differentiating between slum
and non-slum areas, suggesting that, “methodologically, such an approach would start with inno-
vative digital-based satellite imagery analysis, coupled with community ground-truthing and local
observation, and participatory slum mapping.”94
Ultimately, lawyers can make their own decisions as to whether or not to engage with these
debates. Sally Merry has encouraged scholars to think about how to make indicators better, avoid-
ing the overgeneralization, over-homogenization, and lack of context that so often limit the devel-
opment and application of indicators.95 Arguing that numbers can give us important knowledge,
she exhorts policymakers to get more complicated and nuanced information into the process,
particularly by drawing on categories of knowledge and information from the people themselves.96
Socio-legal research is particularly well-suited to contributing to this task, drawing both on under-
standing of legal and official policy formulations as well as conducting empirical investigations
into everyday meanings and understandings of key terms.
We should, then, be sensitive to the limits of quantitative analysis, slow to suggest that a par-
ticular legal framework can definitively improve a given variable, be that economic growth or
urban quality. Some legal concepts have already indicated their potential in urban law. The best
known, perhaps, is the “right to the city,” formulated both in political geography and in legal form,
primarily rhetorical but sometimes also a legal right.97 Activists and scholars have used the con-
cept of a right to formulate a deontological response to problems of urban insecurity as well as
challenging growing private control of public functions and spaces. Similarly, the legal concept of
security of tenure is understood to promote housing safety, linked to wellbeing at the neighbor-
hood scale.98 One question here is whether equivalent—and this is the key test—framings of secu-
rity of tenure can reduce populations living in urban housing insecurity. A German lease differs
significantly from an English lease in terms of renter protection, yet security of tenure can be
91SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND SEX
TRAFFICKING (2016), http://www.bibliovault.org/BV.landing.epl?ISBN=9780226261287 (last visited May 11, 2020).; SALLY
ENGLE MERRY, KEVIN E. DAVIS & BENEDICT KINGSBURY, THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE,
CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF LAW (2015); KEVIN DAVIS ET AL., GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH
CLASSIFICATION AND RANKINGS (2012).
92NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & GEETA TEWARI, LAW AND THE NEW URBAN AGENDA (2020).
93Id. (Indicator 11.1.1).
94United Nations, Tackling Progress Towards Inclusive, Safe, Resilient and Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements: SDG
11 Synthesis Report, High Level Political Forum 2018, 44 (2018).
95Sally Merry, How to Make Global Indicators Better, YOUTUBE, 2016, =https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=68gTttIn2xM
(last visited May 15, 2020).
96Id.
97See Edésio Fernandes, Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 201 (2007); Edésio Fernandes,
The “Right to the City” as a Legal Right: Lessons from Latin America 2; Abigail Friendly, The Right to the City: Theory and
Practice in Brazil, 14 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 158 (2013); HARVEY, supra note 39; Peter Marcuse, From Critical Urban Theory
to the Right to the City, 13 CITY 185 (2009).
98Hedman et al., supra note 47; MANLEY ET AL., supra note 46.
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achieved in both with sufficient political will.99 Rights and security of tenure are recurring legal
concepts often producing, both in their observance or non-observance, how a city feels. Does it
have high levels of civic engagement and political participation? Are there many people living on
the streets or in inadequate housing? Urban studies do not conventionally study the work done by
legal concepts even though, as Raquel Rolnik reminds us, there is remarkable repetition in cities all
over the world.100
III. Governance Concepts
A third, more conceptual justification for urban law is that cities provide spaces to work out
ongoing puzzles. These include the interaction of territory, sovereignty, and jurisdiction at a man-
ageable legal scale. This is useful for internally-facing legal studies, but also for engaging with
related social science and arts disciplines where legal frameworks are often disregarded in favor
of more theoretical or conceptual frameworks of governance.
There is clearly scope for synthesis in qualitative work on urban decision-making studying the
processes through which government is organized and delivered in urban areas as well as the rela-
tionships between state agencies and civil society. Questions of democratic representation, power,
and decision-making have been longstanding issues of interest, with classic American studies, for
example, producing discordant results. For while Hunter Floyd identified a small, interlocking
elite as governing 1950s Atlanta, Robert Dahl rejected such “sovereignties,” finding instead a
pluralist model of community power in 1980s New Haven.101 Urban governance scholars aim
to understand the interaction of public, private, and community participants, all of which happens
within a legal framework, and usually, structures of democratic participatory involvement, which
may—of course—be more or less ignored depending on the type of decision being made.
Recent urban research indicates, however, that there is more interaction between the legal and
governance worlds than might at first be supposed. In their study of “seeing like an investor” in
London, Mike Raco et al. conclude that complex imaginations of planning and regulation have led
to many firms realizing that “market success results from becoming more deeply embedded in the
local political, social, and regulatory environments in which they are investing.”102 This finding
echoes studies of de-centered governance where lawyers and political scientists are reaching
largely compatible conclusions, including the Foucauldian insight that power and control are dis-
posed amongst social actors and the state, a finding which has been particularly significant in
studies of “street level bureaucrats.”103 For as socio-legal scholars know well, regulatory decisions
are dynamic, both in their drafting and in their enforcement, with processes sometimes informing
the look, feel, or smell of a city as much as planned decisions.
99SUSAN BRIGHT, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW IN CONTEXT (2007); ALISON CLARKE, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW
(2020); Peter A. Kemp & Stefan Kofner, Contrasting Varieties of Private Renting: England and Germany, 10 INT’L. J.
HOUSING POL’Y, 379 (2010).
100RAQUEL ROLNIK, URBAN WARFARE: HOUSING UNDER THE EMPIRE OF FINANCE (2019).
101FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS (1953); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO
GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2005).
102Mike Raco, Nicola Livingstone & Daniel Durrant, Seeing Like an Investor: Urban Development Planning,
Financialisation, and Investors’ Perceptions of London as an Investment Space, 27 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 1064, 1064 (2019).
103See generally JULIA BLACK, CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON REGULATION (2002); JULIA BLACK, MARTIN LODGE & MARK
THATCHER, REGULATORY INNOVATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2006); MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: THE DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (1983); Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy
and the Analysis of Urban Reform, 6 URB. AFF. Q. 391 (1971); Richard Crook & Joseph Ayee, Urban Service Partnerships,
‘Street-Level Bureaucrats’ and Environmental Sanitation in Kumasi and Accra, Ghana: Coping with Organisational
Change in the Public Bureaucracy, 24 DEV. POL’Y REV. 51 (2006); PETER HUPE, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY (2019); Einat Lavee & Nissim Cohen, How Street-Level Bureaucrats Become Policy Entrepreneurs: The Case
of Urban Renewal, 32 GOVERNANCE 475 (2019); Jesse Proudfoot & Eugene J. McCann, At Street Level: Bureaucratic
Practice in the Management of Urban Neighborhood Change, 29 URB. GEOGRAPHY 348 (2008).
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Municipal budgets provide yet another relatively understudied aspect of law, despite their
undoubted effects on urban areas.104 Cities may have the broadest jurisdictions and range of
powers, but if they lack allocated funds or cannot directly tax their residents, they are limited
in what they can achieve. In a call to update studies of public law in the 1980s, Terence Daintith
identified “imperium” and “dominium” as mechanisms of governance.105 For Daintith,
imperium represents a legislative expression of government deployment of force—or the threat
of force—and respect for rules, while dominium describes policy instruments that involve the
deployment of wealth by government. The two interact, particularly after periods of budget
reductions.106 While localism initiatives can bring much vaunted freedom for local authorities
to set their own imperium regulatory priorities, the ability to enact urban rules reduces when
coffers are bare.
Money matters enormously to legal studies of urban governance. With financial austerity so
devastating in many cities, these concepts prove useful in understanding decisions between man-
datory and discretionary funding choices. This governance distinction is often blurred in practice
as Mia Gray and Anna Barford explain in their study of urban child welfare.107 For while pro-
tection for “at risk” children is mandatory, the funding of youth centers is discretionary, with
many vulnerable children relying on youth centers for socializing and networks of support.108
Understanding the inter-relationship between funding and administrative rationality is critical
to understanding the practice of urban law and governance.
The urban context also provides space for legal scholars to continue to study ongoing questions
of networks, jurisdiction, scale, territory, and sovereignty. So far, these questions have primarily
emerged in studies of international law and settler colonialism, with notable exceptions only in
municipal law.109 Territory, in particular, is understood as a politico-geographic concept, as well as
a process, whose relevance to administrative law is not yet well understood.110 Sometimes, juris-
diction is understood as having fixed geographic boundaries. However, lawyers know well that
jurisdiction can be contested and does not necessarily stop at national boundaries.111 There
are also tensions between globalization and territory, which the city, particularly with an under-
standing of both repeated public and private practices, as well as networks and infrastructures, can
help us to interrogate.112 Lastly, urban law continues to provide a rewarding context in which to
104TONY PROSSER, THE ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (2014); FRED L. MORRISON, FISCAL RULES - LIMITS ON GOVERNMENTAL
DEFICITS AND DEBT (2016); ANN MUMFORD, FISCAL SOCIOLOGY AT THE CENTENARY: UK PERSPECTIVES ON BUDGETING,
TAXATION AND AUSTERITY (2019).
105T. C. Daintith, Legal Analysis of Economic Policy, 9 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 191–224 (1982).
106See Peter Vincent-Jones, Values and Purpose in Government: Central-Local Relations in Regulatory Perspective, 29 J.L. &
SOC’Y 27 (2002).
107Mia Gray & Anna Barford, The Depths of the Cuts: The Uneven Geography of Local Government Austerity, 11 CAMBRIDGE
J. REGIONS ECON. SOC’Y 541 (2018).
108Id at 555.
109See generally Henry Jones, Property, Territory, and Colonialism: An International Legal History of Enclosure, 39 LEGAL
STUD. 187 (2019); Jeremy J. Schmidt, Bureaucratic Territory: First Nations, Private Property, and “Turn-Key” Colonialism in
Canada, 108 ANNALS OF THE AM. A. GEOGRAPHERS 901, 901–16 (2018); Nicholas Blomley, Precarious Territory: Property Law,
Housing, and the Socio-Spatial Order, 52 ANTIPODE 36 (2020); MARIANA VALVERDE, EVERYDAY LAW ON THE STREET: CITY
GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (2012); Mariana Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal ‘Technicalities’ as Resources for
Theory, 18 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 139 (2009); Nicholas Blomley, The Territory of Property, 40 PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY
593 (2016); Blomley, supra note [56].
110ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: ITS THEORY AND HISTORY (1986).
111Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 843–930 (1999); Mariana
Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal ‘Technicalities’ as Resources for Theory, 18 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 139–157
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HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2019).
112Stuart Elden, Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the Space of the World, 30 TRANSACTIONS INST.
BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 8 (2005).
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investigate legal pluralism in both formal and informal settings.113 Cities provide a “bottom up”
way to investigate territory, networks, and jurisdictional scaling in one place, developing a new
scholarly setting for legal studies.
E. Conclusion
Urban law is an emerging field of socio-legal studies where scholars aim to understand how law
produces and is produced by the city. While the urban is understood as a form or place, legal
research can also identify repeated provisions and practices that contribute to urban patterns, par-
ticularly in land use, transportation or infrastructure, even if these techniques are not necessarily
urban in and of themselves. Identifying these repeated legal moves, drawing on specific provisions
and practices, can help identify what is distinctive about “the urban” as a subject of study. Urban
law can also be pragmatic, starting “on the streets”, in quite classic socio-legal fashion, investigat-
ing cities in their everyday form, asking how urban areas are legally produced and co-produced as
well as how better urban laws and legal practices might produce more sustainable, equitable and
hopeful cities.
One of the key difficulties for urban law lies in identifying the right level of analysis, covering
sufficient legal and empirical detail whilst also making the city legible at an urban scale. Focusing
on small-scale case studies can illustrate repeated patterns or trends with investigations explain-
ing, as Don Mitchell notes, “the structured and intense struggles” in urban development proc-
esses.114 Such granular analyses, Mitchell explains, need to be studied alongside an
understanding of the legal framework of law, governance, and practices within which cities oper-
ate.115 As this article has explained, finding an intellectual infrastructure remains a key task for
urban law, recognizing that scalar tensions produce imperfect compromises. Nevertheless, we
should accept this challenge, just as cities continue to grow and develop so too should urban law.
113See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada,
12 L. & SOC’Y REV. 5 (1977).
114Don Mitchell,Mitchell on Fainstein, “The Just City”, H-ENVIRONMENT, https://networks.h-net.org/node/19397/reviews/
20588/mitchell-fainstein-just-city (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
115Id.
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Abstract
This Article provides a novel insight into how early-career scholars in the UK may combine different
theoretical tools in their research, and the implications that this may have for the socio-legal discipline.
This Article draws upon the author’s experience of combining theoretical tools from different schools of
thought: Feminist legal theory, Bourdieusian theory, and Actor Network Theory, within the context of
recent research into experiences of those representing themselves in family court hearings in England
and Wales. Combining these theories for the first time, this Article explores the difficulties, tensions,
and benefits of combining tools within socio-legal research and reflects upon the influence of the
pedagogical and institutional resources that characterize the socio-legal research environment in the
UK. This Article argues that the task of combining different tools provides scholars with the opportunity
to work politically, because the process of reconciling tensions between different approaches requires
researchers to reflect upon the worldviews that underpin their selected theories. In this sense, it argues
that combining different theories within socio-legal research is a political activity, because researchers
are required to reflect not only on how theoretical choices may contest, expand, or develop dominant
assumptions that characterize socio-legal scholarly traditions.
Keywords: Socio-Legal; legal theory; legal aid; inequality; England and Wales; methodology; feminism; Actor-Network
Theory; Bourdieusian theory
A. Introduction
The discipline of “socio-legal” encompasses a broad range of scholarship which distinguishes itself
from doctrinal approaches to law. Notwithstanding this breadth, the discipline is far from frag-
mented in the UK. Rather, in addition to using analytical tools from a variety of other disciplines
beyond law—and often beyond sociology—pioneering scholars have also invested decades into
organizing themselves under the banner of socio-legal.1 Particularly within the UK, this innova-
tion has resulted in a fertile research environment for early-career scholars, who frequently benefit
from socio-legal pedagogical influences within their legal education, institutional support for
socio-legal doctoral projects, as well as the systematic supervision and guidance of more senior
scholars who continue to play an important role in consolidating and pushing the boundaries of
the discipline. As a result, the emerging generation of socio-legal researchers in the UK are less
likely to face barriers in establishing the value of using interdisciplinary approaches to study the
complex and situated role of law within society. However, they are instead faced with a different
*Jess Mant is a Lecturer in Law at Cardiff University, UK. Dr. Mant specializes in family law and issues regarding access to
legal aid. Email: MantJ@Cardiff.ac.uk. The author is grateful to Katie Richards, Steve Smith, Pauline Roberts, Rachel Cahill
O’Callaghan, and the editors of this Special Issue for their feedback on earlier drafts of this work.
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the German Law Journal. This is an Open Access article,
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1See generally Sally Wheeler & Phil Thomas, Socio-Legal Studies, in LAW(S) FUTURES 267 (David Hayton ed., 2000).
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challenge—important choices about how to use the tools and resources available to them from the
different schools of thought which fall under this banner of socio-legal studies. These choices have
important implications for which scholarly traditions are strengthened and reiterated, and how
the discipline is to continue to develop.
The purpose of this Article is to provide an insight into how early-career socio-legal researchers
may build upon the work of previous generations by combining multiple socio-legal tools from
different schools of thought. It contributes a reflective account of how it was possible to draw
together multiple socio-legal tools within my own recent research project undertaken in the
UK. The aim of this research was to provide a deeper understanding of what it is like for people
who are representing themselves as Litigants in Person in court in England and Wales, following a
major withdrawal of legal aid for private family law cases by the UK government.2 As part of this
project, I conducted interviews with Litigants in Person to find out about the difficulties they expe-
rienced following this reform.3 In doing so, I required conceptual resources that enabled me to do
two things. First, I needed to understand how structural inequalities in society may shape the
experiences that people in England and Wales have of using law. Second, I needed to reflect
on how the culture and procedure of the legal system in England and Wales may itself facilitate
or exacerbate experiences of disadvantage. To these ends, I devised a unique theoretical framework
by drawing together three different approaches, each originating from distinct schools of thought
which have, to varying degrees, been used by scholars working within the socio-legal discipline in
the UK but have never before been drawn together: Feminist legal theory, Pierre Bourdieu’s theory
of social class, and Actor-Network Theory (ANT).
This Article will begin by outlining the usefulness of these approaches for understanding
experiences of inequality and disadvantage and discussing the challenges inherent in the task
of combining these approaches. First, I explain that feminist legal theory is a useful resource
for appreciating how law is often formulated in a way that is blind to marginalized experiences,
and how multiple structures of inequality may overlap in order to produce unique and intersec-
tional experiences of law. Specifically, it encourages researchers to ask the “woman question,”
which means to ask questions aimed at exposing these hidden, diverse, and intersectional perspec-
tives of law. Second, I argue that this approach can be reinforced with Bourdieusian theory, which
specifically addresses issues of class, systems, and processes. This particular theory provides three
key concepts—capital, field, and habitus—which are useful for tracing those structural inequal-
ities that feminist theory demonstrates are otherwise absent from law and policy. Combining these
two theories enabled me to use Bourdieusian concepts in an intersectional way, which meant both
extending the scope of my analysis to incorporate understandings of class, as well as tracing multi-
ple and overlapping structural forms of inequality which intersect to produce unique experiences
of disadvantage.
Building upon these two combined approaches, I then discuss the value of drawing upon the
third approach of ANT. While the first two approaches provide useful ways to think through the
structural context of difference and inequality, it is useful to go further in order to understand how
these inequalities may manifest as disadvantage within the specific context of the family court in
England and Wales. ANT, therefore, provides a pragmatic tool for examining the material ways in
which Litigants in Person may experience disadvantage within the legal system itself. This involves
tracing the detail of the interactions that Litigants in Person have with other people, objects, and
environments in the legal system. As an approach, ANT has been criticized within socio-legal
studies for being problematically anti-structural, but at the same time, it is nevertheless also dis-
tinctly anti-doctrinal, because it requires researchers to view law as only one part of a complex
2Under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, state-funded legal aid for advice and represen-
tation has been almost entirely removed from private family law cases in England and Wales.
3For more detail on this research project and issue within England and Wales more generally, see Jessica Mant, Litigants’
Experiences of the Post-LASPO Family Court: Key Findings from Recent Research, 3 FAM. L.J. 300 (2019).
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network of actors, instead of endowing law with symbolic significance. I will argue that ANT can
be used in a way that complements the structural tools drawn from the other two approaches,
because it enabled me to also explore the specific and material practices through which inequal-
ities and difference manifest in disadvantage within the legal system in England and Wales.
This Article will then discuss the tensions that underpinned the research process as a result of
the decision to use these approaches together. Here, it will argue that the task of working through
these tensions is a political activity which holds important consequences for the socio-legal dis-
cipline. Different theories, particularly those which emerge from different schools of thought, are
underpinned by different ontological and epistemological assumptions. As such, it is generally
accepted that a researcher’s choice of theory shapes their understanding of the research problem.
However, when combining multiple theories, researchers are forced to consider the assumptions
that underpin each of their selected theories, and how they contest each other. They must then
decide which of these assumptions to prioritize and which to reject in order to reconcile their
theories into a theoretical frame that can be used within their research. These decisions are politi-
cal because they involve choosing which theoretical assumptions and worldviews underpin their
research. Importantly, these decisions may also be political because scholars may make these deci-
sions in a way that actively resists dominant assumptions and worldviews. On the basis of this, this
Article will argue that the task of combining different theories involves an opportunity to work
politically, which means to reflect not only upon how theoretical choices affect one’s own research
outcomes, but also upon how these choices may contest, expand, or develop the dominant
assumptions and worldviews that characterize socio-legal scholarly traditions. This degree of
reflexivity is imperative among early career scholars who choose to combine multiple theories
because the work of these scholars will shape the future assumptions and worldviews that
characterize the socio-legal discipline.
B. Feminist Legal Theory
As a dominant school of thought within socio-legal studies, feminist legal scholarship encom-
passes a broad and diverse literature which offers a range of insights into how law can operate
to exclude and marginalize women, facilitate and contribute to their experiences of wider inequal-
ities, and omit their subjectivities whilst presenting male subjectivities as objective, legitimate, or
simply as common sense. A rich history of feminist perspectives has been useful for achieving a
great deal in terms of substantive legal and political reform, as well as informing how scholars
think about the basis upon which such claims should be formulated.4 These have ranged from
liberal claims for formal equality within law, radical calls for more focused attention on the rela-
tionship between sexual difference and oppression, to constructivist understandings of how men
and women are constructed differently on the basis of their gender, and the specific ways in which
law unevenly reinforces and reproduces these constructions.5
In all forms, feminism seeks to reveal and develop an understanding of the conditions of wom-
en’s lives and suggest how these conditions may be improved—either by undertaking a broader
critique of the structures that produce those conditions or advocating specific reforms within
those structures.6 Importantly, both tasks involve telling stories that account for the diverse expe-
riences of women—paying careful attention to different perspectives, definitions, and meanings
which have otherwise been omitted or silenced within law. By rendering the concerns of women
both visible and valuable, feminist theory provides a resource for exposing how law is both actively
and passively implicated in experiences of inequality and disadvantage. For example, early
4HILARIE BARNETT, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 8 (1998).
5Id. at 5–8.
6Jo Bridgeman & Daniel Monk, Introduction: Reflections on the Relationship Between Feminism and Child Law, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD LAW 1, 7 (Jo Bridgeman & Daniel Monk eds., 2000).
1466 Jess Mant
feminist legal scholarship has been key in campaigning for equality within law, and against the
explicit and overt ways in which law may treat men and women differently. However, more
recently feminists have moved beyond calls for formal equality in order to expose the more subtle
ways in which law omits the concerns and realities of women’s lives and is often complicit in
conditions of inequality.7
For instance, while statutory provision may now give equality between men and women in
terms of legal entitlements, feminists have argued that law nevertheless frequently fails to
acknowledge the important ways in which the conditions of their lives differ, or recognize that
different treatment may sometimes be required in order to achieve substantive equality.8
Within the context of my research on Litigants in Person, for instance, it was possible to use
a feminist lens to expose the distinctly gendered ways in which parents experienced the court
process. Disproportionately, mothers had fewer economic resources with which to seek legal
advice and representation in the absence of legal aid and are also overwhelmingly more likely
to be contending with issues like domestic abuse within the court process. As such, my findings
reiterated those of earlier projects in suggesting that the court process is not designed in a way that
explicitly acknowledges the gendered reality of family disputes.9
Across many jurisdictions, scholars, activists, and lawyers have undertaken the task of rewriting
judgments from a feminist perspective in order to show that even if law does not discriminate
between men and women, its failure to incorporate the understandings, experiences, and percep-
tions of women within its legal definitions and rules is a cause of harm in and of itself.10 As these
projects show, women experience inequality in multiple ways—both by way of gender-specific
harms, and also by way of law’s failure to recognize and respond to them.11 As explored by
Ulrike Schultz earlier in this Special Issue, law across jurisdictions tends to be designed around
the idea of a “non-gendered, non-differentiated legal subject,” and this has important conse-
quences for the role that law can play in ignoring, facilitating, and reiterating the material inequal-
ities that women experience within society.12
As such, a feminist approach advocates expanding the lens of critique to include other structures
and institutions which interact with law, such as the family, the labor market, or the tax and benefit
system.Within different countries, cultures, and political contexts, a feminist analysis will therefore
inevitably vary, but a commongoal is to study law as one of several forces that form the backdrop to a
society that is structured in a way that omits the concerns and realities of women’s lives.13 Using
feminism toexpose thesehiddenperspectives involves askingwhat is often referred to as the “woman
question.” In practice, this involves asking several different questions, such as: What kinds of
assumptions, descriptions, or assertions underpin legal definitions and understandings? Further,
how do these understandings compare to the lived realities and experiences of women? By asking
7Alison Diduck & Katherine O’Donovan, Feminism and Families: Plus ca change?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY
LAW, supra note 6, at 1, 2–5; JOANNE CONAGHAN, LAW AND GENDER 103 (2013).
8Diduck & O’Donovan, supra note 7, at 9.
9Mant, supra note 3. See also Liz Trinder et al., Litigants in Person in Private Family Law Cases, in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
ANALYTICAL SERIES (2014).
10Bridgeman &Monk, supra note 6, at 7. Feminist judgment projects have been undertaken in Australia, New Zealand, and
the United States, as well as all UK jurisdictions. See ROSEMARY HUNTER, CLARE MCGLYNN & ERICA RACKLEY, FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (2010); HEATHER DOUGLAS, FRANCESCA BARTLETT, TRISH LUKER & ROSEMARY
HUNTER, AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (2014); KATHRYN STANCHI, LINDA BERGER
& BRIDGET CRAWFORD, FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2016);
MÁIRÉAD ENRIGHT, JULIE MCCANDLESS & AOIFE O’DONOGHE, NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’
TROUBLES AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (2017); SHARON COWAN, CHLOË KENNEDY & VANESSA MUNRO,
SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: (RE)CREATING LAW FROM THE OUTSIDE IN (2019).
11Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
12Rosemary Hunter, The Gendered ‘Socio’ of Socio-Legal Studies, in EXPLORING THE ‘SOCIO’ OF SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 205
(Feenan Dermott ed., 2013).
13Diduck and O’Donovan, supra note 7, at 5; CONAGHAN, supra note 7, at 103.
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these questions, it is possible to challenge the interests that are at the center of law and demand
justification for the inequalities and disadvantages that this disparity perpetuates.14
Several feminist legal scholars have emphasized that this visibility is important for women
because it raises “collective consciousness” among women who recognize and relate to the expe-
riences that are exposed through this activity.15 For example, there are some concerns which are
common among women, such as the way in which structures like law operate to define the mean-
ing of concepts like motherhood and mothering. Similarly, in their research into the legal aid sys-
tem in Australia, Rosemary Hunter and Tracey De Simone found that although eligibility policy
did not overtly distinguish between men and women, women were disproportionately disadvan-
taged by the fact that applications for family legal aid were afforded lower priority than those for
legal aid in criminal matters, because the latter cases were presented as objectively more serious.16
Consciousness-raising among women is therefore a means through which individual experiences
of harm can be translated into collective experiences of oppression, which can in turn be used as
an evidence base and an impetus to dismantle systems and structures that perpetuate inequality.17
However, while this has obvious value, feminist scholars have drawn attention to the important
limitations of research that claims to expose the experiences and perspectives of women, without
accommodating the diverse and intersectional ways in which different women experience law.
Modern feminist scholarship, particularly thatwhich is geared towards achieving legal andpoliti-
cal reform, is intersectional. Intersectionality is a concept largely attributed to the ground-breaking
work of Kimberlé Crenshaw.18 It is derived from arguments thatmainstream feminist discoursewas
unable to account for the unique forms of disadvantage that are experienced bywomenof color, who
exist at the intersection between racism and sexism. The idea that multiple forms of oppression or
marginalization can intersect andproduce specific experiences of disadvantage has been taken upby
feminists who seek to avoid producing research which claims to speak for all women.19 In doing so,
they recognize the value of raising collective consciousness, whilst also challenging the notion that
women have a collective set of interests, characteristics, or needs.20
In this sense, asking the “woman question”means asking questions that reach beyond issues of
gender, and scrutinizing how legal discourse also omits experiences of other inequalities.21 Further,
rather than someone experiencingmultiple formsof disadvantage at once, themetaphor of the inter-
section allows researchers to appreciate howpeople can bemarginalized as a result of different kinds
of disadvantage, which intersect inways that are situated, particular, andwhich cannot be untangled
from one another.22 A feminist approach which is intersectional seeks to expose the complexity of
experiences that are omitted from law and legal practice, by telling stories that account for diverse
experiences—including but not limited to gender—and resisting the temptation to explore just the
aspects of people’s lives that the law determines to be relevant or important.23
Asking the “woman question,” therefore, can broadly be understood as a commitment to con-
structing a narrative that is not built out of abstract principles but is instead built “from the ground
14BARNETT, supra note 4, at 23.
15Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 863–67 (1990).
16Rosemary Hunter & Tracey De Simone, Identifying Disadvantage: Beyond Intersectionality, in INTERSECTIONALITY AND
BEYOND: LAW, POWER AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION 159, 161–62(Emily Grabham et al. eds., 2009).
17Bartlett, supra note 15, at 837.
18Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
19See generally Hunter & De Simone, supra note 16.
20Joanne Conaghan, Intersectionality and UK Equality Initiatives, 23 S. AFRICAN J. HUM. RTS. 317 (2007); Emily Grabham,
Taxonomies of Inequality: Lawyers, Maps and the Challenge of Hybridity, 15 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 5 (2006); BARNETT, supra
note 4, at 7–8, 19–21.
21Bartlett, supra note 15, at 837.
22Emily Grabham et al., Introduction to INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND, supra note 16, at 1.
23CONAGHAN, supra note 7, at 12–14.
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up, out of concrete, specific practices.”24 However, in producing an account that can expose the
complexity of experiences and perspectives, it is important not to lose sight of the structures that
facilitate these experiences. A focus on intersectionality has, for some feminists, gone too far
towards a “formulaic analysis” of individuals and their identity characteristics, and foregone
the task of scrutinizing and challenging structures, institutions, and processes themselves.25
For example, understandings of social class are frequently absent from feminist intersectionality
scholarship, because class does not function easily as an identity category; intersectional under-
standings of inequality are focused on how law responds to people’s experiences, while class analy-
ses tend to focus on the structured processes by which those experiences are produced and
mediated.26 A theory of class was, however, of imperative importance within my research, because
the accessibility of legal advice and representation has historically been framed by socio-economic
inequality, and the disparity between those who can access legal support is now even more stark in
light of the removal of legal aid. Within this project, it was therefore useful to reinforce a feminist
approach with a theory of social class, which is useful for tracing those structural inequalities that
feminist theory demonstrates are otherwise absent from law and policy.
C. Bourdieusian Theory
Although Bourdieusian theory is not widely used within socio-legal studies in the UK, Pierre
Bourdieu’s theory of class is particularly useful for studying experiences of law.27 This is because
his theory provides three foundational concepts—capital, field, and habitus—which can be used
to understand how socio-economic inequality is reproduced through culture. This cultural focus
permits an analysis which accounts for both the unequal distribution of resources, as well as the
inequalities of recognition and value which characterize structures and institutions such as law.
Further, these conceptual tools also enable researchers to explore how unequal arrangements are
frequently reiterated through the interpretations of individuals themselves, as they subjectively
assess and interpret their own position in relation to others within particular contexts like the
legal system. As will be discussed shortly, this cultural dimension has enabled subsequent scholars
to develop Bourdieu’s theory in order to understand the reproduction of other forms of difference
beyond class, such as gender. In this section, I will outline these three concepts before discussing
how these can be usefully combined with feminist legal theory in order to highlight how different
inequalities may intersect with each other to produce complex experiences of disadvantage that
are omitted within law.
I. Capital, Field, and Habitus
The first foundational Bourdieusian concept is capital. Economic capital is a resource that can be
exchanged for benefits or used as a means of influence. However, for Bourdieu, capital also comes
in three additional forms—cultural, social, and symbolic. Cultural capital refers to the skills,
knowledge, and dispositions that people gain during their life, the form of which depends on
the interactions and experiences they have within society.28 Similarly, social capital refers to
the social networks that people can draw upon for support during these interactions and
24Adrienne Barnett, Contact and Domestic Violence: The Ideological Divide, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD LAW,
supra note 6, at 129, 133.
25Joanne Conaghan, Intersectionality and the Feminist Project, in INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND, supra note 16, at 21.
26Id. at 30.
27A notable exception to this is the work of Hilary Sommerlad, who has productively drawn Bourdieusian theory into socio-
legal research. SeeHilary Sommerlad, Socio-Legal Studies and the Cultural Practice of Lawyering, in EXPLORING THE ‘SOCIO’ OF
SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 12, at 205; Hilary Sommerlad, The “Social Magic” of Merit: Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in
the English and Welsh Legal Profession, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2325 (2015).
28PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY 211 (2005).
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experiences. Therefore, both forms of capital are accumulated through life experiences—they differ
according to the people that an individual has met and formed connections with, as well as what
they have learned, been exposed to, and taken interests in throughout their lives. In practice, both
function as tangible resources that can be exchanged or used to gain advantages in different
contexts.
Symbolic capital, however, refers to things like authority, reputation, and prestige, which can
easily be used to accrue other forms of capital. Education is an important example of symbolic
capital because it is something that can be exchanged for other forms of valuable capital in a
variety of different contexts.29 By distinguishing between these different kinds of resources, it
is possible to understand how people from different social origins have different opportunities
and possibilities available to them. However, rather than just signifying differences between
people, the concept of capital can be used to expose the different value that is attributed to
different kinds of capital within society.
This leads to Bourdieu’s second concept: Field. Bourdieu argued that society ismade up of several
overlapping fields which all have their own practices and hierarchies of value. If capitals are synony-
mous with wealth, then fields are themarketplaces in which those capitals are spent and exchanged.
Within each field, therefore, capitals are assigned value which determines how they can be used and
the extent towhich people can succeed in each context. In this sense, fields are sites of competition in
which people struggle against each other in order to establish their “cultural competence”within any
given arena.30 In otherwords, the capitals that are usefulwithin one fieldmaybe completely different
from those that are valuable in another. However, there are some kinds of capital—such as the skills
and confidence thatmay come fromauniversity education—which are valuable across several fields,
but the opportunities to accumulate this kind of symbolic privilege are by no means evenly distrib-
uted. In practice, Bourdieu argues, there are overlaps between fields relating to law, politics, and
economics, because the holders of symbolic capital across each of these fields have “kindred world
views.”31 In other words, those who hold power within society generally have a greater capacity to
continually influence the shape and structure of official fields, and inevitably do so in their own
interests.
In relation to law, Bourdieu extensively discussed that one way of doing this is by privileging
unique practices and hierarchies that characterize the “juridical field.”32 Here, he explains that
law is a field with its own underpinning set of protocols and assumptions, as well as its own internal
social, psychological, and linguistic codes which all frame the way that law is practiced and nego-
tiated but are never specifically recorded or acknowledged.33 For example, valued capitals in the
juridical field include knowledge of and familiarity with legal rules, as well as specific ways of behav-
ing and communicating which are perceived as authentic to law. These unique forms of cultural
capital enable those who are initiated in law to “explore and exploit the range of possible rules
and use them effectively as symbolic weapons to argue a case.”34 Similarly, within the juridical field,
certain forms of speech andwritten text have greatermeaning and value than they do outside of this
context. For example, when giving legal judgments, the act of speaking has the specific power of
making something true. Additionally, the written formalization of text in a court document gives
thosewords power inways thatwould not be possible if theywere simply said aloud.35 The value that
is placed on juridical capital within the juridical field therefore has a distinctly exclusionary effect for
thosewhohavenot been initiated through legal education and training. These exclusionary practices
29Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 812 (1987).
30PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION 86–87 (1984).






enable the juridical field to set its own cultural parameters of what is legally relevant and important,
and to dismiss and devalue other skills and perspectives.36
Bourdieu’s final concept is the habitus. The habitus is the internal mechanism through which
people accumulate different kinds of capital anddevelop their own sense forwhich capitals are useful
when they engage with different fields. This concept requires researchers to consider how people
perceive the context inwhich they find themselves, andhow their responses can in turn further shape
their experiences.AsMikeSavage explains, “it is one thing topoint to growing economic inequalities,
but we need to see how people themselves see these divisions.”37 An important benefit of exploring
experiences through thehabitus, therefore,was togain an insight into the subjectivewaysLitigants in
Person themselves perceived the processes of the family court in England and Wales.
Taken together, these three concepts provide ameans of tracing the ways that structural inequal-
ity and different perspectives may be discounted within the legal system, because the authority and
legitimacy of law is instead derived from the supposed objectivity of legal rules and practices.
However, through Bourdieusian theory, it is possible to expose that this is by no means objective
—rather, the juridical field operates to selectively recognize certain capitals, and to discount capitals
that do not fit neatly into the structure of this field. For example, within my research, Bourdieusian
theory was useful for exploring how Litigants in Person frequently experienced cultural forms of
exclusion from decision-making during court hearings, due to specialist language that was used
by legal professionals, or because theywere unable to complywith highly specialized procedure such
as advocacy or cross-examination. In other words, they were often unable to participate in theman-
ner expected by those working in the juridical field, and as such, perceived the court as an environ-
ment in which they were powerless to influence the outcome of hearings.38 Bourdieusian concepts
can therefore be used to compliment and reinforce the feminist objectives of exposing the hidden
narratives of law, as well as the implications of law’s blindness to inequality.
II. An Intersectional Understanding of Inequality
In relation to socio-economic inequality, these Bourdieusian concepts are extremely useful for
understanding the important links between economic and cultural forms of subordination,
and the implications of this for people who are attempting to participate in the juridical field.
However, it is clear from feminist theory that economic inequality is not the only structural force
that shapes experiences of law. Nancy Fraser argues, for instance, that although inherently linked
with economic inequality, there are many other ways in which people can be oppressed or
disadvantaged on the basis of who they are, and their status within other structures in society,
like gender and race.39
Although Bourdieu did not explicitly discuss this, his concepts are flexible enough to provide
an understanding of these other structures of inequality, because they account for the historical
reiteration of both unequal outcomes and the processes by which these outcomes are produced.40
For example, the task of extending these concepts to address other forms of disadvantage has
already been taken forward by a new generation of Bourdieusian sociologists in the UK.41
Approaching these concepts from very different academic backgrounds to Bourdieu, these
36Id. at 828–29.
37MIKE SAVAGE, SOCIAL CLASS IN THE 21st CENTURY 1 (2015).
38Mant, supra note 3.
39Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Postsocial” Age, in ADDING INSULT TO
INJURY: NANCY FRASER DISCUSSES HER CRITICS 9, 10–16 (Kevin Olson ed., 2008); NANCY FRASER, FORTUNES OF
FEMINISM: FROM STATE-MANAGED CAPITALISM TO NEOLIBERAL CRISIS 193–94 (2013).
40HILARY SOMMERLAD & PETER SANDERSON, GENDER, CHOICE AND COMMITMENT: WOMEN SOLICITORS IN ENGLAND AND
WALES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL STATUS 29, 37 (1998).
41Ciaran Burke et al., Introduction: The Development of Bourdieu’s Intellectual Heritage in UK Sociology, in BOURDIEU: THE
NEXT GENERATION 1 (Jenny Thatcher et al. eds., 2016).
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scholars have been able to develop concepts like “black cultural capital,” and drawn links between
the habitus and the concept of respectability in order to address the ways in which structures of
value are racialized and gendered as well as classed.42
This means that it is possible to use these concepts in a way that is aligned with the feminist
commitment to intersectionality. In relation to law, for instance, Hilary Sommerlad and Peter
Sanderson use Bourdieusian theory to argue that the juridical field facilitates a culture that is spe-
cifically exclusionary to women.43 In their work, Sommerlad and Sanderson use the concept of
field to demonstrate how legal rules are gender blind, and therefore do not account for structural
constraints like caring responsibilities or other social arrangements which disproportionately
affect women. As such, the inequality that women experience across society is constructed as irrel-
evant within the juridical field.44 Additionally, through the concept of capital, they explore the
ways in which women can be ascribed certain characteristics based on their sex or gender, which
are then devalued within the juridical field. In their work, characteristics associated with feminin-
ity or motherhood were ascribed to women by others in the field, and these were then under-
mined, misrecognized, and devalued in ways that those held by men were not.45 In this sense,
Bourdieusian concepts can be used to understand how gender-based inequality can produce dis-
advantage which is different to the disadvantages which stem from socio-economic inequality, and
that both of these structural inequalities can compound and intersect each other within the lived
experiences of women.
Bourdieusian concepts can therefore be used to think through not only how different structures
of inequality operate, but also be applied in an intersectional way, so as to gain an understanding
of how categories like class and gender work together to produce unique experiences of disadvant-
age. A major benefit of doing this is that it enables analysis to move beyond talking about cat-
egories like gender, race, and class as if they are mutually exclusive. Instead, an intersectional
application of Bourdieusian theory provides an imperative to “complicate our understanding
of the social dynamics of inequality” by embracing the complex and overlapping ways in which
these categories may operate.46 For example, within the context of this research, this meant I was
able to recognize not only the cumulative ways in which Litigants in Person were affected by dif-
ferent structures of inequality, but also the unique and complicated ways in which they experi-
enced disadvantage as a result of their different social positions.
Taken together, Bourdieu’s concepts and feminist legal theory provide extremely useful and
versatile tools which can be used to expose a rich understanding of how different structural
inequalities may shape the experiences that people have of law, and how law operates to cut
through these lived realities. However, they do not in themselves provide tools to understand
how these inequalities may manifest as disadvantage within the legal system itself. Given that
the purpose of this research was to understand the disadvantages that may be facilitated within
this system, it was important to reinforce these structural tools with the third approach of ANT,
which provides a materialist understanding of disadvantage within specific contexts.
D. Actor-Network Theory
Despite the word “theory” in its name, Actor-Network Theory is best understood as an analytical
method that can be used to explore social arrangements, rather than a theory through which to
42BEVERLEY SKEGGS, FORMATIONS OF CLASS AND GENDER: BECOMING RESPECTABLE (1997); Nicola Rollock, Legitimizing
Black Academic Failure: Deconstructing Staff Discourses on Academic Success, Appearance and Behaviour, 17 INT’L STUD. IN
SOCIO. OF EDUC. 275 (2007); Derron Wallace, Re-Interpreting Bourdieu, Belonging and Black Identities: Exploring ‘Black’
Cultural Capital Among Black Caribbean Youth in London, in BOURDIEU: THE NEXT GENERATION, supra note 41, at 37.
43SOMMERLAD & SANDERSON, supra note 40, at 17.
44Id. at 2.
45Id. at 28–29, 37–38.
46Grabham et al., supra note 22, at 13.
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understand or explain them. This approach was developed within the field of science and
technology studies and is commonly attributed to the work of Bruno Latour.47 Taking inspiration
from the scientific tradition, ANT advocates examining social arrangements on a micro scale, and
encourages researchers to consider how material objects and locations play important roles within
those arrangements.48 Although ANT is still used by only a few scholars within socio-legal stud-
ies,49 it can be understood as part of a broader materialist turn within the discipline, which has
emphasized the importance of recognizing that law is, in fact, inseparable from its physical con-
ditions.50 The material reality of law has sometimes been neglected within approaches that focus
more heavily on the cultural manifestations of law and society.51 While feminist theory and
Bourdieusian theory are useful for asking questions about the structural context in which
Litigants in Person are navigating the legal system, Actor-Network Theory is therefore useful
for documenting the specific and material ways in which these experiences actually play out
in the court process. However, because of its explicit focus on the micro-scale, there were also
epistemological difficulties inherent in combining it with the other structural theories that com-
prised this framework. In this section, I will first outline the resources that this approach held for
the research, before turning to reflect on how it was possible to reconcile this challenge and com-
bine these three theories.
I. The Actor-Network Theory Approach
There are two central tenets of Actor-Network Theory. The first is that everyone and everything is
both an actor within a network, and a network in itself. The second is that actors can be both
human and non-human. The family court, for example, can be understood as one actor within
the network of the legal system. However, if analytically useful, it can also be examined as a net-
work that can be broken down into its own constituent actors: Litigants in Person, judges, lawyers,
as well as courtrooms and paperwork. In turn, these actors can also be deconstructed and exam-
ined, and there is no limit to how far any object of analysis can be broken down into its constituent
parts. This means it is possible to explore in detail the relationships between its actors, and spe-
cifically trace how certain actors are able to influence others and shape the network. While some
actors may be able to translate the objectives of others into those that mirror their own, others may
have difficulty negotiating some of these relationships.52 Therefore, Actor-Network Theory is
extremely useful for unpacking exactly how people may face specific problems at various stages
of filling out paperwork, navigating court buildings, and constructing legal arguments, where their
success depends on their relationships with other actors. Taking an Actor-Network Theory
approach to this project involved carefully documenting the interactions that Litigants in
Person had with different aspects of the legal system and paying specific attention to the material
detail of those interactions. For example, this enabled me to appreciate the difficulties that
Litigants in Person faced as a result of how physical court environments were designed, such
47BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY (2005).
48JOHN LAW, AFTER METHOD: MESS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (2004).
49ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000); David Cowan &Helen Carr, Actor-Network Theory, Implementation,
and the Private Landlord, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 149 (2008); Alain Pottage, The Materiality of What?, 39 J.L. & SOC’Y 167 (2012);
EMILIE CLOATRE, PILLS FOR THE POOREST: AN EXPLORATION OF TRIPS AND ACCESS TO MEDICATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
(2013); EMILY GRABHAM, BREWING LEGAL TIMES: THINGS, FORM AND THE ENACTMENT OF LAW (2016); Caroline Hunter, Solar
Panels, Homeowners and Leases: The Lease as a Socio-Legal Object, in EXPLORING THE ‘LEGAL’ IN SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 137
(David Cowan & Daniel Wincott eds., 2016).
50MARIE-ANDREE JACOB, MATCHING ORGANS WITH DONORS: LEGALITY AND KINSHIP IN TRANSPLANTS (2012); ANDREAS
PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, SPATIAL JUSTICE: BODY, LAWSCAPE, ATMOSPHERE (2014); Nicole Graham, Margaret Davies
& Lee Godden, Broadening Law’s Context: Materiality in Socio-Legal Research, 26 GRIFFITH L. REV. 480 (2018).
51MARGARET DAVIES, LAW UNLIMITED: MATERIALISM, PLURALISM AND LEGAL THEORY 42 (2017).
52Helene Buzelin, Unexpected Allies: How Latour’s Network Theory Could Compliment Bourdieusian Analyses in
Translation Studies, 11 THE TRANSLATOR 193, 196–97 (2005).
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as feeling intimidated by lawyers in court waiting areas and feeling disparaged by the formal layout
of courtrooms.53
In this sense, ANT is often described as “ethnographic,” because it requires researchers to
describe the material manifestations of social arrangements, as well as the detailed process by
which social arrangements come to be.54 This commitment of ANT has been particularly useful
for socio-legal researchers who are interested in unravelling how law operates within society. As I
have highlighted through Bourdieusian theory, the legal system is often artificially conceived as an
arena with its own culture, assumptions, codes, and practices. These all operate as internal sources
of legitimacy for the juridical field but are never specifically recorded or acknowledged.55 Several
scholars have already demonstrated the value of using ethnographic approaches in order to chal-
lenge these underpinning assumptions about how law is understood and experienced.56 However,
it is this combination of an ethnographic commitment to detail with a particular attentiveness to
materialism which distinguishes ANT from just “good ethnography,” and made it a particularly
useful tool for this project.57
The materialist focus of ANT means that it asks questions about how non-human actors can
play important roles and have significant effects for social arrangements. For example, Annelise
Riles has used ANT to explore the role that documents play within the legal system.58 Legal docu-
ments, she argues, have the power to foreclose important and contentious debates. A document
can be used as a means of rendering complex discussions as “a matter of settled history,” because
the act of recording something in a document can never fully capture the oral discussions that
took place to produce that document. In this sense, documents are artifacts of a prior struggle,
which themselves provide sources of further authority which can be drawn upon at a later stage by
those who were able to influence the record in the first place.59 By tracing the specific role of the
document within law, therefore, Riles is able to disrupt our thinking about how law is able to
function and reinforce itself.60
Focusing on the micro scale through ANT therefore also means having to re-engage with the
very nature of law as a social category, discipline, institution, and label. Importantly, and in align-
ment with the criticisms of intersectionality, this ensures that the structures and processes of the
legal system itself are subject to critical scrutiny. Rather than conceiving of law as something that is
already made, ANT requires researchers to provide a detailed account of law in the making—how
specific interactions and relationships work together to produce outcomes like disadvantage.61
II. Combining Structural and Anti-Structural Approaches
Taken together, the tenets of ANT require researchers to avoid taking social arrangements for
granted, and instead to scrutinize the relationships that make those arrangements possible. In
53Mant, supra note 3.
54Emilie Cloatre, Law and ANT (and Its Kin): Possibilities, Challenges and Ways Forward, 45 J.L. & SOC’Y 646 (2018);
Gianpaolo Baiocchi et al., Actor-Network Theory and the Ethnographic Imagination: An Exercise in Translation, 36
QUALITATIVE SOCIO. 323, 330 (2013).
55BOURDIEU, supra note 28, at 806.
56An important example is legal consciousness scholarship. See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SIBLEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF
LAW (1998).
57Cloatre, supra note 54, at 659.
58ANNELISE RILES, DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE (2006).
59Id. at 76–78, 83.
60This is further reinforced by the work of other scholars who focus more generally on spatial and temporal dimensions of
law. See Marie-Andree Jacob, The Strikethrough: An Approach to Regulatory Writing and Professional Discipline, 37 LEGAL
STUD. 137 (2017); LINDA MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE: JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND THE PLACE OF LAW (2010); Emily
Grabham, Legal Form and Temporal Rationalities in UK Work-life Balance Law, 29 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST STUD. 67 (2014).
61Cloatre, supra note 54, at 657–58; Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, Studying Law by Association: Bruno Latour Goes to the
Conseil d’Etat, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 805, 822 (2008).
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a way that clearly overlaps with feminist objectives, ANT is underpinned by a bottom-up
approach to understanding the complexity of social arrangements. However, by advocating that
social arrangements should be examined in a purely empirical way, ANT is epistemologically and
ontologically distinct from the other theories in this framework. While feminist legal theory and
Bourdieusian theory each provide different resources for understanding how disadvantage may
relate to structural inequality and difference, ANT has traditionally been critical of these kinds
of theoretical explanations. For Actor-Network theorists, using social theory to frame research
findings is to take a shortcut—to treat inequality as an explanation for disadvantage, rather than
to see disadvantage an effect of a social arrangement that needs to be explored.62 It was on this
basis that Latour originally went so far as to argue that social theory such as Bourdieusian theory
should be “jettisoned.”63
Therefore, these were two contesting assumptions and worldviews that I needed to reconcile in
order to draw these theories together into a theoretical framework that I could use within my
research. On the one hand, ANT raises an important concern about the usefulness of social theory
for understanding how people experience law. For instance, it would have been particularly det-
rimental to the aims of my project if I were to use theory in a way that simply reiterated theoretical
presumptions and failed to extend current understandings or incorporate first-hand experiences
of law. However, on the other hand, while this is an important criticism of how researchers may
use theory, this also exposes a key weakness of the ANT approach. By advocating a flat ontology in
which researchers may only explore what they find during their empirical investigations, ANT
does not pay attention to the deeper and historically reiterated structures of inequality that provide
the context within which these social practices unfold. In this sense, ANT may be interpreted as
rejecting analyses that account for categories such as gender or class, or the historical dimensions
of these structures. This skepticism of social theory has been heavily criticized. Feminist scholars
in particular have argued that without a theoretical understanding of the ways in which macro
structures and categories have historically reiterated arrangements of inequality, it is impossible to
fully understand the relationships and interactions which take place on a micro scale.64
By focusing only on the interactions that happen on the ground, ANT risks being “an apolitical
strategy that effectively effaces the violent histories and embedded power imbalances that consti-
tute social relations.”65 In other words, while ANT theorists may criticize structural approaches for
explaining without describing, ANT is also at risk of describing without explaining.66 The task of
drawing ANT into this theoretical framework was therefore a significant challenge, given that its
underpinning assumptions and worldview risk reiterating a problematic blindness to structural
arrangements of inequality. However, by working through this tension, I concluded that it is pos-
sible to use ANT in a way that is sensitive to this structural context for two reasons.
First, it is possible to use Actor-Network Theory without adhering to anti-structuralism.
Reconciling an anti-structuralist approach with structural approaches is by no means simple,
but it is still possible to use these approaches concurrently by following the example of other schol-
ars who have explicitly rejected the anti-structuralist ontology that underpins traditional ANT
approaches. As ANT has been applied in multiple disciplines, researchers have confronted these
important “blind spots,” and instead recommended using ANT Theory as a set of sensibilities that
can be used more productively than traditional applications of Latourian ANT. For example,
within law, Emilie Cloatre has most prominently mitigated these blind spots by taking the benefits
of ANT’s micro approach, whilst rejecting ANT’s skepticism of structural theory. She argues that
it is instead far more progressive to draw ANT together into theoretical frameworks with other
62Baiocchi et al., supra note 54, at 336.
63LATOUR, supra note 47.
64Cloatre, supra note 54.
65Id. at 653.
66Levi & Valverde, supra note 61, at 822.
German Law Journal 1475
theories that provide a proper account of how power and inequality operate on a structural scale.67
In doing so, Latour’s view of social theory has often been resigned to classical or purist forms of
ANT, and is generally regarded as at best problematic, and at worst dangerous.68
Second, rejecting anti-structuralism does not mean that ANT’s concerns about theory are dis-
counted. Instead of jettisoning theory, researchers are encouraged instead to use ANT as a broad
set of sensibilities that can be used as pragmatic guides through which to orient social theory.69
Cloatre has described this method of using ANT “as a matter of care.”70 As discussed so far in this
section, these sensibilities include an attentiveness to the relational and material nature of social
arrangements, as well as how particular social arrangements come to produce effects like disad-
vantage.71 By using ANT in this way, it is possible to move beyond using inequality or disadvant-
age as explanations for the social phenomena being studied, and instead commit to explaining
how arrangements of disadvantage or inequality come to be, through a renewed attention to
the micro-connections that form these arrangements.72 Although it is unlikely that he would have
embraced ANT, Bourdieu himself actually advocated the idea that researchers should be open to
different approaches. He recommends, for instance, that researchers should “mobilise all the tech-
niques that are relevant and practically useable, given the definition of the object.”73 Similarly, as
discussed earlier, the field of sociology within the UK includes an emerging generation of
Bourdieusian scholars who are committed to developing and refining Bourdieu’s concepts beyond
their original incarnation as a grand theory of society. Will Atkinson, for instance, explains that
this task involves working with and against Bourdieu, and that researchers should not be afraid of
deviating from him when the research demands it.74
Instead of undermining the structural understandings gained from the other theories, it is
therefore possible to use ANT as a resource for asking more questions about how disadvantage
is experienced on the ground, rather than closing down questions about how that disadvantage is
rooted in broader structures of inequality. In this sense, ANT—used as a sensibility—can be used
in a way that actually elevates feminist concerns and objectives, because it indicates that research-
ers need to remain open to experiences which do not fit with pre-existing ideas that underpin
structural theories. Even more importantly, ANT can be used in a way that holds researchers
accountable to using theory in a way that helps to gain a deeper understanding of the experiences
that people have of law.
E. Working Politically: The Benefits of Tension
These three approaches draw different conceptual resources from distinct schools of thought.
Taken together, they provide the tools to understand how people are positioned differently within
society, how this may shape specific forms of disadvantage, and how this plays out on a material
level within the legal system in England and Wales. Combining these tools was by no means a
simple task—there are several moving parts that work together and contradict each other in differ-
ent ways. Most notably, there was an important conflict between the underpinning assumptions of
ANT, and the other two approaches. While ANT suggests that knowledge should be empirically
driven and researchers should avoid using concepts like inequality as explanations for social
67Cloatre, supra note 54, at 660.
68Levi & Valverde, supra note 61, at 811; Cloatre, supra note 54, at 653, 658.
69John Law & Vicky Singleton, ANT and Politics: Working In and On the World, 36 QUALITATIVE SOCIO. 485, 485–86
(2013).
70Cloatre, supra note 54, at 660–61.
71Baiocchi et al., supra note 54, at 335.
72Cloatre, supra note 54, at 653.
73PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 227 (1992).
74Will Atkinson, From Sociological Fictions to Social Fictions: Some Bourdieusian Reflections on the Concepts of ‘Institutional
Habitus’ and ‘Family Habitus,’ 32 BRITISH J. SOC. & EDUC. 331, 344 (2011).
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phenomena, feminist theory and Bourdieusian theory suggest that empirical findings cannot be
properly understood without a theoretical understanding of the structural context in which they
occur. In order to draw these theories together within my research, therefore, I had to make a
political decision to reject the anti-structural premises of ANT, and instead conceptualize this
approach simply as a sensibility. On the basis of this, I will now argue that the task of combining
different theoretical approaches is frequently political, because researchers must consider how
their theoretical choices affect not only their own research, but also how they may contest, expand,
or develop the dominant assumptions and worldviews that characterize socio-legal scholarly
traditions.
When combining approaches from different schools of thought, scholars are required to engage
critically with each of their selected approaches, because they are forced to reflect on how these
conceptual resources fit together and how they may contradict each other. Within the context of
their own projects, this means that researchers have to distinguish between the contributions of
different approaches and identify those that are valid within the context of the specific research
questions at hand. However, when theories are underpinned by different epistemological or onto-
logical assumptions, researchers will inevitably have to engage in what Davies calls a “politics of
definition.” This occurs when two or more theoretical objects come into contact conceptually or
physically, and cannot be reduced to a single form, thus leading to a clash of ideas and objectives.
It is at this point that researchers must decide how to proceed, and are forced to apply a politics of
definition, through which one set of assumptions is empowered or prioritized, and the others are
marginalized.75
Within the context of this project, for instance, the contradictions between the structural and
anti-structural assumptions that underpinned these theories arose repeatedly, and as a result, the
research process was characterized by a set of inherent and unrelenting tensions which frequently
had to be confronted and reconciled at various key points of fieldwork and analysis. This task may
be particularly difficult for researchers trained in certain scholarly traditions. For example, before
undertaking this project, I had more experience working with traditional sociological approaches
like Bourdieusian theory than with approaches like ANT. I was therefore conscious of the risk that
I would favor Bourdieusian explanations of disadvantage in my analysis instead of taking the time
to also explore these social arrangements through ANT. In order to contend with these clashes, I
would continually revisit my own analysis and ensure that I was not using Bourdieusian concepts
as explanatory tools, but rather employing them as tools with which to sensitize myself to wider
structures, in light of the sensibilities I had drawn from ANT. The research process was by no
means linear or comfortable but left me with a sense that I had been rigorous, careful, and atten-
tive. It is understandable and common for researchers to shy away from this kind of challenge. As
Davies explains, within the discipline of law, there is a deep-running preference for an “aesthetic of
coherence.”76 Arguments and findings are naturally more convincing if they present logical con-
clusions and do not draw attention to other elements that do not quite fit. But, she argues, there is
“no logical reason for theory to insist upon purity and neatness, especially if it means excluding or
foreclosing the intrinsic complexity of its objects : : : .”77
Building upon this, I argue that engaging in this political task is particularly important for early
career scholars because these decisions about which assumptions and worldviews to reiterate or
resist are not only political within the context of individual research projects, but also hold broader
political consequences for the socio-legal discipline. The research that is produced as a result of
theoretical choices such as those outlined above, has the potential to contest, expand, or develop
existing narratives about what the world is like, how it should be studied, and whose voices and
experiences should be relied upon when building an account of social phenomena. Legal theory in
75DAVIES, supra note 51, at 10–11.
76Id. at 4.
77Id. at 5.
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particular is historically rooted in works that reflect the perspectives of a narrow demographic,
and it is therefore imperative for researchers to reflect upon how their theoretical choices may
influence the kinds of narratives that govern socio-legal research.
This kind of reflexivity aligns with a key objective of feminist research, which is to pay due care
to the way that dominant narratives may easily be reiterated within research that appeals to
existing structures of legitimacy, and to instead create the space for oppositional meanings to
emerge.78 For example, Fraser has written extensively about the need for research to not only
ask questions about inequalities of distribution or recognition within society, but also to pose
important challenges to the ways in which particular voices are represented within the political
process of determining the particular arrangements by which distribution or recognition occurs in
the first place.79 Fundamentally, this involves acknowledging the constructed nature of knowledge,
and recognizing that forms of oppression can be rendered invisible not only by dominant struc-
tures of power, but also by the efforts of researchers who attempt to address these structures.80
When combining multiple theories, therefore, researchers should take this idea forward in order
to work politically, by empowering or prioritizing epistemological assumptions that expand the
scope of dominant ideas and narratives, and marginalizing those that close down opportunities for
deeper and more meaningful understandings. At a fundamental level, this means that when schol-
ars combine different theoretical tools, they can work politically by asking questions such as: What
kind of knowledge are they likely to produce as a result of using certain social theories? Howmight
this knowledge contribute, resist, or reiterate existing power dynamics or structures of inequality?
If done thoughtfully and with care, therefore, working politically to combine different
approaches can open researchers up to broader analytical possibilities. For example, working
through this tension enabled me to use very different theoretical tools simultaneously in order
to oscillate between macro and micro scales of analysis. In turn, this meant that it was possible
for me to acknowledge both the broader historical significance of structural inequalities, whilst
also remaining mindful as to the need to empirically explore how these inequalities actually mani-
fest within material and everyday experiences. This sort of analytical flexibility can be extremely
valuable in socio-legal projects. For example, in relation to her three conceptions of injustice,
Fraser also distinguishes between different kinds of remedies that can be proposed within
research. On the one hand, she argues that there are “affirmative” remedies, which attempt to
redress inequality by improving current social arrangements—such as by redistributing resources
or revaluing previously devalued identities within particular contexts.81 On the other hand, there
are “transformative” remedies which attempt to destabilize the assumed differentiations that exist
between different social groups and transform the very basis upon which these resources are dis-
tributed or valued.82 It is tempting, especially within the UK where a greater amount of socio-legal
research is premised upon empirical work, to pay greater attention to affirmative remedies. This
may often be a rational decision, as it is this work which is likely to have more immediate influ-
ence. For example, in this project it was possible to use ANT to reflect on how small changes to the
court process, such as rearranging courtroom furniture or changing the order in which people
spoke in the courtroom, could make a difference to many experiences of disadvantage that are
currently unfolding in the legal system in England and Wales. However, by combining this with
feminist theory and Bourdieusian theory, it was possible to produce research findings which also
gave an insight into how arrangements within this legal system need to be transformed on a
broader scale, in ways that account for the structural inequalities which characterize society as
a whole and play an important role in these relationships.
78Bartlett, supra note 15, at 857; Barnett, supra note 24, at 132.
79Fraser, FORTUNES OF FEMINISM, supra note 39.
80Bartlett, supra note 15, at 848.
81Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition?, supra note 39.
82Id.
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Inevitably, the ways in which scholars make theoretical choices are likely to be influenced by
the context in which they are trained. In the introduction to this Special Issue, the authors dis-
cussed how the different scholarly traditions between Germany and the UK have emerged as a
result of different patterns of scholarship, pedagogical practices, and institutional structures.
From the articles in this Special Issue, it appears that these differences have played an important
role in shaping how early-career scholars across these jurisdictions conceptualize the possibilities
of socio-legal studies. In the UK, for example, a growing interest in socio-legal research also facili-
tated greater retrospection among socio-legal scholars about how this scholarship might be used to
inform university legal education.83 As such, the pedagogical influences of socio-legal research can
be seen even at the undergraduate level of legal study. This is reinforced by the existence of institu-
tional and national research council funding opportunities for students to embark upon
socio-legal doctoral projects, which are extremely competitive but often come with integrated
training pathways for research methods. Socio-legal doctoral candidates also often have the
benefit of both inter- and intra-institutional training and financial support. The Socio-Legal
Studies Association, for instance, is a charitable organization which plays an important role in
facilitating a socio-legal community of scholars within the UK by holding annual conferences,
funding competitions for research grants, and sponsoring events which contribute to their aim
of advancing education, research, teaching, and knowledge in socio-legal studies.84 As part of their
work, this includes dedicated training opportunities, workshops, and funding opportunities for
postgraduate and early-career members. In recent years, the organization has seen a significant
increase in the proportion of doctoral candidates within their membership, which is indicative of
the structural support that exists for socio-legal early-career researchers in the UK.
As one of these early-career scholars, it is inevitable that my own attitude towards research has
been significantly shaped by this fertile environment of training and supervision. The work of
leading socio-legal scholars, as well as the support of the UK socio-legal community, significantly
influenced my experience of legal education and doctoral study in England and Wales, and they
continue to inform the teaching and research that I do through my own academic position. Early-
career scholars in the UK are therefore less likely than those in other countries to face barriers to
establishing the value of taking an interdisciplinary approach to studying law. However, the
choices that they make about how to build upon the work of more senior scholars have important
implications for which scholarly traditions are strengthened and reiterated, and how the discipline
is to continue to develop. In this Article, I have argued that early-career scholars may choose to
combine approaches from different schools of thought within socio-legal studies. This activity of
merging theory can be inherently critical simply by reflecting on the implications of research that
relies upon particular conceptions, such as the legitimacy it may lend to particular views of the
world. In this sense, Davies advocates the metaphor of “pathfinding” as a means for researchers to
begin navigating theory in a way that adds further dimensions to existing patterns of legal
thought.85 By following existing paths, or forging new paths, we reinforce and ultimately reima-
gine different understandings of law and its place within society.86 By this, she means that theory is
not only useful for understanding existing social arrangements, but also for producing alternative
imaginings of what these arrangements should be like. The conceptual and analytical choices we
make therefore have important consequences, because “ : : : drawing out aspects of the present
that appear to provide direction for the future, and intensifying them theoretically, prefigures a
world that is commensurable with the present and past, but which perhaps adds additional
83Fiona Cownie & Anthony Bradney, An Examined Life: Research into University Legal Education in the United Kingdom
and the Journal of Law and Society, 44 J.L. & SOC’Y 129, 137–38 (2017).
84See WELCOME TO THE SLSA: SOCIA-LEGAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION, https://www.slsa.ac.uk/.
85DAVIES, supra note 51, at 143–53.
86Id. at 150–51.
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emphasis to those elements of it worth promoting.”87 The task of combining theories can therefore
in practice be an extremely productive exercise for the discipline because socio-legal scholars may
be both empowered to find unanticipated potential within their research projects and enabled to
embrace the political potential of the work they do with theory.
F. Conclusion
At the beginning of this Article, I stated that early-career socio-legal scholars are now faced with
important choices about which theoretical, conceptual, and methodological tools they wish to
employ within their research, and how they should do so. Inevitably, these choices have important
implications for how socio-legal scholarship continues to grow and develop. In this Article, I have
provided a reflection on my own experience of combining different socio-legal tools, in order to
demonstrate the important value of merging approaches in a way that is both critical and attentive
to these political possibilities. In doing so, I have outlined the difficulties and tensions that char-
acterized the combination of feminist legal theory, Bourdieusian theory, and ANT. But there are
likely to be a wide range of other complexities that come with combining other approaches.
Further, it may not always be possible to reconcile underpinning contradictions between various
approaches, especially those from very different traditions and disciplines. Nevertheless, this
Article has demonstrated that there is value to be derived from attempting to work through these
tensions. When undertaken with care and reflexivity, the task of combining socio-legal tools can
be an opportunity for scholars to work politically by reflecting on how their theoretical choices
affect not only their own understanding of social phenomena, but also make an important con-
tribution to the task of contesting and expanding upon the dominant assumptions and worldviews
that characterize scholarly traditions. This reflexivity is particularly imperative among early career
scholars who choose to combine multiple theories, because the work of these scholars will shape
the future assumptions and worldviews that characterize the socio-legal discipline.
87Id. at 17.
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